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K.B. Div.] ing steps by court after court. As the law now stands under the cases that have been referred to, if a parish be divided into two parishes, each different from the original parish and described by a different name, a settlement in the original parish disappears with the parish. It must be borne in mind that the order which has been made by the Local Government Board in this and many other cases was made apparently with the intention of preventing the application of the decision in those cases. The order is made for the maintaining of the old parish with the addition to it of the small slip taken from the other parish. The effect of the argument which has been addressed to us by Mr. Avory would be that both the parish of West Ham and the parish of Wanstead disappeared by reason of the order. To my mind it is clear that the order was framed in such a way as to prevent the possibility of any such result. I therefore agree that the appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

WAKEFIELD CORPORATION (apps.) v. COOKE AND OTHERS (resps.).

Solicitors for the union, Hillearys.
Solicitor for the London County Council,
W. A. Blaxland.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION.
Nov. 22 and Dec. 16, 1901.
(Before Lord Alverstone, C.J., DARLING and
CHANNELL, JJ.)

WAKEFIELD CORPORATION (apps.) v. COOKE AND
OTHERS (resps.). (a)

Local Government-Private street works-Sum-
mary jurisdiction of justices-Decision that road
is highway repairable by inhabitants at large-
No estoppel-Wakefield Corporation Act 1887
(50 & 51 Vict. c. lxxi.), ss. 29, 30, 31-Private
Street Works Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), ss. 6,
7, 8.

The decision of justices on an objection taken
under sect. 30 of the Wakefield Corporation Act
1892 (which is identical with sect. 7 of the
Private Street Works Act 1892), that the street in
which the works are proposed to be executed is a
highway repairable by the inhabitants at large,
is not a judgment in rem and will not estop the
local authority from subsequently claiming the
amount of an apportionment in respect of the
same street under proceedings subsequently
taken.

Effect and scope of sects. 29, 30, and 31 of the
Wakefield Corporation Act 1887 (corresponding
to sects. 6, 7, and 8 of the Private Street Works
Act 1892) considered.

Reg. v. Hutchins (44 L. T. Rep. 364; 6 Q. B. Div.
300) followed.

CASE stated by justices.

At a meeting of the general works committee of the corporation of Wakefield, held on the 26th Nov., the following resolution was passed:

That in pursuance of sect. 29 of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887 the corporation do the following private street works in the private street known as Sludge-lane in this city, extending from Eastmoor-road for a distance of 350 yards, namely, sewer, level, metal (a) Reported by J. ANDREW STRAHAN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

[K.B. DIV.

flag, kerb, channel, and make good such street; and further, that the city surveyor be directed to prepare as respects such street, and in accordance with the provisions of the said Act-(a) a specification of the private street works above referred to with plans and sections; (b) an estimate of the probable expenses of the works; and (c) a provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the premises liable to be charged therewith under the said Act.

This resolution having been duly approved of at a meeting of the council, the city surveyor on the 11th Jan. 1901 laid before a meeting of the general works committee the specification, plans, and sections, estimate and provisional apportionment which he had been directed to prepare. The committee passed a resolution recommending the council to pass a resolution approving of such specification, plans and sections, estimate and provisional apportionment, and to order that such resolution be published and copies thereof served in the manner required by the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887.

On the 12th Feb. 1901 the corporation resolved that the specification of the private street works required to be carried out in that portion of the private street known as Sludge-lane, extending from the Eastmoor-road for a distance of 350 yards, together with the plans and sections of such works, the estimate of the probable expenses, and the provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the premises liable to be charged therewith, which had been prepared by the city surveyor, were approved as required by the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887; and, further, that this resolution was to be published and copies of it served in the manner required by that Act.

This resolution was duly published and copies of it served on the owners of the premises shown as liable to be charged in the provisional apportionment as required by the Act.

Alfred Green, George Stubley, Elizabeth Cradock, Robert Cockell, J. B. Cooke, G. T. Kenworthy, C. B. L. Fernandes, and G. B. Firth, the owners of premises shown in the provisional apportionment as liable to be charged with part of the expenses of the works to be carried out in the street, by separate notices served upon the corporation on the 16th March 1901, objected to the proposals of the corporation on the grounds (a) that Sludge-lane was not and did not form part of a street within the meaning of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887; and (b) that Sludge. lane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants of the city of Wakefield at large.

