...page 287

cheap excursion ticket issued by a railway company, that if such ticket is used for any other station than that for which it is issued it will be forfeited and the full fare charged, is a reasonable and binding condition; and a passenger taking such an excursion ticket is not entitled to use it for any other than the station indicated on such ticket, and if he travels on in the same train to a place beyond the specified station, and returns from such further place to the place where the ticket was issued, he is liable to pay the difference between the full return fare for such longer journey and the fare paid for such excursion ticket: Semble, in such a case, the condition being broken, the excursion ticket is forfeited, and the company is entitled to charge the full return fare for the distance actually travelled without making any deduction for the excursion fare. (The Great Northern Railway Company v. Palmer.) Compulsory purchase of land-Minerals-Purchase of all the land and minerals except coal-Compensation-Claim in respect of coal. When a railway company purchases under the Railway Clanses Act 1845, land, together with some of the subjacent minerals but excepting other minerals, compensation in respect of the minerals not taken, or of adjacent minerals, can be claimed only when the mine-owner desires to work the same, and under sects. 77-85 of the Act. (Re An Arbitration between Lord Gerard and the London and 142 North-Western Railway Company.) Construction of special Act-Duty to public-Group rate-Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888Powers of Railway Commissioners.-Where the provisions of a private Act are not limited to the interests of the parties mutually obliged, but impose an obligation in favour of third parties who are sufficiently designated, the obligation so imposed operates as a direct enactment of the Legislature in favour of such parties. By a section in the special Act of the B. Company, in place of giving them running powers over the lines of the T. Company it was provided that the T. Company should charge for traffic on their line destined for or coming from the line of the B. Company at a rate per mile not greater than the lowest rate charged by them for like traffic to or The T. Comfrom certain places on their line.

46

pany charged traders for traffic coming within the description in the section at a rate greater than such last-mentioned rate, though less than the maximum rate allowed by their own special Act. Held, that, in an action for charges in respect of such traffic, the traders could set off such excess charges, the provision being for the benefit of the public, not only for the interests of the two companies inter se, and that such a case was within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law, and not of the Railway Commissioners. A group rate" fixed in terms of sect. 29 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888 cannot affect a mileage rate not converted into a gross rate by the grouping. (Davis and Sons v. Taff Vale Railway Company.) Expenses of promoting a Bill in ParliamentReceivers and managers appointed under the Railway Companies Act 1867.-The Court, in the absence of consent by all parties, refused leave to the receivers and managers of a railway company appointed under the Railway Companies Act 1867 to apply a sum of money out of the assets in their hands in promoting a Bill in Parliament which sought to vary the mode of working the railway. (Re The Mersey Railway Company.) Facilities for passenger traffic-Station accommodation-Water-closets-Charge for use of-Legality of charge-Jurisdiction of commissioners.-The Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854 provides by sect. 2 that every railway company shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable facilities for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of traffic upon and from the several railways belonging to or worked by such com

632

panies. "Traffic" includes passengers and their luggage, and "railway" includes every station of or belonging to such railway used for the purposes of public traffic. The applicants applied for an order enjoining the respondents to desist from making a charge, which they had recently imposed, for the use of the water-closets at the stations on their railway, upon the ground that the respondents by so doing did not afford all reasonable facilities for the receiving and forwarding of passengers. Held (by Collins, J. and Viscount Cobham), that, even if the providing of water-closets for the use of passengers was a reasonable facility within the meaning of the above section, the charge for the use thereof did not entitle the applicants to the order asked for, and the commissioners had no jurisdiction to make the same. Held (by Sir F. Peel), that making a charge for the use of all the waterclosets at a station was a denial of due facilities for the reception of passengers, and that the commissioners had therefore jurisdiction to make the order asked for. (West Ham CorporaEastern Railway Comtion, applicants, v. Great pany, resps.)

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...page 395

Home and foreign merchandise-Difference in treatment of-Undue preference-Matters to be taken into consideration.- In exercising jurisdiction under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1888, on a complaint that a railway company is giving undue preference to foreign merchandise, the court will take into consideration such matters as would be properly regarded as material on a question whether a railway company was between traders giving undue preference as (The Mansion House in home merchandise. Association on Railway and Canal Traffic for the United Kingdom, Incorporated, applicants, v. London and South-Western Railway Company, resps.)

