END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1864-LOSSES. dently decided to draw off, and, at 10 г. м., соmmenced the movement; which ended with our whole army back in its intrenchments before Petersburg, and thence westward to Warren's works, covering not only the Weldon railroad, but the Vaughan and Squirrel Level highways. Thus, while our several advances on the left had been achieved at heavy cost, the following movement, wherein we had the advantage in the fighting and in losses, gave us no foot of ground whatever. Butler's advance on our farthest 597 right, being in the nature of a feint, had effected nothing but a distraction of the enemy's attention, and this at considerable cost. Here ended, practically, for the year 1864, Grant's determined, persistent, sanguinary campaign against Lee's army and Richmond: and the following tabular statement of the losses endured by the Army of the Potomac, having been furnished by one of Gen. Grant's staff to the author of "Grant and his Campaigns," can not be plausibly suspected of exaggerating them: Tabular Statement of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, from May 5, 1864, to November 1, 1864. NOTE -The first line of our losses were fully 10,000. sylvania just about as many. the above table includes several days' desperate fighting at Spottsylvania, in which Our actual losses in the Wilderness were rather under than over 20,000, and at SpottThese corrections, however, make no difference in the aggregates given above. Whether the foregoing returns of ❘ and 24,000 missing (most of the latlosses do or do not include those of ter prisoners, of whom few of the Burnside's (9th) corps before it was formally incorporated with the Army of the Potomac, is not stated; but, as they do not include the losses in the Army of the James, it is safe to conclude that the killed, wounded, and missing of 1864, in our armies operating directly for the reduction of Richmond, reached the appalling aggregate of 100,000 men. If we assume that, of nearly 54,000 wounded *Heth says that, if he had remained, he would have been attacked next morning by able-bodied were exchanged during that year), 30,000 recovered of their wounds, or were recaptured, or escaped from the enemy, it leaves our net losses in that campaign not less than 70,000. The enemy's net loss, including 15,373 prisoners, after deducting the wounded who recovered and returned to their colors, we may safely estimate at 40,000, though they would doubtless make it less. Dur15,000 infantry and Hampton's cavalry. His lack of ammunition compelled withdrawal. ing the many desperate combats of | purposeless commander would have this bloody year, the Army of the Potomac lost only 25 and gained but 32 guns. Its losses of guns were mainly incurred at Reams's station; its gains were chiefly made at Spottsylvania. Grant's conduct of this campaign | was not satisfactory to the Confederate critics, who gave a decided pref erence to the strategy of McClellan. They hold that the former aimed only to overpower and crush by brute force-by the employment of overwhelming numbers-and by a lavish expenditure of blood. Doubtless, a great military genius, such as appears once in two or three centu- | ries, might have achieved them at a smaller cost; as a timid, hesitating, failed to achieve them at all. The merit which may be fairly claimed for Grant is that of resolutely undertaking a very difficult and formidable task, and executing it to the best of his ability-at all events, doing it. That, when south of the James, he was just where the Rebels wished him not to be, they showed by desperate and hazardous efforts to draw him thence; and the proof was duplicated in the final collapse of the Rebellion. Other campaigns were more brilliant; but none contributed more positively and eminently to break the power of the Confederates than that which began on the Rapidan and ended in front of Petersburg and across the Weldon road. XXVI. WEST VIRGINIA AND NORTH OF THE RAPIDAN IN 1864. at Jonesville, in the extreme west of old Virginia, near Cumberland gap, held by Maj. Beers with 300 Illinoisans and 3 guns, who were surrounded, surprised, and captured by Sam. Jones, after a smart contest, in which our loss was 60. The excuse for holding an outpost thus exposed was the necessity of collecting forage for our larger force at Cumberland gap. THE 'ANACONDA' is a clumsy, slug- | northern Virginia. The first occurred gish beast; effecting his ends by an enormous, even lavish expenditure of force; but Grant's anaconda differed from that of Scott and McClellan in being thoroughly alive. The simultaneous National advance in 1864 from all points, against the armies and remaining strongholds of the Rebellion, was not merely ordered; it was actually attempted-with many reverses at the outset, and no decidedly encouraging results for some months, but with ultimately overwhelming success. Before Gen. Grant had been placed in chief command, there had been several collisions in western and 1 Jan. 3, 1864. A nearly simultaneous raid by FitzHugh Lee's cavalry, on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad west of Cumberland, came to nothing; but a later expedition, sent under Rosser over into West Virginia from the Valley by Early, surprised" a train 2 Jan. 30. BRECKINRIDGE DEFEATS SIGEL AT NEWMARKET. 