ferently situated, the rents will be proportioned to the advantages of the situation. Hence the rents of houses depends partly on the advantages afforded by the houses themselves, and partly on their situation.

A tax upon houses is an unequal tax; when paid by the tenant it falls partly on himself and partly on the owner of the soil. It is one of those taxes which falls indifferently on the three sources of revenue; rent, profit, and salary.

When such a tax exists, ascertain how it is imposed; is it in proportion to the revenue derived from the houses, or regulated by the cost of construction. Do houses, not inhabited, pay? Who pays the tax, is it the proprietor or the tenant? When a house is occupied by the proprietor, does he pay in proportion to the rent he would have received if he had let it, or otherwise, and how? At what time is the tax collected; what proportion does it bear to the rent, and what is the annual amount of the tax for the whole country? Is the taxation uniform for all kinds of houses, those in the country as well as those in cities and towns, and for all times alike, or are there any exceptions, and if so, what is their nature and on what are they founded? Sometimes it is not the house but the rent of the ground on which it is built that is taxed, in this case the tax falls wholly on the proprietor of the soil; a mode which has the advantage of not increasing the rent of the houses, and consequently does not discourage building enterprize.

Houses are taxed in various ways in different countries; in some according to the number of fires; in others, the number of windows, &c.; modes of taxation very burthensome on many accounts and very unequal, and which effect the poor more than the rich. The natural tendency of a tax on windows is to lower rents (not to speak of injurious effects on the architectural beauty of buildings).

The revenue or profit derived from a capital, divides itself naturally into two portions, 1st, that which pays the interest; and 2nd, that which exceeds what is necessary for the payment of the interest. The latter portion cannot be directly taxed, but the former may; and that without increasing the rate of interest on money. The rate of interest depends solely on the demand for money compared with the supply. It is commonly believed, that the actual quantity of money in a country affects the interest so as to lower it when there is a great deal; but the contrary has been satisfactorily proved, so that, while the proportion between capi

tal and the demand for it remains the same, the rate of interest cannot be effected by a tax on the profits of capital. Nevertheless, there are two circumstances which prevent the imposition of a tax on the interest of money. 1st, the amount of a capital in money can hardly be known, if its possessor chooses to keep it a secret; besides which it is subject to constant fluctuation. 2nd, one may export one's capital to a country where the interest it bears is not taxed, and thus deprive one's own country of the benefits that would have accrued from the employment of the exported capital. A consequence greatly to be dreaded.

Wherever such a tax exists, how is it imposed and in what proportion; how is it collected and what does it produce to the treasury of the country?

There are taxes which bear principally on the profits of certain industry, these fall ultimately on the consumers; it may nevertheless be unequal; as, for instance, when large and small dealers are taxed alike; notwithstanding which, this inequality is sometimes an advantage, as where it is desirable to limit the number of small retail spirit dealers, &c. Care must be taken, however, not to fall into the opposite extreme, which would convert large dealers into great monopolizers, to the injury of consumers. It is, moreover, very difficult to distribute such a tax with equality; for there is often more business done in little shops than in large ones. A tax on shops, therefore, can never be an equal tax, unless recourse were had to the most annoying measures, such as the frequent domiciliary visits and examinations of appointed agents. If such a tax exists in a country every thing regarding it should be noted; with the sum to which it amounts annually, and the consequences which result from it.

There is another kind of tax imposed upon the presumed profits of those who hold lands of others by farmage or lease; this kind of tax, under the name of taille personelle produced in France in 1775 upwards of forty millions of livres It is, however, the tax in which, of all others, the maxims above alluded to are the most neglected. It tends in a thousand ways, says Smith, to discourage agriculture, and consequently to dry up the principal source of the wealth of a country.

A Capitation tax is also very bad, it is sometimes levied on free men, or only on serfs; sometimes on both. In the first case, it is a bad kind of tax, for it is often arbitrary; and when levied upon serfs or slaves, where the land cannot

be cultivated without them, it is as injudicious as a tax on beasts of labour. The tax on slaves, says Smith, falls wholly on the planters, as they are at the same time owners and farmers; but we are of a different opinion, and to us it appears clear, that a tax on slaves falls ultimately on the consumers of the articles furnished by the planter.

A tax on servants is a tax on expenditure, and therefore assimilates with a tax on articles of consumption: this tax bears heaviest on the middle classes.

The conveyance of property of all kinds by inheritance, and of immovables, as land, houses, &c. between persons living, is taxed in certain countries, and, in the first case, may be so directly; whereas, in the second case, it can be so only indirectly, by means of stamps and registration.

Inheritances are frequently taxed, but in different proportions, according to the relationship of the heirs and other circumstances.

