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visions of the London Building Act 1894 whilst carrying out such alterations.

The following facts were either proved or admitted at the hearing :

By order of the Local Government Board, dated the 2nd April 1897, the care of children who by reason of defect of intellect or physical infirmity cannot properly be trained in association with children in ordinary schools was placed in the hands of the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District.

The managers, for the purpose of carrying out such order, prepared a scheme for purchasing various dwelling-houses in different parts of London adjacent to the schools specially provided and staffed by the London School Board for the education of children of this class. Under such scheme the children were to live, sleep, and board in such houses under the care of a responsible matron in numbers generally not exceeding fourteen in any one house, and to attend such special board schools each day for the purpose of their education. Such houses were intended to be permanent homes for the children.

The building, No. 16, Elm-grove, bad been an ordinary detached dwelling-house of two floors with one room and a basement below, and had been purchased by the managers under such scheme, and they had instructed the appellant under the supervision of the board architect to alter or convert such dwelling-house to make it suitable for the accommodation of twelve to fourteen children and a matron, cook, and housemaid, the latter in the exclusive service of the board.

The total cubical capacity of such dwelling. house was under 50,000 cubic feet with sleeping accommodation as above.

Before the appellant began the alterations he served a notice under sect. 145 of the London Building Act 1894 on the respondent, stating he was about to make alterations to a private dwelling-house and convert the same into a public building, and during the course of carrying out the alterations the respondent served notices on the appellant making certain requirements with regard to the premises.

summons

No point of estoppel which might possibly arise as against the builder in consequence of the form of his notice to the district surveyor was pressed. But, treating the real parties to the as the district surveyor and the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District and assuming the managers were not to be legally affected by the form in which the builder gave his original notice, the only question that was argued before the magistrate was the question whether this building under the above circumstances was a public building within the London Building Act 1894, ss. 5 (27), 63, 79.

The magistrate was of opinion that, regard being had to the terms of sect. 5, sub-sect. 27, and of sects. 63 and 79, this building was in the hands of the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District used or constructed or adapted to be used for a public purpose, and he made the order asked for by the district surveyor.

By the London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 5 (27):

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chapel, or other place of public worship, or as a school, college, or place of instruction (not being merely a dwelling-house so used), or as a hospital, workhouse, public theatre, public ball, public concert-room, public ball-room, public lecture-room, public library, or public exhibition-room, or as a public place of assembly, or used, or constructed, or adapted to be used for any other public purpose, also a building used, or constructed, or adapted to be used as an hotel, lodging-house, home, refuge, or shelter, where such building extends to more than 250,000 cubic feet, or has sleeping accommodation for more than 100 persons.

Macmorran, Q.C. and Herbert Smith for the appellant.-The magistrate was wrong. for this building is not within sect. 5 (27) of the London Building Act 1894. If the children had been put in before the commencement of the alterations nothing could have been done. If the premise had been taken by a private person nothing could have been said, and it can make no difference that the premises have been taken by a public body. The test to be applied in these cases is whether the building is to be used for a public purpose similar to those set out in the section. Clearly it was not. It was decided in the case of Josolyne v. Meeson (53 L. T. Rep. 319) that an ambulance station structurally disconnected with any building, and from which the public is rigorously excluded, is not itself a public building within sect. 3 of the Metropolitan Building Act 1885, so as to require the builder to deposit plans and sections of the building with the notice of its erection to the district surveyor under the byelaw 5 made under sect. 16 of the Metropolitan Management and the Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1873. So in the same way this building cannot in any sense be described as a public building, and it cannot become so merely because it is controlled by a public body.

R. Cunningham Glen for the respondent.-This building is clearly a hospital within the meaning of sect. 5 (27). The only children taken in are those who are defective in intellect or suffer from a physical infirmity. The only exception in buildings of this kind is that of a private school. At any rate it is a building of the same kind as a hospital, and therefore is a building used for any other public purpose."

