Spanish narrative of what happened leads us to believe that they were no more a match for their enemy in point of professional ability than were they in regard to the relative strength of the naval forces at their disposal. The depth of water at the entrance to the bay in either channel precludes the idea of the use of submarine mines, but there would seem also to have been none of those obvious and essential precautions which should have been taken Railway MANILA to want of skill by those engaged in the conduct of operations. Not only were the defences quite inadequate for the protection of the bay against the United States squadron, but the Spanish vessels appear to have been absolutely thrown away in the encounter. That the Spaniards fought bravely we make no doubt, but something more than bravery was required, and the in the circumstances. It does not appear that the southern entrance was defended in any way, and the forts, therefore, on Mariveles Point and Corregidor island were useless except to give notice, but not a sufficiently timely warning, of the impending attack. It seems almost incredible that there should have been no patrol at the entrance to the bay. The smaller Spanish vessels were suitable for this purpose, and doubtless there were other steam vessels at hand which might have been utilized with the same object. As we are told that Admiral Montojo had taken his squadron to sea a few days previous to the action we cannot suppose that he was insufficiently supplied with coal, yet we find four torpedo vessels, indeed five, which might have been used to attack an incoming enemy with a fair prospect of success, placed in a position where their powers of offence were largely neutralized. To anchor such vessels as those which comprised the Spanish squadron in an open bay, even though they might be partially protected by the fire of forts, was in the circumstances to invite disaster. The wording of the official telegram from the Governor-General of the Philippines to the Minister of War at Madrid gives us a notion of his ideas of defence, and presumably of those of his naval adviser as well. He says that the enemy's squadron "forced a passage under the obscurity of night"! What did he expect otherwise? He must have known that he had to deal with a bold and enterprising adversary, of whom it might have been predicted that he would act with decision and in the manner best adapted to his purpose. Admiral Dewey deserves the congratulations and honors which have been showered upon him for the thorough manner in which he carried out a boldly conceived and brilliantly executed enterprise. At the time of writing we are wholly without trustworthy information as to the number and type of the guns mounted in the shore batteries at Cavite, although there are said to have been 10-inch and 12-inch guns placed there recently. Nor do we know the distance at which the Spanish ships were placed from the shore, or the range at which the Americans engaged. These and many more particulars are needed to make clear what took place, and for them we shall have to await a complete account from American sources. How unequal the battle was between the ships needs little demonstration. On the Spanish side not a ship was "protected," and it seems likely that the guns were equally without shields of any kind. The so-called "protection" of the torpedo gun vessels Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon merely consists of a 2.5-inch steel deck over the engine room and boilers; the Reina Cristina had been used as a transport, and it is stated that some of her guns had been removed. The Castilla and Mindanao were wooden vessels, and the Velasco little more than an armed merchantman, while the Don Antonio de Ulloa and the Don Juan de Austria, though fairly good gunboats for colonial work, were like all the rest entirely unfitted for a modern engagement with well protected vessels. We notice that the Olympia in some reports is described as an ironclad. This is not the case, but she is an exceptionally well protected cruiser, and, if not alone, was with the Baltimore and Raleigh quite a match for the whole scratch pack of Spaniards. The other American vessels, although less well protected, were nevertheless superior in point of armament to most of their antagonists. If we include nothing heavier than a 4.7 gun a comparison of the armaments of the two squadrons stands thus: United States-Ten 8-inch, twenty-four 6-inch, and ten 5-inch quick-firers: Spain-Thirteen 6-inch, twenty-four 4.7-inch. The thirteen 6-inch Spanish guns actually comprised six 6.3-inch Hontorias, three 6-inch Armstrongs, and four 5.9-inch Krupps. Σ Spanish narrative of what happened leads us to believe that they were no more a match for their enemy in point of professional ability than were they in regard to the relative strength of the naval forces at their disposal. The depth of water at the entrance to the bay in either channel precludes the idea of the use of submarine mines, but there would seem also to have been none of those obvious and essential precautions which should have been taken MANILA Railway CAVITE. to want of skill by those engaged in the conduct of operations. Not only were the defences quite inadequate for the protection of the bay against the United States squadron, but the Spanish vessels appear to have been absolutely thrown away in the encounter. That the Spaniards fought bravely we make no doubt, but something more than bravery was required, and the in the circumstances. It does not appear that