...

Lands taken compulsorily Severance-Accommodation works-Level crossing-Right of way.-In 1855, by the construction of their railway, a company severed the lands of an owner, and so became liable to make, and at all times thereafter to maintain, certain level crossings for the accommodation of the severed lands. The property remained in the possession of one owner down to 1885, when it was sold. The land on one side of the line was conveyed to P., and a few years later the land on the other side became vested in G. The conveyance to P. contained no reservation to the vendor of any rights over the land conveyed. In 1883 P. released all his right and interest in the crossings, for value, to the company, who took up the crossings, cut dykes, and erected fences. Held, that the company under sect. 68 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 as to these particular make good any accommodation works was to interruption caused by the railway to the user of the lands" through which it passed; and that, in the events which had happened, that obligation had been suspended or extinguished. The company were therefore entitled to restrain G. by injunction from interfering with their fence, but without prejudice to the right, if any, of G., or his successors, in case they should become entitled to use the lands on the other side of the line in connection with or for the purposes of the occupation of their own lands. (The Midland Railway Company v. Gribble.) User of lands-Owners of building estate A railway company, Damage-Injunction. estate under which had taken part of an their compulsory powers, let a small portion of the land (not immediately required for the purposes of the railway) for the erection of a chapel. The letting was of a temporary character, and at a rental of 10s. a year. The estate was being developed as a building estate, and the owners objected to the chapel on the ground that it was prejudicial to their estate, and caused damage. No damage was actually proved as likely to accrue. In an action by the owners to restrain this user of the land by an injunction:

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683

66

Held, that the user of the land was not unreasonable nor inconsistent with the purposes for which the railway company had been formed; and that the action would fail, even if injury had been shown as likely to accrue to the owners. (Onslow v. The Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company.) ...page 256 Metropolis-Tunnel- Subsoil- Appropriate and use"-Purchase.-A railway company, by their special Act (which incorporated the Lands Člauses Consolidation Act), were authorised to construct an underground railway, and it was provided by sect. 85 of the special Act that, with respect to certain lands belonging to the plaintiff, the company should not be required wholly to take them, but might appropriate and use the subsoil and under-surface," subject, however, to the liability to make compensation under sect. 68 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. The company commenced making a tunnel through the subsoil of the plaintiff's land, but without having given him notice to treat under sect. 18 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act for the purchase of the subsoil. On motion treated by consent as the trial of the action: Held, that the defendant company were not entitled to appropriate and use the subsoil under the plaintiff's property, or any part thereof, until they complied with the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, in reference to the compulsory purchase of land. (Farmer v. The Waterloo and City Railway Company.)

RATING.

225

General district rate-Nonpayment-Proceedings against occupier-Evidence as to boundary of borough Jurisdiction of justices. - Where a person is summoned for the nonpayment of a general district rate in respect of premises in his occupation, he is entitled to call evidence to show that the premises are not situated within the area for which the rate is made. (Baglan Bay Tin Plate Company Limited, apps., v. John and others, resps.) 805 Poor rate-Land taken by promoters-Deficiency in assessment-Deductions.-The defendants, under the provisions of the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, made a scheme for reconstructing the streets and houses in a certain area in the plaintiffs' parish, and in pursuance thereof they purchased by agreement certain lands and houses. After the lands and houses had been so taken there was a deficiency in the assessment of the poor rate. Held, that the defendants were liable to make good to the plaintiffs the deficiency in the poor rate to the full amount without any deduction. (Vestry of St. Leonard, Shoreditch, v. London County Council.)

SALE OF FOOD AND DRUGS ACT 1875. Article not of quality demanded-Invoice and label on article as supplied to seller-Warranty.Neither an invoice which contains a description of an article sold, nor a label affixed to such article, even though it contains the words "warranted genuine and pure,' can of itself constitute a written warranty within the meaning of sect. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. (Iorns, app., v. Von Tromp, resp.)

