v. The lands for which the warrants were granted, by POLK'S virtue of which the survey was made, lie within that LESSEE district of country for which the land office was opened by the act of 1777. Had the survey been made on the WENDELL land originally claimed by these warrants, it must have & AL. been a case directly within the ninth section of the act; and the right is declared by that section to be utterly void. But the survey was made on different lands by virtue of an act which empowers the surveyor so to do' in all cases of entries on lands previously appropriated. This clause in the law, however, does not authorize a survey where no entry has been made; and such survey would also come completely within the provision of the ninth section. In such case, there is no power in the agents of the state to make the grant; and a grant so obtained is declared to be void. This subject is placed in a very strong point of view by considering it in connexion with the cession made to the United States. After that cession, the state of North Carolina had no power to sell an acre of land within the ceded territory. No right could be acquired under the laws of that state. But the right was reserved to perfect incipient titles. The fact that this title accrued before the cession does not appear on the face of the grant. It is, of course, open to examination. The survey was not made until May, 1795, many years posterior to the cession, It purports, however, to have been made by virtue of certain warrants founded on entries which may have been made before the cession. But if these warrants had no existence at the time of the cession, if there were no entries to justify them, what right could this grantee have had at the time of the cession? The Court can perceive none; and if none existed, the grant is void for want of power in the state of North Carolina to make it. If, as the Plaintiff offered to prove, the entries were never made, and the warrants were forgeries, then no right accrued under the act of 1777; no purchase of the land was made from the state; and, independent of the act of cession to the United States, the grant is void by the express words of the law. If entries were made in the county of Washington, ง. POLK's but no commencement of right had taken place in the LESSEE coded territory previous to the cession, so as to bring the party within the reservation contained in the act of WENDELL cession, then the grant must be void, there being no au& AL thority in the grantor to make it. In rejecting testimony to these points, the Circuit Court erred; and their judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for are trial. 1 The non-in Absent....TODD, J. APPEAL from the sentence of the Circuit Court for tercourse act the district of Georgia affirming the sentence of the disof 28th of June, trict Court, which condemned the ship Richmond, for a 1809. Vol. 10, violation of the non-intercourse act of 28th of June, 1809, requires a ves- vol. 10, p. 13, by departing from Philadelphia, bound on permitted port a foreign voyage to a permitted port, without having to give bond in given bond not to go to a prohibited port. p. 15, which sel bound to a double the a mount of ves sel and cargo The case was argued by HARPER for the Appellant not to go to a and JONES and PINKNEY for the United States. prohibited port, is appli cable to a ves sel sailing in ballast. If a merchant vessel of the United States, be seized by the naval force of the United a foreign MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows: The ship Richmond, an American registered vessel, States, within sailed from Philadelphia in ballast, in December, 1809, the territorial with a clearance for New York, but proceeded to Portsjurisdiction of mouth in Great Britain, where she arrived in 1810. She friendly pow- made two voyages to Amelia island in East Florida, er, for a violation of the laws during the second of which she was seized in St. Mary's of the United river by gun-boat No. 62, January 14th, 1812, and liStates, it is an belled in the district Court of Georgia, for violating the offence against act passed the 28th of June, 1809, for amending the non that power SHIP intercourse law. The Richmond was condemned in both the district and circuit Courts, and from their sentence RICHMOND the Claimants have appealed to this Court. The Claimants contend, 1. That the vessel was not liable to forfeiture. T. U.STATES. which must be adjusted be tween the two governments. take no cogni 2. That the seizure was made within the territory of This Court can Spain, and that all proceedings founded thereon are zance of it. void. The law does not connect that trespass, ure by the ci cess of the dis When the Richmond sailed from Philadelphia, com- with the submercial intercourse between the ports of Great Britain, sequent seizand those of the United States, was permitted. But the vil authority, act of the 28th of June, 1809, vol. 10, p. 13, enacts, that under the pro “no ship or vessel bound to a foreign port or place with trict Court, so "which commercial intercourse has been or may be thus as to annul the proceedings of "permitted, except, &c. shall be allowed to depart unless that Court a "the owner or owners, consignee or factor of such ship gainst the ves“or vessel shall, with the master, have given bond, with sel “one or more sureties, to the United States, in a sum "double the value of the vessel and cargo, that the ves"sel shall not proceed to any port or place with which "commercial intercourse is not thus permitted, nor be directly nor indirectly engaged during the voyage in "any trade with such port or place." If a vessel shall. depart without having given such bond, the vessel with her cargo are declared to be wholly forfeited. It is contended that this act does not apply to vessels departing from the United States to a permitted port, in ballast. The act is certainly not expressed with all the precision that could be wished. The case contemplated by the legislature most probably was that of a vessel sailing with a cargo; but there is reason to believe that a vessel departing in ballast also, was within the meaning, and intent of the law. The bond is provided to prevent a breach of the existing restrictive laws by a vessel clearing out or sailing for a permitted post, but actually proceeding to a prohibited port. This might be done by a vessel with or without a cargo; and the condition of the bond would be violated, in its letter as well as spirit, by SHIP the vessels sailing without the cargo to a prohibited port. RICHMOND The Court understands the law, then, directing a bond v. to be given in double the value of the vessel and cargo, U.STATES. to apply to the cargo if there be a cargo, but to the vessel only if there be no cargo. The seizure of an American vessel within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign power, is certainly an offence against that power, which must be adjusted between the two governments. This Court can take no cognizance of it; and the majority of the Court is of opinion that the law does not connect that trespass, if it be one, with the subsequent seizure by the civil authority, under the process of the District Court, so as to annul the proceedings of that Court against the vessel. One judge, who does not concur in this opinion, considers the testimony as sufficient to prove that the Richmond, when first seized by the gun-boat, was within the jurisdictional limits of the United States. The sentence is affirmed with costs. The double ERROR to the Circuit Court, for the district of Rhode duties imposed Island, in an action of debt, upon a bond in the penalty by the act of of 3400 dollars, given July 2, 1812, for duties at the July 1st, 1812, custom house. The cause was decided below upon degoods which murer to the pleas of the Defendants who were the principal and sureties in the bond. accrued upon arrived within a collection dis trict on that day. To constitute It was an action of debt on a bond, dated July 2, 1812, an importa- given to the United States for $3400. The condition of tion, so as to the bond, is as follows, viz. "The condition of this attach the "obligation is such, that if the above bounden, S. G. right to duties, it is necessary Arnold, &c. shall and do, on or before the 2d day of not only that 6 October next, well and truly pay or cause to be paid be an arrival " unto the collector of the customs for the district of Pro there should v. vidence for the time being, the sum of $1700, or the ARNOLD "amount of duties to be ascertained as due, and arising on & OTHERS "certain goods, wares and merchandize entered by the "above bounden S. G. Arnold, as imported in the brig U.STATES. "Dover, R. Fenner, master, from Havanna, as per en"try dated this day, then the above obligation to be void, "&c." The following indorsement is on the bond, viz. within the limits of the U. States and of a collection dis “Amount of duties ascertained as due, 1708 dollars and trict, but also "38 cents. THOMAS PECKHAM, Junr. Deputy Collector." dollars within the limits of some port of entry. Semb. That if the condition of a bond be to pay 1700 dollars, or the du ties which may to be due upon not in the op That an obli more than the penalty of the The Defendants pleaded, that, as to 1708 and 38 cents, part and parcel of said sum of 3400 dol- be ascertained lars demanded by the Plaintiffs, with the interest there- certain goods on from the day whereon the same was payable, to the imported, it is time of the plea, being 13 dollars and 38 cents, they owe tion of the obthe Plaintiffs the same, being in the whole the sum of ligee to dis1721 dollars and 76 cents; and that as to the whole re- charge the bond by paysidue of the sum demanded, the Defendants say, that there- ment of the for the Plaintiffs, their said action ought not to have and 1700 dollars. maintain, because they say, "that the brig Dover in the gee may, at "condition of the said bond mentioned, sailed from Ha- law, recover ❝vanna, on the 16th day of June, A. D. 1812, bound to the "said district of Providence, and that she arrived within bond. the "the United States, on the 30th day of June, 1812, and Where computation is "within the said district of Providence, on the 1st day of to be made "July, A. D. 1812, having on board the said goods, &c. from an act done, the day, ❝mentioned in the condition which said goods, &c. were on which the "imported into the said United States, on the said 30th act is done, is "day of June, 1812, and into the said district of Providence, to be included. "on the said 1st day of July, 1812, in the brig Dover, "&c. that Providence is the sole port of entry in the "said district of Providence, and that on the said 2d of "July, 1812, the said goods, &c. were duly entered at the "custom house in the said district of Providence, as im"ported in the said brig Dover, &c. the Defendants further aver, that the bond aforesaid, was made, "executed and given by them to the Plaintiffs as "aforesaid, for securing the duties due on the said "goods, so imported as aforesaid, in conformity with, and by virtue and in pursuance of, the act of "the congress, &c. passed on the 10th day of August, VOL. IX. 14 |