the southern entrance was defended in any way, and the forts, therefore, on Mariveles Point and Corregidor island were useless except to give notice, but not a sufficiently timely warning, of the impending attack. It seems almost incredible that there should have been no patrol at the entrance to the bay. The smaller Spanish vessels were suitable for this purpose, and doubtless there were other steam vessels at hand which might have been utilized with the same object. As we are told that Admiral Montojo had taken his squadron to sea a few days previous to the action we cannot suppose that he was insufficiently supplied with coal, yet we find four torpedo vessels, indeed five, which might have been used to attack an incoming enemy with a fair prospect of success, placed in a position where their powers of offence were largely neutralized. To anchor such vessels as those which comprised the Spanish squadron in an open bay, even though they might be partially protected by the fire of forts, was in the circumstances to invite disaster. The wording of the official telegram from the Governor-General of the Philippines to the Minister of War at Madrid gives us a notion of his ideas of defence, and presumably of those of his naval adviser as well. He says that the enemy's squadron "forced a passage under the obscurity of night"! What did he expect otherwise? He must have known that he had to deal with a bold and enterprising adversary, of whom it might have been predicted that he would act with decision and in the manner best adapted to his purpose. Admiral Dewey deserves the congratulations and honors which have been showered upon him for the thorough manner in which he carried out a boldly conceived and brilliantly executed enterprise. At the time of writing we are wholly without trustworthy information as to the number and type of the guns mounted in the shore batteries at Cavite, although there are said to have been 10-inch and 12-inch guns placed there recently. Nor do we know the distance at which the Spanish ships were placed from the shore, or the range at which the Americans engaged. These and many more particulars are needed to make clear what took place, and for them we shall have to await a complete account from American sources. How unequal the battle was between the ships needs little demonstration. On the Spanish side not a ship was "protected," and it seems likely that the guns were equally without shields of any kind. The so-called "protection" of the torpedo gun vessels Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon merely consists of a 2.5-inch steel deck over the engine room and boilers; the Reina Cristina had been used as a transport, and it is stated that some of her guns had been removed. The Castilla and Mindanao were wooden vessels, and the Velasco little more than an armed merchantman, while the Don Antonio de Ulloa and the Don Juan de Austria, though fairly good gunboats for colonial work, were like all the rest entirely unfitted for a modern engagement with well protected vessels. We notice that the Olympia in some reports is described as an ironclad. This is not the case, but she is an exceptionally well protected cruiser, and, if not alone, was with the Baltimore and Raleigh quite a match for the whole scratch pack of Spaniards. The other American vessels, although less well protected, were nevertheless superior in point of armament to most of their antagonists. If we include nothing heavier than a 4.7 gun a comparison of the armaments of the two squadrons stands thus: United States-Ten 8-inch, twenty-four 6-inch, and ten 5-inch quick-firers; Spain-Thirteen 6-inch, twenty-four 4.7-inch. The thirteen 6-inch Spanish guns actually comprised six 6.3-inch Hontorias, three 6-inch Armstrongs, and four 5.9-inch Krupps. The immense superiority in armament is obvious, and when it is remembered, moreover, that their ships and batteries were much better protected no sur prise can be felt at the result of the action being in favor of the Americans. The unknown factor -the guns in the Cavite batteries -may have done some damage to the United States cruisers, but the destruction of the Spanish flotilla should have been a foregone conclusion. It is for this reason that we are of opinion that the proper use to have made of it was at the entrance to the bay and for a night attack. It is quite conceivable that some people will jump to the conclusion that this engagement shows the relative power of ships and land defences to have undergone a change. If they do they will make a mistake. Even if it were possible for armorclad ships to engage shore batterise without coming off second best it is quite certain that the so-called "protected" vessel is not fitted to be risked in such an encounter. It may be permissible for the sake of preventing the completion of a work to throw a few shells, as Admiral Sampson did at Matanzas, but even this must be done at long range. With regard to the situation in the Atlantic there has been very little definite information through the week. It would appear that both sides have now fully recognized the necessity for secrecy in regard to their movements. As we thought likely last week the departure of the Spanish squadron from Cape de Verde has had its effect, and we hear of a rearrangement and reconstitution of the blockading force. It was necessary, of course, to prepare a squadron which should be capable of meeting the Spaniards if they crossed the Atlantic. Whether the reports are true that instead of so doing this squadron has re |