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BRUCE, J.-In this case I am of opinion that the building in question was not a public building within the definition given in the London Building Act 1894, s. 5 (27). It is said by Mr. Glen that it is a hospital. I do not think the building is a hospital. No doubt the word "hospital originally was a word of very wide meaning It might mean lodging. I see in Mr. Murray's Dictionary a phrase from Spenser's "Faerie Queene" quoted; a line, "Espied a goodly castle for that night's hospital there did thither march." Any place of lodgment may be a hospital in the old meaning of the word, but the modern meaning of the word is very narrowed. It means a place for the treatment of the sick and infirm, and I do not think this place, which is a home for children, not for medical treatment, but a home for them, can be treated as a hospital. Then, if it is not a hospital, is it a place used for "other public purposes" within the words of sect. 5 (27) ? Following the decision in Josolyne v. Meeson (53 L. T. Rep. 319), which is a decision of this court and binding upon us, I think the substance of

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that decision is this: That " public purposes means, not a place used in the public interest, but a place to which the public can demand admission or are invited to come; a place to be used by the public. In Josolyne v. Meeson the court so limited the words " public purposes,' but, even if we were not bound by that decision, "other public purposes must mean some other purposes ejusdem generis, and would not in that case include a home such as the present. But even if it does, I agree with Mr. Macmorran when he says that it appears from the following words that a home is not to come within the definition of "other public purposes " unless it extends to more than 250,000 cubic feet, or has sleeping accommodation for more than 100 persons. As that is not this case, the present building would not fall within that. definition. Therefore I am of opinion that the decision of the magistrate was wrong and must be reversed.

PHILLIMORE, J.-I am of the same opinion. I agree it is conceivable this building might be both home and hospital, but I think it is not a hospital in the old sense which my brother has quoted. The statute certainly does not mean to use the word in that sense, nor does it mean to use it in the old legal sense treated by Lord Coleridge. It uses it in the modern popular sense with which we are all very familiar. Now, there is no reason at all for saying these children are there for treatment of their physical ailments. If they were, it might be possible this was a hospital. The Local Government Board and the Metropolitan Asylums Board in 1897 slightly anticipated that which the Legislature has now made a general provision for the whole of England by 62 & 63 Vict. c. 32. They provided for children receiv ing poor relief, who were incapable of being taught successfully in association with ordinary children, by reason either of defective intellect or physical infirmity, special schools, and, as an adjunct to those schools, the Metropolitan Asylums Board have provided these homes in which the children are maintained. Some of the children may not be infirm at all; but they are not there for treatment of their infirmity-they are there for the purpose of education. No doubt when they are there they must be looked after just as much as any healthy children who get ill must be attended to. So these infirm children must be attended to; but they are not there for the purpose of their physical infirmity being attended to. Therefore it is not a hospital, but it is a home. That would be enough to decide this case, but I also agree with my learned brother, and with the decision by which we are bound-even if we did not agree with itthat this does not mean a building constructed or adapted to be used for "any other public purpose." One sees directly that the words " any other public purpose were not wise words to use, but they were in the old Act and had been construed by this court; and very wisely the draftsman of the new Act left in the old words and did not try to alter them. Those words do not mean "used in the public interest"; they mean, as my learned brother has said, used for a purpose which involves the admission of the public either by right or by invitation, as when you open a lecture-hall to anybody who chooses to pay for his ticket. That is the good sense of

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the thing. This building is not used for any public purposes within the meaning of the Act, and the decision of the learned magistrate cannot be supported. Appeal allowed.

Solicitors: Williams and James; Walter C. Williams.

Jan. 11 and 18, 1901.

(Before Lord ALVERSTONE. C.J., GRANTHAM, BRUCE, DARLING, and PHILLIMORE, JJ.)

TRACEY (app.) v. PRETTY (resp.). (a) Factory-Notice by inspector as to sanitary requirements-Power of justices to inquire into necessity for requirements — Appeal — Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 38— Factory and Workshop Act 1878 (41 Vict. c. 16), 8. 4-Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59), s. 22-Factory and Workshop Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 75), s. 2-Factory and Workshop Act 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 37), 8. 3.

