ARNOLD which they could have no idea of being responsible, & OTHERS when the bond was given. v. U.STATES. This view of the case is according to the essential facts admitted by the pleadings. On the 2d of July, 1812, after the imported articles had been properly inspected, the amount of duties was ascertained and indorsed on the bond in the collector's office. The indorsement was expressed in these terms "amount of "duties ascertained as due, 1708 doll. 38 cents." Bond for securing the duties being required before granting a permit to land the articles from the importing vessel, a gross estimate of the amount of duties only, could be made at the moment of taking the bond, (see section 49, page 359-60) and that estimate was 1700 dollars as mentioned in the condition. When the articles had been duly inspected, after the permit to land, and after return of such inspection, (see page 361-2) but not before, the duties could be and were ascertained in the regular course at the collector's office. The precise amount of duties was then ascertained according to the former impost law, and found to be 1708 dollars and 38 cents, and was so indorsed on the bond according to known provision's of law. Shall that indorsed amount be the measure of the demand on the bond? After the duties had been so ascertained and indorsed on the 2d of July, if a deposit of goods, (according to sec. 42, page 382–3) had been made for securing the amount of the duties for which the bond had been given, what would have been the measure for determining the sufficiency of such security? It was lawful for the collector, in lieu of sureties to accept of a deposit of so much of the goods, as should in his judgment, be sufficient. And this deposit, from the nature of the case, was to be received only after the articles had been landed, and consequently after the amount of duties was regularly ascertained. The deposit, therefore, must have been for securing the specific sum of 1708 dolls. and 38 cents, and only that sum when due could, by law, be charged for duties to be paid from the proceeds of the deposited goods. In the present case, there is no question about the fairness of the proceedings at the custom house. The v. whole transaction was according to the regular course ARNOLD of business. Whatever was uncertain in the condition & OTHERS of the bond, was reduced to certainty by the indorsement; and the full extent of the obligation was then set- U.STATES. tled by fair agreement of the proper agent on the part of the United States. That extent of course would be the measure of pledges to sureties. Such extent would measure the charge for duties on the part of a consignee, who might be principal in a bond. And if the consignee were ordered by an owner, who made the shipments abroad, to sell promptly and pay over the proceeds of sales, the whole might be completed and all accounts between them closed at a place remote from the seat of government, such as New Orleans, before any knowledge could there be had, of the act for imposing double duties. All the official information and proceedings within the district had united to assure him of freedom from all duties or customs, on paying the amount required according to the former impost law. In such a case, to exact double duties from a consignee, who had entered the goods at the custom house, would be manifest injustice. It would operate as fraud or extortion or both. Is it for this Court to believe the legislature capable of intending such wrong? But where is the difference in principle between such a case and the case now before the Court. New Orleans is not the only district where imported articles might be sold by a consignee, or by the owner himself, under such a full conviction of being liable to single duties only, and without a possibility of just compensation or redress, if the government may afterwards surprize him by exacting double duties. If a liability to double duties were known to an owner, at the time of making entry, he might choose to have the articles entered for exportation according to the terms allowed by the general law relative to the collection of duties on imposts. But this privilege might be taken away, by the construction, under which the double duties are demanded in the present case. The intent of the parties gives a rule for decision in cases of contract. At the date of this bond, was it mu บ. ARNOLD tually intended to secure the payment of double duties ? & OTHERS No such allegation is found in the pleadings; nor is such intention to be fairly inferred from the admitted U.STATES. facts. On the contrary, the intention fairly understood on each side, 'was to secure the payment of the single duties only as required under the former impost law. And this intention is apparent from the penal sum of the bond, with the gross estimate of duties as mentioned in the condition, and the ascertained amount of duties indorsed on the bond. As the whole transaction at the collector's office is agreed to have been fair, the fact of that indorsement is decisive to prove, that with reference to the district where the goods were entered and delivered, no rule of duties on imposts had been made known, other than the former impost law. And the general principle of all law requires the rule to be prescribed or made known before it can be obligatory. To this principle Blackstone has reference in the first and fourth volumes of his commentaries. It is true, he has said, Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat. And this he has stated, as a maxim of the Roman, as well as of the English law. But, according to him, the possibility of knowledge is essential to the obligation of knowing the Jaw. To enforce any positive rule as a law, before the individual could be presumed to know it, would be alike inconsisent with public justice and civil right. A Indeed, this qualification relative to the opportunity and consequent presumption of knowledge, is so essential that the statement might otherwise be questioned as deficient in accuracy. For the maxim, in terms as stated by Blackstone, is not found in the text of the Pandests indicated by his note of reference, (4 Blackstone ·Com. page 27,) nor does that text warrant the position stated by Blackstone as a maxim, unless it be considered as applicable to the case of a law, which might be known by every one, and which, therefore, every one is holden to know, and this may be deemed the fair import of the Latin terms, in which the position is stated. If so considered, and not otherwise, it agrees with the general doctrine of the Roman law, and is a principle of universal jurisprudence. v. In relation to positive law, that principle implies the ARNOLD necessity of its being made known, before it can impose & OTHERS any obligation. Positive law is a manifestation of the legislative will; and although there may be a legislative U.STATES. will, it does not become a law, where it is not manifested. There was no argument on the part of the United States. STORY, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows: The United States brought an action of debt against the Defendants on a bond given for the payment of duties on goods imported in the brig Dover inte the port of Providence. Upon the pleadings in the Court below, judgment was given in favor of the United States, and the Defendants have brought the present writ of error to reverse that judgment. The material facts are, that the brig arrived within the limits of the United States on the 30th day of June, 1812; and within the collection district of Providence, on the first day of July, 1812. On the second day of July, an entry was duly made at the custom house and the present bond was then executed. The principal question which has been argued is, whether on these facts the goods are liable to the payment of the double duties imposed by the act of the first day of July, 1812, ch. 112. That act provides that an "additional duty of 100 per cent. upon the permanent du"ties now imposed by law, &c. shall be levied and collected upon all goods, wares and merchandizes which shall, "from and after the passing of this act, be imported into the United States from any foreign port or place." It is contended that this statute did not take effect until the second day of July; nor indeed until it was formally promulgated and published. We cannot yield assent to this construction. The statute was to take effect ARNOLD from its passage; and it is a general rule that where OTHERS the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included. ซ. U.STATES. It is further contended that the importation was complete by the arrival of the vessel within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, on the thirtieth day of June. We have no difficulty in overruling this argument. To constitute an importation so as to attach the right to duties, it is necessary not only that there should be an arrival within the limits of the United States, and of a collection district but also within the limits of some port of entry. This was expressly decided in the case of the United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch, 368. Without therefore adverting to the consideration of the regularity or sufficiency of the pleadings we are all of opinion that on the merits the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed with six per cent. damages and costs. THE ST. LAWRENCE, WEBB, MASTER. (McGregor and Penniman Claimants.) Absent....TODD, J. APPEAL from the sentence of the Circuit Court If, upon the breaking out of for the district of New Hampshire, condemning the ship a war with this St. Lawrence and cargo. All the claims in this case, citizens have a except those of McGregor and Penniman for certain right to with- parts of the cargo, were settled at the last term, and draw their with regard to these further proof was ordered. country, our property from the enemy's country, it No further proof having been produced, the case was submitted to the Court without argument. must be done within a reasonable time. Eleven months after the declaration of war is too late. February 25th. Absent....TODD, J. STORY, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows: |