10,295 67 10,436 31 906 1,882 14 335 75 554 91 309,789 15 Estate of Elizabeth Pontius, alias Miller, Northumberland 500,000 00 729,354 44 600,000 00 1,400,000 00 300,000 00 -3,529,354 44 county 115 00 Margaret Porter, Chester 764 27 James Matthews, Bucks 110 34 No. XXIV. Premiums on Lvans. 989 61 S. & M. Allen, thirteen and fifty-one hundredths per ACTION OF TRESPASS. 155,273 39 Commissioners of the Internal Improvement Fund. Amount refunded by them to the state treasury 100,000 00 leave but little ground for the expectation of a reversal, the case is now given to the public. It was tried before the Hon. T. M. PETTIT, then a Judge, and now the President of the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia, and a special jury. Messrs. Arundel and Meredith, were Counsel for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Jack and Cohen, for the defendant. Streeper vs. Action of Trespass.-Tried November, 1834. Eckert. The following charge was delivered by Judge PETTIT. The amount of property in question in this case is not large, but the principles involved are of much im. portance. Christian Eckert, the defendant, is charged in this action of trespass with having illegally taken certain horses and carts claimed as belonging to John Streeper, the plaintiff. It is not disputed that the property was taken on an execution out of the hands of one Jeffries. Eckert's case is substantially this.-He obtained a judgment against Jeffries before a Justice of 42,506 17 the Peace, on the 17th August, 1832, when Jeffries was the undisputed owner and possessor of the property which is here the subject of dispute. Execution was issued on the 11th September, 1832, and this property was found in the actual possession of Jeffries, and levied on. Streeper says that between the date of the judgment and the day of the levy, he took possession of the property, as a purchaser, and hired it again to Jeffries; and he asserts that in this he did what was lawful. Now here the plaintiff is met by a principle of law, viz: that after a judgment has been obtained, a transfer by the defendant of his goods and chattels, is looked upon as wearing a deep complexion of fraud, and as subjecting to a very jealous examination, the conduct of both alienor and alienee, and that even where there is a full consideration, if the possession remain with the debtor, the act is void as againt creditors; 10 S. & R. 424. A party claiming against the creditors would be bound to remove all doubt of the fairness of the transaction, even if possession accompanied the transfer. With this preliminary caution, of which the defendant has the advantage, the jury will look at the plaintiff's case-for if it is not shown that he was a creditor of Jeffries, there is an end of the controversy. The plaintiff alleges that he was a creditor; the defendant denies it, and the point is for the jury as a question of fact. [The Judge here repeated some of the testimony, and noticed some of the arguments, and under the above remarks, left the question of fact to the decision of the jury.] But suppose that the jury are satisfied that Steeper was a creditor of Jeffries, then the question presents itself, was there such a transfer of the property as the law will sustain. As a general proposition, it is certainly competent to a debtor to make a bona fide sale of personal property, notwithstanding there is a judg ment against him.—As a general proposition,it is equal$1,902 49 ly true, that horses and carts may be lawfully hired out by the owner of them to another person. The effort here, I understand to be, by a combination of these twe principles, each true by itself, to control and defeat, or rather to escape from the effect of another general proposition which must be admitted to be true, to wit: that possession must accompany the transfer of personal property, or it is void against creditors. ACTION OF TRESPASS-FRAUDULENT The following law report contains matter of much interest to the community. The principles stated by the learned Judge, were deemed highly important at the time of the trial. A writ of error was taken out by the plaintiff, and is still pending. But as the case of Pritchett vs. Jones, 4 Rawle, 280, reported since the trial, and not cited in the discussion, strongly corroborates the views here pronounced, and seems to This brings us to the enquiry what kind of possession does the law require? The answer is that the possession must be absolute and exclusive. There must be nothing colourable about it. I refer of course to property capable of delivery as this was. So far as the alienor is concerned, the possession must be substantial and continuing in its character. No device or contrivance 8 STEAM BOAT TRIPS. The Counsel for Defendant argued, that the law would presume payment, in this case from the lapse of time between default and the institution of the suit.That there was laches on the part of the Plaintiff, in bringing this action which should release the sureties. That the law of 1825 requires suit to be instituted on the bond, within two years after default made. This law was reprospective in its operation, and that at most, this suit should have been brought within two years after this act was passed. If it does not extend to previous bonds, suit may be brought at any length of time after