difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply. I telegraphed on the 22d to the General-in-chief as follows: "As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganised. It is absolutely necessary to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, and companies are without a single commissioned officer." On the 23d, the following was telegraphed to the Generalin-chief: HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR SHEPHERDSTOWN, Sept. 23, 1862. 9.30 A.M. MAJ.-GEN. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington. From several different sources, I learn that General R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position at Leestown, between Shepherdstown and Martinsburg, and that General Jackson is on the Opequan Creek, about three miles from its mouth, both with large force. There are also indications of heavy reinforcements moving towards them from Winchester and Charlestown. I have therefore ordered General Franklin to take position with his corps at the cross roads, about one mile northwest of Bakersville, on the Bakersville and Williamsport road, and General Couch to establish his division near Downsville, leaving sufficient force at Williamsport to watch and guard the ford at that place. The fact of the enemy remaining so long in our front, and the indications of an advance of reinforcements, seem to indicate that he will give us another battle with all his available force. As I mentioned to you before, our army has been very much reduced by casualties in the recent battles, and in my judgment all the reinforcements of old troops that can possibly be dispensed with around Washington and other places, should be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our cause. I cannot think it possible that the enemy will bring any forces to bear upon Washington till after the question is decided here, but if they should, troops can soon be sent back from this army by rail to reinforce the garrison there. The evidence that I have that reinforcements are coming to the rebel army, consists in the facts, that long columns of dust extending from Winchester to Charlestown, and from Charlestown in this direction, and also troops moving this way, were seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General Sumner, with his corps and Williams's, (Banks's), occupies Harper's Ferry, and the surrounding heights. I think he will be able to hold his position until reinforcements arrive. G. B. MCCLELLAN, On the 27th I made the following report: MAJ.-GEN. HALLECK, Major-General. HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, General-in-Chief, Washington, All the information in my possession, goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburg, with some troops at Charlestown, not many in Winchester. Their movements of late, have been an extension towards our right, and beyond it. They are receiving reinforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts, perhaps entirely so. This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons; the new regiments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments—our main dependence; and in supplying vacancies among the officers by promotion. My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river close ly, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and there acting according to circumstances, viz.: moving on Winchester, if, from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops, preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear, while they have the garrison of Washington in their front. once. for I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt on Maryland, should the river remain low for a great length of time, and should they receive considerable addition to their force. I would be glad to have Peck's division as soon as possible. I am surprised that Sigel's men should have been sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject, was, that they were at my disposition. In the last battles, the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in number, and it was only by very hard fighting, that we gained the advantages we did. As it was, the result was at one period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day. If the enemy receives considerable reinforcements, and we none, it is possible that I may have too much on my hands in the next battle. My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is, to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to reinforce this army. The railways give us the means of promptly reinforcing Wash ington, should it become necessary. If I am reinforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington. Several persons, recently from Richmond, say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and they few in number. I hope to be able to give you details as to late battles by this evening. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj-Gen. Comd'g. REORGANIZATION AND SUPPLIES. The work of reorganizing, drilling, and supplying the army I began at the earliest moment. The different corps were stationed along the river in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. The great extent of the river front, from near Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred and fifty miles,) together with the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was to be carefully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Virginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's positions and movements, were made frequently, so that our cavalry, which, from the time we left Washington, had performed the most laborious service, and had from the com mencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inadequate to the requirements of the army. This overwork had broken down the greater part of the horses, disease had appeared among them, and but a very small portion of our original cavalry force was fit for service. To such an extent had this arm become reduced, that when Gen. Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania on the 11th of October with 2,000 men, I could only mount 800 men to follow him. Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 22d, and in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the one which had happened to Col. Miles, I immediately ordered Maryland, Bolivar, and Loudon Heights to be strongly fortified. This was done as far as the time and means at our disposal permitted. The main army of the enemy during this time remained in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, forcibly taking their property where it was not voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroying railroads. On the first day of October, his Excellency the President, honored the army of the Potomac with a visit, and remained several days, during which he went through the different encampments, reviewed the troops, and went over the battlefields of South Mountain and Antietam. I had the opportunity during this visit to describe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac. On the 5th of October the division of General Cox (about 5,000 men,) was ordered from my command to Western Virginia. On the 7th of October I received the following telegram: MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN, WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 6, 1862. I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operations, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river. Also, to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add, that the Secretary of War and the Generalin-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. |