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give as much for the next year. Another dictum of Blackburn, J. in Staley v. Castleton Overseers (33 L. J. 178, 180, M. C.) has been referred to and relied on by the appellants, that Rex v. Bedworth (ubi sup.) "is not law at the present time." There, again, that dictum does not appear in the report in 5 B. & S. 505 and the other contemporary reports. On the other hand, the case of Rex v. Bedworth is still regarded as an authority. In that case, where the question arose as to the rating of a coal mine, which had ceased to be productive and was not being worked, Lord Ellenborough, C.J., said: "Here the mine itself is exhausted, the subject-matter of profit is gone, although the rent, which was no doubt calculated upon the probable average produced during the whole term, be still payable. The failure of the coal will not discharge the lessee's covenant to pay rent: perhaps he may have calculated upon that event, and may have received during the former part of his term an adequate value from the then produce of the mine to compensate the continuance of the rent to the end of the term. But, with respect to the parish, he is only rateable for the concurrent annual value during the period for which the rate is made; and when the thing which he occupies no longer affords any such concurrent value the subject-matter of the rating is gone." If that is true in a case where the whole subject-matter is gone, it must be equally true, in my opinion, when a part of the subject-matter is gone. I find that that case was cited in Reg. v. Westbrook (10 Q. B. 178), and to a large extent was the basis of the judgment of Lord Denman, C.J. therein. The observations of Lord Denman, C.J. in the latter case are very much in point in the present case. He said: "The rate is always imposed with reference to the existing value; whether temporary or enduring is immaterial. A case was supposed of a brickfield worked out in less than a year to meet the demand of some enormous contract for a public work; the consequence would be that the land would have a very much increased value for the year, and it would be only reasonable that it should have an increased rate for that year: in the following year its value might sink almost to nothing, and the rate ought to fall proportionately, even to mothing, if, the brick earth being exhausted, the land, like a exhausted coal mine, should become entirely unproductive." Now, that reference to an exhausted coal mine is obviously taken from the case of Rex v. Bedworth (ubi sup.). Lord Denman further goes on to say: "No injustice would be done if in every year the occupier could be assessed according to the actual value in that year; and it is the duty of the overseers to arrive at this as nearly as they can." That seems to me to be exactly in point in the present case, and the observations as to the position when the brick earth is exhausted apply here. Upon these grounds I think that the judgment of Bucknill, J. was right, and that this appeal must be dismissed. STIRLING, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the appellant union, Johnson, Weatherall, and Sturt.

Solicitor for the respondent company, Jackson, Farnham.

[CT. OF APP.

Wednesday, Dec. 19, 1900.

(Before RIGBY, WILLIAMS, and ROMER, L.JJ.)

ATTORNEY. GENERAL v. WILSON. (a)
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION.

Practice-Trial-Venue-Transfer of action-Prerogative of Crown-Selection of tribunal-Discretion of Attorney-General.

Where an action is brought by the AttorneyGeneral, at the relation of private individuals, it is not his practice to exercise the prerogative of the Crown and to select the tribunal by which the action shall be tried. He does not interfere with the discretion of the court. All that he does is by his fiat to authorise the relators to proceed in a matter involving public interest. But he does not clothe them with the prerogative of the Crown, nor has he any intention of so doing.

Decision of Kekewich, J. reversed.

THIS action was brought by the Attorney-Genera (at the relation of the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough of Sunderland) and the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough of Sunderland as plaintiffs against J. and W. Wilson and Sons as defendants.

The writ, to which the fiat of the AttorneyGeneral had been duly obtained, was taken out in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice on the 18th April 1900.

The plaintiffs by their statement of claim alleged that the defendants had excavated the soil of certain premises in their occupation, adjoining a street in the borough of Sunderland, which they alleged was a public highway, and had neglected to maintain a retaining wall, and that by reason thereof large portions of the retaining wall had fallen down and a large area of the street had subsided, rendering the highway impassable and dangerous; and they claimed an injunction restraining the defendants from continuing the alleged public nuisances and requiring them to restore the surface of the street and re-erect the wall; and they also claimed damages.

The defence amounted to a general denial of the allegations of the plaintiffs.

An application was made by the defendants, upon a general summons for directions, asking that the action might be transferred from the Chancery Division to the Durham Assizes for trial by a special jury.

