Now as NOTHING can have no Properties, wherever we perceive any Properties, we therefore reasonably conclude, that there must be SOMETHING; that is,

tence or other to support them.

fome Exif

Hence the Maxim laid down by Spinofa, Modi fine Subftantia, nec effe, nec concipi poffunt: Or, as Sir Ifaac Newton expreffeth it [2], Virtus fine Subftantia fubfiftere non poteft.

And as God is the only Self-exiftent Being, therefore he may, comparatively speaking, be faid to be the only Being in Nature. And accordingly, when Mofes enquired of God, by what Name he should make him known to the Children of Ifrael, God faid, [3] Thus fhalt thou fay to the Children of Ifrael, I AM bath fent me unto you. That is, I that AM hath fent me unto you; for fo it should have been rendered. And therefore, in the first Part of the Verse, where God faith unto Mofes, I am that I am; it fhould be rendered, I AM that AM, as it is by the Septuagint, iyú eius ov, that is, I am be that is, or that exifts, as if, comparatively speaking, there was no other Being or Exiftence but God.

[2] Newt. Princ. Schol. gen. p. 483. [3] Exod. iii, 14.

From which Paffage it probably was, that [4] Plato borrowed his Notion of the Name of God, when he afferted, that the Word is, eft, is folely applicable to the eternal Nature of God. And from him it alfo probably was, that the Word &, i. e. thou art, was all that was written on the Door of the Delphic Temple: Upon which Plutarch remarks, that this Word is folely applicable to God, fince that which truly is must be fempiternal.

All which is true, when we fpeak of God in a figurative and lefs correct Manner, only in Comparison with the Creatures that have been made by him; between whom and their Creator there is no Proportion; and which, when confidered in Comparison with him, are as Nothing. Which is the View that God is to be confidered in, as spoken of in the above-mentioned Paffages, quoted out of the Books of Mofes, and the Theological Works of Plato.

[4] Plato, Timæus.

III. But

III. But when we fpeak of God and his Works, in a philofophical and more accurate Manner, this will not hold. Since, as Des Cartes truly argues, I know that I exift. I cannot be deceived in this. If therefore I exist, and that I am not God, then there is another Exiftence in Nature befide God. I hope I cannot be thought fo abfurd, or fo impious, as to imagine, that there are more Gods than one; or that I did not receive my Exiftence from the Will and Power of God: The Conscioufnefs of my own Exiftence neceffarily leads me to a first Cause, which first Cause can only be one; because two firft Caufes are a Contradiction in Terms. Every Thing therefore that exifts, befide that First Caufe, which Way foever it is brought forth into Being, whether it be begotten, emanated, created, or spoken forth, it must proceed from, and owe its Existence to the [5] Will, as well as Power of that first Cause. However, fure I am, that fince I

[5] Athanafius acknowledges it to be impious, to fay that God the Father was neceffitated to act, even when he begat the Son: And allows also that neither the Son nor Holy Spirit are the first Cause; but the Father alone, and that the Son and Holy Spirit were both caufed.

Vol. 1. p. 512. Id. Vol. II. p. 442, 443.

Athan.

do exist, I exist as a feparate and distinct Existence from God; though not independent of him.

IV. And as my own Consciousness convinces me of my own Existence, fo does the fame Faculty convince me, that this Existence of mine is compofed of two very different Kinds of Existence, that is, of a thinking, active, powerful, Existence; and a dull, heavy, inactive, Existence. One of which, to wit, the active, we will, for Distinction fake, without entering into any further metaphyfical Difputes about Words, call the fpiritual Exiftence, Subfiftence, or Substance; and the other, viz. the inactive, we will call the material or bodily Existence; and fometimes, for Brevity fake, we will call one Spirit, and the other Matter or Body.

V. Wherein the Nature or Effence, either of this material or this fpiritual Substance does confift, we are entirely ignorant; for we know them only by the Effects or the Influence, which fome of their Modes or Properties have upon our Minds. Thus, for Example, though we are capable of perceiving the Hardnefs, Colour, Figure, &c.

of material Existences; yet are we entirely ignorant, what it is that fupports thofe Properties; or wherein the Nature, Effence, or Identity of Body does confift, when the Hardness, Figure, Colour, &c. is either altered or removed. In like Manner, we are equally ignorant of the Nature or Effence of Spirit: We know indeed fome of the Properties thereof, fuch as, Perception, Thinking, Willing, Doubting, &c. But we know not the Effence of that fpiritual Being within us, which perceives, thinks, wills, or doubts, &c.

VI. And though we know not wherein the Nature or Effence, either of Body or Spirit does confift; yet we find by Experience, that is, from the Effects which we feel from within, and from without ourselves, that thefe two Kinds of Existences, of which the human Conftitution is composed, have very different and inconfiftent Properties : As for Example, that one has the Power of Motion in itfelf; whereas the other can neither put itself into Motion, nor put a Stop to its own Motions, when once begun ; whence we reasonably conclude, that their Natures or Effence are alfo different. B 4

VII. We