upon them; and a mandamus can be granted to compel a court of quarter sessions to give them those costs in the event of a refusal to do so. (Reg. v. The Justices of the County of London.) ...page 211 Intoxicating liquor-Sale of same to police sergeant -On or off duty-Knowledge of same.-Appellant was convicted under sect. 16, sub-sect. 2, of the Licensing Act 1872, which prohibits any licensed person from supplying any liquor or refreshment whether by way of gift or sale to any constable on duty unless by authority of some superior officer of such constable." The police constable was in fact on duty. Held, that, the appellant having bona fide believed the police constable to be off duty, the conviction must be quashed. (Sherras, app., v. De Rutzen, resp.)... 839

66

LIGHT AND AIR.

Right to free and undefined passage of air-Obstruction- Nuisance- Mandatory injunction.Every man has a natural right to enjoy the air pure and free from noxious smells or vapours, and anyone who sends on his neighbour's land that which makes the air impure is guilty of a naisance. But a man must not impose an obligation on his neighbour by having a want of proper ventilation on his own premises. An interference with light or air which is not otherwise actionable cannot be restrained on the ground of nuisance. Unless the right to have a free passage of air over the land of another has been acquired by lapse of time, the mere diminution of quantity is not a nuisance at law. An undefined passage of air is too vague to form the subject-matter of a grant. (Chastey v. Ackland.)

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

Buildings in streets-Uniformity of building lineBuilding on either side" "in the same street." -In 1887, R., the owner of a plot of ground on an estate laid out for building purposes, abutting on a new street, built two semi-detached villas on his property, leaving a space of sixty-two feet between their front wall and the road. In 1889 R. acquired the adjoining plot on the east side, and built other two villas at the same distance back from the road as the first. In 1894, L., who had in 1887 acquired the plot a joining R.'s plot on the west side, proposed to erect a house on his property with a clear space of only twenty-one feet between the house and the road. The local anthority considered that the proposed new house was a building in a street "beyond the front main wall of the house or building on either side thereof in the same street," within the meaning of sect. 3 of the Public Health (Buildings in Streets) Act 1838, and in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon them by that section refused to admit the plans. Upon a rule nisi for a mandamus to compel the local authority to admit the plans: Held, that R.'s villas, although they were buildings on either side" of the proposed new building, were not buildings "in the same street," within the meaning of sect. 3. (Reg. v. Fulwood Local Board.) Difference arising under Local Government ActArbitration by Local Government Board-Jurisdiction to order arbitrators of Local Government Board to state special case.-Where the Local Government Board are to decide any difference or other matter referred to arbitration under the Local Government Act 1888, the mode of determining such difference is provided by sect. 63 of the Act only, and not by sect. 87, which is confined to cases of difference which are to be determined by the Local Government Board otherwise than by arbitration, and such arbitrations by the Local Government Board, under sect. 63, come within sect. 24 of the Arbitration Act 1889, so that the court has power, under sect. 19 of the latter Act, to order an arbitrator appointed by the Local Government Board to state in the form of a special case any question of law arising in the course of the reference. A difference between

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845

592

a county council and a local board as to the amount of the annual payment to be made by the county council to the local board in respect of the costs of the maintenance of a main road, was, pursuant to sect. 11 (3) of the Act of 1888 referred to the arbitration of the Local Government Board, who appointed an inspector, under sect. 87, to hold a local inquiry. Held, that the inquiry ought to have been an arbitration under sect. 63, and that in such arbitration the court would have jurisdiction to order the inspector of the Local Government Board to state a special case. (Re An Arbitration between the County Council of Kent and the Sandgate Local Board.)

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...page 725 New buildings-Walls of incombustible materialsGalvanised iron with wooden supports and matchboarding. One of the bye-laws made by the defendants, as rural sanitary authority, required all new buildings to be "inclosed with walls constructed of good bricks, stone, or other hard and incombustible materials properly bonded, &c. The plaintiff proposed to erect a sanatorium for his school, consisting of sheets of corrugated galvanised iron one-thirty-second of an inch in thickness with a layer of felt inside, fixed to the outside of a framework of wooden upright and horizontal posts and rails, with wooden matchboarding inside. Held, that the galvanised iron alone was not a wall, and that the structure composed of wood and iron which constituted the wall was not of hard and incombustible materials as required by the bye-law. (Badley v. Cuckfield Union Rural District Committee.)

