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siderable naval force in the bay of Naples. The government made application to the ambassadors of these countries to have a statement of the reasons for the presence of so many ships of war, and received in reply the most unequivocal assurances, that no hostility was intended. Sir Wm. A'Court, in his answer, said, "that he had no hesitation in giving a frank declaration of the intentions of his government; that the British squadron was simply a squadron of observation, the presence of which was sufficiently explained by the critical circumstances of the country, and the necessity of providing for the security of the persons and property of British subjects, under all possible chances; that the British government was determined to maintain a strict neutrality, and to take no part, either directly or indirectly, in the war which seemed to be on the point of breaking out; that it would interfere in no way with the affairs of the country, unless such interference should be rendered indispensable by any personal insult or danger to the royal family; and that, not foreseeing the possibility of such a case, he flattered himself that nothing would alter the peaceful attitude of Great Britain."

In the mean time, Ferdinand had arrived at Laybach. His first letter spoke only of the amusement he found in the chase, and of the superiority of his dogs over those of the emperor Alexander: No strangers were permitted to reside at Laybach during this convocation of crowned heads; and to make their councils more impenetrable, not even was a secretary permitted to be present

at the conferences of the ministers. The principles, however, which guided these hidden deliberations, were sufficiently known; for, in a state-paper, which appeared at the end of the preceding year, signed by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, there was a formal declaration of irreconcileable hostility to the revolution of Naples. "In order to lead to conciliatory measures," said the allied sovereigns in that document, "the monarchs assembled at Troppau resolved to invite the king of the Two Sicilies to an interview at Laybach; a step, the sole object of which was, to free the will of the king from all external constraint, and to place his majesty in the situation of a mediator between his misled people and the states whose tranquillity was threatened. As the monarchs are resolved not to recognise governments which had been produced by open rebellion, they could not enter into negotiations except with the king alone." France seems to have neither avowed nor denied these principles. But the British go. vernment, in a circular, dated the 18th of January, and laid before parliament on the first of February, declared their dissent from the general principles which had been adopted at Troppau and Laybach, as well as their determination not to interfere in the affairs of Naples; adding, at the same time, that other European states, and especially Austria and the Italian powers, might feel them, selves differently circumstanced; and professing, that it was not the purpose of England to prejudge the question as it might affect them, or to interfere with the course which such states might

think fit to adopt, with a view to their own security, provided only that they were ready to give every reasonable assurance that their views were not directed to purposes of aggrandisement, subversive of the territorial system of Europe, as established by late treaties. The ambassador, however, whom the new government of Naples had dispatched to London, though treated with much personal civility, was not received in an official character.

At last, on the 9th of February, the envoys of Russia and Prussia, and the chargé d'affaires of Austria, communicated to the prince regent the resolutions which had been adopted at Laybach. These resolutions were, that an Austrian army should occupy the Neapolitan territory, unless the order of things established since the 6th of the preceding July were immediately abolished; and, that, even if a spontaneous submission took place, the army should still penetrate into the kingdom, to maintain the new system which was now to be established. At the same time, a letter from Ferdinand to his son was published, dated the 28th of January, in which he stated, that the determination of the confederate sovereigns was irrevocable, but that they were most desirous of promoting the interests of the Neapolitan people, and for that pur pose proposed, that he should frame a system of government calculated to guarantee for ever the prosperity of the kingdom. Ferdinand remained at Laybach, apparently to see what effect would be produced at Naples by these official annunciations of approaching war.

It seemed as if threats of hos

tility had only animated the Neapolitans to a stouter spirit of resistance. The publication of bis majesty's letter was accompanied with fêtes and other demonstrations of joy in the chief provincial towns. The parliament of Naples was a bright blaze of oratorical courage; there was not a deputy who was not eager to throw himself into the very front of the combat. "I see," said the deputy Morici, "my country contemned, menaced, outraged; I feel all the passions of youth boiling in my veins; my indignation is at its height; I feel that I can no longer remain among you ; and I beg you to grant me leave to repair to the army. I do not go there in order to have command; I will serve as a simple volunteer by the side of my fellow-citizens, who have honoured me with their choice to be one of the national representation. I will pray the general under whom I may serve to permit me to fire the first shot against the enemy. I swear here never to return to my home, to perish rather in the field of battle, if the country is not saved."

