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although we cannot estimate the material effects of such an intangible movement of the human spirit, we may be certain that it increased the isolation of John. The tendency towards a reliance on paid troops and upon a handful of advisers was increased.
His own sins were partly responsible for the difficulty in which John found himself, for after his separation from Hawisia of Gloucester and his marriage with Isabella of Angoulême, the pope had urged him to found a Cistercian monastery and to provide one hundred knights to defend the Holy Land for a year. A few years later—when disaster had driven the advice home-John founded the abbey of Beaulieu in Hampshire, but it was throughout a harder matter to part with his knights. We do not hear of any attempt to obey Innocent, and although many men pledged their lands and got licence to depart on crusade or pilgrimage, 2 John succeeded in dissuading some of his most useful officials from the immediate fulfilment of their vows. A papal letter of inquiry refers to the justiciar and six of John's intimates by name, who thus delayed. They were, John stated, so essential to him in the defence of his kingdom and the administration of justice that the loss of their services would be most serious. They also agreed that in such a stormy time it was their
1. See the papal letters for March 27th, 1202, in Potthast, no. 1650, Migne, Patrologia Latina, ccxiv, 972; Luchaire, Innocent III: Les royautés vassales, p. 187.
2. The following crusaders and pilgrims are mentioned, among others, on the rolls. Reginald of Pavilli, of the Wiltshire branch of the house, who died on pilgrimage to Jerusalem (Rotuli Chartarum, 37b); Warin Fitz Gerold (ibid., 100); Henry de Puteac (Rot. Pat., 3b); Hugh, count of Saint-Pol (ibid., 4); Robert of Leaveland, warden of the Fleet (Rot. de Liberate, 25, 26); Henry of Longchamp, lord of Wilton in Herefordshire (Rot. Pat., 11b; Rot. de Liberate, 84); Gilbert of Minières (Rot. Pat., 30b, 33b). Philip, bishop of Durham, like the last-named, made a pilgrimage to Compostella. He followed the Bordeaux route: see Howden, iv, 157, 161, 174; Rot. Chart., 100b. 3. The letter is dated by Potthast, no. 1733, September 28th, 1202. It is printed in Patrologia Latina, ccxiv, 1088.
duty to remain, although the Bassets were eager to go if they could find the means, and the justiciar with Hugh Bardolf and William Brewer only desired to postpone the passage.
These men were, for the most part, employed in England; but a study of the Norman exchequer roll for 1203 suggests that in Normandy also John was tending to rely upon fewer men for the more important posts. I have described how the seneschalships of the empire were entrusted to mercenaries and upstarts. Within the duchy the numerous bailiwicks of Henry II's day were, at the same time, gradually formed into larger units. Richard of Fontenai, for example, was bailiff of Coutances, Vire and Mortain. It is interesting to note that the large bailiwicks created after 1204 point to a systematic adoption. of this process by Philip. Another sign of the times was John's reliance upon Anglo-Normans rather than Normans. Robert Fitz-Walter and Saer de Quinci, who had held and surrendered Vaudreuil, Vaudreuil, were English barons. The constable of Chester defended Château-Gaillard, the earls of Salisbury and Chester Pontorson and Avranches. The castle of Neubourg, upon the border of Philip's conquests in the Evrecin, was guarded by a royal clerk, Robert of Pleshey, and his English band. 3 These were the men who with such well-tried Normans as Peter of Préaux, Richard of Villequier, Richard of Fontenai and William of Mortemer, with the seneschal William Crassus, and the mercenary Louvrecaire, were left by John to resist the king of France.
1. The others mentioned are William of Estouteville and Robert of Berkeley, who had got dispensations from the archbishop of Canterbury which the pope evidently regards with some suspicion.