The main ground for the application was that it was desirable that there should be a view of the locus in quo.

The application was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground that it was an interference with the prerogative right of the Crown to select its own court; and also on the merits.

It was decided by Kekewich, J. (83 L. T. Rep. 569) that the Attorney-General having, in the deliberate exercise of his discretion, selected the Chancery Division for the trial of the action, and in so doing he was exercising the prerogative of the Crown, his selection could not be interfered with by the court unless an extremely strong case were made against the propriety of his choice. His Lordship accordingly decided that in the present case the action must remain in the Chancery Division, although he was of opinion that if the question had to be decided simply (a) Reported by E. A. SCRATCHLEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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upon the ground of convenience, a transfer of the action to the Queen's Bench Division to be tried at the Durham Assizes ought to be ordered.

Subsequently to that decision, the AttorneyGeneral intimated to the defendants that, as a matter of fact, he had not exercised any discretion in the case, and had not selected the Chancery Division as the tribunal by which the action should be tried.

The defendants accordingly now appealed from the decision of Kekewich, J.

Renshaw, Q.C. (with him Edward Shortt) for the appellants-In deciding the question raised upon the defendants' application in this case, Kekewich, J. did so on the mistaken assumption, as it now appears, that the Attorney-General, when granting his fiat, had exercised his discretion as to the Division in which the action should be tried. But since the hearing of the application before the learned judge, the AttorneyGeneral has authorised the defendants to state that, as a matter of fact, he exercised no discretion of the kind. It is not apparently the prac tice for him to do so. He does not go into the facts of the case for the purpose of determining in which court it shall be tried. On the contrary, the selection of the court rests entirely with the plaintiff in each particular case. As regards the present case, the matter in dispute being a purely local one, it would be more convenient that it should be tried on the spot with a jury who would have a view, and that can only take place at Durham. There would consequently be a saving of expense, and I accordingly ask that there should be a transfer of the action to the Queen's Bench Division, in order that there may be a trial at the Durham Assizes with a special jury. The case comes within the principles laid down in

Jenkins v. Bushby, 64 L. T. Rep. 213; (1891) 1 Ch. 484.

The court has a complete discretion as to the mode of trial in the present case, just as if it were an action between private parties :

President, &c., of the College of St. Mary Magdalen, Oxford, v. Attorney-General, 6 H. L. Cas. 189, at p. 210;

Attorney-General v. Vivian, 1' Russ. 226, at p. 236. Although Kekewich, J. decided against the defendants, under the misapprehension as to the Attorney-General having exercised a discretion, he expressed his opinion that on the ground of convenience it would be better that the transfer asked for should be made; and therefore he would have so directed if it had been left entirely to him to determine the question.

Alexander Glen (Warrington, Q.C. with him) for the respondents.-There is no difference between the Attorney-General suing ex officio and at the relation of private individuals. He might have sued alone for an injunction for obstruction: Attorney-General v. Cockermouth Local Board, 30 L. T. Rep. 590; L. Rep. 18 Eq. 172; Attorney-General v. Barker, 4 My. & Cr. 262. The Judicature Acts have not abrogated the right of the Attorney-General :

Attorney-General v. Constable, 4 Ex. Div. 172;
Dixon v. Farrer, 17 Q. B. Div. 658;
Ann. Pr. 1901, note to Order V., r. 9.

As to the merits, the only thing suggested is that

[CT. OF APP.

there should be a view. But a view would not assist. Moreover it would be inconvenient to transfer this action. It is too heavy a case for the assizes, and there is a point of law which would involve two hearings.

No reply was called for.

