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K.B. Div.]

THRELKELD (app.) v. SMITH (resp).

unlawful since the only person lawfully entitled to the deer was Lord Lonsdale, whose property it became when killed. Counsel referred to

Davies v. Powell, Willes, 46;
Blades v. Higgs, 11 H. L. C. 621.

Little in reply.

RIDLEY, J.-This case raises a question of some difficulty, though the facts are simple. The appellant was convicted by the justices under sect. 14 of the Larceny Act 1861, they holding that he had not under the circumstances satisfied them that he had come lawfully into possession of the deer within the meaning of sect. 14. The facts which give rise to the difficulty in the case are as follows: The deer in question was proved to have been one of a herd of deer kept within the forest of Mr. Hasell which had escaped from the forest and was killed by the appellant outside the boundaries of the forest, upon land belonging to Lord Lonsdale. The appellant, not being the owner of the land on which it was killed, cannot set up any right that the deer belonged to him. The question is whether under the circumstances the justices ought to have found that the appellant had satisfied them that "he had lawfully come by such deer." That question depends upon the construction of certain sections of the Larceny Act 1861; but I will first of all state what I believe to be the law with regard to forests. I believe that any offences committed within forests as they were made by the early Norman Kings were treated as capital offences, or were punished severely if the punishment fell short of death. By a series of statutes passed from time to time the severity of the forest laws was mitigated. That being so with regard to offences in respect of animals feræ naturæ committed within a forest, those offences were confined to the limits of a forest. There were, however, certain boundaries wider than the forest which included what we should call the outskirts of the forest, and within those outskirts there were wider rights belonging to those who held the land. The law is, I believe, correctly stated in Coke's Institutes, book 4, ch. 73, where it is said that "when the King's game of the forest do range out of the forest (and purlieu if any be) they belong not to the King, but are at their natural liberty, et occupanti conceduntur." think that occupanti conceduntur means that the person who found them might make himself owner of them. Assuming, however, that it does not mean that, but means that the occupier of the land may kill and take them, it seems to me to show that the rights of the forest ceased at the limits of the purlieu-that those rights were local, and did not extend further. A person who killed

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one of the animals outside the forest did not break the laws of the forest; he may have broken the civil law by taking something which did not belong to him, but he was not liable to criminal proceedings. Within the purlieu there certain other rights which the owner possessed which are stated in Manwood's Forest Laws and in Comyn's Digest, tit. Chase I. It comes to this, that within the forest the owner's right was absolute; that within the purlieu if he caught the animals he might kill them, but he was not entitled to hunt them; and that outside the purlieu he had no rights at all as owner of the forest. That was the law, I believe, as it anciently MAG. CAS.-VOL. XX.

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existed. That law has been gradually altered by statutes, the last of which is the Larceny Act 1861, which we have now to construe. I will first mention sect. 10 of the Act, which deals with the stealing of domestic animals, and makes that an offence punishable with penal servitude. Then sect. 11 provides that "whosoever shall wilfully kill any animal with intent to steal the carcase shall be guilty of felony," and be liable to the same punishment as under sect. 10 if the offence of stealing the animal would have amounted to a felony. That has no application to sect. 12, which immediately follows, although it might be said that it does apply to sect. 13, which makes it a felony to kill deer in the inclosed part of a forest. It is unnecessary, however, to decide that point, for the proceedings in this case are not taken under sect. 12 or sect. 13. Then the statute goes on to deal with deer, and we have to consider the question whether sects. 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 are to be read together as a code to be construed with regard to the previous law upon the subject, or whether these are new provisions which are to be construed without regard to the previous law, and to receive a wider meaning than they would otherwise receive. According to the one interpretation it would be unlawful to do that which the appellant did in this case-to kill outside the limits of a forest a deer which was usually kept within a forest. According to the other interpretation it would not be unlawful, because the deer was not killed within the limits of a forest Now, which is the correct interpretation ? Is it to be supposed that this Act intended to make criminal an act which previously would not have been so regarded? I would hesitate long before accepting such a proposition. It seems to me that it is not probable that it was intended that persons who killed deer escaped from a forest should be treated as if they had done it within the forest. Some stress has been thrown on the word " unlawfully." It seems to me that some light has been thrown on the meaning of that word as used in the Act by the difference between the sections which make it universally an offence to kill domestic animals and sect. 12 which does not make it universally an offence wilfully to kill deer. Up to the time of the passing of this Act it was, as I have said, not unlawful, in the sense of being criminal, to kill deer outside certain boundaries. The word "unlawfully" seems to me to indicate that there may be circumstances under which it might be lawful to kill deer within a forest. being so, may not the word "unlawfully" be sufficiently and properly explained in that way? The word refers to the killing of a deer in a place where it is not lawful to kill it. Then the words "any deer kept or being in an uninclosed part of any forest, chase, or purlieu "have to be interpreted. It has been argued that all of these words must be explained, and that, as the word being" is used, a wider meaning must be given to the word "kept" so as to include deer which are usually kept in the forest but have escaped. These words can, however, be read in this sense —that is, that the statute is to protect the boundaries of a district analogous to an ancient forest, and not the rights of any particular person; that it protects both the animals which are usually kept there and those which happen to stray there. If that is a possible construction of the words, it seems to me that this section may have 2 R

