ment, I should like to inquire of him if it was not at the urgent and repeated request of Gen. McClellan that troops should be sent to him to aid in his attack upon Richmond that this has been done?" Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts: "In response to the Senator's question, I will say that I understand that Gen. McClellan desired to have the forces reserved under Gen. McDowell sent forward to him by the steamers. Upon his request, Gen. Franklin with his division was sent forward to Yorktown. The President, to protect Washington, and at the same time to aid Gen. McClellan by menacing Richmond, withdrew Gen. Shields's division from Gen. Banks, thus concentrating on the Rappahannock forty thousand men. This force could move on Richmond, or act directly for the protection of Washington, according to circumstances. Yesterday the President, in view of what has occurred, stated that this force of twenty thousand men, which he had reserved, and for which he takes the entire responsibility, had been reserved by him in apprehension of precisely such a movement of the enemy threatening this city as has already taken place. "The President may have made a mistake in withdrawing so much of the force of Gen. Banks, but I am sure he acted according to the best lights he possessed. Gen. Banks has been forced to retrace his steps, to abandon the Shenandoah Valley, and to recross the Potomac." On Dec. 10, before a court martial at Washington, Gen. McClellan, in answer to the question, What communication he received from the President through Gen. Franklin, &c.? said: "The substance of the communication of Gen. Franklin from the President was that the Presi. dent assumed the responsibility of the change of destination of Gen. McDowell's corps, regarding that corps necessary for the defence of Washington, although the troops actually left in Washington and in front of it, disposable for its defence, were rather more than double the garrison fixed by the engineer and artillery officers, and considerably more than the largest number recommended by any of the corps commanders to be left in the vicinity of Washington." The following orders of Gen. McClellan will show his plans for the protection of Washing ton: HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 16, 1862. Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth, Military Governor of the District of Columbia: SIR: The command to which you have been assigned, by instruction of the President, as Military Governor of the District of Columbia, embraces the geographical limits of the district, and will also include the city of Alexandria, the defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to Difficult Creek, and the post of Fort Washington. I enclose a list of the works and defences embraced in these limits. Gen. Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of Williams and Shields, composing the Fifth Army Corps, but you should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced guards. You will use the same precautions on either flank. All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington and Georgetown, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, and for other indicated special duties, should be removed to the south side of the river. In the centre of your front you should post the main body of your troops, in proper proportions, at suitable distances toward your right and left flanks. Careful patrols will be made to thoroughly scour the country in front from right to left. forts and their armaments in the best possible order, It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the to look carefully after the instruction and discipline of their garrisons, as well as all other troops under your command, and by frequent and rigid inspection to m sure the attainment of these ends. The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges, and ferries within the above-named limits will devolve upon you, and you are to insure their security and provide for their protection by every means in your power. You will also protect the depots of the publis stores and the transit of the stores to the troops in actual service. By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country south of the eastern branch, and caution to intercept mails, goods, and persons passing also on your right, and you will use every possible preunauthorized to the enemy's lines. The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, canfacilitate the movement of all troops destined for the not be too strongly enforced. You will forward and active part of the Army of the Potomac, and especially the transits of detachments to their proper regiments and corps. The charge of all new troops arriving in Washing ton, and of all troops temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate their equipments. Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, composition, and equipment.by every opportunity. Besides the regular reports and returns which you will be required to render to the Adjutant-General of the army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated morning report of your command every Sunday morning, and a monthly return on the first day of each month. command of Maj. Gen. McClellan. The foregoing instructions are communicated by Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Assistant Adjutant-General. HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 16, 1862. To Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac: of Manassas, intrench yourself strongly, and throw SIR: You will post your command in the vicinity cavalry pickets well out to the front. Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry-say four regiments, with two batteries-at or near the point where that railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley, as well as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps be occupied advantageously by a detachment of infantry well intrenched. Block houses should be built at all the railway bridges occupied by grand guard, Warrenton Junction or Warrenton itself, and also some still more advanced points on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as soon as the railroad bridges are repaired. Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal to scout to ward the Occoquan, and probably' a fourth toward Leesburg. To recapitulate, the most important points that should engage your attention are as follows: Fire-A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centreville, and another force, a brigade, also well intrenched near Strasburg. Second-Block houses at the railroad bridges. Third-Coustant employment of cavalry well to the front. Fourth-Grand guards at Warrenton, and in advance as far as the Rappahannock, if possible. Fifth-Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as to the enemy. Sirth-The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington. The foregoing is communicated by order of Maj.Gen. McClellan. Assistant Adjutant-General. On the 1st of April Gen. McClellan addressed the following additional note to Gen. Banks: HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, ON BOARD COMMODORE, April 1, 1862. Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Army Corps: GENERAL: The change in affairs in the valley of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, from the plan we some days since agreed upon. In my arrangements I assume that you have a force amply sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided he is not reenforced largely. I also assume that you may find it impossible to find anything toward Manassas for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army have drawn all the rebel force toward Richmond. You are aware that Gen. Sumner has for some days been at Warrenton Junction, with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regiments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to the Rappahannock forced the enemy to destroy the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad. Since that time our cavalry have found nothing on this side of the Rappahannock in that direction, and it seems clear that we have no reason to fear any return of the rebels in that quarter. Their movements near Fredericksburg also indicate a final abandonment of that neighborhood. I doubt whether Johnston will now reënforce Jackson with a view to offensive operations. The time has probably passed when he could have gained any thing by so doing. I have ordered one of Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson) to Alexandria for embarkation. Blenker's has been detached from the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to report to Gen. Fremont. Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Junction to-day; Geary at White Plains. Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Summer. Four thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once for Manassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days, and soon after three thousand additional. I will order Blenker to move on Strasburg and report to you for temporary duty; so that, should you find a large force in your front, you can avail yourself of his aid. As soon as possible, please direct him on Winchester, thence to report to the Adjutant-General of the Army for orders; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front. In regard to your own movements, the most important thing is to throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position as to enable you to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communications are reestablished, it will be probably important and advisable to move on Staunton; but this would require communications and a force of 25,000 to 30,000 for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on Richmond. At all events, not so long before it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on you and then return to me. I fear that you cannot be ready in time; although it may come in very well with a force less than I have mentioned, after the main battle near Richmond. When Gen. Sumner leaves Warrenton Junction, Gen. Abercrombie will be placed in immediate command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your gen eral orders. Please inform me frequently by tele graph and otherwise as to the state of things in your front. I am, very truly yours, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, To Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, Adj.-Gen. U. S. A.: GENERAL: I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the Hon. Secretary of War. The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are about as follows: Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient troops to give him five thou sand men for the defence of Baltimore, and one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight available for the eastern shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about four hundred men. The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to ten thousand men, other disposable troops now with Gen. Wadsworth being about eleven thousand four hundred men. The troops employed in guarding the various railroads in Maryland amount to some three thousand three hundred and fifty-nine men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send them forward to Manas sas. Gen. Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Col. Geary's at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at their disposal, will amount to some seven thousand seven hundred and eighty men, with twelve pieces of artillery. I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York and in any of the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. This force I should be glad to have sent at once to Manassas-four thousand men from Gen. Wadsworth to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of Gen. Abercrombie to something like eighteen thousand six hundred and thirty-nine men. It is my design to push Gen. Blenker from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus-including Blenker's division, ten thousand and twenty-eight strong, with twenty-four pieces of artillery, Banks's Fifth Corps, which embraces the command of Gen. Shields, nineteen thousand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with fortyone guns, some three thousand