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tendencies differed. In England the exigencies of service across the Channel brought about a closer organisation of the feudal force on a representative basis. There is no trace in Normandy of any system of representative service. 1 There was not the same excuse in Normandy for lengthening the term of service in the open, and permanent garrisons were more suitably composed of paid men. Moreover, it is quite probable that the different methods of assessing the aid in the two countries helped to encourage a representative system in England and to hinder it in Normandy. In Normandy, as we have seen, the aid was not payable on every knight enfeoffed, but only upon the servitium debitum.


1. The knights and barons who were sent to Issoudun in 1194 (Rot. Scacc., i, 136, above, p. 160) are the nearest example, but there is no evidence that they were systematically selected. I am, of course, not referring to the provision of knight-service by the knights of a fief for war or castleguard. The returns from Bayeux in 1133 show that in this respect a representative system was developed in Normandy as in England. In some cases this doubtless resulted in a long service system, especially on the marches: "idem episcopus debebat servicium viginti militum in marchis Normanniae per quadraginta dies, ubicunque rex vellet, et istud servicium faciebant quinque milites per unum." (sic, annum. Histor, de France, xxiii, 699). There are many instances, e.g., in the Feoda Normanniae compiled after 1204 (Ibid, p. 705).

2. The aid was of course collected from all the knights during an escheat, e.g., the long list of payments by the knights of the honour of Montfort in 1198 and 1203 (Rot. Scacc., ii, 364, 559). In 1198 Richard Silvain accounted in detail for the aids of 22 and seventwenty-fourths. The number of knights' fees in the service of the lord in 1172 was 22 and seven-twelfths (Red Book, ii, 642). Stapleton incorrectly identified these knights with the 33 and seven-twelfths ad servitium suum of Hugh of Montfort in Coquainvilliers, and suggests an emendation accordingly (II, lxvii), but Coquainvilliers was never in ducal hands. The aid was also paid upon all the knights during a minority, as in 1198 in the honour of Moion (Rot. Scacc., ii, 298, compared with Red Book, ii, 629). The relief also seems to have been paid on all the knights; see the entry relating to Peter of Sable's payment. for the knight's of Gacé (Rot. Scacc., ii, 317). It is an interesting:

Henry II extended the assessment in England, he was doubtless thinking of the superior advantages of financial to military aid in his continental wars: it would be tedious to ship the military service of England across the Channel, and if taxation were resorted to, it might be general,―not confined, like the old scutage on ecclesiastical fiefs, to a tax on the service which was legally due. The next step was easy. If personal service were needed, a proportion of the knight service legally due, or, better still, a hundred knights or so picked from the whole of England, would be much more useful, since they would be available for a longer period. On the scene of warfare no such necessity was apparent; and, in any case, it would have been more difficult to disturb military obligations which had been fixed before the conquest of England. But several important results might have followed the extension of Henry's policy into Normandy. The towns might have escaped with lighter tallages; the English scutages need not have been so onerous; and more scope would have been offered for the development of a national representative system of military service.

In England, after the loss of Normandy, the growth of such a system was checked, and it gradually gave way before different methods of raising an army; but no student of John's reign can doubt that military organisation had great influence upon later experiments in political representation. Is it too fanciful to suggest that if such a system had taken root in Normandy, the whole history of the duchy might have been changed?

On the other hand, we cannot be certain that no attempts were made in Normandy to establish a definite territorial

question whether the lord who was given power to collect an aid on his estates was expected to maintain himself in the ducal service from the surplus, after the payment of the aid on the servitium debitum. A ducal writ permitted a lord to levy an aid upon his tenants pro gravamine guerre (Statuta et Consuet., c. xlviii, in Tardif, I, i, 39).

army, more national than the feudal levy by knight service. At all events, it is necessary, in the face of contemporary developments in France, to consider the possibility of such attempts. In France from 1194 onwards, if not earlier, the royal demesne and the towns were expected to provide a definite number of servientes and waggons, and for this military purpose the demesne was divided and the towns grouped. The obligation did not remove the possibility of a universal levy, but for the most part it took its place, and, like the arrière-ban, involved a recognition of the Carolingian idea of service. The king called upon sub-vassals as well as vassals, and made no distinction between the vassal and the liege-man. The communes might be required, and indeed generally were required, to give money instead of sending their quota, but the decision rested with the king. Finally, the men-at-arms, when they were summoned, were paid by the king. Now it is not necessary to exaggerate the military value of such a force as this, which was more often than not translated into money, but its constitutional importance was great. It points to the organisation of royal resources, and the development of feudal relations on principles which were other than feudal. It would be strange if no such expedient were tried in Normandy, where the exploitation of the demesne had been so great. In England the survival of popular institutions gave vitality to the fyrd and permitted such a systematic organisation of local forces as was ordered by John in 1205;2 in Normandy we should expect a more definite and