Where a factory inspector has given a notice under sect. 22 (2) of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890, and sect. 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891, the justices cannot inquire into the necessity for, or the reasonableness of, the requirements specified in the notice. The only question that can be raised before the justices is whether there has been a neglect or refusal to comply with the notice, and they cannot decide the question of the suitability or sufficiency of the accommodation in the way of sanitary conveniences in the factory. Phillimore, J. dissentiente.

Semble, the only appeal against the requirements contained in the notice is to quarter sessions. CASE stated on an information charging the respondents with unlawfully neglecting and refusing to comply with the requirements of a notice given under sect. 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891, and amending Acts, and sect. 22 (2) of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890.

The following facts were proved or admitted :The respondents were the occupiers of a building used as a corset factory situate at Tower Ramparts.

The Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 had been adopted in the borough of Ipswich.

The building in question was a factory within the meaning of the Factory and Workshops Acts 1878-95 and was situate within the sanitary districts of the Ipswich Urban Sanitary Authority. The appellant was an inspector under the Factory and Workshop Acts 1878-95.

The notices prescribed by sect. 4 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 were given to the sanitary authority by means of a letter dated the 2nd March 1899 of which, so far as it is material to this case, the following is a copy:

I beg to inform you that on visiting the corset factory occupied by Messrs. Pretty and Sons, and situated at Tower Ramparts, Ipswich, the undermentioned sanitary matters appear to require attention: Insufficient sanitary accommodation for women. 730 women when visited; full number 1000. Fourteen sanitary conveniences provided.

(a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Q.B. Div.]

TRACEY (app.) v. PRETTY (resp.).

It appeared to the appellant that the acts, neglects, and defaults alleged in the letter of the 2nd March 1899 were punishable or remediable under the laws relating to public health, but not under the Factory and Workshop Acts.

Proceedings were not taken by the sanitary authority upon the notice so far as it related to the alleged insufficiency of sanitary accommodation for women against the owners or occupiers of the factory.

It appeared to the appellant that the provisions of sect. 22 (1) of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 were not complied with on the 15th May.1899 in the case of the factory.

The appellant gave a written notice to the respondents, the occupiers of the factory, of which notice the following is a copy :

Factory Department, Home Office, London, S W.-I, the undersigned, one of H.M. inspectors of factories, acting in pursuance of sect. 4 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, sect. 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891, and sect. 3 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895, hereby give you notice under sect. 22, sub-sect. (2), of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 that the provisions of sect. 22, sub-sect. (1), of that Act are not complied with in the building of which you are occupier, used as a manufactory and situated at Tower Ramparts, Ipswich, the same being a factory within the meaning of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, and I hereby require you within two calendar months from the date of this notice to provide the said building with sufficient and suitable accommodation in the way of sanitary conveniences, having regard to the number of persons employed or in attendance at the said building, and with proper separate accommodation for persons of each sex, and for that purpose to provide for the use of the females so employed or in attendance eighteen additional water-closets, with proper fittings and appur. tenances. If you neglect or refuse to comply with this notice, you will be liable for such default to a penalty not exceeding 201. and to a daily penalty not exceeding 40s., and proceedings will be taken in pursuance of the said sect. 22 of the Pablic Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 to recover the same.-(Signed) ANNA TRACEY. May 15th, 1899.-To Messrs. Pretty and Co. Limited, Tower Ramparts..

The respondents, the occupiers of the factory, neglected or refused to comply with the lastmentioned notice.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended upon the above stated facts that the court of summary jurisdiction had no jurisdiction to hear evidence upon or decide the question of the suitability or sufficiency of the accommodation in the way of sanitary conveniences existing in the factory, or the necessity for the further accommodation required by the notice dated the 15th May 1899, and that those questions were by law left to the discretion of the appellant. In support of this contention the following cases were cited: St. Luke's Vestry v. Lewis (5 L. T. Rep. 608), Hargreaves v. Taylor (8 L. T. Rep. 149), and Bogle v. Sherborne Local Board (46 J. P. 675).

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the matters were questions of fact which the justices had jurisdiction to decide upon evidence to be given before them.

The justices decided in favour of the contentions of the respondents, and accordingly heard evidence on behalf of the appellant and the respondents, and upon that evidence dismissed

[Q.B. DIV. the summons and ordered the appellant to pay 61. 4s. costs.

