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were forthcoming the history of siege engines in these years would probably throw some light on the military results of the Third Crusade. We may think, then, that as he supervised the workmen at Andeli, Richard's thoughts often went back five or six years to the siege of Acre or to his visit to the great Syrian fortress of Margat.
Although the story of warfare which it has been possible to compile in previous chapters is in the main a story of sieges, the evidence is much too scanty to enable any modern student to follow in detail the wars between Philip Augustus and the dukes of Normandy. Indeed, it is probable that only a handful of persons were kept aware of all the military operations: only now and then did definite facts become matter of common knowledge. We are able to see from the terms of treaties and from casual letters enrolled by officials that, all along the Norman frontier, there was constant building, attacking, and destruction of fortresses, of whose existence in most cases a piece of disordered ground, or perhaps a popular tradition, is the only record.2 Fortunately, however, we are better informed about the organisation of the castle and its importance in time of war.
In the first place, it should be noticed that a castle rarely stood in isolation, but was generally a part of a definite system of fortifications. Sometimes these arrangements were of a temporary nature, as in 1184, when the earl of Arundel commanded all the frontier castles from Vaudreuil to Gisors,3 but more permanent affiliations can be traced beneath these extraordinary commands. In a few cases, a fortress relied partly upon its own strength, partly upon its intimate relation to a
1. See, for example, the treaty of 1200, quoted above p. 253.
general system of communications. Thus Verneuil, with its triple town, earthworks and artificial ponds, was not only strong in itself; it had become the centre or objective towards which the energies of central Normandy as a whole were directed for the defence of the Avre. Behind it lay L'Aigle and Breteuil, upon the latter of which converged the road from Rouen by Neubourg and Conches and the important strategic route from Lisieux by Chambrais (the present Broglie) and Lire;' on either side lay the less important defences of the Avre,-Nonancourt, Tillières and Courteilles to the east, Saint-Christophe and Chennebrun to the west. The accounts of the bailiff of Verneuil, who was also the farmer, in 1198, give a picture of its importance: there was frequent intercourse between Verneuil and the fortresses in the valley of the Seine;2 the bailiff's expenses show that he supervised the administration of Tillières, and the defences of Damville, Courteilles,3 and Cintray to the north-west). Verneuil itself was the barracks of a little host of artillerymen and other mercenaries, one or two of whom bear strange-sounding names, and of mounted men-at-arms and foot soldiers.
Such great centres as Arques, Gisors, Vaudreuil, Falaise, and Argentan were, like Verneuil, places of national importance, intimately dependent upon the administration as a whole. Where this was not the case, a system of local grouping can generally be traced, such as is familiar in feudal history and in feudal literature. This grouping is naturally more marked in private honours, which, being on the whole more compact in Normandy than they were
1. King Richard went by this road in 1194, and King John in 1203. See above pp. 151, 243.
2. “Pro prisonibus captis in Gerra de Rothomago apud Vernolium [ducendis) et hantis et picoisis et venatione Regis et hernesio balistariorum pluries ducendis a Vernolio et Aquila apud Vallem Rodolii et Insulam de Andele.” (Rot, Scacc., ii, 311–2).
3. “Pro claudendo bailio de Corteilles de petra, ccc. li.” (Ibid., p. 315).
in England, could be organised as military units: the ffteen castles of the Widow Lady in the romance of the Holy Graal, or the more historical nine held by Robert of Bellême in Maine, find their counterparts in the castellariae of the honours of Mortain ? and in France of Montfortl'Amaury. On the ducal demesne, however, the administrative system often comprised a similar organisation of strongholds. Some of the groups were originally held by vassals or neighbours; others were due to official action; some again were more of the nature of federations, such as that which comprised the four castles of Lions, Neufmarché, Longchamp, Beauvoir,3 or the union of Moulins and Bonmoulins; others consisted of a castle with subsidiary forts, such as Falaise and Pommeraye, 4 Vaudreuil and Louviers.5 The erection of Château-Gaillard brought with it the creation of a similar group of subordinate forts, Tosny, Boutavant, and Cléry.
We get a glimpse of the relations which were customary between the various castellariae of an honour, in an inquiry instituted by Philip Augustus into the rights of Evreux and Gaillon. 6 Until the occupation of Gaillon by the French king in 1193 or 1194,7 it was part of the honour of the count of Evreux. The chief evidence was given by Geoffrey Barket, who had been the count's castellan when Philip besieged the castle. He pointed out the fiefs and woods which did not owe service at Gaillon, distinguished
1. Mortain, Cerences, Tinchebrai, Condé-sur-Noireau.
2. Gressey, Haye-de-Herce, Richebourg, Gambais, Houdan, formed part of the châtellenie of Montfort l'Amaury south of the Avre; Dion, Etude sur les châteaux féodau. des frontières de la Normandie, pp. 363-5.