775

New street-Erection of one house-Laying out of new street Bye-laws. An urban sanitary authority, acting under the provisions of the Public Health Act 1875, made bye-laws providing that any person laying out a new street should comply with certain requirements as to its width. A builder bought an open piece of land, bounded on one side by a street, and, on an adjoining side, separated from a row of cottages by a narrow passage eight feet wide, which led into the street. On this piece of land he began to build three houses, exactly similar to each other, facing the street, and intended to be used as shops in the street. One of these three houses was built at the corner formed by the street and the passage. It had no door or window opening into the passage. The outer wall of the house extended forty feet up the passage, and beyond that was the wall of the garden at the back of the house. The urban sanitary authority claimed an injunction to restrain the builder from erecting the corner house on the ground that he was laying out a new street, and in so doing was not complying with the bye-laws which regulated the width of a new street. Lawrance, J. at the trial held, that, upon these facts, the defendant had not begun to lay out a new street. Upon appeal this decision was upheld. (St. George's Local Board v. Ballard.)... 345 Parish council-Election of-Mode of questioning validity of election-Election petition-Appeal to county council-Mandamus. At a first election of parish councillors under the Local Government Act 1894, there were four candidates C., S., L, and M., for two seats, seven others having been already elected. Upon a show of hands the chairman declared C. and S. to have been duly elected. A poll was then demanded, which was granted by the chairman, and a day fixed for the polling. It afterwards appeared that the person who demanded the poll was not entitled to do so, and the chairman then sent out notices that the poll would not take place, and issued his certificate that C. and S. had been duly elected at the meeting. The returning officer insisted that the poll should be held, and it was held on the day fixed, and L. and M. had the majority of votes. At the first meeting afterwards L. and M. attended and made and signed the required declaration, but the chairman refused to allow C and S to make and sign the declaration. Upon a rule for a mandamus to the chairman to convene the parish council and allow C. and S. to sign their declarations: Held, that

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Police-Cost of pay and clothing-Borough maintaining separate police force-Constables added temporarily from another force-Contribution by county council.-When a borough maintains a separate police force, and has temporarily added constables from another police force under an agreement made under sect. 25 of the Police Act 1890, the county council is bound to pay to the council of the borough one half the cost of the pay and clothing of the constables so added, under sect. 24, sub-sect. 2 (j.), of the Local Government Act 1888. (Reg. v. The County Council of the West Riding of Yorkshire.) Private street-Expenses of paving, &c.-Plans once approved by local authority-Works executed in accordance with plans-Liability of frontagers for subsequent repairs from time to time.-Sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875 provides that where any street within any urban district (not being a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large) is not sewered, levelled, paved, &c., and made good to the satisfaction of the urban authority, such authority may, by notice to the owners or occupiers of the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on such parts thereof as may require to be sewered, &c., require them to sewer, level, pave, &c., or make good the same, and if the notice is not complied with the urban authority may execute the works and recover the expenses from the owners in default. Held, that. so long as a street remains a private street, and unless and until it is declared, under sect. 152, to be a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, the provisions of sect. 150-except as regards sewers, which are placed in a different position under sects. 13 and 15 of the Act, may be put into operation, and the local authority can call on frontagers to do what is necessary to put the street in regard to these matters-excluding sewers-in a proper condition as often as the street requires such repairs. (The Barry and Cadoxton Local Board v. Parry.)...

Private street works-Objections to resolutionsJurisdiction of court of summary jurisdiction.— Where a municipal corporation, acting under certain sections of their local Act, which are in almost identical terms with sects. 6, 7, and 8 of the Private Street Works Act, 1892, passed a resolution approving plans for new works proposed to be carried out: Held, that a court of summary jurisdiction, in determining objections to the proposed works, bas jurisdiction to take into consideration the sufficiency of the existing state of affairs which it is proposed to alter. (The Corporation of the City of Sheffield v. Alexander and others.) Sewers made by owner of building estate-Sewers vesting in local authority-"Sewers made by any person for his own profit."-Lump sum charged by owner for permission to connect with sewer. Where the owner of a building estate constructs sewers merely for the purposes of that particular estate, in the expectation of being recouped his outlay by the enhanced prices to be obtained from the purchasers of the various plots laid out for building, although the owner charges each purchaser a lump sum for permission to connect with the sewers, such sewers are not made by any person for his own profit" within the meaning of exception (1) in sect. 13 of the Public Health Act 1875. In 1886 the plaintiffs laid out an estate of six acres for building purposes, and constructed roads and a sewer for the purposes of the houses to be afterwards erected. The agreements made by the plaintiffs with builders contained a clause stating that the plaintiffs would form a roadway and construct a main drain thereunder, the grantees to pay a lump sum towards