They found as facts (1) that the existing sanitary accommodation in the factory was suitable and sufficient; (2) that the sanitary authority had made all due inquiry into the suitability and sufficiency of the sanitary accommodation existing in the factory, and had found the accommodation to be suitable and sufficient.

The question for the opinion of the court was whether they had jurisdiction to hear evidence upon or decide the question of the suitability or sufficiency of the accommodation existing in the factory or required by the notice.

The Attorney-General (Sir R. Finlay, Q.C.), Sutton, and Muir for the appellant.-This case depends upon the construction to be placed upon certain sections in the Factory and Public Health Acts. By sect. 4 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 (41 Vict. c. 16), "where it appears to any inspector under this Act that any act, neglect, or default in relation to any

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water-closet .. in a factory or workshop is punishable or remediable under the law relating to public health, but not under this act, that inspector shall give notice in writing of such act, neglect, or default to the sanitary authority in whose district the factory is situate,

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and it shall be the duty of the sanitary authority to make such inquiry into the subject of the notice and take such action thereon as to that authority may seem proper for the purpose of enforcing the law." So it will be seen that under the Act of 1878 the duty of inquiry and of taking action vested with the sanitary authority only. Sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 contains the provisions as to sanitary conveniences in factories, and it provides a remedy. Before the magistrates the notice and order are final, though there is an appeal to quarter sessions under sect. 7. The next step in the legislation was sect. 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 75), which provides that "where notice of an act, neglect, or default is given by an inspector under the said sect. 4... to a sanitary authority, and proceedings are not taken for punishing or remedying the act, neglect, or default, the inspector may take the like proceedings for punishing or remedying the same as the sanitary authority might have taken, and can recover any expenses from the sanitary authority not recovered from the other person. So it would seem that if the sanitary authority do not move after the notice mentioned in sect. 4 of the Act of 1878 the inspector can take the like proceedings himself. The question, therefore, is, does this section give the inspector power to serve a notice under sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890, from which there is no appeal except to quarter sessions. We contend that the inspector is in the same position as the sanitary authority, either with or without an appeal under sect. 7 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890. By sect. 3 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895 "where notice of an act, neglect, or default is given by an inspector under sect 4 of the principal Act," that is the Act of 1878, "to a sanitary authority, it shall be the duty of the sanitary authority to inform the inspector of the proceedings taken in consequence of the notice," and

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further, the time in sect. 2 of the Act of 1891 is altered to one month. The summons clearly brings out what the charge was, and the first letter to the sanitary authority was in accordance with sect. 4 of the Act of 1878. Then a notice is given for the non-compliance with which the present summons is issued. The point in this case is a new one. But, even if the sanitary authority come to the conclusion that there is no act, neglect, or default, the inspector can proceed further, otherwise sect. 2 (2) of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891 would be a nullity. The intention of the section is to give a sort of appeal. The effect of the two sections is that the inspector may give notice to the sanitary authority, but if they take no action then the inspector himself can take proceedings. In a borough such as Ipswich the only way by which proceedings can be taken is by a notice, and further it should be noticed that the sanitary authority do not act altogether independently, but under sect. 3 of the Act of 1895 they must keep the inspector informed as to any proceedings taken. They also referred to Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 36, 38. Sect. 38 deals with factories, and shows what the law was at that time before the Factories and Workshops Acts. Sect. 68 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 shows the powers inspectors have for carrying the Act into force and for satisfying themselves; and sect. 7 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 gives the right of appeal to quarter sessions, except where there is an appeal to the Local Government Board under sect. 268. Where sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 is in force, and the provisions of sect. 38 of the Public Health Act 1875 superseded, the only remedy is that provided by sect. 22; and so if the local authority will not take proceedings, sect. 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891 is of no use, for the inspector cannot give the notice. [PHILLIMORE, J.-Where in the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 do you get the powers given to the inspector ?] The sanitary authority get their powers under sect. 4 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, and so all those powers are open to the inspector. Under sect. 3 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895 the word "proceedings" includes the step by the local authorities in giving the notice. Where the sanitary conveniences are not proper, the factory becomes one kept not in accordance with the Acts; and sect. 81 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, and sect. 35 of the Act of 1895 show how such a factory is dealt with. Sect. 35 of the Act of 1895 applies where sect. 22 of the Public Health Act 1890 does not. But the inspector has the same powers as the sanitary authority, and there would be the same appeal under sect. 7 of the Act of 1890. There are, therefore, two classes of proceedings. First, those within the Act of 1890 for non-compliance with sect. 35 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895, and in such cases the magistrates can go into the facts. The others are those within the Act for non-compliance with the notice, and in such a case the magistrates cannot go into the facts. In such cases the notice is final.