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K.B. Div.]

THRELKELD (app.) v. SMITH (resp.).

a narrower interpretation than that for which the respondent contends. Now, having regard to the previous law on the subject, I think that that is a proper interpretation of sect. 14, and that the narrower construction is the better one. Then comes sect. 13, which relates to deer in an inclosed forest, which we need not consider. Then comes sect. 14, the one now in question, which provides that if any deer shall be found in the possession of any person or on his premises with his knowledge and he does not "satisfy the justice that he came lawfully by such deer" he may be convicted and fined. For the respondent it was argued that the appellant was not lawfully in possession of the deer, because it belonged to Lord Lonsdale under the rule of law that the owner of land has the right to animals feræ naturæ which are on the land, and that no person has a right to kill them and claim them as his without the permission of the owner of the land. Is the word lawfully " used in that sense in this section ? It seems to me that it is not. I think that, having regard to sect. 12, it is used in the same sense as unlawfully" in sect. 12. Therefore, if the person found in possession of the deer can show that he had killed it outside the limits of a forest protected by sect. 12, I think that he shows that he came by it "lawfully " within the meaning of sect. 14. The following sections (sects. 15 and 16) seems to be supplemental sections. They deal with attempts to kill deer and with persons who set snares or enter into a forest with intent to hunt deer. During the argument some stress was laid upon the use of the words "if any person shall enter into any forest" in sect. 16. Under that section no person can be convicted unless he has done something within the forest, chase, or purlieu, whether inclosed or not. I think that furnishes an argument in favour of our view rather than of the contrary view, and shows that all these sections are intended to protect animals at the particular place which is limited by the boundaries of the forest, chase, or purlieu. For these reasons I have come to the conclusion that the justices were wrong, and that they ought to have found that the appellant was lawfully in possession of the deer.

BIGHAM, J.-I am of the same opinion. The respondent supports the conviction first by saying that sect. 14 is of general application, and is not to be read with exclusive reference to the offences created by sects. 12 and 13. In my opinion that is not a sound contention. Having regard to the position of sect. 14 in the Act, coming as it does after the two sections which make it an offence to kill deer and before the two sections which do not relate to the offence of killing, I have no doubt that sect. 14 intends, when it says that a person shall be convicted unless he shall satisfy the justices that he came lawfully by the deer, that the person charged shall not be convicted if he satisfies the justices that an offence has not been committed under sect. 12 or sect. 13. I think that any other construction would lead to absurd consequences, for it would make any person who happened to be in possession of any part of a deer liable to have an information laid against him under sect. 14. I think that sect. 14 is only meant to apply to a person who is in possession of any part of a deer and cannot show that an offence has not been committed in respect thereof under sect. 12 or sect. 13. Then it is contended

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that even if sect. 14 is to be construed as having that narrow application, still it appears from the facts of this case that the appellant was guilty of the offence dealt with by sect. 12 because the deer which he killed was "kept " in the forest. This deer was one which, in a sense, was at one time kept or was in the uninclosed part of a forest, and would therefore appear to be a deer which while it was there came within sect. 12. Now, sect. 12 provides that "whosoever shall unlawfully and wilfully kill any deer

