PROGRESS IN RAISING BLACK SOLDIERS. unfortunate race come within your lines, that you do not turn them away, but receive them kindly and cordially. They are to be encouraged to come to us; they are to be received with open arms; they are to be fed and clothed; they are to be armed." There was still much prejudice against Negro Soldiers among our rank and file, as well as among their superiors; those from New England possibly and partially excepted: but the Adjutant-General was armed with a potent specific for its cure. The twenty regiments of Blacks which he was intent on raising he had authority to officer on the spot from the White veterans at hand; and this fact at least, until the commissions should be awarded-operated as a powerful antidote to anti-negro prejudice. There were few, if any, instances of a White sergeant or corporal whose dignity or whose nose revolted at the proximity of Blacks as private soldiers, if he might secure a lieutenancy by deeming them not unsavory, or not quite intolerably so; while there is no case on record where a soldier deemed fit for a cap taincy in a colored regiment rejected it and clung to the ranks, in deference to his invincible antipathy to "niggers." And, though Gen. Banks, in his order" directing the recruitment of a 'Corps d'Afrique' in his department, saw fit to say that "The prejudices or opinions of men are in no wise involved;" and "it is not established upon any dogma of equality, or other theory, but as a practical and sensible matter of business. The Government makes use of mules, horses, uneducated and educated White men, in the defense of its institutions. Why should not the negro contribute whatever is in his power for the cause in which he is as deeply interested as other men? We may properly demand from him whatever service he can render," &c., &c. 527 and not many who refused to admit, that a systematic arming of the Blacks in defense of the Union imposed obligations and involved consequences incompatible not merely with the perpetuation of Slavery, but with that of Caste as well. Hence, the proclaimed repugnance in Congress, in the Press, and among the People, to arming the Blacks, was quite as acrid, pertinacious, and denunciatory, as that which had been excited by the policy of Emancipation. Yet, in spite of ugly epithets, the work went on. Presently, a distinct Bureau was established," in the Adjutant-General's office at Washington, "for the record of all matters relating to the organization of colored troops;" and a Board, whereof Gen. Silas Casey was President, organized for the strict examination of all candidates for commissions in Black regiments; by whose labors and investigations a higher state of average character and efficiency was secured in the officering of these than had been attained in the (too often hasty an and hap-hazard) organization of our White regiments. In August, the Adjutant-General again visited the Great Valley on this business; and he now issued from Vicksburg 2 order which was practically a conscription of all able-bodied male Blacks who should seek protection within the Union lines, and should not be otherwise employed, into the National service. Next appeared an order from the War Department, establishing recruiting stations for Black soldiers in Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee, and directing the enlistment as volunteers of "all able 63 yet there were few who did not see, bodied free negroes;" also the "slaves 60 May 1. 01 May 22. 62 Aug. 18. 63 Oct. 3. of disloyal persons [absolutely], and slaves of loyal persons with the consent of their owners," who were to be paid $300 for each slave so enlisted, upon making proof of ownership and filing a deed of manumission. Thus the good work went on; until, in December, '63, the Bureau aforesaid reported that over 50,000 had been enlisted and were then in actual service; and this number had | been trebled before the close of the following year. And, though some of our Generals regarded them with disfavor, while others were loud in their praise, it is no longer fairly disputable that they played a very important and useful part in the overthrow of the Rebellion. Though they were hardly allowed to participate in any of the great battles whereby the issue was determined, they bore an honorable part in many minor actions and sieges, especially those of 1864-5. In docility, in unquestioning obedience to superiors, in local knowledge, in capacity to endure fatigue, in ability to brave exposure and resist climatic or miasmatic perils, they were equal if not superior to the average of our White troops; in intelligence and tenacity, they were inferior; and no wise General would have counted a corps