of aldermen. The mayor of each was required to approve or disapprove every act or ordinance of the local legislature, but such an act or ordinance might be passed over the veto by a vote of two thirds of all the members elected to the board. Both reports made provision for various subordinate officers. Both provided for the division of the state into counties, towns, cities, and villages. The majority proposed to prohibit the creation of any other local division or district, or the annexation of territory to a city, except for the purpose of changing its boundaries. The minority proposed to prohibit the creation of such local divisions or districts, except for police or sanitary purposes, and also proposed to reserve to the legislature the power to provide for the preservation of the public health, and to appoint and control the police force of the state, and to create any local divisions it might deem expedient for these purposes. Both proposed to abolish the board of supervisors of New York, and to give the city exclusive power to determine the amount of taxation for local purposes. Both reserved to the legislature control over matters relating to the port of New York, and general commercial interests, and the article was not to affect the state's title to land under water in any city. Both provided for the appointment of three commissioners by the governor "to reduce into a systematic code the laws of this state relating to the government of cities." Both required the legislature, at its first session after the adoption of the Constitution, to enact a general law for the organization and government of cities. The majority proposed that justices and judges of inferior courts not of record be elected by the people. The minority proposed that they be appointed by the mayor and board of aldermen.

While the article was under consideration Mr. Landon proposed to limit its application to cities which had a

population exceeding 50,000, leaving the smaller cities free to administer their own affairs in such manner as the legislature might direct. This suggestion was not adopted. Mr. Spencer moved to strike out the section providing for mayors, and, after some debate, the Convention adopted a substitute proposed by Mr. Curtis, and which was contained in Mr. Murphy's minority report, providing, in substance, that each city should elect a mayor for a term of two years, who should be the chief executive officer of the city.

The time apparently was not ripe for including in the Constitution the radical provision relative to cities proposed by the committee. Serious opposition to the committee's plan developed early in the debate, and after some discussion nearly all of the article was stricken out, the only parts left being those providing for the election of mayors, the enactment of general laws for the organization and government of cities, and reserving to the legislature power concerning quarantine, the port of New York, state lands under water within city limits, and the regulation of wharves, piers, or slips in any city. The restriction contained in § 17 of article 3, prohibiting extra compensation in certain cases, was made applicable to common councils and boards of supervisors. This subject will be resumed in the chapter on the Convention of 1894.

CANALS AND FINANCE.

The canals from the beginning of their history have had a potent influence in shaping our financial policy. They have necessarily had much to do with the material development of the state, and for more than a century statesmen have been engaged in devising ways and means for their construction and maintenance. In the process of constitutional evolution the canals have logically been treated as a part of our financial system. In the ConvenO VOL. II. CONST. HIST.-23.

tion of 1846 the committee on canals and finance was one of the great committees, and it produced impressive and enduring results,-establishing principles concerning public debt, taxation, and appropriations that have proved, and will continue to prove, of inestimable value in protecting the people against extravagant expenditures of public money. In 1867 the subject of canals had become so large that the Convention deemed it expedient to appoint two committees, one on canals, and the other on canals and state finance, including also public debt, revenues, taxation, appropriations, and restrictions on legislative power in respect thereto. Both committees made reports which were considered together in committee of the whole. Existing financial provisions, except those relating directly to canals, were continued without substantial change. Some of the most important recommendations of these committees have since found their way into the Constitution by independent amendments, while many others have not yet passed beyond the domain of constitutional suggestion. Of this latter class it is not probable that many will ever be incorporated in the Constitution, because the conditions which at one time seemed to make them desirable have changed, and the progress of events has rendered them unnecessary. While many of these suggestions no longer have any vitality, they were once deemed important by wise and patriotic statesmen, and they are worthy of at least a casual notice in considering constitutional possibilities.

It had long been apparent that reform was needed in canal administration. This system of administration had grown up gradually from small beginnings, and from the outset extraordinary powers had been conferred on the canal commissioners. In the preliminary article on state debt, in the chapter on the Constitution of 1846, I have quoted from Governor Seward's message in 1839, his

objection to the powers exercised by the commissioners, and his suggestion of a "board of internal improvements,' with general supervision over public works. Experiencehad justified Governor Seward's criticism on the system, although the remedy suggested by him had received littlepractical attention, and the conviction in the minds of experienced statesmen that a remedy was needed had become so strong in 1867 that a change of canal administration was expected almost as a matter of course, and there was little difference of opinion in the Convention on this subject, except as to the method by which this change should be effected and the kind of administration to be substituted. The canal committee proposed to abrogate the canal board, contracting board, and the powers and duties of state engineer and surveyor as applicable to canals, and also to abolish the offices of canal commissioner and canal appraiser. The comptroller, treasurer, and attorney general were continued as commissioners of the canal fund, omitting the lieutenant governor and secretary of state, who were also commissioners under the Constitution of 1846. The powers of these commissioners were prescribed to some extent by the Constitution, and additional powers might be conferred on them by the legislature. The office of canal auditor, created in 1848, was made a constitutional office to be filled by appointment by the governor and senate.

In the article on state officers, in the chapter on the Convention of 1846, I have referred to the amendment offered by Mr. Loomis to create the office of commissioner of public works, with powers quite similar to those now vested in the superintendent of public works. The Loomis amendment was not favorably received, and was rejected almost without debate, but it shows that one of the ablest men in that Convention appreciated the importance of concentrating authority and responsibility in

canal management. The suggestion bore fruit, however, after more than twenty years, and, in substance, was adopted by the committee on canals in the Convention of 1867, who proposed to vest the new canal administration in one officer, to be called a superintendent of public works. He was to be appointed by the governor and senate for a term of eight years, and on his recommendation the governor and senate were to appoint four assistants for a like term. Mr. Bergen and Mr. Seymour concurred in the plan for one superintendent, but thought he ought to be elected by the people. Mr. Schoonmaker, Mr. Tappan, and Mr. Champlain presented a minority report in which they dissented from the recommendation to create the office of superintendent of public works with assistants to be appointed by the governor and senate. They concurred with the majority in the necessity of changing the management of the canals, concentrating power and responsibility. They objected to the "one-man power" proposed by the majority, without direct responsibility to the people, and holding the patronage of 1,000 miles of canals. This, they said, was a fearful power to place in the hands of one man; it was a power which, in the hands of a designing politician, could be used to control political nominations and elections. The minority recommended four superintendents instead of one, dividing the canals into four distinct sections, each to be under the exclusive control of one superintendent, and the four superintendents to constitute a board with general supervision of the whole system. The superintendents were to be elected by the people for terms of eight years.

The provision for a superintendent of public works, proposed by the majority of the committee, modified by reducing the term from eight years to five, was approved by the Convention, and included in the proposed Constitution. This subject will be considered again in connec