The county council of the West Riding of Yorkshire, the owners of certain other premises shown in the provisional apportionment, by notice served on the corporation on the same day, objected to the proposals of the corporation on similar grounds, with the following additional ground, that the street was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, and was so found to be by the justices of the city of Wakefield at a court of summary jurisdiction held at Wakefield on the 6th Jan. 1898.

The month during which owners of premises shown in the provisional apportionment as liable with any part of the expenses of executing the works could by written notice object to the proposals of the corporation expired on the 23rd March 1901.

K.B. Div.]

WAKEFIELD CORPORATION (apps.) v. CooкE AND OTHERS (resps.).

Messrs. Claude Leathem and Co., as solicitors and agents for the acting executors and trustees of the will of Thomas Nichols, one of the owners shown in the provisional apportionment as liable to be charged with some part of the expenses of the works proposed to be carried out in Sludge-lane, by notice served on the corporation on the 20th April 1901 objected to the proposals of the corporation on similar grounds.

On the 10th July 1901 the corporation, in pursuance of sect. 31 of the Act, applied to a court of summary jurisdiction in and for the city of Wakefield to appoint a time and place for determining the matter of all the objections, and the 25th July 1901 at the Town Hall at Wakefield was appointed for the purposes. At the hearing it was admitted that all the resolutions, plans, and rotices had been passed, prepared, published, and given by the corporation in accordance with the provisions of the Act, but the objectors objected that the matter was res judicata, and a certified copy of an order of three justices of the city of Wakefield dated the 6th Jan. 1898, which had not been appealed against and remained in full force and effect, was put in.

The order was as follows:

In the city of Wakefield, before the court of summary jurisdiction sitting at the Town Hall in the said city, Jan. 6, 1898.-Whereas the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of the city of Wakefield in exercise of the powers vested in them by virtue of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887 at a meeting duly held and convened on March 9, 1897, passed a resolution of which the following is a copy: "That the specification of the private street works required to be carried out in the private street commonly known as Sludge-lane in this city, together with the plans and sections of such works, the estimate of the probable expenses of such works, and the provisional appropriation of the estimated expenses among the premises liable to be charged therewith which had been prepared by the city surveyor in accordance with instructions given to him now laid before this meeting, be approved as required by the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887; and, further, that this resolution was duly published, and copies of such resolution were duly served on the owners of the premises shown as liable to be charged in the said provisional apportionment, and whereas in accordance with the provisions of the said Act the following owners namely, Frederick Simpson, J. B. Cooke, George Stubley, Thomas Nichols, Robert Cockell, Alfred Green, G. F. Firth, the county council of the West Riding of Yorkshire, and the executors of the late Benjamin Watson-objected to the proposals of the corporation on (inter alia) the following ground: That Sludge-lane is a highway repairable by the inhabitants of the city of Wakefield at large; and whereas as further required by the said Act the corporation

made application

to two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace acting in and for the city of Wakefield to appoint a time

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and place for hearing the matter of the said objections and whereas two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace acting in and for the said city did appoint Monday, December 20, 1897 for hearing and determining the matter of the said objections, from which day the hearing and determining of the matter of the said objections as aforesaid hath been adjourned to this day, and whereas we, the undersigned, sitting as a court of summary jurisdiction in pursuance of sect. 31 of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887, to hear and determine the matter of all such objections as aforesaid, do hereby determine that the following objection—namely, that Sludge-lane is a highway repairable by the inhabitants of the city of Wakefield at large-made by or on behalf of the said Frederick Simpson, J. B. Cooke, George Stubley, Thomas

[K.B. DIV.

Nichols, Robert Cockell, Alfred Green, G. F. Firth, the county council of the West Riding of Yorkshire, and the executors of the late Benjamin Watson, is a good and valid objection.""

It was admitted as a fact by all the parties that the resolutions, plans, notices, and objections referred to in the application of the 10th July 1901 related not only to so much of Sludge-lane as was the subject-matter of the proceedings of the 6th Jan. 1898, but also to an additional length of eighty yards in a straight line and continuous therewith.

