In England the camailed basinet ceased to be worn when the 15th century was only two or three years old; but the basinet itself continued in use, having, in place of the camail, a gorget of steel plate, encircling and protecting the throat. In Fig. 25 a representation is given of a French basinet, without any camail, but having the acutely-peaked visor or mesail lowered and closed.63

The men-at-arms still used the old weapons of the earlier knights with some comparatively trifling modifications. Their lances, longer and heavier than before, instead of following the earlier usage of having the shaft plain and even from end to end, had their shaft increasing in circumference near the end furthest from the point; and, also at the handle the shaft passed through a small circular shield, or hand-guard (called a vamplate), which was fixed to the shaft of the lance, and was found to be of great use in giving firmness and stability to the grasp, as well as for protecting the hand.

The sword is also seen to differ in a very decided manner from the corresponding weapon of the earlier ages, when, having been made to be used both for striking blows with the edge and thrusting with the point, it could scarcely be considered really efficient for either purpose. Now, the sword, designed to be used only for delivering a thrust with the point becomes a rapier, long and slight and sharply pointed, and thoroughly efficient for the use assigned to it. This description, which is applicable to French swords, does not extend to the contemporaneous English weapons. In England, the earlier swords, even if they were not very perfectly adapted for thrusting, were perfect in the hands that then wielded them for striking blows; and, later, the English swords of the fourteenth century and of the early part of the fifteenth century, while well qualified to inflict wounds with the point, were second to none in their efficiency for the delivery of genuine hard English blows with their edge. The

rapier belongs to another—a later and a perfectly distinct period in the history of English weapons. In France the mace, the hammer amongst weapons, came into more general use when the rapier form of sword began to prevail.

The infantry, in the fourteenth century, began to arise from out of its nothingness, and to assume on the field of battle that importance which from thenceforth was destined continually to increase. The power of this arm was first shown by the foot-soldiers and the archers of England, and this was done by them in a manner that was felt very severely by the French. At Crécy (August 26, 1346), the first lesson was given, and it was a very harsh one. On that day, however, the French army had in its ranks an infantry force which ought to have been able to have decided the victory. This was the corps of Genoese crossbow-men, in the pay of France, which in the first instance was opposed to the English archers. Unhappily, the crossbow-men had to open the discharge of their bolts while their bow-strings were still wet from a heavy shower, and so the missiles would not fly with their proper force. On the other hand, the archers of England had succeeded in keeping their bow-strings dry. When the Genoese desired to retire (and they had a good reason for such a desire), King Philip, who with his knights and men-at-arms was in the rear of the Genoese, would not suffer them to fall back, and, in his violent indignation, as a true (?) warrior of the knightly class, he exclaimed-" Forward, and strike down this useless rabble, who thus are blocking up the way in our front!" And with his squadrons of cavaliers the king charged the army of England, trampling under foot the dead bodies of his own Genoese crossbow-men.

This was far from being the first occasion on which such an incident had taken place; nor was Crécy by any means the first mediæval battle that commenced with the destruction of the foot soldiers by the cavalry of their own army.

When we consider the utter contempt in which the knights held the unfortunate peasantry whom they dragged with them to battle, it certainly does not appear very easy to assign any satisfactory reason for their encumbering themselves with such auxiliaries. Armed as they were, the French footsoldiers could not possibly oppose any effectual resistance to a charge of mounted men-at-arms: and the estimation in which they were held by their noble and knightly comrades is shown but too significantly by their readiness to crush and destroy them, at any moment, on the very field of battle. The presence of these troops, then, if troops they may be called, in the armies of France, can be explained apparently only by the fact, that it was customary to begin a battle with such an attack as the foot-soldiers might be able to make. It is certain that battles then opened with an advance of the French infantry; and it would seem to have been the motive of the commanders in ordering such a movement, to place their own inferior troops in a position where they might cause some little annoyance to the hostile chivalry, and might take off the edge of their fresh energy; but the discomfiture and the destruction also of the infantry, while discharging the duty assigned to them, were regarded as matters of course ; so much so, in fact, that if they fought too well, and accordingly were not routed with sufficient speed to satisfy the impatience of their own knights, those valiant warriors took upon themselves to complete the overthrow of their hapless fellow-countrymen, and, like King Philip at Crécy, delivered their own charge through (or, more probably, over) the shattered ranks in their front.

At Crécy, the Genoese were not quite so easily crushed as the royal chivalry doubtless had expected; indeed, so far were they from submitting with good humour to the charge of their mounted allies, that they actually resisted it. Thereupon a strange, yet disastrous confusion ensued; and thus

were the French knights for a considerable time entangled amongst the Genoese, while the English archers with a sure aim poured upon them their deadly arrows in flights thick as hail. At last, having disposed of the Genoese with no little difficulty, in grievously diminished numbers the French knights fell upon the English archers, and they succeeded in breaking their lines, but not without fresh and very serious loss. Then they closed with the knights of England, and were driven back by them. Such a result was inevitable. Once more, in retreating, the French knights were exposed to the terrible discharge of the English archers; by whom, without any such deliberate intention on their part, the fate of the Genoese was fearfully avenged. So the victory that day was with England.

But there yet remains to be noticed another event that took place at Crécy, which was calculated to enhance most powerfully the importance of infantry, and to secure for that arm a very different reputation with the highest military authorities. At that battle, setting an example altogether new and without precedent, the Prince of Wales (the Black Prince) caused his men-at-arms to dismount; and with the butts of their lances resting on the ground, acting as infantry -infantry with knightly armour and weapons-in obedience to his command, they received and repulsed the charge of the French knights. The complete success of this manœuvre caused it to be imitated for at least two centuries. The French made an experiment, in imitation of the tactics of the Black Prince, at Poitiers (September 19, 1356). Unfortunately for themselves, they applied the excellent example of the Prince in a manner which reversed both his motive and his course of action. The English army had been formed in order of battle on rising ground, difficult of access, and to which indeed there was a practicable approach for an attacking force only by a single defile. By this pass the French men-at

arms were led, dismounted and in their full armour, to attack the English position, and, if possible, to carry it by storm. This was an enterprise of a very different character from the calm and steady formation of his dismounted knights by the Black Prince, for the reception of an impetuous and somewhat disorderly attack. The English archers at Poitiers, well covered by thickets, lined the pass, and with their arrows drove the toiling men-at-arms of France before them in terrible disorder and with frightful loss. Two of the three French divisions broke into hopeless confusion, and fled, without having effected much more than an advance within sight of the enemy. The third division, led by King John (A.D. 1350 to 1363), made an effort to rally and to save the day; but they were assailed, first by the same formidable archers who had routed their comrades, and then by the English knights, who remounted for their charge. Escape for them, consequently, was impossible, and they were either killed or captured almost to a man.

At Cocherel, and at Auray, some time later (May 16, and September 29, 1364), we discover a novel application of the same principles. The men-at-arms dismounted and charged on foot; and in order that they might be able to manage their lances more effectually under such unusual conditions, before they went into action they reduced their length from the customary twelve feet to about five feet. At Auray the English archers showed that they possessed other military qualities, in addition to their well-known ability to shoot with a sure aim and great power from a long distance. Intermixed with the dismounted men-at-arms of their own army, with their swords and cutlasses they fought hand to hand against the lances of the enemy.

It is necessary that we should here explain the unquestionable fact, that at the period under our notice the English foot-soldier, in addition to the superiority of his military