default. which the wit of man could suggest, short of an open tice. By that act the Postmaster General is requirand unequivocal possession, would be allowed to de-ed to institute suits within two years after any default feat the rule of law. The putting a third person in in payment, &c. or the "securities shall not be held charge with the alienor, is but a concurrent possession, liable to the United States, nor shall such suit be insti and would be inoperative. The faking possession of tuted against them,” horses and carts for a single night, followed by a resto ration of them in the morning, on an alleged contract of hiring, when the design that they should be restored, existed at the time of taking possession, would be a device in fraud of the law, and would not be permitted to prevail. Where the object of the whole arrangement is a mere security on the goods, and the former owner is allowed to retain them, or after a formal and temporary possession, intended so to be, is suffered to obtain them again with all the visible marks of ownership, the arrangement is void as against creditors. Any mere temporary possession taken with a view of evading the rule of law relative to unequiv ocal possession, but which is followed by placing the party and the property visibly in the face of the world just where they were before the alleged transfer, would be fraudulent. In thus stating the law, I do but carry out the principles of the decisions of the Supreme Court. If the rule which those decisions have recog. nized, not as new but as old and previously well esta blished law, could be so readily eluded, they would have been pronounced to but little purpose. The rule certainly has vigour enough for self protection. Mrs. Jeffries and Mr. Then what is the case here. Shaw both say the object was to secure Mr. Streeper. Mr. Shaw suggested the sale of 30th August, the delivery of temporary possession, and the return of the property under a contract of hiring as manifested by the paper dated 31st August. The plaintiff's counsel have fairly met this point, and treated the two papers of 30th and 31st August, as having been executed in pursuance of an original purpose existing before the date If Streeper took the articles on of the first of them. the 30th August, with an understanding existing at the moment that he was to restore them the next day on a contract of hiring, and Jeffries t he next day accor dingly re-took them into his use and possession, the transaction was fraudulent in law, and void as against Eckert's execution. Another point was suggested by the defendant's counsel, namely; that Eckert was not liable in this suit, even supposing Streeper to have a legal claim upon the property. The case is free from legal difficulty on this head. If Eckert knew of the levy, and after receiving notice of Streeper's claim, approved of the proceedings of the Constable,-if he attended at and gave his sanction to the sale under his own execution, he is lia. ble for the trespass, if any was committed, Verdict for the Defendant. From the Commercial Herald. Postmaster General VS. Appleback, Gunt & Rice. District Court of U. S., Eastern This was an action brought against the securities on the Bond of the Postmaster at Cherryville, for his default in not paying over a balance appearing to be due to the United States, on a settlement of his accounts. John Appleback was appointed Postmaster at Cherryville, in 1816, and gave his bond with two securities, Gunt and Rice, for the faithful execution of the duties of his office. On each of the tri-monthly settlements of his accounts, there was found a small balance against him, which in the year 1820, amounted to $51 65, and for this sum the present suit was instituted in 1831.— Previous to the act of 1825, regulating the Post Of fice, the law did not require the Postmaster General to take bonds of Postmasters, though such was the prac Prosecuting Attorney in reply:-There can be no The presumption of payment here from length of time-ten law of 1825, does not repeal the act of 1810, otheryears only have elapsed; it was an open account. wise it would take away its own remedy. This was a bond under the act of 1810, and the provision in the act of 1825, as to time of bringing suit, being two years, No laches of applies to bonds taken under that act. a public officer can affect the rights of the United States. JUDGE HOPKINSON.-When the bond was taken, there H. D. Gilpin, Esq. Prosecuting Attorney. The Pleasure Voyage to the Upper Lakes. ERIE, Pa, June 9th, 1835. The splendid steamboat Thomas Jefferson, left this port on Saturday last, for the Upper Lakes, with 400 passengers. Cabin passage $60. She is expected to clear by this trip $6000, and will be absent 20 to 25 days. From the U. S. Gazette. CAPE MAY. The following is the time that the Steamboat Con. stitution, Captain Jefferies, was performing her first trip to Cape May. Left Chestnut street wharf at 5 o'clock 5 min. A. M.; arrived at New Castle 8-46 min.; left New Castle 8-52 min.; arrived at Cape Island 12-254 min P. M.; left Cape Island 1-26 min.; arrived at New Castle at 6--3 min.; left New Castle at 6-8 min.; and arrived at the city, (Chestnut street wharf,) at 8 o'clock 17 minutes. The Inquirer of this morning made a typograph ical error, they say she came up in 5-34, it should read 6—84. |