The same objectors were present or represented at the hearing on the 25th July 1901 as were present or represented at the hearing on the 6th Jan. 1898, except Frederick Simpson and Thomas Nichols. Elizabeth Cradock, who objected on the 25th July 1901, was not an objector on the 6th Jan. 1898, although then owning property the subject-matter of the proceedings. The property belonging to Frederick Simpson on the 6th Jan. 1898 was included in the proceedings of the 25th July 1901 as belonging to George Stubley, by Stubley having purchased the property from Frederick Simpson in the meantime. Thomas Nichols had died between the 6th Jan. 1898 and the 25th July 1901, and his executors, as owners of the property included in the proceedings of the 6th Jan. 1898, were represented at the hearing on the 25th July 1901. The property belonging on the 6th Jan. 1898 to the executors of Benjamin Watson had been acquired from them by G. T. Kenworthy and C. B. L. Fernandes, and was included in the proceedings of the 25th July 1901, at which they appeared. It was admitted that C. B. L. Fernandes was also present at the hearing on the 6th Jan. 1898, and that he expressed his willingness to be bound by the proceedings on that occasion.

It was contended on behalf of the objectors that as the court of summary jurisdiction had on the 6th Jan. 1898 found as a fact that Sludge-lane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, and had so determined, and that as the subject-matter, namely, as to whether Sludgelane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, and the parties, namely, the corporation on the one hand and the owners of the property abutting on the road in question on the other, were the same, the matter was res judicata, and the corporation were estopped in the present proceedings by the determination of the court on the 6th Jan. 1898.

It was contended for the corporation, on the authority of Reg. v. Hutchins (44 L. T. Rep. 364; 6 Q. B. Div. 300), that the court of the 6th Jan. 1898 had no power to try the question whether Sludge-lane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, and that the subject-matter was not the same by reason of the corporation having taken a greater length of road than on the previous occasion, and that the parties were not the same, since some of the property had changed hands since the 6th Jan. 1898, and one objected who did not object then. The corporation further urged that since the 6th Jan. 1898 they had discovered and intended to adduce in evidence certain additional facts relevant to the objection that Sludge-lane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large.

owner

The justices decided that the matter was res judicatu, and declined to hear any evidence or go

K.B. Div.]

WAKEFIELD CORPORATION (apps.) v. COOKE AND OTHERS (resps.). [K.B. Div.

into the merits of the objection, but stated this case for the opinion of the court.

The sections of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. lxxi.) relevant to the question in the case are the following, which are practically identical with sects. 6, 7, and 8 of the Private Street Works Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57):

Sect. 29 (1). Where any street or part of a street is not sewered, levelled, paved, metalled, flagged, kerbed, channelled, made good, and lighted to the satisfaction of the corporation, the corporation may from time to time resolve with respect to such street or part of a street to do any one or more of the following works (in this Act called private street works), that is to say, to sewer, level, pave, metal, flag, kerb, channel, or make good, or to provide proper means for lighting such street or part of a street, and the expenses incurred by the corporation in executing private street works shall be apportioned (subject as in this Act mentioned) on the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on such street or part of a street. Any such resolution may include several streets or parts of streets, or may be limited to any part or parts of a street. (2) The survey or shall prepare as respects such street or part of a street (a) a specification of the private street works referred to in the resolution, with plans and sections (if applicable); (b) an estimate of the probable expenses of the works; (c) a provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses among the premises liable to be charged therewith under this Act. specifications, plans, sections, estimates, and provisional apportionments shall comprise the particulars prescribed in part 1 of the 2nd schedule to this Act and shall be submitted to the corporation, who may by resolution approve the same respectively with or without modifi. cation or addition as they think fit. (3) The resolution approving the specifications, plans, and sections (if any), estimates, and provisional apportionments shall be published in the manner prescribed in part 2 of the 2nd schedule of this Act, and copies thereof shall be served on the owners of the premises shown as liable to be charged in the provisional apportionment. During one month from the date of the first publication the approved specifications, plans, and sections (if any), estimates, and provisional apportionments (or copies thereof certified by the surveyor), shall be kept deposited at the corporation offices, and shall be open to inspection at all reasonable times.

Such

Sect. 30. Daring the said month any owner of any premises shown in a provisional apportionment as liable to be charged with any part of the expenses of executing the works may by written notice served on the corporation object to the proposals of the corporation on any of the following grounds (that is to say) (a) that an alleged street or part of a street is not and does not form part of a street within the meaning of this Act; (b) that a street or part of a street is (in whole or in part) a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large.

