Talcott, August 10, 1824, was assigned, temporarily, to the duty of making the preliminary arrangements for building the work; and, February 22, 1825, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph G. Totten, Corps of Engineers, who had planned it, was charged with its construction. He continued personally to direct the work till his promotion, December 7, 1838, to be the Chief Engineer of the Army, at which time Fort Adams approached completion. Most of the young officers of engineers served their apprenticeship here, this work being a kind of school of application for the Corps of Engineers.

During the war of the Rebellion, the West Passage being entirely undefended, permanent batteries were commenced on Dutch Island, which it is designed to occupy with works mounting sixty heavy guns, arranged in amphitheatre on its southern slope and upon the summit of the island. An interior keep should be added for reserve magazines and other purposes.

Though large sums have been expended upon the fortifications of Narraganset Bay, its entrances are far from being adequately protected against the present heavily-armored steam fleets with their enormous guns. The art of war, like almost everything else, has had its evolution. War-chariots, the Greek phalanx, and the Roman legion, have yielded to the thin formations of modern armies in battle. The sling, the pike, the cross-bow, and the matchlock have given place to the improved magazinerifle for our infantry. The catapult, the culverin, and the small smooth-bore cannon, have been superseded by heavy rifled artillery, sometimes of pieces weighing one hundred tons, and throwing projectiles of two thousand pounds with prodigious force to great distances. Fleets of row-galleys, of wooden sailingships, and of side-wheel steamers, have been surrendered, first for light-plated, and now for the heaviest armored propellers. And, in like manner, thin earthern parapets, masonry scarpwalls, and low barbette batteries are now to be displaced by heavy iron turrets and the strongest combinations of earth, masonry, and shields of hardened steel.

In this changed condition of things our sea-coast fortifications have lost much of their power of offense and defense; yet they are far from being useless, as is often supposed by civilians. On the contrary, they are most useful adjuncts to any new system of works which we may hereafter construct. With our increased population they are still adequate to resist for a sufficient time. any land attack; armed with our present guns, converted into rifled artillery, they could protect our harbors against naval

marauders, and our channel torpedoes from boat expeditions; and, with slight modifications and some large ordnance, would be able to cope with any, except heavily armed and armored ships. But we must be prepared for all future contingencies, hence we require better shielded and stronger armed fortifications.

Fortunately, with the greatly increased range of modern artillery, we have very advantageous positions, within good supporting distance, for new fortifications for the defense of the middle and western entrances into Narraganset Bay. For the eastern entrance the bridges at Tiverton obstruct the passage of ships into its waters.

As we have before stated, Dumplings Point offers an admirable position for powerful batteries to directly oppose the approach of fleets advancing up the Middle Passage.

Lower down are Castle Hill and the Ridge of Conanicut Island, opposite the mouth of Mackerel Cove, both admirable sites for strong citadels, only a mile and a half apart, which distance could be lessened to a mile and a quarter between elevated batteries lining either shore, and protected by the higher enclosed works. Therefore hostile ships, proceeding up midchannel, would be within the effective range of five-eights or three-quarters of a mile of the heavy armament of these defenses.

The citadel on Conanicut Island, co-operating with another at the Bonnet on the Main, with shore-batteries, would in like manner and at like distances defend the West Passage; while the fires from Dutch Island would enfilade approaching ships.

With such strong works and batteries on these several points, well armed, and aided by properly placed channel torpedoes, Narraganset Bay would be secure against the most powerful armed fleets.

To this new system of more advanced works, Fort Adams would be a most valuable interior adjunct, not only for offense, but as a safe and defensible position wherein to keep magazines and ordnance stores, commissary and hospital supplies, and, at the same time, be a secure refuge for the sick, wounded, and noncombatants.

In concluding this Paper I must tender my most sincere thanks to Colonel Elliot, the Engineer Officer now in charge of the Defenses of Narraganset Bay, for his valuable assistance in making the measurements of the West Passage Batteries, and his great kindness in putting at my disposal the services of his draughtsman-Mr. Mielatz-who has so accurately and artistically de

lineated the sketches from which the map and plates, illustrating

this paper, were engraved.

General GEORGE W. CULLUM,
Corps of Engineers (Retired) U. S. A.

Washington, 1884.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES.

ORGANIZATION.

Spain. Officers of Navy and Marine Corps.

The strength of the corps of officers of the navy and of the marine corps was fixed by royal order of April 21st, of this year as follows:

a. Navy.-1 admiral, 6 vice-admirals, 15 rear-admirals, 24 captains of ships of the line, first-class, 47 captains of ships of the line (22 for shore duty), 87 captains of frigates (37 for shore duty), 117 lieutenants, first class, (43 for shore duty), 313 lieutenants (51 for shore duty), 224 ensigns.

