against Russia in 1812; while less extraordinary generals soon arrive at the limit of the amount of force they can wield with effect. Experience proves that armies may be embarrassed and really enfeebled by their excessive numbers, and that greater results may sometimes be obtained by a smaller force which, under the impulse of a single directing mind, can deliver its blows with rapidity and vigour where they are least expected. An army of moderate amount may in this way have an advantage over one so large as to be unwieldy, even though both should be equally well trained; if, in the larger army, the perfect training and equipment of the troop should have been in any degree sacrificed for the sake of increasing their numbers, there can be no doubt that the increase must have caused a loss instead of a gain of real military power.

There yet remains to be mentioned another strong objection to the policy of forming armies on the excessive scale now general on the Continent-namely, that by oppressing the people, and creating in them a sense of injustice, it is injurious to the authority and moral power of the Governments that adopt it. Gigantic armies, such as the European nations are now vying with each other in striving to raise, can only be kept up by the system of conscription, of which the extreme injustice seems to be very imperfectly understood. Nothing is more common than to hear it asserted that it is the duty of every man to take his share in defending his country, and that there is no injustice in a law which imposes this duty alike upon every man, and presses equally upon all. This argument is plausible, but fallacious, and is no defence of any of the systems of conscription adopted by European nations. Granting that a nation would be justified in making military service compulsory if this were really necessary for its safety, it is clear that this service ought to be paid for at its fair value. But such has not been the practice; soldiers obtained by conscription receive as a rule much less than the value of their labour. The pay of the Prussian soldiers is said to be so miserable that they could not live upon it with tolerable comfort, were it not for the assistance they usually receive from their families. Again, though it is claimed as a merit for the system of conscription that it presses equally on all, the fact is that the pressure is in the highest degree unequal. It is not true that anywhere all young men who attain the military age and are physically fit are required without distinction to enter the army. Though the law may impose this obligation upon them, it never has been, and never can be, practically enforced. Every State in which the law of conscription exists has by some device miti

gated

gated the severity of the rule, and in general only a certain proportion of those liable have been actually called upon to serve, the selection being made by lot. Conscription so regulated is certainly not free from the vice of inequality, since it imposes a grievous hardship upon some men from which others are exempt. And the inequality is rendered only more galling by the fact that the exemptions are distributed by blind chance. A ballot determines who are, and who are not, to be soldiers, and according to what is regarded as the most perfect system of conscription, the selection thus made is final; those who are drawn for service not being allowed to seek for substitutes amongst those who have escaped. This regulation is held to be necessary to prevent rich men from eluding their fair share of service to their country; but its working is absurd, and alike injurious to the State and to the men themselves. Some men are fitted by nature for the life of soldiers-others detest it, and can never become good ones, though qualified to do excellent service to their country in peaceful pursuits. When chance alone determines the selection, some of the last class must often be chosen to serve in the army, and some of the first be left out. If those drawn for service were allowed to pay those who escaped to take their places as substitutes, this inconvenience would be in some degree avoided to the great advantage of all parties; but whether substitutes are permitted or not, it cannot be said that a law which imposes the obligation to serve on all the subjects of the State, but exempts from it a certain number selected by lot, is a system of equality.

And even if all young men were actually called upon to serve, this nominal equality would not prevent a real and cruel inequality in the hardship inflicted on different men by subjecting them to the same obligation. The peasant or unskilled labourer who is accustomed to a rough life, and whose fitness for his ordinary labours is not likely to be impaired by his being withdrawn from them for two or three years to serve in the army, would really suffer nothing (provided he were properly paid while serving). On the other hand, to many men of different habits, and of sensitive natures, the hardships of a soldier's life may be intolerable; and in the case of those intended for the learned professions, or for some branches of commerce and manufactures, to take them away for the same time of two or three years from what is to be the business of their lives, may be to spoil their whole career.

These considerations point to the conclusion that the continental nations have made a mistake in seeking to secure themselves against the enormous military power of Germany, by copying

its policy of imposing generally on the rising male population the onerous obligation of serving for a longer or a shorter time in the army. They would have done much more wisely if, instead of this, they had endeavoured to form armies much less numerous than those they now aim at being enabled to embody, but as perfect as possible in organization, training, and equipment. Such an army cannot be formed in any country by means of a law imposing the obligation of being trained as soldiers on all, or even a majority, of the young men of military age, since it is utterly impossible that so large a proportion of the population should be kept under training long enough to make them perfect soldiers. In order that the training given to soldiers may be complete, it is indispensable that the number to whom it is given should be limited, and also that by some means or other a selection should be made so as to bring into the ranks of the army those who are fittest for it, and to leave out those to whom military service would be distasteful, and who for that very reason would be unlikely ever to become good soldiers. A restriction of the numbers of an army is therefore a necessary condition of its thorough efficiency; but this would be quite consistent with adopting what is really excellent in the Prussian policy-the system of retaining soldiers during peace only long enough in actual service to give them complete instruction in their duty, and then dismissing them to the ordinary business of civil life, subject to the obligation of coming back to their colours in time of need. In three or four years (hardly in less if their training is to be perfect) recruits under good instruction may acquire a complete knowledge of their duty as soldiers, and as soon as they should be certified to have done so, they might be encouraged to retire into the reserve to return when wanted to the active army. Under this arrangement a nation might, in no great number of years, form a reserve of trained soldiers, available, on short notice, which would render a comparatively small army in peace sufficient for the security of the State.