sewers

520

692

242

the expenses, and to pay a proportionate part of the cost of keeping the road and drain in repair, until the same should be taken to by the urban sanitary authority. When houses were built the plaintiffs charged a lump sum for permission to connect the drainage with their sewer. They, in fact, made a small profit on the sewer. The owner of a house on an adjoining property declined to pay the sum charged for connecting, on the ground that the sewer was vested in the local sanitary authority. For the plaintiffs it was contended that the sewer was made "for their own profit." Held, that, although the plaintiffs intended to recoup themselves for their outlay, the sewer had been made for the purposes of the particular estate, and for no other purpose, and was therefore not made by any person for his own profit" within the meaning of the first exception in sect. 13 of the Public Health Act 1875. (Vowles v. Colmer.)...

LUNACY.

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Practice Discovery - Privilege — Inspection of documents filed in lunacy proceedings-Death of alleged lunatic-Proceedings for administration of his estate Probate action - Will disputed on ground of insanity of testator.- With certain exceptions the general rule is to allow inspection of documents filed in lunacy proceedings by any person claiming an interest in the property of a deceased lunatic, or alleged lunatic, and who can satisfy the court that he wants inspection for some reasonable and proper purpose. And the fact that, if the documents are of such a kind that a litigant, if he had them, could not be compelled to produce them, does not disentitle his opponent to see them. But where an alleged lunatic had died pending an inquiry into the state of his mind, and proceedings were taken in the Probate Division to obtain a declaration that he had died intestate, and in opposition thereto two wills were set up by the person in whose favour they purported to be made, the validity of which was disputed on the grounds of insanity, undue influence, and defective execution, the Court refused to allow the legatee inspection of the documents filed in the lunacy proceedings, as to do so would enable her to see her opponent's case, an advantage to which she had no right. (Re Horace Ward Strachan, an alleged Lunatic.)

Jurisdiction-Settled land Lunatic tenant for life-Bill in Parliament-Costs of opposition -Payment out of corpus of settled property.

...

The Lords Justices sitting in lunacy have jurisdiction to order the costs, charges, and expenses incurred in relation to an unsuccessful opposition to a Bill in Parliament, affecting the estate of a lunatic tenant for life of settled land, to be paid out of the corpus of the property subject to the settlement. (Re Frederick Blake, a Lunatic.) Property in Ireland-Remittance of part of income to England-Inquisition and order for maintenance in England-Percentage on whole income paid in Ireland-Percentage whether payable in England on income remitted for maintenance.-Upon the true construction of the Lunacy Act 1890, s. 148, the Lunacy Act 1891, s. 27, the Rules in Lunacy 1892, r. 126, and the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871, ss. 109, 114, where a percentage has been charged in Ireland on the annual income of a lunatic whose property is situate in that country but who is resident in England, a remittance of part of that income to England for the maintenance of the lunatic is not also subject to a similar percentage, the words "clear annual income in rule 126 not being applicable to a sum remitted for that special purpose. (Re Mary Frances Grehan, a Lunatic.)

MAINTENANCE.

Defence of Criminal proceedings-Maintenance of criminal suits-Legality of-Indemnity for costs -Right of action on indemnity.-The doctrine of maintenance is confined to civil actions, and does

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383

not apply to criminal proceedings, the "maintaining" of which is therefore not illegal; and accordingly, where a person gives a guarantee whereby he agrees to indemnify a solicitor in respect of the costs of criminal proceedings to be undertaken against another person, and such proceedings are taken and costs incurred, the solicitor can maintain an action on such guarantee, and the person sued thereon cannot set up as a defence that the agreement was void as being tainted with the illegality of maintenance. (Grani v. Thomson.)