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Sect. 31. (1) The corporation at any time after the expiration of the said month may apply to a court of summary jurisdiction to appoint a time for determining the matter of all objections made as in this Act mentioned, and shall publish a notice of the time and place appointed, and copies of such notice shall be served upon the objectors, and at the time and place so appointed any such court may proceed to hear and determine the matter of all such objections in the same manner as nearly as may be and with the same powers and subject to the same provisions with respect to stating a case as if the corporation were proceeding summarily against the objectors to enforce payment of a sum of money summarily recoverable. The court may quash in whole or in part or may amend the resolution, plans, sections, estimates and provisional apportionments, or any of them, on the application either of any

objector or of the corporation. The court may if it thinks fit adjourn the hearing and direct any further notices to be given. (2) No objection which could be made under this Act shall be otherwise made or allowed in any court proceeding or manner whatsoever. (3) The costs of any proceedings before a court of summary jarisdiction in relation to objections under this Act shall be in the discretion of the court, and the court shall have power if it thinks fit to direct that the whole or any part of such costs ordered to be paid by an objector or objectors shall be paid in the first instance by the corporation and charged as part of the expenses of the works on the premises of the objector or objectors in such proportion as may appear just.

Macmorran, K.C. (Senior with him).—The only question the justices were entitled to decide in 1898 was whether the resolution brought before them was valid or not. They decided that it was not valid on the ground that Sludge-lane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. This ground of their decision was a mere finding of fact, and was in no sense a judgment at all, or at any rate a judgment in rem, settling finally the status of Sludge-lane. The justices had no jurisdiction to decide that question. Therefore the decision as to the resolution in 1898 in no respect made the matter now in question res judicata (Reg. v. Hutchins, sup.) But even if the justices had jurisdiction to decide the matter, their decision would only be binding between the same parties, and so far as the subject-matter of the proceedings was the same. Here the parties are different, and the subject-matter is not the same portion of Sludge-lane, but the same portion and a further part of that lane.

Danckwerts, K.C. (Alexander Glen with him) for some of the objectors.-Reg. v. Hutchins (sup.) was a decision upon the procedure established by sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875. In that section no express power is given to the justices to decide whether a road is or is not a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. All they are entitled to do is to decide whether or not the expenses sued for are recoverable. But under sects. 29 to 31 of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887 jurisdiction is expressly given to the justices to decide that question. It is made an objection which may be expressly set up, and which the justices may expressly decide, and in sect. 31 (2) their decision is to be final. It is not an incidental question, but the question decided by the justices. Their decision, then, is final as to the status of the road, and estops the reopening of the question in any way. He referred to

Reg. v. Inhabitants of Hartington, 4 E. & B. 780; Reg. v. Inhabitants of Haughton, 1 E. & B. 501; Reg. v. Blakemore, 2 Den. C. C. 410. Compston for other objectors.

Macmorran, K.C. in reply.-Neither the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887 nor the Private Streets Act 1892 altered or was intended to alter the law as laid down in Reg. v. Hutchins (sup.). The object of both was to enable objections to be taken by persons liable before the works were executed and the expenses incurred. He referred to

Twickenham Urban Council v. Munton, 81 L. T.
Rep. 136; (1899) 2 Ch. 603.

Dec. 16.-Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J. read the following judgment of the court:-This is an appeal from a decision of the justices of the city of Wakefield deciding that certain proceed

K.B. Div.] WAKEFIELD CORPORATION (apps.) v. COOKE AND OTHERS (resps.).