Other deputies immediately demanded leave to repair also to the frontiers; and it was resolved, that all military deputies should have that liberty, and that their substitutes should supply their places in parliament. Private citizens made individual offers of personal service or pecuniary supplies; and the parliament sat with leisurely complaisance to hear the letters read, which contained such offers, and to return solemn thanks to the writers. Sir Robert Wilson was among the number of those, who were eager to distinguish themselves in so holy a

cause. Every day some new law was passed-some new decree issued, which breathed the purpose of preferring destruction to submission. Levies were announced as completed; new ones were ordered; the roads were to be broken up; provisions were to be carried off, and all was to be laid waste before the enemy; that, finding desolation before and around him, his victories might be useless to him, and his final defeat inevitable.

Nor were there wanting reasonable grounds of hope, that the menaced invasion might be successfully repelled. Formidable as were the Austrian armies, they were to act at a distance from their own resources, and separated from their own frontier by provinces extremely ill-disposed to their cause. The war could not fail to be enormously expensive to the assailants; and, if it was at all protracted, the Austrian finances, by no means in a flourishing state, would prove unequal to the burthen. Troops might be had from Russia or Prussia, but the supply of the funds requisite for putting them in motion and keeping them in the field, was not to be expected from these quarters. Instant and decisive success was necessary to Austria; if she did not obtain this if the first blow did not terminate the contest, she was likely to lose all; and there were circumstances, which, to say the least, rendered it extremely doubtful, whether she would be able to bring the war to so rapid a conclusion. There were two roads, by which the Neapolitan territory could be invaded, the one leading through the Abruzzi, the other going through Rome VOL. LXIII.

and the Pontine marshes, quitting the papal dominions at Terracina, and passing through Fondi and Capua to Naples. The latter was the better road, but it abounded in difficult passes. Sometimes it winded among narrow dells; at other times it was hemmed in between the mountains and the sea; it was intersected at one point by the Voltorno, and at another by the Garigliano, on the banks of which, in a former age, the Spanish captain Gonsalvo made his celebrated defensive campaign against the French, compelling them, after months of warfare, to retreat with ruin and disgrace. The local peculiarities of the ground were such, that the most formidable obstacles might be opposed to the approach of an invader, by merely breaking up the highway for a short distance; where it passed, more especially, through the Pontine marshes, a little labour would render it impassable to the heavy baggage and artillery of an army. Even if an enemy succeeded in penetrating by this line of road, his communications upon it could not be maintained without the presence of a considerable force; because they would be liable to constant interruptions from attacks by sea, of which the Neapolitan squadron would have the command, and from incursions of the garrison of the strong fortress of Gaeta.

The other road, passing through the interior of the country, did not admit of an equally simple and obvious mode of defence; for collateral communications, diverging to the right and left, would give a skilful invader an opportunity of turning the flanks of the defensive army. The ge[Q]

neral face of the country was, however, well adapted to irre gular warfare. It abounded in strong posts, which would occasion loss, both of men and of time, to the assailants; it passed through many mountainous defiles; it presented a long and difficult line of march through a country which afforded no resources for an invader. There was no small reason to doubt, whether the Austrian army could force their way by it to the capital, with a regular army in their front, of respectable amount, and commanded by experienced officers, and an armed population hovering all around them. Even if the capital fell into their hands, they would have made little progress towards final success, if the nation were resolute in its resistance. The provinces, which constituted the chief strength of the kingdom, would still lie out of their grasp. The possession of the metropolis by demanding the presence of a numerous garrison, would be only a source of weakness; and the prosecution of the war in the southern and eastern provinces would be more arduous than the march through the Abruzzi and the Terra di Lavoro. The subjugation of some millions of men, who know and prize the blessings of independence, is always a difficult task; and, considering the peculiar nature of the country, should, in the case of Naples, have been almost impossible.