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MANDATORY INJUNCTION. Interlocutory order-Restoring demolished staircase-Legal right-Damages. The plaintiff in this case was lessee of a set of rooms in a large building in St. James-street, under a lease from the defendant company for seven years from Michaelmas 1891. The lease expressly demised the rooms together (in common with the other tenants of the lessor) with the use of the entrance hall and stairs leading to the said rooms; and the company covenanted for quiet enjoyment of the premises thereby demised together with the use of the said entrance hall and stairs. In 1893 some application was made by the defendant company to the plaintiff to consent to an alteration of the staircase, but he refused to do so except on terms which the company did not accept. On the 4th March 1895 the defendants, M. and P., to whom the company had shortly before leased the greater part of the building for the purposes of a club, began to pull down the staircase. The plaintiff was away from his rooms at the time, he returned on the 7th. An action was commenced on that day, but the writ and notice of motion were not actually served till the afternoon of the 8th, by which time the staircase had been pulled down. The plaintiff amended his notice of motion by asking for a mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from permitting the staircase to remain removed. The evidence showed that there was access by another staircase to the plaintiff's rooms, but it was admittedly circuitous, and, as the plaintiff alleged, inconvenient. Held, that the plaintiff had a legal right to the enjoyment of the staircase, which the defendants could not be allowed to take away by payment of compensation; that he would therefore be entitled to a mandatory injunction at the hearing, and, as there was no ground for supposing that any fresh evidence could be adduced at the hearing, it ought to be granted on this motion. (Allport v. The Securities Company Limited.)

MARRIAGE.

Divorce - Jurisdiction - Matrimonial domicile Law of Ceylon-Proclamation of 1799-Charter of 1801-Charter of Justice of 1833-Procedure Code of 1889, sect. 597-Jurisdiction of District Court. There is no recognised rule of general law to the effect that a "matrimonial domicile gives jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage. According to international law the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage. Sect. 597 of the Procedure Code 1889 does not give the District Courts of Ceylon jurisdiction to entertain a divorce suit not previously cognizable by the courts of that island. The Charter of 1801, which applied the English matrimonial law then existing to British residents in Ceylon, having been revoked by the Charter of 1833, the matrimonial law applicable to European residents is the Roman-Dutch law, which prevailed in the colony before its annexation, and was confirmed by the Proclamation of 1799. By that law the courts of the island have no jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage contracted in England by British subjects, who, though resident within the forum, still retain their English domicile. (Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier and others.)

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533

MARRIED WOMAN.

Separate estate-Restraint on anticipation-Costs of unsuccessful action.-The court has jurisdiction, under sect. 2 of the Married Women's Property Act 1893, to order payment of the costs of an unsuccessful action instituted by a married woman, which was commenced prior to and was pending at the date of the passing of that Act, out of property which is subject to a restraint on anticipation. (Re Godfrey; Thorne-George v. Godfrey.) ...page

MASTER AND SERVANT. Authority of servant-Delegation of authoritySudden emergency-Liability of master.-The defendants sent out their omnibus in charge of a driver and a conductor. When the omnibus was about a quarter of a mile away from the defendant's yard, a police inspector, being of opinion that the driver was drunk, ordered him to discontinue driving. Held, that there was no evidence of any necessity which justified the driver and conductor in handing over the omnibus to a third person to drive home, without first communicating with the defendants; and the defendants were therefore not liable for the negligence of the third person while driving the omnibus home. (Gwilliam v. Twist and another.)

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115, 579

Breach of contract-Information obtained by servant in course of business-Names of customersBreach of confidence-Implied contract-Liability of servant. The plaintiff, a dealer in game and eggs, employed the defendant as his manager. During such employment the defendant secretly copied from the plaintiff's order-book the names and addresses of the plaintiff's customers, and having set up a similar business at another place, made use of such list for the purpose of soliciting the orders of such customers. The defendant, having been guilty of a gross breach of his duty and obligations to his master, had broken an implied term of his contract of service, for which the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages. (Robb v. Green.)