Macmorran, Q.C. (E. E. Wild with him) for the respondent. Throughout the whole of the sanitary legislation, the person required to do work is MAG. CAS.-VOL. XX.

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heard at one stage of the proceedings or another. Sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 gives no appeal to the Local Government Board, but instead of that an appeal is allowed by sect. 7 to quarter sessions-that is, where the requisition is by the statutory authority. But where the notice is given by the inspector no appeal is provided for. If the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 is not adopted by the urban authority, and in all rural districts, the section that governs is sect. 35 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895, and in such a case there are two judicial hearings. If the Crown is right in their contention, where an inspector gives a notice under sect. 2 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891, the owner of a factory has no right of appeal and no means of having an inquiry. Sect. 4 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 was intended to enable a factory inspector to call the sanitary authority's attention to nuisances which they ought to get abated. The duty of the sanitary authority under the section is to make inquiry and see if the notice is well founded. In this case they have done all that they are required by law under that section, or sect. 22 of the Act of 1890. The meaning of the word "proceeding" in sect. 2 (2) of the Factory and Workshop Act 1891 is where proceedings ought to be taken. The inspector cannot himself find as a fact that there has been an act, neglect, or default. There must be some judicial determination. He referred to

St. Luke's Vestry v. Lewis, 5 L. T. Rep. 608; 1
B. & S. 865;

Hargreaves v. Taylor, 8 L. T. Rep. 149; 3 B. & S.
613.

The Attorney-General in reply.

Cur. adv. vult.

Jan. 18.-Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J. read the following judgment:-This case raises, in my opinion, questions of very considerable difficulty, and I express my judgment with great hesitation. After the best consideration I can give I have, however, come to the conclusion that the appellant is entitled to judgment. The substantial question which arises is whether upon a summons for penalties under sub-sect. 3 of sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890, for neglect to comply with a notice given by a factory inspector, it is competent for the magistrates to receive evidence upon the merits as to the necessity for the sanitary accommodation required by such notice. The difficulty arises from the fact that the powers of the factory inspector in the matter are given by reference to the powers of the sanitary authority under the Public Health Act; and we have to determine to what extent the powers of the sanitary authority are transferred under the general words used. Certain other incidental points arise which I will consider in the course of my judgment. dealing with cases of legislation by reference, I think that, as a rule, the primary consideration to be kept in view is the general scope and object of the amending legislation, as this affords more guide as to whether a wide or narrow interpretation is to be put upon general words or expressions capable of a wider or narrower meaning. By the 4th section of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 it is provided that where it appears to an inspector under the Act that any neglect or