RIGBY, L.J.-In this case the learned judge in the court below, as I read his judgment, has thought that, on the merits properly so-called, he would have sent the case for trial to the Queen's Bench Division without deciding now whether it should be tried with or without a jury, leaving all that to be determined in the Queen's Bench Division. But he felt himself hampered because he supposed that as Her Majesty's AttorneyGeneral had elected the Chancery Division as his tribunal in which he chose to have the case tried, he was exercising the prerogative right of the Crown, and the court had no right to interfere. Now, with regard to that last point, I think it is perfectly plain. Perfectly plain it is now in one sense, because we have it from the Attorney-General that he never intended to exercise any such prerogative right; and he does not wish to interfere with the discretion of the court in any way. Even if he had not given u that information, I should have arrived at precisely the same conclusion, for, from all that I know of the practice of the Attorney-General, and, I will add, the reason of the case, I think it never has been the practice for the AttorneyGeneral to exercise in that manner the preroga. tive of the Crown, assuming him to have it. All that he does is by his fiat to authorise the relators to go on with the matter involving public interest, so long as he thinks it right that they shall be permitted to go on. He does not clothe them with the prerogative of the Crown. He has no intention of doing so. They take the step which they think right and proper, and they take it with no greater sanction, no greater solemnity, than they would if they were only acting as plaintiffs. I therefore come to the conclusion that the Attorney-General has not expressed his election, and that, therefore, the question of election by him is altogether out of the case. That seems to me to resolve the question without going into questions which may be of importance as to what would take place if he had elected. I think we are at liberty, and we are bound, to treat the case as if it were only an election by the plaintiffs, who are also relators, to bring their action where it has been brought. That being so, I see no reason to differ from the opinion which I understand to be held by Kekewich, J. on the merits of the case. And I think we now ought to make the order for the transfer which he would have made if he had not felt himself hampered by the prerogative of the Crown. The appeal will accordingly be allowed. The appellants will get the costs of the appeal in any event, and the costs below will be costs in the action.

WILLIAMS, L.J.-I agree. Assuming that the Attorney-General was an actor in this case-that is, assuming that he had to be treated as a party to these proceedings, and assuming that he had chosen his court, which I take it the AttorneyGeneral in a case in which the Crown was interested would have a right to do, it still seems to me quite plain, on what we now know the

CT. OF APP.]

UPPERTON v. RIDLEY AND ANOTHER.

Attorney-General says, that if there was any right in the Attorney-General to object to the transfer of the proceedings from the Chancery Division to the Queen's Bench Division, he has done that which he has been requested to do, namely, disclaimed any right of the Crown to raise any such objection.

ROMER, L.J.-I agree, and I have nothing to add. Appeal allowed.

Solicitors Crossman, for the appellants, Prichard, Crossman, and Block, agents for Kidson, McKenzies, and Kidson, Sunderland. Solicitors for the respondents, Johnson, Weatherall, and Sturt, agents for F. M. Bowey, Sunderland.

Tuesday, Jan. 15, 1901.

(Before SMITH, M.R., COLLINS and
ROMER, L.JJ.)

UPPERTON v. RIDLEY AND ANOTHER. (a) APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Police-Pension-Mode of calculation-" Annual pay "-Special duty allowance-Police Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 45), s. 1; sched. 1, part 1, r. 1; part 3, r. 11.

By the Police Act 1890 a constable, who has completed a certain time of service, is entitled to a pension which, by rule 11 of the 1st schedule, is to be calculated "according to the amount of his annual pay at the date of his retirement." A constable was selected for permanent special duty at the House of Lords, and continued to serve in that capacity for some years up to the date of his retirement."

During the whole period of this special service the constable received a special allowance of 78. a week in addition to his ordinary pay under the scale for the time being in force by the authority of the Home Secretary.

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Held (dismissing the appeal), that the special allowance was not part of the "annual pay of the constable, within the meaning of the Act, for the purpose of calculating his pension. THIS was an appeal by Upperton from the decision of the Divisional Court (Channell and Bucknill, JJ.) upon a special case stated by quarter sessions.

Upperton appealed to the quarter sessions for the county of London from the decision of the police authority for the metropolitan police district, under the police Act 1890, refusing to reconsider his claim for an increased amount of pension.

The respondents were Sir Matthew White Ridley, the Home Secretary, and Sir Edward Bradford, the Commissioner of Police of the metropolis.

The appeal was dismissed subject to the opinion of the High Court upon a case stated, which, so far as is material, stated the following facts:

Upperton joined the metropolitan police force on the 30th Dec. 1872, and on the 1st Jan. 1899 he had completed not less than twenty-five years' approved service as a police constable. He had previously duly signed an acceptance of the provisions of the Police Act 1890. He had given all requisite notices of his desire to retire and to

(a) Reported by J. H. WILLIAMS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
MAG. CAS.-VOL. XX.

[CT. OF APP.

receive a pension, and he was entitled as of right by the Police Act 1890 to retire and receive a pension for life of two-thirds of his annual pay at the date of his retirement.

