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wars. The increase in enfeoffments was not accompanied by a proportionate increase in fighting power, yet with a restricted demesne the kings had to support an expensive army and an elaborate system of defences. To some extent the call was met by Henry's careful inquisitions into his regalia, and by Richard's high farming of the public offices, but these methods of raising the revenue were in the nature of the case limited, and were neutralised or abused by the extravagance and recklessness of Richard and John.3 The true answer to the problem is, as Gerald of Wales points out, that the extraordinary revenue (accidentia) was vastly increased during the second half of the twelfth century. The growth of a settled and industrious population, protected by the law in town and country, had multiplied these indirect proceeds of the land which were accessible to the government; if rents were inelastic, loans, tallages, and fines were capable of vast extension.

Yet, as the struggle with Philip Augustus went on, it

1. Giraldus Cambrensis, De principis instructione in Opera, viii, 316: "quaeri ergo potest ab aliquo . . . qualiter rex Henricus secundus et ejus filii tot inter werras tantis thesauris abundant. Ad quae ratio reddi poterit, quia quod minus habebant in redditibus, totum in accidentibus, plus in accessoriis quam principalibus confidentes, supplere curabant."

2. Richard's policy was systematic and extended to all his dominions; cf. Howden, iii, 267.

3. John's unscrupulousness may be illustrated by the grant to William of Préaux of the Lieuvin, April 22nd, 1202. William had lent money to the king, who in order to pay his debt gave him the bailiwick at double the usual farm (duplicando solitam firmam) and ordered the barons of the exchequer to compute the farm to him until the debt was paid (Rot. Norm., 89, 90).

4. The fine was in the majority of cases a payment for a licence, and the opportunity for selling licences increased as the complexity and interdependence of social relations increased. In itself a legitimate tax upon the growing activities of feudal society, the fine was subject to easy yet almost incredible abuse by John. See Delisle, in Bibliothèque, xiii, 112; McKechnie, Magna Carta, p. 532.

became clear that Normandy was unable to maintain the defence of her frontiers without English aid. The hardest fighting began in 1194, and in 1194 the duchy was already in debt. The money which had been drawn off for the Crusade did not come back, but the returned Crusaders had to redeem from neighbour, monastery or Jew the lands which they had pledged before their departure. Moreover, the king's ransom saddled Normandy with her share in a great public debt: in the year 1194-5 the German envoys received £16,000 from the financiers of the duchy. The redemption of this debt went on slowly; even in 1203 some Norman barons owed instalments of their contribution.3 Then in 1194 the war expenditure began, including vast outlays upon men and fortresses. According to one account which survives from this period, the seneschal alone expended over £7,000 in less than eighteen months, in wages, repairs and incidental expenses, and the seneschal's financial disbursements, though comprehensive, met only a small part of the annual call upon Normandy. Before 1198 was Before 1198 was over, nearly £50,000 were spent upon the fortifications at Andeli 5 and its neighbourhood. It should be remembered, at the same time, that in 1193 King Philip had, as a result of his annexations, wrested the eastern bailiwicks from the

1. Compare Richard's letter from Acre, in Bibliothèque, v, 36: "sciatis quod, cum quosdam fideles nostros pro negotiorum nostrorum opportunitate ad transmarinos partes remittendos duxerimus, nichil autem de proprio in hoc casu, secundum peregrinationis votum alienare possimus, dilecto nostro Jacobo de Jhota curam potestatemque commisimus."

2. Rot. Scacc., i, 136.

3. e.g., Rot. Norm., p. 74 A "rotulus Redemptionis" contained records of the payments made by the barons (Rot. Scacc., i, 128).

4. Guérin of Glapion's statement of accounts for 1200-1201 (Rot. Scacc., ii, 500).

5. Above, p. 303.

control of the Norman exchequer, and although the loss was, with the exception of Gisors and a few other places, temporary, the Norman Vexin and Bray were henceforward rarely at peace. Owing to the loss of Gisors they cost more for their defence than they could contribute. As Philip advanced, seizing a little here and a little there, he restricted the revenue-yielding area while he forced an increase in Norman expenditure.