ings under the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887, for providing for the expense of paving, metalling, and channelling a certain street of the city were invalid on the ground that in similar proceedings taken in the year 1898 it had been decided by the justices having jurisdiction in the matter that the street to which the proceedings relate was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. The matter arises under sects. 29 to 31 of the Wakefield Corporation Act 1887, which contain provisions analogous to those in sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875, and practically identical with sects. 6 to 8 of the Private Street Works Act 1892. The point raised for our decision is whether a finding of the magistrate taken under sect. 30 of the Act of 1887 to the effect that a street is a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large is conclusive in any subsequent proceedings for apportionment, whoever may be the parties to the subsequent proceedings. In the case of Reg. v. Hutchins (sup.) it was decided by the Court of Appeal that an adjudication by justices upon a summons to recover the amount of an apportion. ment made under sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875, that a street was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, did not prevent the local authority from subsequently claiming the amount of apportionment in respect of the same street under proceedings subsequently taken. It was, however, contended before us that the provisions of sect. 31 of the Act of 1887 and the corresponding provisions of sect. 8 of the Private Street Works Act 1892 had altered the law in this respect, that proceedings under these sections were of the nature of proceedings in rem, that they affected the status of the street, or that at least they were conclusive and final as between the corporation and the person who either themselves or their predecessors in title had been parties to the earlier proceedings. This contention was based upon the following among other grounds: that under sub-sect. (b) of sect. 30 the owner of premises shown in a provisional apportionment liable to be charged would object upon, among other grounds, that the street in question was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, and that under subsect. 1 of sect. 31 a court of summary jurisdiction was to appoint a time for determining the matter of all objections, and might proceed to hear and determine the matter of all such objections in the same manner as if the corporation were proceeding summarily against the objectors to enforce payment; and. further, that by sub-sect. 2 of the same section, by which it was provided that "no objection which could be made under this shall be otherwise made or allowed in any suit, proceeding, or manner whatsoever." It was also argued that these provisions show that any objection which could be raised by objectors was to be determined once and for all, not only as regards the apportionment then under consideration, but for the purposes of any future proceedings under the same section. The consequences of such a view are very far-reaching. For example, although some only of the owners liable to be charged may have taken objections, the finding would be held binding upon other owners or persons entitled to object who were no parties to the proceedings. If the justices had power to determine finally and as against all parties that a street was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, they must have power to determine that it was not, and in

[K.B. DIV.

that case a serious injury might be inflicted, because other owners might be in a position to produce quite different evidence from that on which the decision proceeded. Still, the consequences of giving effect to this contention would not be sufficient to prevent us from so holding if the language of the section fairly read leads to that conclusion. But, in our opinion, the provisions were enacted with an entirely different object, and not, as was suggested, with the view of altering the law as laid down in the case of Reg. v. Hutchins (sup.). We think that the objects of sects. 30 and 31 were to enable objectors to raise objections to the apportionment before any expense had been incurred, and also to enable preliminary points to be determined at an early stage, which could not be raised upon a summons to recover the apportioned amount. Under sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875, the urban authority were compelled, before they could take proceedings to recover the amount, to execute the work. The section in question sect. 30 of the Act of 1887-allows owners to raise questions as to the character of the proposed works, the propriety of the estimate, the sufficiency of the plans, and other matters which, if they are to be raised at all, it is convenient that they should be raised before the works are executed. We think that the real jurisdiction given to the justices is that contained in the concluding words of sub-sect. (1) of sect. 31, to "quash in whole or part or may amend the resolutions, plans, sections, estimates, and provisional apportionments," and that the earlier words, "appoint a time for determining the matter of all objections," and the words "and shall proceed to hear and determine the matter of all such objections," are only intended to enable the justices to determine the questions which, as provided by sect. 30, may be raised by the persons entitled to object. This determination enables the justices to quash or amend or confirm the resolutions, plans, estimates, and provisional apportionments. In this view the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Hutchins applies to this case, and we think that the objection taken on behalf of the objectors, that there has been a previous determination that the street in question was a highway repairable by the inhabitants of the city at large, was no bar to proceedings taken in this case. It is unnecessary to consider the points which were raised on behalf of the appellants.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitors for the appellants, Sharpe, Parker, and Co., for C. J. Hudson, Town Clerk, Wakefield. Solicitors for the first objectors, Seaton F. Taylor, for J. B. Cooke, Wakefield.

Solicitors for the second objectors, Radford and Frankland, for C. W. L. Fernandes, Wakefield.

K.B.] Re ARBIT. RURAL DIST. COUNCIL OF ST. THOMAS & HEAVITREE URB. DIST. COUNCIL. [K.B

Thursday, Jan. 30, 1902.

(Before WRIGHT, J.)

Re AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL OF ST. THOMAS AND THE HEAVITREE URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL. (a) Local government-Severance of part of district -Constitution of new district-Adjustment of liabilities-Adjustment and agreement as to existing accounts-Right to claim subsequent adjustment for loss by severance-Local Government Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), s. 57, sub-s. 1 (c.)-Local Government Act 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), ss. 54, 68, sub-s. 1. By an order made by a county council under sect. 57 of the Local Government Act 1888, a part of a rural district was severed from the district and constituted a new urban district, and all necessary adjustments were to be made in accordance with the provisions of sect. 68 of the Local Government Act 1894. An adjustment of accounts was then made and an agreement entered into between the councils providing for the payment of certain sums in respect of matters therein specified, and these sums were paid. Subsequently, the rural council, finding that the severance was a pecuniary loss to them, requested the urban council to come to an agreement as to the amount to be paid for such loss, but the councils were unable to agree and an arbitrator was appointed to determine the question of adjustment of the financial loss sustained by the rural district by the severance of the urban district, in so far as such loss was not determined by the prior agreement. No claim for such loss was included in the prior agreement:

