special contrivances for attaining special ends. To regard representative institutions as merely reflective of the average morals of the electorate is as inaccurate as would be the notion that artistic or scientific institutions are merely reflective of popular ideas about art or science. Political institutions are exactly like all other institutions in that they reflect special aptitude and opportunity. Politics will always be carried on by politicians just as art is carried on by artists, engineering by engineers, business by business men; but in each case their ordinary character and aims will respond to the conditions governing their activity. So while it is impossible to get rid of politicians much may be done to improve the breed. The test of value in political arrangements is the kind of men they tend to select for public office. By far the most important principle of politics is the controlling influence of conditions, and it is through ability to shape conditions that the character of government is susceptible of improvement through thought and effort.

Considered merely as an abstract statement the profound importance of this principle will scarcely be appreciated. The point may be made clearer by a concrete example drawn from ordinary business experience. An employer is aware of leakage from his cash receipts but does not

know how to stop it. One tells him that his trouble is due to the fact that he is not sufficiently careful to choose good persons for his service. Another suggests a system of examinations to exclude the unfit. Another advises effort to inculcate morality. There may be merit in all these familiar suggestions, but the problem is not efficaciously attacked until the question is asked, "What sort of system have you for keeping your cash?" Suppose it appears that each counter has its till from which the employees get what they require in the transaction of the business. The proper remedy then is a change of system. Abolish the tills, put the custody of the money in the hands of a cashier and verify his accounts at frequent intervals. The change of system will not absolutely preclude individual delinquency but will be apt to expose it when it occurs and it will establish conditions that will tend to secure financial integrity and give tone and character to the service. Exactly the same principle applies to the conduct of the public business. No real improvement can be obtained through change of persons without change of system.

In every kind of government power must exist and be trusted somewhere. The characteristic function of representative government is to hold the trusteeship to steady account for its behavior.

Therefore to establish a representative system all the following conditions are essential:

1. That the people shall be free to choose whom they will to represent them.

2. That the representative assembly shall be face to face with the administration.

3. That the representatives shall be so circumstanced that they can use their authority only on public account.

4. That elections shall be confined to the choice of representatives.

5. That the supervision and control of the representative assembly shall extend over the whole field of government.

On all these points Mill made instructive observations, the value of which is now enhanced by the fact that we are in a position to test them by the results of actual experience in the working of representative institutions for over sixty years since he wrote.

CHAPTER V

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

IN actual practice the people have never been allowed complete freedom of choice in selecting their representatives. Qualifications are prescribed which may relate to character, or status, or residence.

Instances of the first class are laws making ineligible aliens, mental defectives, bankrupts and felons. Disqualifications of this nature which the electorate is not allowed to disregard, were anciently much more extensive than at present, but for at least a century past it has been the settled tendency to reduce them in number and importance. Religious tests, once general, have almost disappeared from the statute books, and questions as to moral fitness are left to the people themselves to decide in expressing their choice at the polls. In the famous Wilkes case, the British parliament repeatedly excluded as morally unfit a man whom the people were bent on electing, and in the end parliament had to give way. That famous case settled the question so far as English practice is concerned, and some legal difficulties revealed by the Bradlaugh case in 1880 were soon removed by appropriate legislation.

In the United States a return to ancient claims of moral supervision over the popular choice has taken place in at least one noted instance. In 1920 the New York assembly unseated some of its members on the ground of unfitness because of their adherence to the doctrines of Socialism. This was in effect a ruling that the people have no right to choose Socialists as their representatives. The transaction brought so much censure upon those responsible for it that it is more likely to serve as a warning than as an example.

Although in general a liberal spirit now pervades the laws with respect to personal qualifications, the doctrine is still constantly preached that it is the duty of the people to elect good men to office, and it is a common opinion that the chief cause of bad government is popular negligence in the performance of this duty. It seems therefore to be still a point for consideration whether it would not be proper to take legal steps to compel the performance of that duty. Whatever shape action might take the issue involved would be this: - Ought people to be allowed to choose a bad man as their representative? The proper answer to this is that it is of the essence of representative government that the people themselves shall be the judge in that case. What looks good to them is just the good which the representative system seeks, no matter how bad it looks to other people.