SALE OF GOODS. Hire-and-purchase agreement-Possession of goods by hirer-Factors Act 1889.-By an agreement made between the appellant, therein called the owner," and B, therein called the "hirer," the owner agreed to let a piano on hire to the hirer, and the hirer agreed to pay a monthly rent or 'hire instalment" to the owner, on the terms that if the hirer should pay a certain sum by a series of such monthly instalments the piano should become his property, but that until the full amount was paid it should remain the property of the owner. It was further agreed that the hirer should not let the piano go out of

802

499

his own possession, and that if the agreement was not duly performed the owner might retake possession, and that the hirer might terminate the hiring by delivering up the piano to the owner, B. obtained possession of the piano, and paid some of the instalments; but, before the full amount agreed upon was paid, he pledged the piano with the respondents without notice of the appellant's claim. Held, that B. had not agreed to buy" the piano within the meaning of sect. 9 of the Factors Act 1889, and that the appellant could recover it from the respondents. (Helby v. Matthews.)..... ...page 811 Hire-and-purchase agreement-Possession of goods under-Sale by hirer before passing of property to him-Conviction of hirer for larceny as a bail-eRevesting of property in owner.-Sect. 24 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which provides that where goods have been stolen and the offender is prosecuted to conviction, the property in the goods so stolen revests in the person who was the owner of the goods," does not apply to the case of a conviction for larceny as a bailee. Accordingly where a person intrusted by the owner with the possession of goods fraudulently sells the same and is afterwards prosecuted by the owner and convicted of larceny as a bailee, the property, if it has passed to the purchaser, does not by reason of such conviction revest in the owner. S. being in possession of a piano as a hirer under a hire-andpurchase agreement, before all the instalments of the purchase money were paid, and before the property in the piano had passed to him, sold the piano to a purchaser who bought in good faith and without notice of any lien of the owner. S. was prosecuted by the owner, and convicted of larceny as a bailee. In an action brought by the owner after such conviction against the purchaser for conversion of the piano: Held, that the property, which by the sale had passed to the purchaser under sect. 9 of the Factors Act 1889, did not revest in the owner by reason of the conviction of S. for larceny as a bailee, and that the purchaser therefore had a good title. (Payne v. Wilson.) ... 110 Value upwards of 101.-Proof of contract-Acceptance-Act of buyer recognising pre-existing contract. In an action for non-acceptance of goods sold, of the value of upwards of 10l., it was proved that the goods were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant with a delivery note, that the defendant took a sample from the bulk, and then, saying that they were not equal to a sample in his possession, refused to have them. Held, that there was evidence on which the judge at the trial of the action might not unreasonably find that the defendant had done an "act in relation to the goods which recognised a pre-existing contract of sale,' which constituted an acceptance of the goods within sect. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893

(Abbott and Co. Limited v. Wolsey.)... 117, 581

SETTLED LAND. Tenant for life-Improvements-Repairs-Application of capital money-Reimbursement in respect of money already expended.-By the combined effect of sect. 26 of the Settled Land Act 1882 and sect. 15 of the Settled Land Act 1890, the court has jurisdiction to accede to the application of a tenant for life of settled land that capital money shall be applied in or towards reimbursing him in respect of improvements which he has effected on the property, and paid for prior to the application. But where a scheme has not, before the execution of the improvements, been submitted for approval, the court is bound to regard the improvements more critically and carefully. (Re Tucker's Settled Estates.)

SETTLEMENT. Construction-"Other goods, chattels, and effects" -Ejusdem generis -Intention of settlor.-General words used in a grant of chattels in a settlement are to be construed largely, unless it can be clearly collected from the instrument that the

619

settlor intended to use such words in a restricted sense. (Anderson v. Anderson and another.) ...

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(Re

Limitation-No words of inheritance-Reference to other document-Construction - Will Persons entitled under Statutes of Distribution. Hudson; Kühne v. Hudson.) Voluntary deed-Rectification-Action-Evidence -Intention. An action was brought to rectify a voluntary settlement, made by a deed-poil or declaration of trust, and dated the 15th July 1880. It was executed by the plaintiffs, two elderly ladies and their nephew, who was appointed trustee. The plaintiffs had recently discovered, as they alleged, that the deed did not carry out their real intention, and they therefore desired to have it rectified in certain respects. It was decided by Kekewich, J. (72 L. T. Rep. 556) that the court had jurisdiction, in a proper case, to reform or rectify a voluntary settlement, as well as a settlement for value; but that the court would hesitate to rectify a voluntary settlement at the instance of the settlors merely on their own evidence as to their intention, unsupported by other evidence, such as written instructions, even though the rectification sought would bring the settlement more into harmony with recognised precedents, and with what the settlors might reasonably have intended at the time. On appeal : Held, that under the circumstances this was not a case in which the court ought to order the deed to be rectified, there being no satisfactory evidence of a mistake having been made; and that therefore the appeal must be dismissed. (Bonhote r. Henderson.) ..