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kept or being in the uninclosed part of any forest" may be convicted and fined. The first question is whether the appellant did "unlawfully" kill this deer. What does "unlawfully' there mean? For the respondent it is said that 'unlawfully" there means in such a way as to violate the private rights of an individual, and that the appellant in killing this deer did violate the private rights of Lord Lonsdale. I will assume that he did do so; but in my opinion that does not make his act unlawful within the meaning of sect. 12. Probably it has at all times been contrary to the criminal law to 'course, hunt, snare, or carry away, or kill or wound" any deer in a forest. From time to time statutes have defined the punishment for that offence. Those statutes have from time to time been repealed and replaced by other statutes, and the last of those statutes is the Larceny Act 1861. Sect. 12 does not create the offence, but refers to it as an existing offence, and, I think, as an existing common law offence. What, then, does sect. 12 mean? It means that if any person violates the criminal law by doing this act, he shall be liable to the prescribed punishment. I interpret the adverb "unlawfully" as used in sect. 12 to mean, not in contravention of the rights of a private individual, but in contravention of the criminal law of the land. I think that the appellant did not commit any unlawful act in that sense. He killed an animal feræ naturæ at a time when to do so was not to commit any crime. He was possibly violating the rights of Lord Lonsdale, but he was not doing anything more, and therefore was not, in my opinion, acting "unlawfully within the meaning of sect. 12. The next question is whether the deer, at the time it was killed, was "kept or being" in the forest within the meaning of sect. 12. It certainly was not in any part of the forest, for it had escaped and was in the manor of Bampton. It was said, however, that although it was not in the forest, it was kept" in the forest. Now, in my opinion, sect. 12 refers only to acts done in the forest itself, and does not refer to anything done outside of the limits of the forest, chase, or purlieu. I think that sect. 12 means that the act must be done in respect of an animal which is either kept there by the owner of the forest or happens to be there. I can put no other construction upon the words "kept or being." I am of opinion therefore-first, that the act done by the appellant was not under the circumstances done unlawfully' within the meaning of sect. 12; and, secondly, that his act was not an offence within this statute, because it was not done in a forest, chase, or purlieu, and also because this deer was not at the time "kept or being" in a forest. The conviction was therefore wrong. I may add that in my opinion the decision in Reg. v. King (sup.) involves the notion

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K.B. Div.]

HOARE AND CO. LIM. v. MAYOR, &c., OF LEWISHAM.

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The proprietor of a public-house with a "draw-up" in front of it which also belonged to him offered by letter to the corporation of the borough to permit such draw-up to be thrown into the public road on condition that his signpost was allowed to continue at a convenient spot on the widened highway, and that certain front gardens belonging to other frontagers were also thrown into the road. The corporation did not reply to this letter, but subsequently it did throw the said gardens and the draw-up into the public road. The proprietor of the publichouse thereupon erected his signpost in the high. way some 45ft. from the site of the draw-up. The corporation threatened to have it removed. Held, that the proprietor was entitled to restrain such removal, as the facts constituted an agreement between him and the corporation in the terms of his letter, and that such agreement was part performed by the action of the corporation and was not an illegal agreement as sanctioning the erection of an obstruction in the highway, but was within the powers conferred on the corporation by sect. 144 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855.

In this case the plaintiffs, a firm of brewers, claimed against the defendants, the mayor and corporation of Lewisham, an injunction to restrain the defendants, their servants, agents, and workmen, from removing a signpost erected by the plaintiffs in High-street, Lewisham, in front of a public house belonging to the plaintiffs, or, in the alternative, a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled on the removal of such signpost by the defendants, to erect and maintain such signpost on some convenient spot in front of the said public-house on the site of what had formerly been a draw up appendant to it.