of them equal, man for man, in a great, protracted battle, to a like number of our Whites. Yet there were Black regiments above the average of Whites in merit; and their fighting at Fort Wagner, Port Hudson, Helena, Mobile, and some other points, was noticed by their commanders with well deserved commendation. To exalt them to the disparagement of our White soldiers would be as unwise as unjust; but those Whites who fought most bravely by their side will be the last to detract from the gratitude wherewith the Republic fitly honors all her sons who freely offered their lives for the salvation of their country. XXIJI. THE WAR ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST IN 1864. THE XXXVIIIth Congress having assembled, and the House been organized by the friends of the Administration and the War-Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker, and Edward McPherson, of Pennsylvania, Clerk-President Lincoln transmitted next day his Annual Message, to which he appended a Proclamation of Amnesty, which he therewith issued, offering a free pardon, on condition of taking an oath to support Dec. 7, 1863. the Federal Constitution and Union, and also "abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing Rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified by decision of the Supreme Court." Exceptions to this proffer of amnesty were made in case of all who had thrown up seats in Congress, Federal judgeships, or commissions in the army or navy of the United States, in order to embark in the * Vote: Colfax, 101; all others, 81. GEN. TRUMAN SEYMOUR IN FLORIDA. 529 Rebellion; all civil or diplomatic | diers fired and ran as our troops officers or agents of the Rebel Gov- debarked, to find the place in ruins, and very few residents remaining. 5 At 3 г. м. next day, our troops moved westward parallel with the ernment; all officers in the Confede- Operations against Charleston having been but languidly prosecuted since the complete conquest of Morris island, the failure of Dahlgren's boat attack on Sumter, and his refusal to attempt to pass its ruins with his iron-clads and fight his way up to the city, Gen. Gillmore decided to employ a part of his force in a fresh expedition to Florida. The President, apprised of this design, commissioned John Hay, one of his private secretaries, as major, and sent him down to Hilton Head to accompany the proposed expedition, under expectations, founded on the assurances of refugees, that Florida was ripe for amnesty and restoration | to the Union. 3 ly made; but only 150 men were at the camp-Finnegan, with the residue, having hurriedly fallen back. Henry evaded a Rebel cavalry force covering the front, and dashed into the camp unannounced; capturing 4 guns, with a large amount of camp equipage and commissary stores, and a few prisoners-but not till the telegraph had had time to give the alarm to Baldwin, beyond. Henry pushed on at 4 A. M., and was in Baldwin at 7; capturing another gun, three cars, and $500,000 worth of provisions and munitions. He had a skirmish at the south fork of St. Mary's, 5 miles farther on, and drove the enemy, but lost 17 men. At 6 г. м., he was in Sanderson, 40 miles from Jacksonville; where he captured and destroyed much property; pushing on, at 2 A. M., very nearly to Lake City, almost half way from the coast to Tallahassee; but here, at 11 A. м., he found Finnegan in position, very stubborn, and too strong to be moved: so he fell back 5 miles, bivouacked in a drenching rain, and telegraphed to Seymour, now at Sanderson with part of his infantry, for orders and food. It was reported that Finne Jan. 13, 1864. VOL. II.-34 4 Feb. 6. 5 Feb. 8. i gan, though he had 3,000 men, fellness of his project which was, in back from Lake City that night. effect, to pit his (at most) 6,000 disWhether he did so or not, the belief posable men against whatever force that he did probably misled Seymour the Rebels, with all Georgia and Alainto his great blunder thereafter. bama to draw from, and railroads at command, might see fit to concentrate upon him. Gen. Turner was sent post-haste with this letter; but it was too late. When he reached Jacksonville, he met there tidings that Seymour was already fighting at OLUSTEE. 