1. Borrelli de Serres, op. cit., i, 467 seqq., especially pp. 489, 493, 519. The prisia servientium, or quota lists, date from 1194, for as Borrelli de Serres shows, this is the date of the well known document edited in the Recueil des Historiens de France, xxiii, 722; and in Giry's Documents sur les relations de la royauté avec les villes en France (1885), p. 39. The date is significant, for Philip Augustus was preparing to meet Richard after the latter's captivity.

2. Stubbs, Constitutional History, i, 634.

centralised plan, like that betrayed by the quota-lists (prisia servientium) of France. And if we scan the evidence, some parallels to French practice certainly do appear. There is the reference to the men-at-arms whom the citizens of Rouen are obliged to send in time of war.1 There are the occasional allusions to the "servientes qui debuerunt facere servitium Regis," and who were fined for non-appearance. The bailiffs are apparently responsible for the payment of these men, who may therefore be regarded as tenants of the ducal demesne. The Assize of Arms may have been intended to facilitate the operations of a system of this kind; we are told that Philip Augustus copied Henry's Assize of Arms, and it is tempting to connect it with Philip's military organisation of his demesne. If, that is to say, an Assize of Arms lay behind the military organisation of France, we might with more confidence presume a similar development from the Norman Assize. But the evidence is vague and uncertain, and we must be content to regard a Norman organisation on these lines as possible rather than probable.


King John kept together his paid army by recruiting, by lavish grants of pensions and lands, and by the maintenance in his service of bands of artillerymen, crossbowmen and mercenaries.

The failure of negotiations in April, 1202 forced the king to face a serious crisis, and his efforts to attract troops are illustrated by the open letters which he entrusted to his "recruiting sergeants" in May. On May 2, William of Cresec was commissioned to enroll recruits on liberal

1. Rot. Scacc., i, 306; above, p. 313. Note that the citizens pay money instead. See also p. 312 note, for Fécamp.

terms. On May 27, Simon of Haveret was set to work among the knights of Flanders, Hainault and Brabant.2

Just as he made special efforts to gather men together, John made special efforts to retain them in his service by grants of lands and money. It would be tedious to enumerate those who received pensions in return for service.3 It is sufficient to remark that this form of vassal relation was frequently adopted by John. The grants of land, which were as numerous as grants of revenue, are of interest to the student in so far as they illustrate the effect of warfare upon existing social relations. For example, a reversion to the beneficiary system is clearly seen in such grants as those of Léry and Conteville to Gerard of Fournival, and of the Channel Islands to Peter of Préaux. These were not ordinary cases of enfeoffment. For the service of one knight Gerard of Fournival was granted lands which had brought into the exchequer £40 per annum, and had been regarded as a fair exchange for Pont de l'Arche. The enfeoffment of the Channel Islands to Peter of Préaux for the service of three knights was a measure of military

1. Rot. Pat., 10: "et sciatis quod factum servicium vestrum ita bene remunerabimus quod nobis et eidem Willelmo grates scietis." William had just previously gone surety for Baldwin the chamberlain of Flanders “quod ad servicium nostrum fideliter nobis veniet in Normmanniam" (Rot. de Lib., 29). He held lands in Wiltshire (Red Book, ii, 483, 484) and received many favours from John (ibid., p. 555; Rot. Norm., 60; Rot. de Lib., 44, 51). For a time he seems to have been suspected, but in 1207 he made a fine for his lands (Rot. de Finibus, i, 377).

2. Rot. Pat., 12.

3. e.g., Rot. Norm., 32 (Herveus de Preez), Rot. de Lib., 4, 13. The grant is usually accompanied by the words, "unde homo noster est." 4. See the remarks of Viollet on this form of the relation de fide et servitio, in Hist. Litt de la France, xxxiii, 133.

5. Cf. Baldwin, Scutage and Knight Service, p. 79.

6. Rot. Norm., 19.

7. Rot. Chart., 33b; Havet, in Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes (1876), xxxvij, 188.

8. Rot. Scacc., i, 239; Stapleton, I, clxvii, II, clxi; above, p. 287.

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