SHIPPING.

...

892

..556, 814

Bill of lading-Exemption of shipowners' liability -Negligence of stevedore.-Goods were shipped under a bill of lading, a clause of which provided that the shipowners should be in no way liable "for any act, negligence, default, or error in judgment, of the pilot, master, mariners, or other servants of the shipowners in navigating the ship or otherwise." Damage was caused to the goods by their being negligently stowed by the stevedore employed by the shipowners. Held, that the clause exempted the shipowners from liability for the damage caused to the goods. (Baerselman v. Bailey and others.)

Compulsory pilotage-Unexempted vessel-Qualifi cation of pilot-Refusal to take pilot-Liability of master. The Merchant Shipping Act provides, by sect. 353, that every master of any unexempted ship, navigating within a compulsory pilotage district, who, after a qualified pilot has offered to take charge of such ship, either himself pilots such ship without possessing a pilotage certificate enabling him to do so, or employs or continues to employ an unqualified person to pilot her, shall for every such offence incur a penalty of double the amount of pilotage demandable for the conduct of such ship. The appellant was the holder of a licence which entitled him to act as pilot for the purpose of conducting exempted ships, and no others, up and down the river Thames. The respondent was the master of an unexempted ship which the appellant offered to pilot on an occasion when she was navigating up the river Thames, no pilot licensed to pilot unexempted ships having offered his services. The respondent refused to accept the services of the appellant, and employed an unlicensed pilot to navigate the ship. The appellant sought to recover a penalty against the respondent under the above section on the ground that he was a qualified pilot. Held, that the respondent was not liable to a penalty, as the appellant was not a qualified pilot for the purpose of navigating the respondent's ship. (Stafford, app., v. Dyer, resp.). Consignee for sale-Receipt of goods under bill of lading-Liability for freight-Deposit-Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Act, 1862.-A consignee for sale of a cargo shipped abroad and delivered

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to him out of a warehouse under a bill of lading, is not liable to be sued for the bill of lading freight if he has deposited the amount of such freight with the warehouse owner under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment Act 1862. (White and Co. v. Furness, Withey, and Co.). page 157 Co-ownership-Sale against majority of owners.The majority of the co-owners of a ship, by constituting themselves a limited liability company, made it impossible for the ship to be profitably employed in the general interests of the owners, unless the dissenting minority of the owners consented to come in to the company. On motion by the minority, in an action of restraint, for the sale of the ship: Held, that the majority of the owners had no right to change the character of the ownership without the consent of all persons concerned, and therefore the court would exercise its discretionary power under sect. 8 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861, and decree the sale of the ship. (The Hereward.)... Mortgage · First and second mortgagees Priorities Assignment of freight Accounts between mortgagees Commission on sale Interest on advances provided for in mortgageCollateral agreement --Validity. (The Benwell Tower.)

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(See BANKRUPTCY-PORT AND HARBOUR.)

SOLICITOR.

Costs-Security - Mortgage-Charging order. — A solicitor in an action accepted from a client a mortgage to secure his costs. The action was successful, and the solicitor moved for a charging order for his costs upon the property recovered. Held, that the solicitor, having obtained a mortgage for his costs, was debarred from obtaining a charging order. (Groom v. Cheesewright.) ...

Taxation Lease - Common form-Scale fee -General Order to the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, sched. 1, part 2.-The scale fee does not apply where a common form of lease has been settled once for all, and the solicitor has only to fill up details left in blank. (Welby v. Still)

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903

664

555

108

Taxation-Scale fee-Sale to public authority -Voluntary agreement -A sale to a local board for the purpose of establishing sewage works under the Public Health Act 1875, although made by a voluntary agreement, is a sale under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1815, and therefore, by virtue of the exception contained in rule 11 of part 1 of schedule 1 of the General Order made under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, the vendor's costs are not to be taxed under the scale of charges provided by schedule 1, part 1, but under schedule 2. (Re Burdekin and Co.) 417, 639 Trustee de son tort-Breach of trust-Improper investment-Solicitor making himself responsible -Liability of partners-Limitation of actionsTrustee Act 1888-Interest in possession. (Mara v. Browne.)

