The loss of the Russian army during the preceding campaign of four months, is said to have been only 3,900 men although four fortresses and 262 pieces of cannon had been captured.*

A retrospective glance at the invasion of Turkey will give us a march of about 1,150 miles, the capture of two fortresses, Brailow and Varna, after lengthened sieges, the drawn battle of Marash, and a retreat from before Schumla as well as Silistria as the results of the campaign in European Turkey of 1828. In Asia Minor three fortresses were reduced, and a battle gained before one of them, viz : Akhaltsikh.

The results of the succeeding campaign in European Turkey were the same lengthened march for a portion of the army, followed by one important battle, that of Kulewtscha, the reduction of Silistria, and a coup de main march across the Balkan. In Asia Minor the chain of the Saganlugh was forced in face of the Turkish army, and the subsequent defeat of the Seraskier led to the fall of Erzerúm and of some smaller places. The well-earned distinction of a Field Marshal's bâton awaited Count Paskevitch as the reward of his skilful and successful operations. Count Diebitsch, the leader of the European forces, received, in addition to a similar distinction, the title of Zabalkanski (the crosser of the Balkan), conferred as an acknowledgment of his successful march across that

*La Russie dans l'Asie Mineure, &c., par Felix Fonton, p. 399-532.

hitherto impassable barrier, as well as of his having subsequently opened a communication with the Russian deet in the Mediterranean.

The two empires presented the most striking contrast at the commencement of hostilities, when the height of power and prosperity belonged to one of the contending powers, whilst the state of the other was almost the very

reverse.

The well-equipped army of about 120,000 men, which took the field in May, 1828, does not give a fair estimate of the force employed by Russia on that occasion against Turkey; for, as in the case of the British troops in the Peninsula, its numbers and efficiency were kept up in spite of the serious drain of human life, consequent on the reverses in Bulgaria and the adjoining territory. Moreover, this force had the advantage of operating in a tract of country which was already known by previous campaigns, as well as in consequence of more recent topographical examinations.

On the other hand, Turkey was worse than unprepared to resist the sudden invasion of Russia. An exhausting struggle of six years' duration in Greece had just been terminated at Navarino; and, in addition to the loss of the command of the Euxine by the destruction of her fleet in that unequal contest, the internal state of the country was far from being favourable to its defence. Several projects of reform and improvement occupied the attention of Sultan

Mahmoud at that moment; among which the most prominent was the organization of the army. This serious. undertaking had already been commenced with a bold hand on an enlarged scale. Consequently, the empire was in a transition state, from the iron rule of the Janissaries to the more manageable and milder substitute of an organized force. In commencing this task, the Sultan caused mere lads to be selected for the ranks, as being freer from prejudices and more amenable to discipline than grown men. To borrow the words of a celebrated Russian diplomatist, when speaking of the war undertaken by the Emperor, "If the Sultan had been allowed sufficient time. to give his organization solidity, he would have made that barrier impenetrable which we found so much difficulty in surmounting, although art had hitherto done so little to assist the efforts of the nation.'

Considering that the experienced soldiers of Russia encountered half-drilled recruits, and a levy en masse hastily assembled, whose numbers were very limited when compared with the time of the Janissaries, the surprise must be that so much was done by the Turks during the campaigns of 1828 and 1829 to resist an invasion, for which the most ample preparations had been made for some time previously.

By the hasty treaty of Adrianople, the Sultan engaged

* Extract of a very secret despatch from Count Pozzo di Borgo: Paris, Nov. 28, 1828, p. 349 of the Portfolio.

to pay a large sum into the Russian treasury, as an indemnity for the war which Russia herself had caused. Additional territory was also gained by her in Asia, viz.. the fortress and Pashalik of Akhaltsikh, with a portion of the coast of the Black Sea, in addition to Brailow (in Europe), and a tract of country lower down; which, to a certain extent, enables her to control the entrance of the Danube. And, what is still more serious than all these acquisitions, Russia acquired the right of interference in the concerns of the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia; which has already, for the second time, produced most baneful effects.

CHAPTER X.

CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND

RUSSIA.

Exactions of Russia in consequence of the treaty of Adrianople-Secret article in the treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi--Occupation of the Principalities by Russia from 1848 to 1850-Mission of Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople-Ultimatum of Russia-Dignified conduct of the Porte-Cessation of diplomatic intercourse-Circular of Count Nesselrode-Russia invades the Principalities-The Porte protests against this aggressionFrance and England also remonstrate-The four western powers propose terms-Modifications suggested by the Porte-Russia rejects the proposals-The Grand Council of Turkey decides on a contingent declaration of war against Russia--Disadvantages suffered by Turkey from delaying this step.

Ir the author has been in any degree successful up to this point, the preceding chapters will have given the reader some idea of the resistance that was offered by the Turks to the Russian invasions of 1828 and 1829, and will also have enabled him to form some estimate of what may be expected from the Ottomans, if left to continue the present contest single-handed.

But before touching upon the relative means of Russia to accomplish a march to the banks of the Bosphorus, and those of the Sultan to defend the peculiar description of country which intervenes, let us briefly pass in review the ostensible causes of the present war.

These would seem to go back at least to the treaty of