7 Gillmore had followed his lieutenant down to Jacksonville and out so far as Baldwin; returning directly to Jacksonville, and thence to Hilton Head; without a shadow of suspicion that Seymour contemplated, or (without orders) would attempt, a farther advance. In fact, he had telegraphed to Gillmore from Sanderson on the 12th that "I last night ordered Col. Henry to fall back to this point. I am destroying all public property here, and shall go back to the south fork of St. Mary's as soon as Henry returns. I hope he will be in this morning." Gillmore at once responded : "I want your command at and beyond Baldwin concentrated at Baldwin without delay." Seymour replied, insisting that "To leave the south fork of the St. Mary's will make it impossible for us to advance again;" but intimated no purpose to make such advance without orders. Gillmore thereupon returned to Hilton Head; and was very soon thunderstruck by receiving a letter from Seymour, saying that he had been compelled to remain where his men could be fed; but adding "Not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me to execute my intention of moving to the Suwanee river. But I now propose to go without supplies;" and asking that an iron-clad demonstration be made up the Savannah, to prevent the dispatch of Rebel forces from Georgia to Finnegan! Gillmore at once wrote him a strong remonstrance against the mad Seymour had left Barber's (the south fork aforesaid) that morning, with a few short of 5,000 men; advancing westward along the highway which runs generally parallel with the railroad, frequently crossing it, till about 2 P. M., when the head of his column ran square into the dead-fall which Finnegan had set for him. Our men were faint with hunger and a hard march of 16 miles over miry or sandy ground, until, two or three miles east of Olustee station, our van reached a point where the railroad is carried straight through a long cypress swamp, while the wagon-road makes a square turn to the right, crossing the railroad, in order to avoid and flank the swamp. Here Finnegan had disposed his men, under cover of the swamp and adjacent pine forest, with his flanks thoroughly protected by the former and by a lakelet known as Ocean Pond; while our men, rushing heedlessly, headlong on, were at close quarters before they suspected that they were to be seriously resisted. Our strength lay in artillery, whereof we had 16 pieces to 4-Finnegan having lost most of his in his hasty retreat from Camp Finneganbut our guns were rushed up to the Feb. 9. Feb. 15. * Feb. 18-dated Feb. 17. • Feb. 20. SEYMOUR DEFEATED AT OLUSTEE. 531 very edge of the woods which con- | ten men for every one of the enemy cealed and sheltered the foe, so that their sharp-shooters picked off the artillerists and shot down the horses as though enjoying a sportsman's battue; while our infantry, half formed, and not well armed, were pushed into the slaughter-pen with equal stupidity. Had our line been formed half a mile back from the enemy's, and there simply held while our gunners shelled the woods, we might not have achieved a brilliant success, but we could not have been beaten; but Hamilton's battery went into action, under a heavy fire of musketry, barely 150 yards from the Rebel front, and in 20 minutes had lost 40 out of 50 horses and 45 out of 82 men-when what was left of it recoiled; leaving 2 of its 4 guns where its life-blood had been blunderingly squandered. And this was a fair specimen of the generalship displayed on our side throughout. Col. Henry's cavalry (40th Mass.), with Maj. Stevens's battalion, and the 7th Conn. (infantry), Col. J. R. Hawley, were in the advance, and drew the first fire of the mainly concealed enemy. Hawley, finding his regiment falling under a concentric fire, ordered up the 7th New Hampshire, Col. Abbott, to its support; Hamilton's, Elder's, and Langdon's batteries also coming into action. The 7th N. H. was a tried and trusty regiment; but it had been lately deprived of its beloved Spencer repeating rifles, and armed instead with Springfield muskets which it pronounced in bad order and unfit for service; so it was not in good condition for maintaining a position in which it was rapidly losing at least it had even a chance to hit. It was The Our left column, Col. Montgomery, came last into the fight, just in time to stop a Rebel charge. The 54th Mass. went in first, followed by the 1st N. C. (both Black). They were of course overpowered; but the latter left its Col., Lt. Col., Major, and Adjutant, dead on the field. It was admitted that these two regiments had saved our little army from being routed. For Seymour - who had fought with reckless gallantry throughout, rushing from point to point, wherever Rebel bullets flew thickest-profited by their charge to rëestablish what remained of his batteries farther to the rear; and now, giving four parting volleys of grape and canister, he ordered a retreat; which was covered by the 7th Connecticut, and executed deliberately, and without effective pursuit." We brought off 1,000 of our wounded, and probably left 250 more, beside 10 Pollard says, "Just then [4 P. M.], our [Rebel] ammunition became exhausted.", |