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Binding agreement-Statute of Frauds-"Lease to be approved in the customary way by my solicitor." -By a letter which contained all essential terms of a contract, the defendant offered to take a lease of a number of houses from the plaintiff, but there was this provision at the end: Such lease to be approved in the customary way by my solicitor.' The offer contained in this letter was accepted by the plaintiff. The defendant's solici tor subsequently refused to approve the lease, or to complete. Held, that there was a binding, and not a conditional, contract, which must be specifically enforced. The meaning of the provision was, that the defendant's solicitor was to see that nothing irregular or unusual was inserted in the formal lease which was to carry out the agreement. (Chipperfield v. Carter.)

Defence to-Agreement for compromise of actionSilence as to a material fact-No obligation to

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...page 763

disclose. An action having been brought by a plaintiff for an account of moneys received and expended by the defendant, terms of settlement were come to on the same day that a summons in the action was decided by the chief clerk adversely to the plaintiff, a fact then unknown to the defendant or his solicitors. The defendant now resisted specific performance of the terms of settlement of the action on the ground of the suppression of a material fact. Held, that this was not sufficient to enable the defendant to resist specific performance. (Turner v. Green.) Lessor and lessee Agreement for underlease Omission of date of commencement of leaseStatute of Frauds-Covenant not to underlet without licence of lessor-Respectable and responsible tenant-Unreasonable refusal.-On the 28th March 1894 the plaintiff and defendant signed a memorandum of agreement, by which the defendant was to take an underlease of a house on certain terms. The date from which the underlease was to commence was omitted in this agreement, but it was understood by the parties, at the time, that it was to be the 7th April 1894. This date was specifically agreed to in writing by subsequent letters. Held, that there was a contract made on the 28th March 1894, sufficiently evidenced in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. By the lease under which the plaintiff held, there was a covenant that the lessee would not assign or underlet without the licence in writing of the lessor, but the licence was not to be withheld in the case of the lessee obtaining a respectable and responsible person as tenant. The defendant was a respectable and responsible tenant, but the lessor declined to consent to the underlease, unless a certain undertaking was given by the defendant. This refusal to consent was also pleaded as a defence to an action by the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement. Held, that the defendant would get a good title and run no substantial risk of having it impeached on the ground of any breach of covenant by the granting of the underlease. He was therefore ordered to specifically perform the contract. (White v. Hay.)...

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Interest- Payment by devisee - Real Property Limitation Act 1874.-A. by deed covenanted for the payment of 4000l., to be held on trust for his son for life with remainders over, and charged the sum on certain lands. By his will A. devised the land to his son absolutely, subject to the charge, and gave the residue of his estate to other persons, and appointed his son one of his executors. A. died in 1871. The son entered into possession of the land, and received the rents and profits. The 4000l. was never raised, and no interest was paid in respect of it. Held, that the claim of the trustees of the 4000l. as against the personal estate of the testator was barred by the Statute of Limitations. (Re England; Steward v. England.)

STOCK EXCHANGE.

Purchase of stocks for speculation, not for investment-Gaming contract-Principal and brokerCivil Code, art. 1927-Special leave to appealPractice-Costs.-A contract entered into merely for purposes of speculation is not a "gaming contract" within art. 1927 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. The respondent, a person of small means, instructed the appellant, who was a broker on the Stock Exchange, to make purchases and sales of stocks and shares for him. He provided only a small portion of the purchase money, and the balance was obtained by the broker by pledging the shares purchased with a bank. The respondent never asked for delivery of the shares, and, to the knowledge of the appellant, did not purchase them as an investment, but as a speculation to sell again when they rose in value. The appellant was paid by a fixed commission on the purchases and