The fixed farms of the Norman bailiwicks and preposituræ amounted to £20,000 a year in Angevin money. Now, if we take the usual military season about the year 1200, from Saint Hilary's day (January 13) to Michaelmas, and place a fairly small garrison of two knights, five men-atarms of the cavalry class, and twenty other men-at-arms in a second-class fortress, we find that a cost of £650 is incurred. Thirty such garrisons would consume the fixed revenue of Normandy, and the Norman government was responsible for the defence of about forty-five castles, many of which would need a much larger garrison than the one described. It is of course true that the majority of these places were maintained by local effort, and would only be specially garrisoned during a critical period, but when we reflect upon the other expenses of the year, both military and civil, it is clear that the additional revenue required must have been great. As I have said, English aid was necessary, to supplement the proceeds of aids, tallages and loans.

If the series of exchequer rolls were complete, it would doubtless be possible to compile the financial history of Normandy between 1194 and 1203. But from the three rolls which survive only general conclusions can be drawn. Aids were imposed for special as well as for general objects,

1. Above, p. 146. Moreover the Norman exchequer, by the treaty of 1193, was responsible for the maintenance of the garrisons placed by Philip in Arques and Drincourt.

2. Rot. Scacc., ii, 513, 514. This was the garrison at Gavrai in 1203. 3. Above, pp. 103 seqq.

for a siege, a fortification or the wages of soldiers on the Norman march. Some of these were levied instead of service, some were probably taxes levied on the ducal demesne.1 Casual references upon the exchequer rolls show that in 1202 a tallage was laid upon the lands of Normandy held in free alms, or in other words upon the Church,2 and that in 1203 a general aid of two shillings was levied throughout the Norman bailiwicks.3 This last evidently corresponds to the English carucage, and shows that under the stress of war the Norman and English financial systems were being assimilated. The greatest pressure, however, was felt by the towns. The richer burgesses or property holders were taxed at £10 and upwards, and their contributions reached a total, varying with the size of the towns, from £100 or so up to the £600 of Bayeux and the £650 of Falaise. By these means enormous sums were raised for the defence of the march.

These exactions were supplemented by loans from towns, bailiwicks, Jews and private persons, by the proceeds of amercements, fines and sureties and the chattels of deceased usurers. 5 But as time went on John relied more and more upon his treasure from England. In 1203 the king was unable to pay the wages of his servants on the march; early in February, at the commencement of the most critical year of warfare, numerous orders were issued

1. See Delisle, Bibliothèque, xiii, 120-126. As Delisle points out in a note on pp. 119, 120, the terms auxilium and tallagium were frequently used alternatively in Normandy.

2. Rot. Norm., 65: “occasione tallagii positi super elemosina Normannie."

3. Ibid., 90: "auxilium duorum solidorum quod positum fuit generaliter in Normannia."

4. Delisle, op. cit., p. 130. For the method of assessment, see the exchequer rolls, passim. The numerous emprumenta or loans were They are, of course, distinct from the loans made by individuals which are mentioned below.

collected in the same way.

5. The chattels and lands of William of Calviz, a usurer, brought in large sums in 1195.

to meet the deficit by means of English treasure; half the arrears up to February 9th were to be paid, and full pay for twenty days beyond that date. It has been calculated that during this year 18,120 marks of silver were sent from England into Normandy. In Angevin money this sum would amount to £48,320, or more than double the fixed Norman revenue.

Two facts, which are closely connected, are revealed very clearly by a study of Angevin finance during the reign of King John. In the first place, although the various exchequers had in concert with the royal chamber developed a careful system of bookkeeping, they did not make any attempt at a financial policy. Enormous sums were gathered, distributed and spent; and every official concerned in their collection or expenditure rendered account of his service, but it was nobody's business to inquire whether the money was exacted wisely or expended prudently. It was particularly desirable that the Angevin government should know how it stood because -and here I come to the second point-finance was becoming a cosmopolitan power. Credit, with its subtle operations and reactions, was growing. Untouched by the annual stocktaking at the exchequer, new forms of accommodation, fresh sources of wealth were opened to Richard and John by Jew, money-changer and Italian merchant. Centuries were to pass before the European states learned the elementary canon of sound finance, that the need for a careful examination of accounts grows in proportion to the ease with which money can be obtained; but a habit of financial criticism would have been sufficient to check the recklessness of the Angevin kings. Unfortunately, this habit could only be formed in a state which felt the unity given by national sentiment. It was

1. Rot. Norm., 75, 76. The statement in the text are deductions from the entries on these pages.

2. Delisle, in Bibliothèque, x, 289. The calculation is made from the Liberate roll for 1203.

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