Power of occupier to assign his right to take Game Act 1880.-The ground game-Ground plaintiff, who was the occupier of a farm under a lease which did not reserve to the landlord any right to the game, agreed in writing to let to the defendant the sole right of shooting and killing all winged game, hares, and rabbits, on the farm. Held, that such agreement was not an alienation of the right of the occupier as declared, given and reserved to him by the Ground Game Act 1880, and therefore not void under sect. 3 of that Act. (Morgan v. Jackson.)

GUARANTEE.

Joint contractor-Joint Guarantee-Payment by one guarantor by cheque-Unsatisfied judgment on cheque-Action against other guarantor upon the guarantee. An unsatisfied judgment, recovered by the creditor upon a cheque given by one joint guarantor in respect of the ability upon the guarantee, is no bar to an action against the other joint guarantor upon the guarantee. (WeggProsser v. Evans.)

HACKNEY CARRIAGE. Licence-Entries in columns thereon-Matter of complaint-Compensation-Jurisdiction of magistrate.-N., a cabdriver, entered into the service of B., a cab proprietor, on the 16th March, and left temporarily on the 25th March-during a cab strike--but shortly returned, and finally quitted his service on the 2nd May. B's manager filled in the form on the licence with the name and address of the proprietor, and in the third column he put the date, the 16th March, when N. first entered B.'s service, and no other date, but, in the fourth column, he put the two dates when N. quitted B.'s service, and, in addition, signed his own (the manager's) name. N. thereupon took out a summons against B. for unlawfully defacing his licence, and produced evidence that the entries in the fourth column amounted to a "chairmark," and prejudiced him in his business. No evidence of special damage was given. Held, that sect. 8 of the Hackney Carriage Act 1843 had not been complied with, and that there had been a defacement of the licence in the fourth column, and that this was a matter of complaint within sect. 22 of the Act, and that the magistrate had, therefore, jurisdiction to order compensation. (Norris, app., v. Birch, resp.)

HEDGE AND DITCH. Boundary-Presumption of ownership-Dispossession Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27), s. 3-Real Property Limitation Act 1874. The plaintiff and defendant were the owners of adjacent houses, the gardens of which were divided by a hedge belonging to the plaintiff. Formerly a ditch ran along the defendant's side of the hedge into which both houses drained. In 1868 the then owner of the plaintiff's house laid down pipes at the bottom of the ditch for the drainage of both houses, and then filled up the ditch. The site of the ditch was afterwards used by the owners of the defendants house as a path belonging to their garden. Soon after 1875 the defendant planted trees on a part of this path, made a rose bed in another part, paved a part near his stable with cobbles, built a fowl-house on another part, and cindered the remainder. The plaintiff, however, trimmed the hedge from defendant's side, and on two occasions opened the drain-pipes for the purpose of repairing them, and alleded that this had been done without any permission from the

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defendant. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the site of the ditch. Held, that, if the site of the ditch formerly belonged to the plaintiff, the defendant had dispossesed the plaintiff and had acquired a title to it under the Statute of Limitations. Whether the presumption that, where there is a hedge and ditch, the ditch is the property of the person on whose land the hedge stands, applies where there is nothing to show that the ditch was artificial, quære. (Marshail v. Taylor.)

HIGHWAY.

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Cart and horses passing upon-Horses standing still -Driver leaving horses-Liability of driver to penalty. The Highway Act 1835 provides by sect. 78 that if the driver of any carriage negligently or wilfully be at such distance from such carriage, or in such a situation whilst it shall be passing upon such highway, that he cannot have the direction or government of the horses drawing the same, he shall be liable upon conviction to forfeit a sum not exceeding five pounds. The appellant, the driver of a farm waggon, was convicted under the above section, it appearing from the evidence that when he was driving along a highway he stopped his horses and went into a public-house. The horses remained standing ontside the house while the appellant was inside, and it was contended on his behalf that, as the horses were standing still, the cart was not passing upon the highway. Held, that the conviction was right. (Phythian, app., v. Baxendale, resp.)...