In some countries, the charge of stamps is regulated according to the nature of the act; in others, according to the value of the property transferred, and in some places, as in Holland, the duties on stamps and registration is determined either way according to circumstances.

The tax or duty on the conveyance of property by will, falls ultimately, as well as immediately, on the person to whom the property is transmitted. The duty on the sale of lands, and old built houses falls altogether on the seller; that on newly built houses falls on the buyer. The duty on stamps and registration of contracts for loans of money, falls wholly on the lender; the duties of like kind in law proceedings falls entirely on the parties pleading; they diminish for both parties the value of the disputed object.

In general, duties upon the transfer of property, of whatever kind, are more or less disadvantageous, as they encroach upon the capital of those who entertain none but productive labourers, to increase the revenue of the Sovereign, who entertains scarcely any but the unproductive class. Taxes of this kind, however assessed, are always injurious.

The stamp duty on playing cards, though classed with the duties above mentioned, are of a very different nature.

In general the traveller should observe whether, in the country he examines or would describe, there are any duties or taxes imposed upon the transfer of property; and if so, in what cases, under what circumstances, and under what conditions, is the assessment made; what this kind of

tax produces annually, and its consequences on the general prosperity of the country, or on that of certain classes, or on particular branches of industry; in a word, all the details which may be interesting on this subject.

The salaries of workmen are every where regulated by the demand for labour and the mean price of provisions. So long as these remain the same, a direct tax on the price of labour can have no other effect than that of raising it a little; but there are cases in which such a tax is most injurious and absurd; notwithstanding which, it exists in several countries. As it is differently imposed in different countries, it is necessary to observe how it is regulated; what proportion it bears to the salary; whether every kind of labour be taxed alike or differently, and the reason of such diversity; whether some kinds of labour are quite exempt from taxation, and which; on whom the principal weight of the tax falls; what it produces annually; its effects on industry in general, and on certain branches in particular.

The taxes which bear indistinctly on all kinds of revenue are a Capitation tax, and the taxes on articles of consumption. With regard to a capitation tax,-having already mentioned it, we will merely add, that it rarely produces so much as was expected from it.

As for taxes on articles of consumption we have spoken of them generally under the article Excise. Sect. COMMERCE. We shall, however, give in this place, a few more details on the subject. The distribution made by Adam Smith, between objects of necessity and those of luxury, appears to us hardly admissable. He calls strong liquors, beer, and wine, in countries where the latter is the ordinary beverage, objects of luxury; for, says he, "a man may abstain from these without incurring the slightest blame." This is true, but for a porter in London, beer is as necessary as the shirt on his back. Hume defines luxury "Great refinement in the satisfaction of the senses." We shall not, however, enter into any discussion of the various definitions of luxury. It is clear that every article of consumption is either necessary or superfluous; the extremes are well known, but it is difficult to determine where necessity ends, and superfluity begins. It is evident that a tax which bears upon objects of consumption generally, must bear upon those of absolute necessity, as well as upon those of the most refined luxury.

A tax upon objects of necessity raises the price of labour in proportion.

A tax on objects of luxury does not necessarily raise the price of labour. Adam Smith, considering porter as a luxury, says, that when the price of this article was raised it did not raise the price of labour, but this we think may be in some measure attributed to the diminution in the price of sundry other articles consumed by the working classes; a diminution resulting from the perfection and multiplication of machinery, and which allowed the labourer to consume as much porter as before, without any augmentation of his salary. In fact, workmen receive in the way of salary only as much as is necessary for their maintenance. If then any object of ordinary consumption should be raised in price, their salary must necessarily rise in proportion, unless some other object or objects are lowered in price, so that the general expenditure remains the same.

Wherever their exists a direct tax on objects of consumption, whether it be on those of absolute necessity or on objects of luxury, a note should be taken of the objects taxed, of the rate of taxation, and the sum which each furnishes annually to the treasury. How is the tax imposed; does the consumer pay an annual sum, and what, for the privilege of consuming certain commodities, or are the articles themselves taxed, while still in the hands of the merchant or dealer, before selling them to the consumer? Some objects are more advantageously taxed according to the first, and others according to the second mode. In some countries both modes exist simultaneously. The greater number of taxes and duties on objects of consumption come under the head of Custom-house and Excise dues; of which we have already spoken; for although in different countries they may bear different names, in fact they almost all belong to the one or the other class of contributions. Besides the taxes we have mentioned there are others of greater or less importance according to particular circumstances, as, for instance, Transit dues, imposed upon merchandize which merely passes through a country. How are such dues regulated; on what kind of merchandize; when and how are they paid, and what do they furnish?

In certain countries absentees are taxed; nothing can be more just than this in every respect; but it is a kind of tax not easily determined or collected. It ought to be proportioned to the amount of revenue consumed out of the