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681

THAMES CONSERVATORS. Election by shipowners-Voting of corporate bodies by proxy-Errors or irregularities "in or about " an election-Thames Conservancy Act 1894. (Reg. v. Samuel and another.) Navigation of barge Apprentice duly bound Right of apprentice to act as lighterman-Right of apprentice to assist licensed lighterman as second hand-The Watermen and Lightermen Amendment Act 1859-Bye-law 35 made thereunder-Bye-law 16 of the Thames Conservancy.An apprentice properly bound for the period and in the manner prescribed by the Watermen Act 1859 is an apprentice "qualified according to the Act," within the meaning of sect. 54 of the Act, and he cannot be convicted under that section for acting as a lighterman without having a licence. Such apprentice may be a competent person to assist as second hand a duly licensed lighterman when navigating on the river Thames a barge of over fifty tons burden, within the meaning of the 16th bye-law of the Thames Conservancy, as the words in that bye-law "one man in addition" are satisfied by there being on board to assist an apprentice duly bound within the meaning of the Watermen Act and the bye-laws made thereunder. (Gosling, app., v. Newton and Eagers, resps.)

TITHES.

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Income tax-Appeal by occupier of land against surveyor's assessment - Reduction by commissioners-No notice of appeal to tithe-ownerRight of tithe-owner to appeal after determination by commissioners.-By sect. 8 (1) of the Tithe Act 1891, if the sum claimed in respect of tithe-rontcharge, when added to any sum paid within the preceding twelve months, exceeds twothirds of the annual value of the lands out of which such rentcharge issues, as entered in schedule B. of the Income Tax Act 1853, then the excess of such rentcharge is to be remitted and is irrecoverable; and by sub-sect. 3 the tithe-owner is, for the purposes of the section to have the same right of appeal as the owner of lands. A person who was the owner and occupier of lands, appealed from the surveyor's assessment under schedules A. and B. of the Income Tax Act 1853, and the commissioners reduced the assessment under schedule B. to an amount which would affect the tithe-owner within the above section, but no notice of such appeal was given to the tithe-owner; nor did he know until after the hearing that such appeal had been heard, and the tithe-owner himself had given notice of appeal within the proper time. Held, that, notwithstanding the determination of the occupier's appeal by the commissioners, the titheowner, having given his notice of appeal in time, was entitled, under sub-sect. 3, to have his appeal heard by the commissioners, and that the commissioners, therefore, had jurisdiction, and were bound to hear such appeal. (Reg. v. the Commissioners of Taxes for the Barnstaple Division of Essex.)

572

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800

Legal origin of title-Parish lands-Long continued and uninterrupted-Possession and acts of ownership-Presumption of grant-Rentcharge.-The plaintiff, as surviving feoffee of parish lands, alleged that from the time of legal memory a certain part of such lands had been vested in the feoffees upon trust for the vestry, subject to a rentcharge of 31. 68. 8d., and that the defendant corporation had been tenants of the vestry at a rent of 1501. per annum since 1838, which tenancy had expired. Held, that a legal origin of title was not impossible, and must therefore be pre sumed, for after such a possession it was plainly incumbent on the court to find a legal origin if such could be found. Held also, that the omission of the land in question from the feoffments of the parish before 1838 was not sufficient to rebut the inference which the long possession compelled the court to draw. (Eliot v. The Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of Bristol.) ...page 752

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TRADE LIBEL.

Masters and workmen-Trade union-Intimidation -Malicious injury-Actionable wrong-Interlocutory injunction.-In consequence of a dispute with reference to an alleged preferential employment of non-union men by a building firm, a trade union published a poster headed Trollope's Black List," containing the names of non-union men employed by the firm. Upon motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication, it was decided by Kekewich, J. that the publication was a purely malicious act, and that therefore an interlocutory injunction must be granted. The defendants appealed. Held (affirming the decision of Kekewich, J.), that a primá facie case had been established that the defendants were doing more than was in fact necessary for their own protection; and that therefore the order for an interlocutory injunction ought not to be interfered with. (Trollope and Sons v. The London Building Trades Federation.) Slander of goods-Advertisement by rival traderInjunction.-The respondent was the proprietor of a food for infants known as "M.'s Infants' Food." This hejsupplied wholesale to the appellant, who was a chemist. The appellant was the proprietor of a rival article known as Dr. V.'s Food." The appellant sold the respondent's food by retail, first affixing to each bottle a notice, "The public are recommended to try Dr. V.'s Prepared Food for Infants and Invalids, it being far more healthful and nutritious than any other preparation yet offered." The respondent brought this action for an injunction to restrain the appellant. He called evidence to show that his food was the better of the two, but did not prove any special damage. Held, that the appellant's conduct amounted to nothing more than a puffing advertisement of his own goods, and that the action would not lie. (White v. Mellin.)