six hundred and fiftythree disposable cavalry, and the railroad guard, about twenty-one hundred men-amount to about thirty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-seven men. It is designed to relieve Gen. Hooker by one regiment-say eight hundred and fifty men-being, with five hundred cavalry, thirteen hundred and fifty men on the Lower Potomac. To recapitulate: At Warrenton there are to be seven thousand seven hundred and eighty; at Manassas, say ten thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine; in the Shenandoah Valley, thirty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-seven; on the Lower Potomac, thirteen hundred and fifty-in all, fifty-five, OPERATIONS), and the insecurity of the transthousand four hundred and fifty-six. There would ports, while the navy really had not entire conthen be left for the garrisons in front of Washington trol of the James river, caused the troops to be and under Gen. Wadsworth some eighteen thousand men, exclusive of the batteries, under instructions. landed at Fortress Monroe, and the march to The troops organizing or ready for service in New be commenced overland from that point. York, I learn, will probably number more than four About the 1st of April the force above stated thousand. These should be assembled at Washington, had reached Fortress Monroe, Gen. McClellan subject to disposition where their services may be arrived on the 2d, and commenced active operations. On the 4th of April the following order was issued from the War Department: most needed. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. Some explanation of these orders is to be found in answers of Gen. McClellan to interrogatories before the court martial above mentioned. In one answer he said: "The force left disposable for the defence of Washington was about 70,000 men, independent of the corps of Gen. McDowell." Again, he said: "My recollection of the suggestions as to the forces to be left varied from forty to fifty thousand. I think Gen. McDowell proposed the latter number. Of one thing I am confident: that, with the facts fresh in my mind, I thought that I left more than was suggested by any corps commander." As to the necessity that Gen. McDowell should remain for the defence of Washington, he said: "I think that Gen. McDowell was correct in his opinion that it was safe and proper for him to unite with the Army of the Potomac. I think that immediately after the occupation of Hanover Court House by a portion of the Army of the Potomac, there was no rebel force of any consequence between Hanover Court House and Gen. McDowell. I think that the main object of Jackson's movement against Gen. Banks was to prevent reënforce ments from being sent to the Army of the Potomac, and expressed that opinion in a telegram to the President within a day of the time I received information of Jackson's movements. I think that if Gen. McDowell had moved direct upon Hanover Court House, instead of in the direction of Front Royal, Jackson would have rapidly retraced his steps to join the main rebel army at Richmond. With a strong army of our own in the vicinity of Richmond, and threatening it, I do not think that the rebels would have detached a sufficient force to seriously endanger the safety of Washington." Before Gen. McClellan left Washington, an order was issued placing Gen. Wool and all his troops under his command, and he was expressly authorized to detail a division of about 10,000 men from the troops under Gen. Wool and to attach them to the active army. After operations had commenced on the peninsula, on the 3d of April Gen. McClellan received an order from the Secretary of War countermanding all this. No explanation of this has ever been made. The design of Gen. McClellan was to make a sure and rapid movement upon Richmond, but other causes still occurred to defeat this purpose. The contest between the Monitor and Merrimac took place on the 9th of March (see NAVAL War DepartmenT, WASHINGTON, April 4, 1562. Ordered, 1.-That the portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge shall constitute a military department, to be called the Department of the Shenandoah, and be under the command of Maj.-Gen. Banks. Ridge and west of the Potomac and the Fredericks 2. That the portion of Virginia east of the Blue burg and Richmond railroad, including the District of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent, shall be a military district, to be called the Department of the Rappahannock, and be under the command of Maj. Gen. McDowell. By order of the PRESIDENT. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. The effect of this order was to take from under the control of Gen. McClellan the forces of Gens. Banks and McDowell, and the direction of all military operations in his department west of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and in lower Maryland, and to coufine him strictly to the remainder of eastern Virginia. On the 11th of April, the following order was sent to Gen. McDowell: WAR DEPARTMENT, April 11, 1862. Maj.-Gen. McDowell Commanding: will consider the national capital as especially under SIR: For the present, and until further orders, you your protection, and make no movement throwing your force out of position for the discharge of this primary duty. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. On the 5th of April, firing was opened by the enemy at Yorktown on the extreme Federal right, to repel a bold reconnoissance. While this was going on, Gen. McClellan heard for the first time that Gen. McDowell was with drawn from his command. Yorktown is a post village, port of entry, and shire town of York county, Virginia. It is situated on rising grond on the right bank or south side of York river, eleven miles from its mouth. It is seventy miles east-southeast of Richmond, and had before the war about sixty houses, four hundred and fifty inhabitants, and several thousand tons of shipping. The army of the Potomac had commenced its march upon this place wholly in the dark as to the nature of the country, or the position and strength of the enemy. The maps which were furnished by the commanders at Fortress Monroe were found to be entirely erroneous. The peninsula is bounded on the north by York river, which is commanded by Yorktown and Gloucester, on either side. Both places were strongly fortified to obstruct the entrance of the river by gunboats. The Confederate batteries mounted fifty-six guns, many of which were rifled one-hundred pounders, and could have sunk the entire fleet of these gunboats. The James river, which bounded the peninsula on the south, was in full possession of the enemy. The line of defence at Yorktown was selected with great judgment. Taking advantage of the highest ground on the peninsula at that place, and projecting a line of intrenchments and forts bearing a little southwest to a point connecting with the head of Warwick river, the enemy had continued his works down that stream to James river, making the entire distance from point to point eight and a half miles. While the flat and marshy surface of the peninsula, together with streams constantly fed with copious supplies of water from the swamps, afforded peculiar means of defence, it was equally unfavorable to offensive operations, especially when distant from the harbor for supplies and with bad roads. The country was also covered with dense forests of pine, which formed a valuable shield to the positions of the enemy. From the 5th to the 8th, when the unfavor able weather suspended active hostilities on both sides, there were frequent skirmishes, and firing by artillery, to prevent the enemy from constructing further defences and mounting additional guns, with few casualties on either side. On the 8th, 9th, and 10th there was a succession of extraordinary storms of rain and hail with some sleet and snow. The enemy took advantage of this weather to complete their defences. Much work was done in the interval by the Federal army in making and corduroying roads to the depots, &c. When the army left Fortress Monroe, Gen. Keyes with three divisions proceeded along the James river until he reached the Warwick. In seeking for a ford he discovered the Confederate line of defence. Dykes had been erected in different parts of this stream, converting it into a kind of pond. These dams were defended by redoubts, artillery, and rifle pits. The supplies of the army consisted in provisions for two days, which each soldier had taken. After these two days the army was entirely dependent on the wagons for subsistence. It was therefore necessary to construct roads. These were made by cutting down trees of equal size, and from one foot to eighteen inches in diameter, and placing the pieces from twelve or eighteen feet in length, side by side, on the ground. All the infantry that were not on picket duty on the outposts, were employed up to their knees in mud and water in this labor. By this means the cannon and wagons arrived at places where otherwise it would have been impossible to have brought them. vanced up the left bank of the York river, in the direction of West Point, and rendered the position of the Confederate army most perilous, if they had persisted in holding it. The execution of this movement had been confided to the corps of Gen. McDowell, which was to have embarked the last of all, at Alexandria, and arrive at Yorktown at the moment when the rest of the army, coming from Fortress Monroe, appeared before that place. This corps of Gen. McDowell was detained, as has already been stated. The effect of its detention is thus stated by Prince De Joinville: "We received the inexplicable and unexplained intelligence that this corps had been sent to another destination. The news was received by the army with dissatisfaction, although the majority could not then foresee the deplorable consequences of an act performed, it must be supposed, with no evil intention, but with inconceivable recklessness. Fifteen days earlier this measure, although it would always have been injurious, would not have had so bad effect; for new arrangements might have been made. Now, it was the mainspring removed from a great work already begun. It deranged everything. Among the divisions of the corps of Gen. McDowell there was one-that of Franklin an which was regretted more than all the rest, both on account of the troops themselves and of the officers commanding them. The commander-in-chief had carefully superintended its organization during the winter. He held it in great esteem and earnestly demanded its restoration. It was sent back to him, without any explanstion, in the same manner as it had been withdrawn. This splendid division-eleven thousand strong-arrived, and for a moment the commander thought of intrusting to it alone the storming of Gloucester; but the idea was abandoned." The next step was to search the Confederate line of defence for weak points. It was believ ed that if any were found and forced, the result would be, that the enemy would, as is usual in such cases, believe that his position was turned at both extremities, and his forces would become demoralized. Then if he was vigorously pushed with overwhelming force, a scrious, if not fatal disaster might be inflicted on his army. This point was supposed to exist about the centre of the line, on Warwick river or creek, below Winn's Mills and near Lee's Mills. Here the Federal forces had thrown up a considerable work, with wings for riflemen, in which guns were mounted. Directly opposite the enemy, were protected by a demi-lune with two embrasures, with long inIn order to avoid the delays of a siege, Gen. fantry epaulements extending from each wing. McClellan had formed a plan to turn the posi- An open field some six or seven hundred yards tion at Yorktown. This was to be done by ef- in width intervened. The enemy's works restfecting a landing on the Severn river, north and ed on the skirts of a pine forest, while the Fedin the rear of Gloucester, by which this latter eral were in the centre of the field. The forest position might be carried, and thus render the extended like a curtain clear across the north York river less difficult of entrance by the gun- edge of the field, in which sharpshooters on boats. The Federal force could then have ad- either side were posted. : |