599 moving from New creek to Peters- | Gen. Crook, aiming at the Rebel re sources in the vicinity of Staunton and Lynchburg. Sigel, with some 10,000 men, moved up the Valley accordingly, and was met, near NEWMARKET, by a Rebel army of at least equal force under Breckinridge; to strengthen whom, the region west of him had very properly been stripped and left nearly defenseless. After some maneuvering and skirmishing, Breckinridge, at 3 P. M., ordered a determined charge, by which Sigel's badly handled army was routed, and driven back to Cedar creek, near Strasburg, with a loss of 700 men, 6 guns, 1,000 small arms, his hospitals, and part of his train. Breckinridge seems not to have followed up his victory, because his forces were needed to repel the advance of Crook from the west. Crook had moved from Charlestown simultaneously with Sigel's advance from Winchester; and as if to preclude the last chance of ultimate success-had divided his command; sending Averill, with 2,000 cavalry, to destroy the lead-mines near Wytheville, while he advanced farther to the left. But when Ave 7 days before. Verdigan, with but 10 | rill reached Wytheville, he found men, captured a General, 4 other officers, and 25 privates, beside the steamboat and her crew; throwing overboard the captured arms so fast as he could seize them, so as to preclude the danger of a rescue. Scammon and his two aids were sent prisoners to Richmond; the residue paroled. there John Morgan, with a formidable cavalry force dispatched by Gen. W. E. Jones from Saltville; and a stubborn fight came off, wherein Averill was clearly worsted. He tries in his 'General Order' to make the result a drawn fight against "overwhelming numbers;" but, as he does not claim to have destroyed the leadworks, nor taken the town, nor achieved anything in particular, save that "the purposes of the enemy were foiled by the engagement," there is 5 May 1. * May 15. May 10. Gen. Grant's comprehensive plan of campaign embraced a cöoperative movement up the Shenandoah under Gen. Sigel, and up the Kanawha by 3 Feb. 2. * Feb. 12. no room for doubt that he was virtually beaten. Gen. Crook, with 11 regiments, numbering some 6,000 men, had made directly for the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at Dublin station; 4 miles from which he was met by a far inferior Rebel force under McCausland, which fought bravely, but was beaten off, with a loss on our part of 126 killed and 585 wounded. The railroad here, and for a short distance eastward, was destroyed. And now the appearance of a considerable Rebel rëenforcement, dispatched from Wytheville by Morgan before he fought Averill, impelled Crook to retreat to Meadow bridge; so that, when Averill reached Dublin, Crook was gone, which left him no choice but to follow. Thus the concentric movement upon Lee's flank and rear resulted, as usual with such combinations, in general failure, if not positive disaster. A force that, if concentrated, could have beaten all the Rebels in Virginia west of the Blue ridge, had been so dispersed and frittered away as to achieve less than nothing. was ing Gen. Hunter to succeed him. The old, fatally vicious system of a concentric advance from opposite points on a common focus still adhered to. Hunter, somewhat strengthened, at once resumed the offensive; the pressure on Lee by Grant's persistent hammering having constrained Breckinridge's withdrawal, with the better part of his force, to the defenses of Richmond; W. E. Jones, with most of the Rebel forces in the western part of old Virginia, including McCausland's, having been hurried forward to confront the new danger. The two armies met at PIEDMONT, near StauntonHunter's being somewhat more numerous - and a spirited and wellfought action resulted in the defeat of Jones, who was shot through the head, and fell dead on the field. Among the fruits of this victory were 1,500 prisoners, 3 guns, and 3,000 small arms. It was, in fact, a rout; leaving the Rebel army incapable of further resistance. 