In this manner the European nations might provide for being able to bring into the field when wanted, armies more truly efficient than those of excessive numbers they are now striving to create; while at the same time by relieving their finances and their people from the heavy burden of the latter, they would promote the increase of wealth and population, the two great elements of military power. And to all these nations the relief they might thus obtain would be of the greatest importance. The actual state of their finances ought to be a subject of serious anxiety alike to Russia, to France, to Austria, and to Italy. In all these countries there is much need for reducing the weight

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of taxation, and also for applying more money than, with such enormous armies, they can spare, to much needed improvements of various kinds; and in all of them also the Government would gain in popularity and in strength by being enabled to mitigate the severity of the conscription, which has been well named 'the tribute of blood,' and is justly odious to the people. It is not to be hoped that any of these nations would at present venture to dispense with the system of raising their armies by conscription; but if the armies were smaller, not only would fewer men require to be raised, but it would also become possible to make the essential injustice of the system less felt by raising the pay of the soldiers to the ordinary rate of wages of unskilled labourers. If this were done and substitutes allowed, the practical hardship inflicted by the law of conscription would be greatly mitigated. It would be still further mitigated if such advantages were offered to trained soldiers for continuing in the reserve, that they might generally be willing to do so as long as they were physically fit for military duty. To conscription under such conditions there would be little practical objection; and it certainly is not without important advantages in the circumstances of some of the continental nations. The statesmen of Italy, for instance, seem to be right in believing that military service, enforced by conscription, affords them the most powerful instrument that could be employed for fusing together what were lately separate States, into a single, well-united nation, and for civilising the rude inhabitants of the most backward provinces. The army might be made a valuable school both for general and industrial instruction, while the labour of the soldiers might be turned to account in making roads and in other public works. But however true it may be that the system of conscription is in some respects, and in some cases, highly useful, it is not less true that it has been generally carried by the nations of Europe to a most injurious extent, and that they would gain much by reducing their demands on the people for military service.

To Russia and France more especially the advantage of such a change of policy would be incalculable. The slightest consideration of the circumstances of Russia is sufficient to show how entirely she is mistaking the true mode of increasing her power when she seeks to do so by keeping up so vast an army. Were she to be engaged in war, she has neither the money nor the other means required for employing with effect the two millions of soldiers that her armies on the war establishment are intended to furnish. And in peace, with so large a proportion of her territory still unimproved, and so much useful work delayed by

the

the want of hands, to withdraw six or seven hundred thousand men from productive industry, is to throw away what ought to be the means of ensuring her rapid advance in greatness. If a part of the money spent in keeping up an army so much larger than she could use were devoted to extending and improving her railways, and other means of communication, she would probably be able, whenever she may be engaged in war, to bring to the scene of action a more numerous, as well as a more effective force, than she will succeed in making available by adhering to her present policy.

As to France, we may hope she is wise enough not to cherish those purposes of vengeance, which the use by the Germans of their power as victors might naturally lead her to form; but she must earnestly desire to recover such strength and such a position, as not to be at the mercy of a power which, after severely exercising the hard rights of conquest, still maintains towards her an overbearing, if not a threatening attitude. But in order to recover her strength and her position, France, for a time at least, needs to reduce as low as possible the demands of the Government upon the nation for men and for money. By doing so she would much more quickly regain the power of defending herself from aggression than she can hope to do, if after the terrible losses she has sustained she calls upon the people to furnish conscripts enough to fill the ranks of an enormous army, and to bear taxes sufficient to pay for it. In former days, when it was Prussia that was trodden down without pity by triumphant France, this policy of husbanding her resources was that adopted by Prussia, not indeed by her free will, but with instructive success. In the treaty which closed the disastrous war of Jena, Prussia was compelled to bind herself not to keep up an army of more than 42,000 men. By imposing upon her this condition, her conqueror unconsciously did her a great service, as it obliged the Government for a time to moderate its demands upon the resources of the people, thus enabling the nation more speedily to recover its strength after its misfortunes. The condition they had been forced to agree to, suggested to the Prussian statesmen the plan of dismissing recruits as soon as they were trained into a reserve, in order to prepare the nation for another great struggle for independence; and there can be little doubt that the success of this scheme, by which Prussia was enabled to take so large a share in the uprising of Europe to throw off the French yoke in 1813, was greatly promoted by the limitation of the number of her army which had been imposed upon her with very different views by the first Napoleon. Now that France has in her turn suffered the calamities of a disastrous