The Neapolitans, however, did not avail themselves of the advantages, which their situation offered. The primary cause of the inefficiency of their resistance, is to be found in the indifference of the mass of the population to

political events.

The revolution had been brought about by a set of men, who entertained views and were actuated by sentiments, in which few of their countrymen participated. The middling and better classes of society appear to have been well affected to the late changes; but the peasantry and populace cared little about them. They were ready enough to shout and to illuminate, and to share in fêtes, and to crowd to any meeting that partook of a joyous nature; for to do so was in accordance with their disposition, and operated upon them as a momentary excitement. But they had neither the temper, nor the principles, nor the habits, that interest men in political changes. They had not opposed the revolution; they would not oppose its destruction. They continued to be-what for centuries they had been-the passive slaves of events. Of the existence of this spirit of indifference there can be no doubt; indeed, it could not have been otherwise. The nature of a people cannot be altered in a day by the intrigues of a few daring or exalted spirits. A love of freedom and independence cannot be called forth in a moment by the magic of plots and conspiracies ;' it is the slow growth of time, and, ripening through successive ages into firmness and vigour, is transmitted from generation to generation, as the most precious part of the inheritance of a people.

In spite of this indifference to the late changes, much might have been done with a people so much the subject of momentary impulse, if their rulers had taken able measures for obstinate defence. But the half year, which they had to prepare themselves

for the struggle, was not turned to any good account. A considerable portion of the army was locked up in Sicily, where, instead of co-operating in the general defence, it was occupied in asserting the right of one part of the nation to keep the other in subjection. Sicily added nothing to the means of resistance; it furnished neither troops nor money, but exhausted considerable supplies of both. The sloth and inattention, which pervaded every branch of the administration, is truly wonderful. Upon paper, indeed, the military preparations were sufficiently formidable; but the reality was widely different. The army was divided into two great commands. The most important was intrusted to general William Pepe; who, with forty battalions and a proportional force of cavalry, was to defend the Abruzzi, General Carascosa, with seventy battalions and thirty squadrons, was to support and co-operate with Pepe, and at the same time defend the approach to the capital from Rome. Yet, such was the negligence of the executive-such was the blindness of the parliament to the exigencies of the moment-that, on the 15th of February, a fortnight after the Austrians had crossed the Po, Pepe had not received his appointment to the command, nor had any person been named chief of the general staff. No system had been established for procuring information of the enemy's movements-no lines of defence had been fixed upon -no obstacles thrown in the way of the invader. There were no magazines of provisions in the Abruzzi, no means of conveyance, no hospitals, no quarter-master

general, no money in the army chests, not even a paymaster-general. The battalions of militia had never been called out, mustered, organized, or in any way disciplined. They were expected to quit their firesides and peaceful occupations, and to be transformed into useful soldiers, and to be supplied with every requi site of war, by merely finding themselves in front of an enemy. No stores of shoes and cloaks were provided for them, nor even of fire-arms. Few of them had cartouche-boxes, or any other means of securing their scanty ammunition from wet or damp. As they had no leathern knapsacks, linen ones had been promised them; but these were never furnished; and the defenders of the country were left without the means of carrying a pair of shoes or a loaf of bread. It seems as if the Neapolitan rulers had believed, that some supernatural power was to put forth its might in their behalf, and that they were to be victorious over a formidable foe without having employed any of the ordinary means of success.

It is not enough to ascribe this neglect to the lukewarmness of the executive, in the cause of the revolution. Though the prince was nominally at the head of affairs, the reins of power were actually in very different hands. The chiefs of the revolutionary party were all-powerful; and they ought to have been vigilant in causing every proper measure to be adopted. But the fact is, that there was no one among them, whose genius was fitted to guide the destinies of a people. They could draw up plans on paper; they could talk; they could

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