3. Stapleton, I, cxiii.
7. More probably in February, 1194. See the account of Philip's movements above, p. 147. For Richard's attempt to retake Gaillon, see p. 169 note.
between those pleas which could be tried at Gaillon, and those which, involving a possible resort to the duel, had to go to Evreux;1 and, finally, he enumerated the items which composed the farm of the estate. All damages sustained by the woods of Gaillon during the period of tenure by the farmers were assessed at Evreux; and the count or his bailiff enforced judicially the payment of stated alms and grants.
The next fact which becomes clear from a study of available evidence is that the castle, from a military no less than from a financial standpoint, was inseparable from the surrounding or dependent area.3 The castellaria or châtellenie comprised castle, lands, feudal duties and fiscal arrangements; it was an artificial bundle of property and services, 4 designed for the maintenance of the fortress and the profit of the lord. Indeed, it is hardly paradoxical
1. This is in agreement with a general statement made by the justices of Normandy in 1155 in an assize held at Domfront (Delisle, Robert de Torigni, ii, 241).
2. "si firmarii de Gaillon non persolverent elemosinas suas assignatas et feoda, justiciabat eos comes ad persolvendum, vel baillivus suus."
3. e.g., Robert of Torigni, ed. Delisle, ii, 134 : “Quidam constabularius domini regis Henrici, Osbernus de Hosa nomine, qui castrum Caesaris Burgi, cum patria que ad illud pertinet, custodiebat.”
4. I have not seen this stated elsewhere so clearly as in the following letter from John to the constable of Rockingham, dated Reading, April 13th, 1216. (Rot. Pat., 176b.) “Precipimus tibi quod retentis in manu nostra ad castellariam Rokingham maneriis de Geytinton et de Clive et de Brikestok et de Corby et custodiis militum qui sunt de feodo Abbatis de Burgo et tenseriis pertinentibus ad predictam castellariam, omnia alia spectancia ad Vicecomitem Norhantonie et unde Vicecomes se intromittere solebat ante adventum tuum apud Rokingham, plenarie habere permittas dilecto et fideli nostro Rogero de Nevill Vicecomiti nostro Norhantonie."
5. It has been maintained by some writers that manorial monopolies in mills, ovens, etc., were due to an artificial organisation of this kind : the erection of a fortress involved the creation of monopolies. See C. Koehne's “Studien über die Entstehung Zwangs-und Bannrechte” in Lorraine during the ninth and tenth centuries, in the Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, 1904, xxv, 172-191.
say that it was easier to maintain a châtellenie without a castle than a castle without its châtellenie, 1 The aim of warfare was the capture of castles and the control of the capital stock which they represented. In 1193 King Philip demanded as sureties for the payment of 20,000 marks of pure gold Troyes the four castles of Loches, Châtillon-surIndre, Drincourt and Arques.” When in 1196 he recovered Nonancourt, his panegyrist refers to the success as the restoration of the castle to fiscal control.'3 In both these cases occupation of the châtellenie is meant, for the possession of a stronghold without its sources of revenue was inconvenient and unprofitable. This fact is stated very vividly by the biographer of the Marshal. It will be remembered how, on the intervention of the papal legate, Richard and Philip agreed in January 1199 to a five years' truce, on the condition that Philip, while retaining during this period the Norman castles already in his possession, should surrender all claims to the control of the surrounding lands. The advantage which could be gained from this arrangement was pointed out to King Richard by the Marshal. Richard evidently felt that he had been first tricked into a truce by the legate, and then insulted by a demand for the release of the bishop of Beauvais. After his interview he shut himself up in his chamber choking with rage like a wounded boar. Only the Marshal dared to approach him. He called to him loudly to open, and spoke to him thus: 'Why be annoyed at such a trifle; you should laugh rather, for you have gained all. The king of France wants peace. Leave him the castles until the next passage to the Holy Land, but keep the land which belongs to us. When he can get nothing from the land
1. Torigni in 1203 (above, p. 272) may possibly be a case in point. 2. Above p. 149. 3. The king "in fisci castellum jura reducit ” (Philippid., v. 119, ed. Delaborde, ü, 129).
4. Above p. 184.