On the 11th March 1894 Upperton, having already served for nine years as a police constable at the Houses of Parliament, was selected by the Commissioners of Police for permanent duty at the House of Lords, and continued to serve in that capacity until the 2nd Jan. 1899, the date of his retirement.

The duties of Upperton at the House of Lords were to preserve the peace, to keep order, to protect the person and property of the High Court of Parliament and of persons resorting thereto, to attend fire drill, and generally to act as a police constable in pursuance of his oath and under the orders of the commissioners.

From the 11th March 1894 to the 2nd Jan. 1899 Upperton was paid every week the sum of 32s., being the ordinary pay of a constable of his rank and service, and an additional sum of 78. in respect of the special duty upon which he was employed.

Some constables attend at the Houses of Parliament for special duty during the session of Parliament only; but all constables attending there, whether permanently or for the session only equally receive a special duty allowance of 18. a day.

It was stated in evidence by Mr. Bathurst, chief clerk to the Commissioners of Police, that the commissioners were under no obligation to pay Upperton the additional sum of 7s. even while he remained on special service, though that is done partly as a recognition of the good conduct for which a constable is placed on special service, and partly because, by being withdrawn from ordinary duty, he loses to some extent his chance of promotion.

From the said sum of 32s. the sum of 7d. was deducted as a contribution towards the pension fund, in accordance with sect. 15 of the Police Act 1890.

The sum of 78. was paid without any deduction for pension being made therefrom.

Upperton signed the weekly pay list, which contained one column headed "Amount of Pay," and another column headed "Allowance for

Special Duties." The sum of 328. appeared in the former column, and the sum of 78. in the latter, along with allowances in lieu of coals and boots.

By sect. 15 of the Police Act 1890 the police authority of every police force is authorised and directed to deduct from the pay of every constable such stoppage during sickness as may be provided by the regulations respecting the force.

In the metropolitan police force, during absence owing to sickness, 1s. a day is usually stopped from the ordinary pay of a constable, and in the case of a constable employed on special duty and receiving a special allowance in respect thereof, that allowance is usually stopped in addition to the stoppage of 18. a day. During the period of his absence the amount of the said allowance would be paid to the constable who actually performed the special duty.

Upon Upperton's retirement the police authority, the respondents, awarded him a pension of 551. 98. 4d. a year, being fifty-two times the sum of 21s. 4d., which was two-thirds of the sum of 32s.

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CT. OF APP.]

UPPERTON v. RIDLEY AND ANOTHER.

On behalf of Upperton it was contended (a) that he was entitled to receive a pension at the rate of two-thirds of 39s. a week, and that the sum of 78., which was expressly voted by Parliament as a special duty allowance and had been paid to him for a period of nearly five years, was pay" within the meaning of sched. 1, part 1, of the Police Act 1890, and that the purpose of that Act would be defeated if a police authority could treat as non-pensionable a special duty allowance attached to a permanent appointment; (b) that his "annual pay was 365 times his daily pay, and not fifty-two times his weekly pay.

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On behalf of the respondents it was contended (a) that Upperton was only entitled to a pension at the rate of two-thirds of 32s. a week, and that the sum of 78. was not part of his pay as a constable, but was only an allowance in the nature of a gratuity, and that the said sum of 78. was properly not taken into account in arriving at the pension due to him; (b) that his "annual pay meant fifty-two times his weekly pay and no

more.

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The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Whether the sum of 78., though called an allowance, was "pay within the meaning of the Police Act 1890, and as such ought to have been taken into consideration in arriving at the amount of the pension due to Upperton; (2) whether "annual pay" means fifty-two times the weekly pay, or 365 times the daily pay.

The Metropolitan Police Act 1829 (10 Geo. 4, c. 44) provides:

Sect. 12. The receiver, out of the moneys so received by him, shall be allowed a yearly salary not exceeding seven hundred pounds, to be payable quarterly; and the receiver, out of the same moneys, shall from time to time pay to the persons belonging to the police force appointed under this Act, such salaries, wages and allowances, and at such periods, as one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State shall direct.