686

448

Liability of master for assault by servant-Conviction of servant for assault.-A master is liable for a wrongful assault committed by his servant in the course of, and in furtherance of, his employment; and an action will lie against the master though the servant has been convicted and fined for the assault. (Dyer v. Munday.) Maliciously inducing employer to discharge employed. The defendant A. maliciously induced the employers of the plaintiffs to discharge them, and not to employ them again. By this no breach of contract was caused between the plaintiffs and their employers. Held, that the fact that there was no breach of contract did not affect the rights of the plaintiffs. The malicious disturbance of another in his calling or business, causing him damage, is an actionable wrong. (Flood and Taylor v. Jackson, Knight, and Allen.)... Wrongful dismissal-Employment by partnersContract for a term of years-Dissolution of partnership before expiration of term.-A firm of merchants, consisting of four partners, engaged the plaintiff to act as their manager for a fixed term of two years at a yearly salary paid monthly. Before the expiration of the term they voluntarily dissolved their partnership. The business continued to be carried on by two of the late partners, who offered to continue the employment of the plaintiff upon the terms of his agreement with the old firm. Held, that the dissolution of partnership operated as a wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff, but that under the circumstances he was only entitled to nominal damages. (Brace v. Calder and others.) $29

589

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66

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ground in the metropolis erected thereon two blocks of buildings, consisting of forty-six sets of apartments. The blocks were divided by a paved yard twenty feet wide. Across one end of the yard was a wall, joining the outer walls of the two blocks which stood on the boundary of the piece of ground. Across the other end of the yard in a similar position was a railing with an opening in it leading into a public thoroughfare, so that the piece of ground was completely fenced in all round except for the opening in the railing. The entrances of one block were from the yard; the entrances to the other block were from a public thoroughfare, but windows of this block received light from the yard. In the yard was a dustbin, which was in fact used by the occupiers of both blocks. The drainage was by means of twelve drains running from the two blocks of buildings into a nine-inch pipe running under the yard into a sewer within one hundred feet of the blocks. Held, that the nine-inch pipe was used for the drainage of "premises within the same curtilage" within the meaning of sect. 250 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855, and was therefore a drain" and not a sewer within the meaning of that Act. (Pilbrow, app., v. The Vestry of the Parish of St. Leonard, Shoreditch, resps.) page 135 General line of buildings-Certificate of superintending architect-Wall of forecourt-Alteration of wall-"Building structure or erection."-The appellants were the owners of a dwelling-house which had in front a forecourt bounded by a low wall which abutted on a street. The appellants raised the wall some feet, and used it for the purpose of affixing advertisements thereto. The respondents contended that the raised wall was a structure within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Act 1862, s. 75. The superintending architect decided that the front of the appellants' dwelling-house was the general line of buildings, and the appellants were summoned for erecting a structure beyond it. The hearing of the summons was adjourned pending an appeal against the decision of the superintending architect, which decision was subsequently affirmed. The magistrate before whom the summons was heard held that the wall was a structure erected beyond the general line of buildings, and ordered it to be demolished. Held, that the decision of the magistrate was right. (Lavy and another, apps., v. London County Council, resps.) New street Interpretation - Turnpike road Repairs Paving expenses-Apportionment When conclusive. Sect. 112 of the Metropolitan Local Management Act 1862, which interprets the term "new street," does not preclude the court from holding a road not included in the interpretation, which is a street in the popular acceptation of the term, to be a new street." A turnpike road, which was disturnpiked in 1865 and which up to that date was in the charge of the turnpike trustees and the carriage-way of which was after that date repaired by the vestry and the paths temporarily repaved, held to be a new street within sect. 150 of the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855. An apportionment of expenses under sect. 150 of the Act of 1855 is conclusive, although it is unequal in the amount it imposes upon the same kind of property, if it does not deal with matters outside the jurisdiction of the vestry. (Davis, app., v. Greenwich District Board of Works, resps.) Sewers rate-Special district-Sewer in new street. -A metropolitan police magistrate granted a distress-warrant to recover a special sewers rate made under sects. 159 and 161 of the Act of 1855 for a special sewers district. On the appellant claiming not to be rated under those sections of the Act of 1855, but to be rated under sects. 52 and 53 of the Act of 1862, in which case the property rated would have been entitled to certain exemptions (no appeal had been made against the rate to quarter sessions): Held, that the learned magistrate was right to enforce the rate; such

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674

being good on the face of it, he had no power to go behind it. On the case as stated the respondents had the initial right to make a rate under sects. 159 and 161 of the Act of 1855, irrespective of sects. 52 and 53 of the Act of 1862. (Bates, app., . The Plumstead Overseers, resps.) ...page 393 MINING LEASE.

Consent of Ecclesiastical Commissioners - Open mines-Injunction.-From the date of the restraining statutes of Elizabeth (13 Eliz. c. 10 and 14 Eliz. c. 11) and up to the date of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 108, a rector could not, even with the consent of the patron and ordinary, open a new mine upon the glebe lands. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England, whose consent to a mining lease under glebe lands is necessary by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 108, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 57, have such an interest in a mine of that description as entitles them to bring an action for an injunction to restrain the illegal working thereof. (The Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England v. Wodehouse.)