Held, that the adjustment claimed by the rural council was an adjustment within the meaning of sect. 68 of the Local Government Act 1894, although the severed portion had been formed into an urban district of itself and had not been transferred to an existing district; and further that the claim to have such adjustment was not barred by the prior agreement between the councils.

AWARD of an arbitrator stated in the form of a special case.

By the County of Devon (Heavitree) Confirmation Order 1896, being an order under the seal of the Local Government Board confirming, subject to certain modifications and alterations therein appearing, an order of the County Council of Devon, it was ordered that as and from the 24th June 1896 the parish of Heavitree, which formed part of the St. Thomas' Rural District Council, should be severed from the St. Thomas' Rural District, and duly constituted an urban district to be called the Heavitree Urban District; and it was further ordered in clause 7 of the order that "all adjustments necessary in consequence of this order shall be made in the manner provided by and in accordance with the provisions contained in sect. 68 of the Local Government Act 1894, and any sum required to be paid for the purpose of an adjustment or of any award by any authority affected by this order, may be paid out of such funds as shall be determined by the agreement or by the arbitrator."

By an agreement dated the 5th Nov. 1897 and (a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

made between the rural district council of St. Thomas (therein called the rural council) in the county of Devon of the one part and the urban district council of Heavitree (therein called the urban council) of the other part, after reciting that the district of the urban council was formerly part of the district of the rural council, but had been severed therefrom, and upon adjustment of the accounts between the two councils there was found to be due from the rural council to the urban council the sum of 9081. 11s. in respect of the highways, and the sum of 441. 88. in respect of the sanitary account, and there was also found to be due from the urban council to the rural council the sum of 31. 10s., being one-sixth part of the amount paid on precept by the rural council to the Exeter Port sanitary authority from the 28th July 1896 to the 30th Sept. 1897, which sums of 9081. 11s. and 441. 8s. had on or before the execution thereof been paid to the urban council, and which sum of 31. 10s. had at the same time been paid to the rural council (the receipt of acknowledged), and after reciting that the rural which sums the two councils thereby respectively council was liable to pay annually the sum of 31. 88. 10d. to the clerk and surveyor of the late Ottery St. Mary Highway Board, and the apportionment of that sum falling to the share of the urban council amounted to 10s. 8d., and the sum of 12s. 5d. in respect thereof up to the 30th Sept. 1897 was due from the urban council to the rural council and had been paid, it was witnessed:

(1) That the urban council thereby released the rural council from all claims in respect of the highways and sanitary accounts respectively, and thereby covenanted and agreed to pay annually to the rural council on the 30th Sept. in every year so long as the same was payable the said sum of 10s. 8d.

(2) The urban council thereby covenanted and agreed with the rural council to pay to them yearly and every year a sum equal to one-sixth of the whole amount paid in that year by the rural council to the Exeter Port sanitary authority.

(3) The rural council thereby covenanted and undertook upon receipt of the said annual payment of 10s. 8d. to discharge from time to time the above sum of 31. 88. 10d., and did thereby release the urban council rom all claims in respect of the sum so paid by the rural council to the Exeter Port sanitary authority as aforesaid.

On the 15th Feb. 1901 the rural district council of St. Thomas by their clerk wrote to the clerk of the urban district council of Heavitree as follows:

I am instructed by this council to write to you as clerk to the Heavitree Urban Council with reference to the loss this rural district has sustained in consequence of the withdrawal of Heavitree from its contributory rateable area by virtue of the order of the county council of March 1896. Experience proves that the loss is considerable, and I beg therefore to invite your council to go into the matter with my council, so that an agreement may be come to under sect. 68 of the Local Government Act 1894, settling the amount which will be paid by Heavitree as compensation for the loss mentioned.

On the 21st Feb. 1901, the urban district council of Heavitree wrote that they had considered the matter with regard to the compensation, and that they did not acknowledge any liability, and that they must therefore decline to accept the invitation of the rural council.

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