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Lion and Lamb) and two shops fronting the High-street at Lewisham-and they bring their action against the mayor and corporation of Lewisham, sued as the metropolitan borough of Lewisham. The defendants are the successors of the Lewisham Board of Works, and the streets and highways are vested in them. Before 1899 the whole of the frontage owned by the plaintiffs was occupied by the Lion and Lamb public-house; but in that year the plaintiffs rebuilt the house, and only about half the frontage was occupied by the rebuilt public-house, the remainder of the frontage being taken up by two shops which were built on part of the land on which the Lion and Lamb had stood. In front of the Lion and Lamb was a piece of ground called a draw-up," on which was a trough used for watering horses calling at the Lion and Lamb, and a signpost stood near to the footpath which ran close to the public-house. This draw-up was open to the street, and was divided from the road by a channel, otherwise it was possible for anyone to use it. When the public-house was rebuilt a suggestion of a public improvement was made by Guy, the architect employed by the plaintiffs, in a letter dated the 7th Feb. 1899 to Carline, who was surveyor to the defendants. I had better read the letter which forms part of the case: Feb. 7, 1899.-Dear Sir,-Lion and Lamb site, Lewisham.-I forward you plan showing how above is to be developed-namely, two shops and the public-house at the corner of the private road (widened to some 20ft.)—and I would suggest that a public improvement would be made here. My client will do away with the horse-trough and remove the signpost to the corner, and the present draw-up would be given over to the parish and thrown into the roadway, and if the inclosure in front of Child's ham shop was removed the traffic could then go both ways. present at this spot it is much congested, and will be more so when the Jubilee Memorial is erected. The pathway lowered to the draw-up in front of the public-house (reduced to 40ft.), Messrs. Hoare and Co. would reserve the right for any vehicle to stand thereon. I may add that with the new house there would be no catering for the class of customers formerly encouraged. I should be pleased to meet you on site if you wish it." The suggestion was that the draw-up should be thrown into the public highway, and that further improvement be made by taking in land belonging to other people which stood in front of their houses, and that was adopted afterwards. Letters were repeatedly written by Guy on the subject throughout 1899, to which no answers were sent, and in June of that year, the defendants having taken the draw-up into the public street, the plaintiffs, being unable to get any answer to their repeated applications, placed the signpost at the corner of the street on the

At

Avory, K.C., E. Morten, and H. M. Sturges edge of the footpath. Further correspondence for the plaintiffs.

Mattinson, K.C. and A. H. Poyser for the defendants.

The facts and arguments sufficiently appear from the following written judgment:

LAWRANCE, J.-In this case the plaintiffs are owners of certain houses-viz., a public-house called the Marquis of Salisbury (formerly the

(a) Reported by J. ANDREW STRAHAN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

ensued, which ended in a refusal from the highway authorities to allow the signpost to remain upon the footpath except on the terms that it should be so constructed as to form a sewer ventilator and to be removable at any time by the authority. To this latter stipulation the plaintiffs objected, and in Dec. 1900 the writ in this action was issued. In the meantime the defendants had completed the suggestion of the architect by making the draw-up a part of the High-street