MORTGAGE.

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Foreclosure-Several defendants-One time to redeem-Form of order.-In the case of a judgment in a foreclosure action, where, in addition to the mortgagor, there are several defendants who have charges on the mortgaged property subsequent to the plaintiff's mortgage, and one time is given for the defendants or any of them to redeem the plaintiff, there should be added to the form of order, No. 22 in 2 Seton, 5th edit., p. 1628, a direction that the defendants or defendant so redeeming the plaintiff are or is to be at liberty to apply for the addition to the judgment of any further amounts and directions consequent thereon which by reason of such redemption the Court may think just, and that on such application the defendant so applying is not to give the plaintiff notice thereof. (Biddulph v. Billiter- street Offices Company Limited.)... Mortgage of colliery-Undertaking and business not expressly included in security-Appointment of receiver and manager-Jurisdiction-Company Directors Quorum Deed Execution Authority to affix seal of company-Validity.Where a colliery is mortgaged and the mortgage deed does not expressly include the undertaking and business of the colliery, they must nevertheless be taken to be included by implication; and on default being made in payment of the moneys secured by the mortgage the court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and manager at the instance of the mortgagees. Where the seal of a company has been duly affixed to a mortgage deed by the secretary of the company, it is not the duty of the mortgagees to go behind the articles of association and to ascertain whether the secretary was duly authorised by the private regulations of the directors to affix it, or whether the meeting at which the deed was sanctioned was or was not attended by a quorum of directors; and it must therefore be taken that the deed was well executed. (The County of Gloucester Bank v. The Rudry Merthyr Steam and House Coal Colliery, &c., Company Limited.)

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. Election of aldermen-Validity of method of voting -Delivery of voting papers-Municipal Corporations Act 1882.-At a meeting of a town council for the purpose of electing aldermen for a municipal borough, the chairman requested the town clerk to collect some of the voting papers, and hand them to him. Some of the voting papers were handed direct to the chairman. Held, that a proper delivery of all the voting papers had been made. (Baxter and others, pets., v Spencer and others, resps.; Re An Election of Aldermen for the Borough of Haslingden.) 838 Election of councillor-Misspelling of surname of candidate Burgess-roll Nomination paper Municipal Corporations Act 1882.-The petitioner, whose surname was Miller, was a candidate for

election

of councillor for one of the wards of a

municipal borough. Upon the burgess-roll and upon each of the nomination papers his name appeared as ་་ Millar." Objection being taken to the same he was prevented going to the poll, and respondent was elected. Held, that the name as spelt did not invalidate the nomination papers, and the election as made was void. (Miller, pet., v. Everton, resp.) ...

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NAVIGABLE RIVER. Riparian proprietor-Sale of water power as appurtenant to land. The fact that a river is navigable will not prevent a riparian owner from acquiring an interest in the water power, which he may sell along with and as appurtenant to a parcel of his land. The appellants sold to the respondents a piece of land on the bank of a river "together with a quantity of water power equivalent to 50-horse power to be taken off from the water power and dam of the said vendors," with a warranty against all troubles and hindrances whatsoever. Held, that, under the terms of the conveyance, the purchasers were entitled to a supply of water power in priority to the vendors or their tenants, in the event of the supply falling short of what was required by both parties. (Hamelin and others v. Bannerman and others.)

NEGLIGENCE.

Injury to plaintiffs' workman owing to defect in gearing supplied by third party-Liability of third party to plaintiffs-Remoteness of damage.-A workman in the employment of the plaintiffs, a firm of stevedores unloading a cargo for the plaintiffs, was injured owing to the defective state of one of the chains provided by the defendant. The workman sued the plaintiffs for damages for personal injuries, and the plaintiffs properly settled his claim by the payment to him of 1251. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover that sum from the defendant. (Mowbray t. Merryweather.) ...

Adjoining owners

NUISANCE.