2. Above, p. 338.
3. This seems to follow from a comparison of Rot. Norm., 101, with Rotulus Cancellarii 3 Joh., 15, 269.
If now we seek to define the results of these various inquiries into the army and finances of the Norman State, a growing separation appears between the society of the duchy, with its feudal traditions, and its ruler, both in the organisation of the host, in the methods of collecting money and in the personnel of government. It is true that the forms and appearance of feudal warfare had not been changed; we may see them in the gathering of barons, knights and men-at-arms, in the charters of towns and grants of land for the promise of service, in the military aids and tallages, in the quasi-legal spirit of conflict and the settlement of prisoner and booty. But on the other hand, the king withdrew more and more behind the shelter of his mercenaries, became increasingly dependent upon and involved in the non-feudal operations of finance, and, in the administration of his estates, ceased to rely upon the energies of Norman society. Yet, if we go on to inquire whether these tendencies are sufficient to explain the collapse of Angevin rule, we must hesitate and grope for an answer. Some of these tendencies were not new nor peculiar to Normandy; some were to be characteristic of the later state, they anticipate the centralised rule of Edward I and Philip the Fair. Indeed we may find a parallel to some in the contemporary France of Philip Augustus. Philip also relied upon mercenaries and Jews,1 and preferred money payments for fixed services to the general feudal levy, and the feudal levy to the levée en masse. In so far as his financial system was less developed he suffered by contrast with John. 2 In Richard's hands
1. For the recall of the Jews in 1198, which was due to Philip's difficulties in the face of Richard, see Cartellieri, Philipp II August., iii, 184.
2. Borrelli de Serres, op. cit., 169-171; Viollet, Histoire des institutions politiques, iii, 364; Holtzmann, Französische Verfassungs geschichte, p. 260. Although the taille is mentioned in 1190, direct taxation really dates from a century later. It is the return to the idea of universal
the military and financial forces which have been described were potent weapons for checking Philip and sufficient agencies for the transitory direction of opinion against him. The causes of Angevin failure were less material than these. They lie partly, of course, in John's character, but they are to be found even more in the fact that, while in France the growing separation between feudalism and government was a symptom of national strength and purpose, in Normandy it was typical of a general disintegration. In crushing the power of resistance to themselves Henry II and his sons destroyed the desire to unite against an invader. The loss of the duchy has in consequence the inexplicable character which attaches to some men's moral downfall. With no apparent failure, maintaining to the end the exercise of their peculiar virtues, they lose their hold on life.
It will be necessary in the last chapter to deal at more length with one aspect of this problem.
NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.
SENESCHAL, CONSTABLE AND MARSHAL IN NORMANDY.
There is clear evidence that the seneschal directed the distribution of the Norman garrisons. The castellans were, of course, appointed by the king. The statement of accounts for June 1200 to November 1201, presented by Guérin of Glapion as seneschal, shows that large sums were entrusted to the seneschal's care-in this case £7,365-and that they
military obligation which is really important in Philip's reign, for this underlay the definition of services, even though money might be preferred in their stead (Borrelli de Serres, p. 519). From this point of view there is something misleading in Vuitry's remark that the financial régime was the outcome of feudal institutions and not of political sovereignty. It is of course still more misleading with regard to England and Normandy. See his Etudes sur le régime financier de la France (1878), p. 411.
were very largely expended upon garrisons. Moreover, a Norman roll for the fifth year of John's reign is endorsed with memoranda of the seneschal's actions in the enormous bailiwick of Richard of Fontenai. Richard had set a garrison in Mont-Saint-Michel, and afterwards "posuit v. servientes armatos per preceptum Radulfi Taxonis tunc Senescalli Normannie." 2 Richard also garrisoned Vire and Tenchebrai "per preceptum "per preceptum Senescalli."3 The seneschal was sometimes accompanied by the constable on these important tours of inspection. On June 3 both these officers came to Mortain "et ibi statuerunt remanere xv milites et x servientes et x pedites qui ibidem interfuerunt usque ad diem Martis in festo Apostolorum Simonis et Jude in Octobris, videlicet per C. et xl. dies."4
The duty of the marshal is exemplified by letters patent of December 9, 1202, sent from Séez: 5
Rex etc. omnibus militibus et servientibus ad quos etc. Mandamus vobis quod sitis intendentes fideli nostro Johanni marescallo nostro, et servicium vestrum faciatis sicut vobis ipse dicet. Teste me ipso apud Sagium
ix die Decembris.
John the Marshal is not merely entrusted with the arrangements for a levy. He is marescallus noster, our marshal. This is interesting, for there seems to be no doubt that we have to do with the son of John the Master Marshal, or great officer of state, the elder brother of William the Marshal; and this John was in turn the son of the famous John, the Marshal of Henry I's and
1. Rot. Scacc., ii, 501, 502. The exchequer rolls similarly illustrate the duties of the seneschal, e.g., Rot. Scacc., i, 137, 138: William Fitz Ralf in 1195 received £1196. 10s. Od. for the wages of knights and men-at-arms in time of war, and 'ad faciendas operationes Regis in pluribus locis per Normanniam." Cf. ibid., p. 236: wages for the knights who accompanied the seneschal and others along the March. 2. Rot. Norm., 120.
3. Ibid., 121.
5. Rot. Pat., 21b.