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and by widening the same street by taking into it certain pieces of land which were planted and fenced by the owners of the adjoining properties. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the draw-up was dedicated to the public as highway or whether it continued the private property of the plaintiffs. There was evidence that on two occasions the public authority had placed stone on it, and that on one of those occasions the steam-roller had gone over it. On the other hand, there was a considerable body of evidence which showed that repairs to the draw-up had been repeatedly done by the tenants of the Lion and Lamb and that the trough was repaired by the same tenants. I find, as a fact, that taking the position of the draw-up in question and the manner in which it was used, it never formed part of the highway and was never dedi. cated to the use of the public. This being so, it formed no part of the highway until the offer was made by the plaintiffs' architect so to dedicate it on the terms that the plaintiffs were to have the right to have a signpost near the public. house either on the footpath or in the high road. I think that the offer made by the plaintiffs was accepted by the defendants and that they have partly performed their agreement by taking advantage of that part beneficial to themselves. The defendants' answer to the plaintiffs' claim is (1) that the terms of the said agreement were ultra vires because not under seal; (2) that the erection of the signpost is an obstruction to the highway which the board has no power to authorise; and (3) the Statute of Frauds. As to the last point, it appears to me that the performance by the defendants of their part of the agreement is a sufficient answer. As to the contract not being under seal, it appears to be well established that a corporation may so acquiesce in an informal contract without actually ratifying it as to be bound by it: (Brice on Ultra Vires, 3rd edit., p. 553; Crook v. Corporation of Seaford, 25 L. T. Rep. 1; L. Rep. 6 Ch. App. 551; Leake on Contracts, 3rd edit., p. 515; Laird v. Birkenhead Railway, 1 L. T. Rep. 159; 29 L. J. 218, Ch.; London and Birmingham Railway v. Winter, Cr. & Ph. 57). The principle of the cases cited is, I think, recognised by Cotton, L.J. in Hunt v. Wimbledon Local Board (40 L. T. Rep. 115; 4 C. P. Div. at p. 62) and by Romer, L.J. in Mayor of Oxford v. Crow (69 L. T. Rep. 228; (1893) 3 Ch. 535). Cotching v. Bassett (32 Beav. 101) is an authority for the proposition that communication to a surveyor of an intention to build and acquiescence by his employer in the building is sufficient to raise this equity. I am therefore of opinion that performance of these terms was not ultra vires on the first ground taken by the defendants, and that if no other objection could be sustained the defendants could be restrained from breaking the agreement although it was not made under their common seal. With regard to the second point, that performance is impossible because it involves the defendants' causing or permitting an obstruction in the highway, it appears to me that sect. 144 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120) applies. The section is as follows: "The Metropolitan Board of Works" (now the defendants) shall have power to make, widen, or improve any streets, roads, or ways for facilitating the passage of the traffic between different parts

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of the metropolis, or to contribute or join with any persons in any such improvement as aforesaid, or to take by agreement or gift any lands, rights in land, or property for the purposes aforesaid (or otherwise) for the improvement of the metropolis, on such terms and conditions as they may think fit, and such board, where it appears to them that further powers are required for the purpose of any work for the improvement of the metropolis or the public benefit of the inhabitants thereof, may make application to Parliament for that purpose." I have no doubt that the defendants under this section were enabled to carry out the agreement-namely, to remove the signpost belonging to a private owner, with his consent, to a place 45ft. distant from its original site. So far from creating an obstruction, the result was, by the removal of the trough, to remove a serious obstruction upon the widened road. It follows that, in my opinion, the defendants cannot justify the removal of plaintiffs' signpost and that the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction claimed. Even if sect. 144 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855 does not enable the defendants to maintain the signpost in its present position on the edge of the footpath, it would certainly enable them to maintain it on some portion of the draw-up. It cannot be contended that a private owner of land dedicating it to the public might not annex to his dedication the stipulation that the signpost should be removed to some convenient position upon the land so dedicated. This would entitle the plaintiffs to the declaration they claim in the alternative. But, for the reasons already given, I think they are entitled to the injunction, which I grant with costs.

Judgment accordingly. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Sandilands and Co.; for the defendants, W. W. Young and Son.

:

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, July 18, 1901.

(Before the KING IN PARLIAMENT.)

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REX v. EARL RUSSELL. (a) Criminal law - Bigamy - Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100), s. 57— Jurisdiction.

Sect. 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100) makes bigamy felony "whether the second marriage shall have taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere." Held, that the courts in this country have jurisdiction to try a charge of bigamy against a British subject where the second marriage took place outside the King's dominions.

IN Feb. 1890 Earl Russell married in England a Miss Scott. Differences arose between them, and in Nov. 1890 she filed a petition for a judicial separation on the ground of her husband's cruelty. The case was tried before Sir C. Butt and a special jury in Dec. 1891, when the jury found that the respondent had not been guilty of cruelty, and the petition was dismissed.

They continued to live apart, and in April 1894 the countess filed a petition for the restitution of (a) Reported by C. E. MALDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Jaw.

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conjugal rights. The earl by a counter-claim asked for a judicial separation on the ground that the countess had been guilty of cruelty in persisting, since the first trial, in allegations of a very serious nature against him, knowing them to be false, and he also alleged that the suit for the restitution of conjugal rights was not brought bona fide.