9 Hunter advanced to Staunton, where Crook and Averill-no considerable force having been left by Grant at once relieved Sigel, send- Jones to oppose them-joined him; * June 5. beating back repeated charges of our infantry and • Col. C. G. Halpine, chief of staff to Hunter, cavalry, under Gens. Sullivan and Stahl-for says of this conflict: "The forces actually engaged were about equal: Gen. Hunter having some 9,000 men actually in action, while the enemy had about the same-strongly posted, however, on a range of hills, horse-shoe shaped and heavily timbered, and further protected by rifile-pits and rail-fence barricades, hastily thrown up the night before. The Rebel morning report of the day previous, found on the dead body of Gen. Jones that after noon, showed that he had then under him 6,800 regular Confederate soldiers; while we knew that he was joined on the morning of the engagement neither the divisions of Crook nor Averill had by Vaughan's brigade from East Tennessee, and also by about 1,500 militia-old men and young boys, not worth the powder required to kill them-hurried forward from Staunton and Lynchburg on news of our advance. "The fight, though not large in numbers, was singularly obstinate and fluctuating: the enemy bered nature of the country, the famous feat of ing on of night, and the broken, heavily-timsional orators and enthusiastic editors-might 'bagging' that army-so popular with Congreshave been easily accomplished; for a worse whipped or more utterly demoralized crowd of beaten men never fled from any field." 10 June 8. HUNTER MISCARRIES AT LYNCHBURG. 601 and moved thence directly to Lex- | have been misjudged; but Hunter, ington; disappointing Grant, who lacking many things, never lacked had expected him at Gordonsville, courage; and he believed that an atand had sent his cavalry under Sheridan to meet him there. His failure to do so subjected Sheridan to like failure in his approach to Gordonsville, as we have seen. Hunter's force was now increased to about 20,000 men; and he hastened, via Lexington, to Lynchburg -the chief city of western (old) Virginia-intent on its speedy reduction. But Lynchburg, the focus of a rich, populous region, and of extensive manufactures, lies on the James river and canal, in unbroken railroad communication with Richmond and Petersburg on the one side, and with the farther south on the other. Leewho might as well have lost Richmond-dispatched a very considerable force to its relief; part of which arrived the day before Hunter at tacked " the city from the south, and still more during the following night, wherein several trains arrived from the east filled with men. Hunter found his ammunition running low, a strong city before him, and the whole Confederacy virtually rallying to overwhelm him. He had no choice but to retreat, sharply pursued; following the railroad westward to Salem-where the pursuit ended-and thence striking, via Newcastle," for Meadow bluff, in West Virginia; his provisions long since exhausted, and very little to be gleaned in midsummer from that poor, thinly-peopled, war-exhausted region. No rations were obtained till the 27th; and the sufferings of men and loss of horses were deplorable. The direction of his retreat may But tempt to regain the Shenandoah directly from Lynchburg would have seriously imperiled his army. his withdrawal into West Virginia rendered him no longer formidable to the enemy, and involved a circuitous, harassing movement by the Kanawha, the Ohio, Parkersburg, and Grafton, before he could again be of any service. 14 The Rebels, aware of this, promptly resolved to make the most of their opportunity. Early, who had headed the corps sent from Richmond to the relief of Lynchburg, collecting all the forces he could muster, moved rapidly northward, and very soon appeared on the Potomac: Sigel, commanding at Martinsburg, retreating precipitately by Harper's Ferry, with a heavy loss of stores, and taking post on Maryland Heights, where the enemy did not see fit to assail him, but once more destroyed the Baltimore and Ohio railroad for a considerable distance, levied a contribution of $20,000 on Hagerstown, burned some buildings at Williamsport, and, raiding up into the border of Pennsylvania, scoured the country far and wide for horses, cattle, provisions, and money. The movement was so well masked by cavalry that the strength of the invading force-probably never so much as 20,000-was enormously exaggerated, spreading general panic, and causing the Government to call urgently on Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, for militia to meet the emergency. 1 Gen. Couch was commanding in Pennsylvania; Gen. Lew. Wallace 11 June 18. 12 June 22. 13 June 25. 14 July 2-3. |