with quoting the Subftance of a Verse, without sticking close to the Letter, which leaves room for various Interpretations, and fhews him to be a Novice in Argumentation. But, whether he be of any or no Profeffion, he is, the Au-. thor conceives, no Philofopher, and hopes the Reader will be of that Opinion, when he fhall confider the following Reasons, and read attentively the feveral Books he recommends, written on the Subject of Natural Philofophy, as well as be clearly convinced, the Author's Account of Matter and Motion is the only true one, that may ferve for a Foundation on which to build all future Systems and Speculations whatever: And the Author cannot help expreffing his Wonder, that the Author of Siris fhould be fo miftaken in the Caufes he hath affigned of the Separation and Combination of the Particles of Matter, when the true Cause lay fo near to him as hardly to be miffed by one of a philofophical Turn ; the Knowledge of which would have faved him a great deal of Thinking, and unneceffary and painful Inquiry after Nature, in the Method he has chosen of Experi

́ment and Analysis; whereas the Way is, to hit upon the true Caufe at first, and from thence make Deductions through all the various Modifications of Matter, inftead of that prepofterous Method of arguing back, which of late hath been ridiculously introduced into Divinity as well as Philofophy.

If the Reader will be pleased to review the Elay on Spirit, p. 22, he will find the Author's Principle at large, and he takes leave to call it his, as there is no Trace of it in Newton or Defcartes, Bacon or Barrow, at least that the Author could find in the occafional Researches he made into thofe Writers about Mathematicks, who, it feems, are very much in vogue; and the Reader will cafily perceive, that, if his Principle be the only true one (which he hopes to make out) then the Principles, which these Gentlemen and their Followers have gone upon, must be wrong. I argue thus to make the Affertion still more evident.

If the Author's Principle be the only true one, then all Principles differing from it must be wrong.

But the Author's Principle is the only true one; therefore the Principles of thefe Gentlemen and their Followers must be wrong.

The Author is fenfible fome People may deny the Sequel of the Enthymemė (the Minor will hardly be denied) and that it by no means follows, because be is right, others must be wrong: But to obviate this Objection he inferted the Word differing in the Major; and the Objection can be made by none but Perfons unskilled in Logic.

But to explain the Author's Principle farther, and fhew plainly that every Par ticle of Matter is animated, he craves leave to offer to the Reader fome additional Arguments, or rather Illustrations (for his former Arguments are fufficient to all but the Vulgar) to put the Thing paft Doubt, and leave no room for future Cavils.

It has been proved already, that Motion is no original or neceffary Property of Matter, (for nothing is neceffary which we can conceive any Thing to be with out;) that Motion must be impreffed on

it

it by fomething elfe; that That some→ thing else must be Spirit; that, as one Spirit cannot be in all Places at once, there must be a great many Spirits to attend on Matter, and put it into the va rious Motions, we fee every Day; that thefe feveral Spirits must be as it were wedded to the firft Particles they join, and confequently contract a Liking to their own Poffeffion, in order to avoid Dif putes, or interfering with each other, and, in fhort, manage all Things in the Manner we fee.

Now, to illuftrate this a little more, and prove his main Affertion," that all "Spirits are of the fame Kind, and only "differ as they happen to have different "Organs to work in;" let us confider fome of the Phanomena under daily Ob fervation.

It has been afferted by the best Philoso phers, that the Elements have, from Time immemorial, always acted in the fame Manner, without varying one fotor Tittle fince the Beginning of the Egyp tian Dynasties, and probably ten thoufand Years before. Now, Matter canC not

not think, and acting fo uniformly must be the Confequence of thinking, and nothing elfe can produce it; therefore Matter is directed by Spirit, or (as the Author rather chufes to call it) Instinct.

Again, different Spirits, or of diverse Species, would act diverfly, and occafion Confufion; therefore all Spirits must be of the fame Kind or Species; and the different Effects in their operating follow from the Difference of organized Matter. If this be not granted, infinite Abfurdities will follow. Water, for Inftance, always feeks the lowest Place, and Fire afpires. Now, if Spirits of a different Kind were to poffefs Water, they would operate differently, and Water might take the Place deftined to Fire. This, he thinks, is clear.

Again, the Sounds emitted by all Bodies on Collifion are found to differ as the Matter is different, or as the Impulse from without is agreeable or difagreeable to the Spirit within. If a Man is wounded, he utters an articulate Sound; if a Beaft, one inarticulate and harsh; a Stone, as it happens either to be porous

or