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default under the Act in relation to any watercloset, earth closet, or other matter in the factory or workshop is punishable or remediable under the law relating to public health, and not under the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, the inspector shall give notice in writing of such act, neglect, or default to the sanitary authority of the district, and it shall be the duty of the sanitary authority to make such inquiry into the subject of the notice and take such action thereon as to the authority may seem proper for the purpose of enforcing the law. By the same section it was provided that an inspector under the Act may for the purposes of the section take with him to the factory a medical officer of health, inspector of nuisances, or other officer of the sanitary autho rity. The material provisions of the law relating to public health which were in force at that time -namely, at the passing of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878-are to be found in sects. 35, 36, and 38 of the Public Health Act 1875. The most material section is the 38th, which provided that, where it appeared to any local authority by the report of their surveyor that any house is used or intended to be used as a factory in which persons of both sexes were employed, the local authority might, if they thought fit, by written notice require the owners within a time specified in the notice to construct a sufficient number of water-closets, earth closets, or privies for the separate use of each sex. The section provided a penalty for neglect to comply with such notice. No appeal was provided against the requirements of the local authority under this Act. By sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890, which is the section under which this case arises, further powers were given to the sanitary authority. Sub-sect. 1 of that section provides that every building used as a workshop shall be provided with sufficient and suitable accommodation in the way of sanitary convenience, having regard to the number of persons employed, and also where persons of both sexes are employed with proper separate accommodation for persons of each sex. It further provides by sub-sect. 2 that where it appears to an urban authority on the report of their surveyor that the provisions of the section are not complied with they may by written notice require the owner or occupier to make such alterations and additions therein as may be required to give such sufficient, suitable, and proper accommodation. Sub-sect. 3 prescribes a penalty for neglect or refusal to comply with such notice. Pausing for a moment, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that under this section the urban authority could only give a general notice requiring the owner or occupier to provide sufficient and proper accommodation; on behalf of the appellant it was contended that the urban authority must by the notice specify the alterations and additions which they require to be made. I think the latter view is correct- The section provides a penalty for neglect or refusal to comply with the notice. It would, I think, be inconsistent with such an enactment that the notice should be in general terms only, as the person to whom it was given would in that case have no means of knowing how he could avoid the liability to a penalty. But, in addition, by sect. 7 of the same Act, an appeal to quarter sessions is given against any

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requirement of a local authority, and I think it was intended that on such an appeal not only the question of the necessity for some additional accommodation, but also the reasonableness or propriety of the amount of the accommodation required by the notice might be raised. It was further contended before us on behalf of the respondents that sect. 4 of the Act of 1878 did not apply to this section, that sect. 4 enabled notice to be given only in the case of some neglect or default in relation to an existing watercloset, earth closet, privy, or ash-pit, and not in relation to alleged insufficiency of accommodation. In my opinion this contention is unsound. I think the factory inspector may give notice to the sanitary authority in respect of a neglect by the owner or occupier of a factory to comply with the provisions of sub-sect. 1 of sect. 22 of the Act of 1890. I may further point out that this seems to be placed beyond all doubt by the provisions of sect. 35 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895, which provides that in every place where sect. 22 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1890 is not in force every factory or workshop where persons of both sexes are employed shall have separate accommodation, and that a factory or workshop in which there is contravention of this section shall be deemed not to be occupied in conformity with the Factory and Workshop Act 1878. If sect 22 of the Act of 1890 is in force the rights and duties of the parties must be governed by that section. Thus far I have only considered the powers which were given to the factory inspector to put the sanitary authority in motion; but by sub-sect. 2 of sect. 2 of the Act of 1891, under which the particular question in this case arises, it is provided that where notice of an act, neglect, or default is given by the sanitary inspector under sect. 4 of the Act of 1878 to a sanitary authority and proceedings are not taken within a reasonable time (fixed by sub-sect. 2 of sect. 3 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895 at one month) for punishing or remedying the act, neglect, or default the inspector may take the like proceedings for punishing or remedying as the sanitary authority might have taken. The question which arises in this case is whether the words "like proceedings for punishing or remedying" are confined to legal proceedings in respect of the neglect of an owner or occupier to comply with the notice given by an urban authority under sub-sect. 2 of sect. 22 of the Public Health Act of 1890, or do they give the factory inspector the right himself to give a notice under sub-sect. 2 of sect. 22 of the Act of 1890 requiring alterations and additions to be made. The question is, as I have said, one of very great difficulty. The word "proceedings" is not the word one would have expected to find as applicable to a notice or requirement. Moreover, unless a requirement given by a factory inspector is subject to the appeal to quarter sessions, under sect. 7 of the Act of 1890, as in the case of a requirement by the local authority, I should without hesitation have come to the conclusion that a factory inspector was not entitled to give such notice. It seems to me clear that the Legislature could not, without express words, make the opinion of a factory inspector as to the amount of accommodation required final and conclusive upon the factory owner or occupier. But the words in sub-sect. 2 of sect. 2 of the Act of 1891 are 66 the like pro

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