The Police Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 45) provides:

Sect. 1. Sabject to the provisions of this Act every constable in a police force :-(a) If he has completed not less than twenty-five years' approved service, and, where a limit of age is prescribed by the pension scale in force under this Act, is of an age not less than the age so prescribed, shall, on the expiration of such time not exceeding four months after he has given written notice to the police authority of his desire to retire as the police authority may fix, be entitled without a medical certificate to retire and receive a pension for life. Sect. 3.-(1) The pensions shall be in accordance with the pension scale for the force. (2) The pension scale for a police force shall be (a) as regards ordinary pensions, a fixed scale adopted by the police authority within the maximum and minimum limits set forth in part 1 of the first schedule to this Act.

Sect 11. In any of the following cases- -(b) Where a constable claims a pension under this Act as of right and the police authority do not admit the claim the constable may apply to the police authority for a reconsideration of the claim to the pension and if aggrieved by the decision upon such reconsideration may apply to the next practicable court of quarter sessions and that court, after inquiry into the case, may make such order in the matter as appears to the court just, which order shall be final.

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Sect. 15. The police authority of every police force shall deduct from the pay of every constable in the

[CT. OF APP. force-(a) Sams at a rate not exceeding two and a half per cent. per annum on his pay.

Sect. 16.-(1) There shall be a pension fund of every police force, and there shall be carried to that fund (a) The deductions made in pursuance of this Act

rom the pay of the constables in the force.

Sched. 1, part 1.-Ordinary Pensions : (1) The pension to a constable on retirement shall be within the maximum and minimum limits following, that is to say (c) If he has completed twenty-five years' approved service, an annual sum not less than thirty-sixtieths nor more than thirty-one-fiftieths of his annual pay, with an addition of not less than one-sixtieth nor more than three-fiftieths of his annual pay for every completed year of approved service above twenty-five years, so, however, that the pension shall not exceed two-thirds of the annual pay.

Sched. 1, part 3, rule 11.-In estimating any pension, gratuity, or allowance for the purposes of this Act —(a) a pension or gratuity to a constable shall be calculated according to the amount of his annual pay at the date of his retirement.

Under the scale of pay for metropolitan police constables directed by the Home Secretary, and in force at the date of Upperton's retirement, his pay was 328. a week only.

The pension scale adopted for the metropolitan police force is the maximum limit allowed by sched. 1, part 1, of the Police Act 1890.

The Divisional Court (Channell and Bucknill, JJ.) held that" annual pay " meant three hundred and sixty-five times the daily pay and not fiftytwo times the amount of the weekly pay. Upon the other question the learned judges differed in opinion, Channell, J. holding that the 78. a week was not part of the "annual pay" of the constable and Bucknill, J. that it was. Upon this point, therefore, the appeal was dismissed (19 Mag. Cas. 495; 82 L. T. Rep. 233).

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Upperton appealed.

E. H. Pickersgill for the appellant.-The question on this appeal turns upon the meaning of "annual pay" in the 1st schedule to the Police Act 1890. The pension, to which the police constable is entitled as of right, is to be calculated according to the amount of his "annual pay" at the date of his retirement. This expression" annual pay" is used for the first time in this Act, which contains no definition of 'pay" or "annual pay." The statute which provides for the pay of constables in the metropolitan police force is 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 12, which provides that the receiver shall pay to the members of the force "such salaries, wages, and allowances, and at such periods, as one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State shall direct," and in the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 44), s. 22, the expression used is pay of every constable"; the expression "pay" therefore seems to be used to include the salaries, wages, and allowances," provided for in the earlier Act. This special allowance of 7s. a week was part of the constable's pay. increased remuneration given to the constable in recognition of his previous good conduct and as recompense for losing his chance of promotion. His employment on special services in the House of Lords was permanent, and the allowance of 78. a week was permanent. The money out of which this special allowance was paid was provided by Parliament expressly for the purpose of paying these allowances. Upon being appointed on

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CT. OF APP.]

UPPERTON v. RIDLEY AND ANOTHER.

special duty at the House of Lords a new contract was made with the constable to pay him his former ordinary rate of pay, and also this further special amount in respect of the special duty. The whole amount, ordinary pay and special allowance, then became his "pay," and it was his "annual" pay, for it continued for several years. The fact that no deduction was made from the special allowance for the pension fund was the fault of the police authority, and the constable ought not to be prejudiced by that omission of the police authority to make the proper deductions. If this constable had not been placed on this special duty he might have been promoted and so obtained increased pay which would have increased the amount of his pension, and he ought not to be placed in a worse position as regards pension because he took this special duty with a special allowance, and thereby lost his chance of promotion. "Pay" is a reward or remuneration for services rendered, and in this case the constable secured the whole of the 7s. a week as remuneration for his services; it was not an allowance to meet expenses or disbursements.

