2. The freehold of the church lands
Is in the parson.
Taylor,
3. The act of Virginia of 1776. con-
firming to the church its rights to
lands, was not inconsistent with
the constitution or bill of rights of
Virginia; nor did the acts of 1784,
ch 88, and 1785, ch. 37, infringe
any of the rights intended to be se-
cured under the constitution, ei-
ther civil, political, or religious.
Terrett v. Taylor,
43
4. The acts of Virginia, of 1798, ch.
9, and 1801, ch. 5, so far as they
go to divest the episcopal church
of the property acquired previous
to the revolution by purchase or
donation, are unconstitutional and
inoperative. Terrett . Taylor,
5. The act of Virginia of 1798, ch. 9,
merely repeals the statutes passed
respecting the church since the
revolution; and left in full opera-
tion all the statutes previously en-
acted, so far as they are not in-
consistent with the present consti-
tution. Terrett v. Taylor, 44
6. Church-wardens are not a corpo-
ration for holding lands. Terrett
v. Taylor,
44
7. Church lands cannot be sold with-
out the joint consent of the parson
(if there be one) and the vestry.
Terrett v. Taylor,
44
3. If a grant be made of a tract of
land in New Hampshire, in equal
shares, to 63 persons, to be divided
amomgst them into 68 equal
shares, with a specific appropria-
tion of 5 shares, one of which is
declared to be "for a glebe for the
church of England as by law
established," that share is not hol-
den in trust by the grantees, nor
is it a condition annexed to their
rights or shares. Town of Paw-
let v. Clark,
9. The church of England is not a
body corporate, and cannot re-
ceive a grant co nomine. Town of
Pawlet v. Clark,
10. A grant to the church of such a
place is good at common law and
rests the fee in the parson and his
successors. If such a grant be made
by the crown it cannot be resumed
by the crown at its pleasure. Town
of Pawlet v. Clark,
293
11 Land at common law may be
granted to pious uses before there
is a grantee in existence compe-
tent to take it, and in the mean
time the fee will be in abeyance.
Such a grant cannot be resumed
at the pleasure of the crown.
Town of Parvlet v. Clark, 1 293
12. The common law so far as it re-
lated to the erection of churches
of the episcopal persuasion of Eng-
land, the right to present or col-
late to such churches, and the
corporate capacity of the persons
thereof to take in succession, was
recognized and adopted in New-
Hampshire.
It belonged exclusively to the crown
to erect the church in each town
that should be entitled to take the
glebe; and, upon such erection,
to collate through the governor, a
parson to the benefice.
A voluntary society of Episcopalians
within a town, unauthorised by the
crown, could not entitle them-
selves to the glebe.
Where no such church was duly
erected by the crown, the glebe
remained as an hæreditas jacens ;
and the state, which succeeded to
the rights of the crown, might,
with the assent of the town, alien
or incumber it; or might erect an
Episcopalian church therein, and
collate, either directly, or through
the vote of the town indirectly, its
parson, who would thereby become
seized of the glebe jure ecclesia
and be a corporation capable of
transmitting the inheritance.-
Town of Pawlett v. Clark, 294
13. By the revolution the state of
Vermont succeeded to all the
rights of the crown, to the unap-
propriated, as well as appropria-
ted glebes; and by the statute of
Vermont, of the 30th of October,
The comptroller of the treasury has See Land, 15, 16, 19,
a right to direct the marshal to
whom he shall pay money receiv-
ed upon execution. U. S. v. Giles
& others,
213
It is not necessary that an executor
of a will made in Virginia, devi
sing to the executor land in Ken-
tucky, should take out letters tes-
tamentary in Kentucky, to enable
1. The double duties imposed by the
act of July 1, 1812, accrued upon
goods which arrived within a col-
lection district on that day. Ar-
nold v. U. S.
104
2. To constitute an importation so as
to attach the right to duties it is
necesssry, not only that there
should be an arrival within the li-
mits of the United States and of a
collection district, but also within
the limits of some port of entry.
Arnold v. U. S
104
3. Semb. that if the condition of the
bond be to pay 1700 dollars, or the
duties which may be ascertained
to be due upon certain goods im-
ported, it is not in the option of the
obligor to discharge the bond by
payment of the 1700 dollars, but
the United States may recover, in
an action at law upon that bond
against the sureties, the whole
amount of the duties on those
goods, although the duties amount
to more than the penalty of the
bond. Arnold v. U. S.
5. If captured goods claimed by a
neutral owner, be, by consent, sold
under an order of the Court, and
admitted by the Defendant în hi
answer, who calls upon the Com-
plainant to make fui proof there-
of in the Court below; this Court
will not presume that any other
proof was made than appears
in the transcript of the record.
Drummond v. Magruder, 122
A copy of a deed from a clerk of
the Court, without the certificate
of the presiding judge, that the
attestation of the clerk is in due
form, cannot be received as evi-
dence in a suit in equity. Drum-
mond v. Magruder,
5. If this Court reverse a decree up-
on a technical objection to evidence
(probably not made in the Court
below) it will not dismiss the bill
absolutely, but remand the cause
to the Court below for further pro-
ceedings. Drummond v. Magru
der,
123
6. The answer of one Defendant in
Chancery as not evidence against
his co-Defendant; nor is his depo-
sition although he had been dis-
charged under the act of assembly
of Rhode Island (of 1757) from all
debts and contracts prior to the
date of the discharge; and all
though the debt in suit was a debt
contracted prior to such discharge;
the debt having been contracted in
a foreign country. Clark v. Van
Riemsdyk.
7. An answer in Chancery, although
positive, and directly responsive to
an allegation to the bill, may be
outweighed by circumstances, es-
pecially if it be respecting a fact
which, in the nature of things, can
not be within the personal know-
ledge of the Defendant.
Clark v
Van Riemsdyk,
8. A denial of previous authority,
without a denial of subsequent as-
sent, is not such an answer as will
deprive the Complainant of his
remedy; for a subsequent assent
is equivalent to an original au-
thority. Clark v. Van Riemsdyk,
9. In Kentucky, Courts of law will
not look beyond the patent, but
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