The corps of naval officers was increased by this order by 4 captains, first class, 6 captains, 17 lieutenants, first class, and 55 lieutenants.

b. Marine Corps.-1 field-marshal, commanding the corps, 4 brigadiers, 12 colonels 16 lieutenant-colonels, 32 majors, 140 captains, 164 lieutenants, 80 brevet lieutenants (ensigns).

Increase: I colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 4 majors and 47 captains.

The Spanish marine corps comprises ordinarily 7000 men, divided into 3 regiments (each of 2 battalions of 4 companies each), with headquarters at Cadiz, Cartagena and Ferrol, a half-brigade serving in Cuba, 2 regiments (each of 2 battalions) on the Phillipines, 4 companies of watchmen for the arsenals, and I company of clerks and orderlies.

-Deutsche Heeres-Zeitung, August 7, 1897.
TACTICS.

General Questions in Field Artillery Tactics.

There are three questions in field artillery tactics with which military literature has been occupied for several years past.

The first is the question of separating a corps artillery or assigning all the batteries to the infantry divisions. This question has not been further elucidated during the past year.

The question of the future armament of the field artillery, still in the foreground of interest, has been cleared up to a great extent. In Russia the heavy gun of effective action is preferred to the light rapid-fire gun. Even in France, where the idea of a rapid-fire gun had its origin, there has been a complete revolution of feeling. In other states, too, the tendency to adopt a gun of effective single shot action is apparent.

We are still of the opinion that, on account of the mechanical and technical questions involved, the field gun of the future will have a caliber of from 7.7 to 8.0 cm., and fire a projectile of 7.0 kg. with an initial velocity of (in round numbers) 500 m. The shrapnel will be a base-charged shrapnel with 280 to 300 bullets. Such a gun would have a considerably greater effect in single shot action than the one adopted, and would surpass it considerably in mobility and in rapidity of fire.

The character which discussion relative to the field gun of the future has assumed during the last five years, shows how essential it is for the artillerist, who desires to form an opinion on this subject, to be not only tactician but also ballistician; otherwise he will be very apt to go astray.

Closely connected with the question of the future weapon of the field artillery, is that of the organization of this arm, especially the strength and composition of the batteries, which has been so freely and fully discussed in the past year. In the article in the Militär-Wochenblatt, No. 13, 1896, "Shall the field batteries be composed in future of four or of six guns?" it was shown that a battery of four rapid fire guns would undoubtedly have the same action in fire by either flank as a battery of six guns, since the latter by this mode of firing, which is now and must remain the rule for the actual artillery combat, cannot fire any faster than the battery of four guns. But the reduction in the number of guns from six to four would involve many advantages; shortening of the column of march, dimunition of the front of the firing line, easier fire control, and better instruction and training of the battery for war, from which it might follow that the action of the war battery of four guns is actually greater than that of six, always, of course, assuming fire by a flank. In independent fire the battery of six guns will, of course, have the greater action; but, at ranges liable to arise in actual war, this method is entirely out of the question, since all fire control would thereby be entirely lost. As a disadvantage of the smaller strength it was pointed out that the battery would become more sensitive to losses. With equal distances between pieces, the smaller battery will, under circumstances otherwise similar, suffer less loss, to be sure; but relatively the losses (and therefore the diminution in power) will be greater. However, since the battery of four guns can more readily adapt itself to natural cover, or can increase the distances between guns, and thus diminish losses, this disadvantage may be somewhat counteracted. The horses and men thus becoming available by the removal of two guns from each battery may be utilized, without much additional cost, to form four new batteries. The action of 24 batteries of four guns, which each army corps would then have, would be undoubtedly superior to the 20 batterses of six guns in the artillery duel.

If, after the introduction of rapid-fire guns, the same number of men and horses are assigned to the artillery, the battle power of the entire personnel and material (guns and ammunition) will be made most highly effective by reducing the number of guns in a battery, changing a part of the pieces into ammunition wagons, and increasing the number of batteries proportionally. The always interesting question of the attack of objects behind cover by artil lery has been considerably discussed in the past year.

The Revue d'Artillerie published an article "Curved Fire or Torpedo Shell," which advocated the introduction of a piece for curved fire. Another article in the same magazine, "Actual condition of foreign field artilleries as regards pieces for curved fire and torpedo shell" gives a review of the manner in which the question of attacking troops behind cover with artillery has been solved by the various armies of the world.

The most thorough discussion of the question is that by Captain Prehn, for many years director of the Krupp proving grounds at Meppen: "Shrapnel from field mortars and howitzers." Prehn advocates a 12 cm. howitzer, for which he proposes a shrapnel of special construction, with a charge of high explosive, placed partly in the head, partly in the base. This gun would avoid the objections attaching to the high explosive shell with time fusehollow interior of the cone of explosion--as well as to the shrapnel in use for pieces with curved fire-too narrow a cone of explosion.

Firing from behind cover (indirect fire), which, for fear of adverse criticism,