TRAMWAY COMPANY.

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Compulsory purchase-Local authority-Tramways Act 1870-North Metropolitan Tramways Acts 1869-1892. (North Metropolitan Tramways Company v. London County Council.) Debenture-holders' action-Sale of undertaking— Interim appointment of receiver and managerCompany formed for public purposes.-The holders of debentures issued by a tramways company governed by the Tramways Act 1870 do not, under sect. 44 of that statute, acquire a right to enforce their security by a sale of the undertaking and property of the company, nor a right to a judicial sale under the order of the court in an action brought for that purpose, such a company being formed for public purposes. Marshall v. The South Staffordshire Tramways Company.)

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334

586

542

TROVER.

Fraud by vendor-Sale of goods-Real owner unpaid -Title of real owner or vendee to goods-Attornment by warehousemen to vendee-EstoppelMeasure of damages.-Several bags of sugar belonging to G. were warehoused in his name in the defendant's warehouse. G. was induced by the fraud of F. to authorise the defendant to hold the sugar to the order of F. On the same day F. agreed to sell the sugar to the plaintiffs, but before the plaintiffs paid him they insisted on having it transferred into their own name. This was done, and, on the 7th June, the defendant informed the plaintiffs that he held the sugar at the plaintiffs'"order and disposal," and they then paid the purchase money to F. G. having soon afterwards discovered that he had been defrauded, gave notice to the defendant not to part with the sugar, and he accordingly having refused to do so, the plaintiffs brought an action to recover the value. Held, that the defendant was estopped by the attornment to the plaintiffs on the 7th June from setting up the title of G., and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the market value of the sugar at the date the defendant refused to deliver it to them. (Henderson and Co. v. Williams.) ...page

TRUSTEE.

Costs-Right to retain out of trust estate-Order making no order as to costs "-Trustee's right of retainer negatived-Rules of Court Nov. 1893, Order LXV., r. 14.-An originating summons was taken out by the testamentary guardian and next friend of an infant who was in the position of a tenant for life under the will of a testator, who died in May 1880, asking for accounts and inquiries and other relief (not including administration) against the defendant to the summons, who was the surviving executor and trustee of the will. An order was made by Kekewich, J., on the 7th Aug. 1893, which, after directing that the defendant should pay all future income of the testator's residuary real and personal estate to the plaintiff, concluded thus: And the judge doth not think fit to make any order as to the costs of this action." The defendant having retained his costs out of the trust moneys in his hands, Kekewich, J., on the 9th Feb. 1895, on the application of the plaintiff, made an order declaring that the defendant had not any right to do so, having regard to the words at the end of the order of the 7th Aug. 1893. The defendant appealed. Held, that the words in question negatived the primâ facie right of every trustee to retain the costs, charges, and expenses incurred by him out of the trust estate; and that, therefore, the appeal failed. Decision of Kekewich, J. affirmed. (Re Hodgkinson; Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson.) Liability for acting unreasonably-Vexatious and unjustifiable conduct Costs thereby incurred. -A trustee may be honest, and yet from overcaution or some other cause he may act unreasonably, and if his conduct is so unreasonable as to be vexatious, oppressive, or otherwise wholly unjustifiable, and he thereby causes his cestuis que trust expense which would not otherwise have been incurred, the trustee must bear sach expense, and it ought not to be thrown on the trust estate or on his cestuis que trust. (Re Chapman; Freeman v. Parker.)

Trustee and cestui que trust-Reversionary interest -Right of legatee to particulars of investments of trust estate-Solicitor-Costs disallowed between solicitor and client.-The plaintiff was entitled under a will to the sum of 100l., subject to the life interest therein of the testator's widow, who was eighty-four years of age. The testator died in July 1894, and probate of his will was granted in August. In November the plaintiff, being desirous of raising money on the security of her reversionary interest, asked the trustees for the particulars of the securities in which the estate