that an erroneous decision, on a question relating either to the doctrines or the evidences of Christianity, or indeed of any other religion, can either be more prejudicial to us, or require more particularly the protection of God, than any other error not necessarily involving a greater share of moral turpitude or obliquity. If we decide against any doctrine or any miracle, because barred either by wilfulness, or by self-deceit, from a humble and candid reception of the truth, few immoralities can be more serious than this. This is altogether that evil heart of unbelief which, as we are taught both by reason and Scripture, is one of the worst and most hateful of vices. But intellectual error, even on religious questions, is not more virulent than other errors of the intellect, which have only an equal bearing on morals, or on those practical lessons of faith and obedience, which it was our blessed Saviour's first object to inforce.

On the other hand, also, I am not sensible that any serious mischief can be expected to arise from the being led by want of an exact criterion concerning miracles, to believe some miracles to be genuine which are not so: that is, in cases where no revelation is founded on them, or

none which is inconsistent with reason or Scrip

ture.

One reason in particular, which, if I mistake not, has great weight in inducing a disposition to discredit all miracles, those excepted which are recorded in Scripture, appears to be evidently light and unfounded. It is often remarked that, if miracles were common, their peculiarity, which consists in a deviation from the common or observable course of nature, must consequently be in the same degree undiscernible. And this remark is applied to justify the conclusion, that if frequent miracles were to be performed in all ages, we could not distinguish any ordinary course of nature, nor infer that the miracles recorded of Moses and Christ were out of that course, or vouchers of their mission.

But this conclusion is, I think, evidently invalid. If, indeed, we could discern no course of nature, if events of all kinds succeeded each other in such a way, that from seeing the acts of one man, we could infer nothing as to whether or no they surpassed the powers possessed by his species, in this case certainly we could know nothing of miracles, we could infer nothing from them. Still, however, if we saw the power of miracles

1

to be not universal, but limited to one object, confided only, we may suppose, to the teachers of Christianity, I do not see that that power of miracles could be on any account fairly regarded as indecisive, or that it would not operate most justly, and reasonably, as a standing evidence of the certain truth of the religion. It might still be employed only to promote that religion, or to reward the virtues, and confirm the faith of believers. All human affairs might still revolve, in other respects, in their usual or recognized course. If thus there were one subject, a subject involving a claim of a particular divine revelation and providence, which subject was obviously regulated on different principles from those which regulate the common affairs of the world, it appears to me clear that a complete proof of its being so regulated would prove the authority to which the revelation lays claim. If we had such a proof, we should undoubtedly value it highly. It is, indeed, much the same with that argument of Warburton, which, abstracted from the paradoxes with which it is in some measure incumbered, no one, I presume, has ever thought of contesting; that if we grant that the Jewish polity could not have sub

sisted without a particular Providence, we infer, of course, its divine original and authority.-So also, if the power of working miracles were still conferred by our Saviour on his church, we should have an argument for Christianity of similar nature and certainty, and an argument in addition to our present evidence.

It is clear from what has been said, that to prove the truth of a miracle, it may not be necessary to examine all cases of miracles, or to be able to draw any exact line of distinction between true and false pretensions to miracles.

But though this is certain, and it must consequently be impossible to pronounce with certainty, where the miraculous may be said to end or begin, it is not the less certain that the miracles of Scripture are clearly discriminated from all other pretensions. Of other pretensions let us admit that some may be true: yet none of them have all those distinguishing marks by which the miracles of Scripture are impressed with a peculiar character of their own. these marks are may be seen by retracing the former arguments, the arguments proposed concerning the nature of the facts, the early reception of them, the impartiality of the witnesses,

What

the fulness of their conviction, the testimony of adversaries. These marks of truth, and also the number of the miracles, the cause in which they were performed, and the effect which they produced, are marks which altogether complete a body of evidence, incomparably superior to that of any other miracles, even granting that other miracles may have been performed, in any age whatsoever.

Moreover, we may be persuaded that this distinctive character is not impressed on the Scripture miracles without some moral and providential design, but is meant to excite our attention and gratitude, to discriminate the more touchingly from all others that great cause in which the first-begotten was sent into the world. Also, though not necessary to prove the truth of miracles, I have shown already that it enhances our proof, to know that there exist not any other claims which are at all comparable to ours; that though, if the miracles of Scripture be disproved, there exists not any other revelation, which can any where be set up against the Deist, yet, though every other claim be disproved, ours still possess the strongest ground of their own.

a

a See the conclusion of Chap. 11. § III.