The case was tried before Pollock, B. and a special jury in April 1895, and, in answer to questions, the jury found that the countess had been guilty of cruelty, and was not acting bonâ fide. Pollock, B. thereupon dismissed the suit of the wife, and pronounced a judicial separation in favour of the husband.

The countess appealed, and the Court of Appeal varied the order of Pollock, B., holding that the wife's conduct was sufficient to justify the court in refusing a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights, but did not amount to legal cruelty sufficient to support the husband's claim for a judicial separation (Russell v. Russell, 73 L. T. Rep. 295; (1895) P. 315). The earl appealed to the House of Lords, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed: (77 L. T. Rep. 249; (1897) A. C. 395).

On the 14th April 1900 Earl Russell obtained a divorce from his wife in the State of Nevada, in the United States of America, and on the following day he went through the form of marriage in Nevada with a Mrs. Somerville, a widow. It was admitted that the divorce proceedings in Nevada were not effectual to dissolve the English marriage.

In June 1900 the countess presented a petition for a divorce on the ground of bigamous adultery. The suit was not defended, and a decree nisi was made on the 24th March 1901.

After his return to England Earl Russell was arrested on a charge of bigamy. A true bill was found by the grand jury at the Central Criminal Court, and the Recorder thereupon informed the House of Lords that a true bill for felony had been found against a peer of the realm. The indictment was removed by certiorari, and the Lord Chancellor (the Earl of Halsbury) was duly appointed Lord High Steward to preside at the trial before the House of Lords.

The judges were summoned, and Sir Francis Jeune, President of the Probate Division, and Mathew, Wills, Lawrance, Wright, Kennedy, Bigham, Darling, Cozens-Hardy, Farwell, and Buckley, JJ. attended.

The Attorney-General (Sir R. Finlay, K.C.), the Solicitor-General (Sir E. Carson, K.C.), H. Sutton, R. D. Muir, Bodkin, and G. R. Askwith appeared for the prosecution.

Robson, K.C. and H. Avory, K.C. (C. Matthews, Llewellyn Davies, and Pilcher with them), for the prisoner, took the preliminary objection that there was no jurisdiction in this country to try a prisoner on a charge of bigamy committed abroad. The charge is founded on sect. 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100), which is as follows: "Whosoever, being married, shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable at the discretion of the court to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years

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and not less than three years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years with or without hard labour; and any such offence may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in any county or place in England or Ireland where the offender shall be apprehended or be in custody in the same manner in all respects as if the offence had been actually committed in that county or place, provided that nothing in this section contained shall extend to any second marriage contracted elsewhere than in England and Ireland by any other than a subject of Her Majesty, or to any person marrying a second time whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years then last past, and shall not have been known by such person to be living within that time, or shall extend to any person who, at the time of such second marriage, shall have been divorced from the bond of the first marriage, or to any person whose former marriage shall have been declared void by the sentence of any court of competent jurisdiction." The ordinary construction of the section cannot give jurisdiction to try an offence committed in a foreign country. "Elsewhere" must mean "elsewhere in the King's dominions.'

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the same Act, which deals with murder, the words are "within the Queen's dominions or without," which show what was intended. Similar words in a colonial statute have been so construed in McLeod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (65 L. T. Rep. 321; (1891) A. C. 455) by the Judicial Committee. A similar implied limitation is to be found in other Acts. referred to

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At the conclusion of the argument the Lord High Steward gave judgment on the question of jurisdiction.

The LORD HIGH STEWARD (Halsbury, L.C.). -My Lords: We have the advantage of having His Majesty's judges here. I have been myself of opinion for some time that the matter which has been discussed at such length is really too plain for argument. The statute is plain in its ordinary signification, and the only ground upon which the learned counsel can suggest that we should not give it its ordinary signification is, apparently, because of the existence of other words in other statutes enacted under other circumstances in relation to other crimes. I thought it right to ask His Majesty's judges whether there is anything in the argument suggested which should call for a reply from the Attorney-General; and they are of opinion that there is not, and that it is not necessary to hear the Attorney-General.

Thereupon Lord Russell, under the advice of his counsel, pleaded "Guilty," and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment as an offender of the first division.

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