129

Discharge of rain-water Alteration of pipes with the plaintiff's consentOverflow of water-Absence of negligence.-The plaintiff had the right of discharging rain-water from the roof of his house by means of pipes into an open area which belonged to the defendant. The defendant began to cover in the area with a flat roof, and a dispute arose between him and the plaintiff as to obstruction of the plaintiff's light. They came to an arrangement upon certain terms, under which the defendant finished building the roof over the area and the drain pipes by means of which the plaintiff's rain-water had been discharged were altered so as to discharge the water on to the roof built over the area. The pipes from the roof having become clogged through no negligence on the part of the defendant, the rain-water collected on the roof and flowed into and damaged the plaintiff's house. In an action to recover damages, Held, that the plaintiff had consented to the new mode of discharging the rain-water, and, there being no negligence on the part of the defendant, he was not entitled to recover. (Gill and others v. Edouin.) ... Statutory powers Electric Lighting - NoiseVibration-Structural damage-Lessee and reversioner-Right to injunction-Electric Lighting Act 1882-Practice- Appeal - Relief claimed partly refused and partly granted-Claim for injunction dismissed, but damages granted-Time for appealing.-Although the court has jurisdiction under Lord Cairns' Act to award damages instead of an injunction in cases of continuing actionable nuisances, such jurisdiction ought not to be exercised in such cases except under very exceptional circumstances. An electric lighting company, which carried on its undertaking under the provisions of certain Acts of Parliament and provisional orders made thereunder, caused a

e

467

579

serious nuisance to the lessee of a house by the noise and vibration arising from the use of the machinery used for generating the electricity, the vibration being such as to cause cracks in the walls of the house. Held, that sects. 10 and 17 of the Electric Lighting Act 1882 refer to the execution of works, and not to the use of works when executed; and that the defendants were not expressly empowered by the Acts of Parliament and the provisional orders to cause a nuisance in carrying on their undertaking, and were therefore liable if they caused a nuisance. Held also, that the nuisance was such that the lessee was entitled to an injunction restraining its continuance; that the actual and prospective permanent structural injury to the house entitled the reversioners to an injunction on the same terms; and that it was a case in which the court ought not to grant damages only under Lord Cairns' Act. An action was commenced claiming an injunction restraining the continuance of a nuisance and damages. The injunction was refused with costs, but an inquiry was directed as to damages, the plaintiffs to pay the costs so far as they related to the claim for in junction, and the defendants so far as they related to the claim for damages. Held, that the decision was not a mere refusal of the relief claimed, and that the time for appealing against the order commenced from the date it was drawn up, and not from the date the judgment was pronounced. (Meux Brewery Company Limited v. City of London Electric Lighting Company Limited. Shelfer v. The Same.)

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PARTNERSHIP. Articles-Provision that goodwill shall be sole property of one partner-Books of firm-Right to make extracts.-A. and B. were partners. The articles provided that the goodwill should be the sole property of A., and that each partner should have access to the books, and be at liberty to take copies thereof, or extracts therefrom, at all reasonable times. The articles did not, however, contain any stipulations to prevent B. from competing with A. after the close of the partnership, or from making use of information acquired by him as a partner. B. had extracted from the books a list of the names and addresses of the customers of the firm, with the avowed object of soliciting the customers at the termination of the partnership. On an application by A. for an injunction to restrain B. from making extracts for any purpose other than the purposes of the partnership business, it was decided by Stirling, J, that, inasmuch as the articles contained no restrictive stipulations, and there being no ground for implying any, the injunction must be refused. On appeal: Held, that, if it could be proved that B.'s intended use of the extracts which he had made was adverse to the interests of the partnership firm or an infringement of the rights of his co-partner, there might have been ground for granting an injunction; but that, applying the principle of Pearson v. Pearson (51 L. T. Rep. 311; 27 Ch. Div. 145), B. was justified in the course he had taken. (Trego v. Hunt.)... Death of partner before annual account-Valuation of share Negotiations pending for purchaseGoodwill.-J., a partner in a firm of oil and colour merchants, died on the 10th April 1891. partnership articles provided that an annual balance-sheet was to be made out on the 31st March, and the share of any partner who died was to be taken to be the amount standing to his credit in such balance-sheet. It was held at the trial that the executors of J. were entitled to have an account taken as on the 31st March 1891, and that the leasehold premises occupied by the partnership ought to be valued as on that day. In previous balance-sheets nothing had been entered for the value of the leasehold premises, which were regarded as held at a rack rent, nor for the goodwill. Some time before J.'s death a railway company had given notice to treat for a part of the premises, and negotiations were pend

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