Macmorran, Q.C. and J. P. Grain for the respondents. This special allowance was not a part of the pay" of the constable, within the meaning of the Act. The scale of pay of metropolitan police constables is that which is authorised and directed by the Home Secretary, pursuant to sect. 12 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829. By that scale the "pay" of this constable at the date of his retirement was 328. a week only, and did not include this special allowance. The contract under which the constable was employed entitled him to "pay" only in accordance with the scale; he was bound to serve wherever he might be sent; he had no option as to performing, and no permanency of employment, in respect of the special duties at the House of Lords; he had no right to claim payment of the special allowance, which was merely a gratuity paid out of a fund provided by Parliament. This special allowance was never treated as "pay" by anyone, as appears from the pay lists signed by the constable. [They were stopped by the Court.]

SMITH, M.R.-This is an appeal from the Queen's Bench Division in a case in which the two learned judges differed. The question arises as to the meaning in the Police Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 45) of the words "annual pay," according to the amount of which the pension of a police constable is to be calculated. The amount of the pension depends upon the amount of the "annual pay" of the constable. In order to see what is the position of this police constable in the metropolitan police force it appears to me to be necessary to consider carefully the document which the police constable signed in order to see what are the terms in respect of "pay" under which he served. When that document is looked at, it seems to me to be perfectly clear that the conditions under which the police constable served in the metropolitan police force were that he was to receive 248. a week while in the first class, and to advance to 27s. and 30s. a week in the higher classes. This last sum of 30s. a week was subsequently increased to 32s. a week by the direction of the Home Secretary, the proper authority for that purpose. Under those circumstances

[CT. OF APP.

what is the amount of pension to which the police constable is entitled ? It seems to me, from this document which he signed, that the pay there contracted and stipulated for was the prescribed amount as directed by the Home Secretary and nothing else. Over and above the sum of 32s. a week, the pay according to the prescribed scale, what was the police constable entitled to sue for as the reward for his services? There was no contract under which he could claim or receive the additional sum of 78. a week. In my opinion, upon considering the statutes and documents, there was nothing whatever to entitle the police constable to any pay over and above the different sums stated in the scale directed by the Secretary of State. The case, however, by no means rests there, because there is in the special case this very material statement: "It was stated in evidence by Mr. Bathurst, chief clerk to the Commissioners of Police, that "the commissioners were under no obligation to pay the appellant the additional sum of 78., even while he remained on special service, though that is done partly as a recognition of the good conduct for which a constable is placed on special service, and partly because by being withdrawn from ordinary duty he loses to some extent his chance of promotion." Therefore, this police constable, who asserts that he is entitled to have taken into consideration as part of his pay this sum of 78. a week, cannot show any contract to pay that sum, and the above paragraph of the special case shows that there was no obligation to pay that sum. Again, what has been the practice for many years with respect to this special allowance in the police force? It appears from the pay sheets that it has been the practice for many years to treat this as a gratuity or special allowance, but not as pay. If it had been treated as pay, there must have been made a deduction from the 7s. a week for the pension fund in accordance with the provisions of sect. 15 of the Police Act 1890; but this deduction was never made. In my opinion, this sum of 78. a week was not pay at all within the meaning of the Act. I agree, therefore, with the judgment of Channell, J. in the court below, and I think that this appeal must be dismissed.

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COLLINS, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. I would have been very glad to be able to differ from the judgment of Channell, J. in this case if it were possible to do so, because of the long and meritorious service of this good and respectable police constable. His right, however, to pension depends upon the terms of the Act of Parlia ment, and the amount of the pension must be a certain proportion of his “annual pay at the date of his retirement. Now, the person who alone can determine the amount of the annual pay of a police constable in the metropolitan police force is the Secretary of State. Sect. 12 of 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, provides that "the receiver shall from time to time pay to the persons belonging to the police force appointed under this Act such salaries, wages, and allowances, and at such periods, as one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State shall direct," and that provision does not appear to have been since altered. The only evidence before us upon which we are entitled to act is that the scale of pay which was set out in the document signed by the police constable himself was the scale of pay directed by the

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