Extraordinary traffic-Contracts with owners of traction engines for haulage of ballast-Person by whose order the extraordinary traffic was conducted. The respondents, being under an agreement with a railway contractor for the haulage of ballast for delivery at different places on the railway as the contractor should from time to time indicate, entered into agreements with several owners of traction engines for the haulage of the ballast at a fixed rate per ton. The usual course of business was that the contractor gave notice to the respondents for the delivery of ballast at a place indicated by him, and they then arranged with one of the traction engine owners for the haulage and delivery. The respondents exercised no control over the owners of the traction engines as to the time for delivery, the engines they used, the weights they carried, the route followed, or otherwise. When a traction engine hauled any ballast under this arrangement a clerk of the respondents made out a delivery ticket. and made certain entries in their books, but this was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the quantity delivered to the contractor under the contract between him and the respondents. Damage was caused to the roads by this traffic, which was admitted to be "extraordinary traffic," within sect. 23 of the Highways and Locomotives Act 1878. Held that the respondents were the persons by whose order," within the meaning of sec. 23, the extraordinary traffic had been conducted, and they were therefore liable for the extraordinary expenses incurred in repairing the road. (The Kent County Council, apps., v. Vidler and others, resps.) ... Highway commissioners-Transfer of their powers, duties, and liabilities to district council. (Re The Isle of Wight Highway Commissioners.) Repair-Extraordinary expenses- - Recovery ofCertificate of surveyor-Summary proceedingsTime within which complaint to be made.-On a complaint preferred by a highway board, under sect. 23 of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act 1878, against the respondent, the certificate of the surveyor to the board was to the effect that extraordinary expenses had been incurred in repairing certain highways in four separate townships by reason of extraordinary traffic and excessive weight on such highways caused by the respondent. This certificate was dated the 7th Dec. 1893. The respondent's traffic

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ceased in April 1894. On the 31st May 1894 the surveyor gave a further certificate that extraordinary expenses had been incurred between April 1893 and April 1894, in respect of a single highway in one of the aforesaid townships, owing to the same reason. The complaint was preferred on the 5th July 1894. Held, that the first certificate was sufficient for the purpose of founding proceedings for the recovery of the expenses, and was not invalid because it related to more highways than one, but that, as the proceedings in July 1894 were not commenced within the limit of six months from the giving of the certificate, according to sect. 11 of 11 and 12 Vict. c. 43, the time had passed during which any claim could be made in respect of expenses incurred before the 7th Dec. 1893. (Wirral Highway Board, apps., v. Newell, resp.)... page 535

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HIRING AGREEMENT. Construction - Property in goods - BankruptcyBill of sale. The respondents supplied an engine to P. upon the terms that P. was to pay a certain sum down, and the balance of the purchase money by eight quarterly instalments. The agreement provided that until all the instalments were paid P. should not sell, assign, or remove the engine without the leave of the respondents, and that if the instalments fell into arrear the respondents might sue for the whole amount, or might resume possession of the engine and sell it, paying over to P. the balance of the price, if any. beyond what was due to them; and that until all the instalments were paid the engine should remain the property of the respondents. allowed the instalments to fall into arrear, and became bankrupt. Held, that the agreement was not a bill of sale requiring registration under the Bills of Sale Act, and that the assignees in P.'s bankruptcy had no right to retain the engine as against the respondents. (M'Entire and another v. Crossley Brothers.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

P.

Appeal from justices-Conviction for aggravated assault Separation Maintenance Right of husband to give evidence on question of means.After conviction by justices for an aggravated assault under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 42, 43, a husband is a competent witness upon the question of means, and, if he desire to give evidence, the magistrates cannot legally refuse to hear him after such conviction, and before they proceed to fix the amount of maintenance to be paid by the husband under a separation order. (Jones v. Jones.)

Divorce-Alimony-Income of respondent. (Hanbury (Husband) v. Hanbury (Wife), and Cross Appeal.) Nullity of marriage Daress - Decree.-A man, after paying to a girl of sixteen attentions which she rejected, threatened to blow her brains out if she would not consent to marry him, and produced from his pocket a pistol, which he held at her head. She then promised to marry him on condition that he put away the pistol, which he did. A few days later she went home, and shortly afterwards he intercepted her while on a railway journey, and took her to the office of a registrar of marriages, stating that they were going to see his mother. During the marriage ceremony she fainted, and, as soon as it was over, she got right away. The marriage was never consummated, and the man never insisted upon his marital rights. The Court pronounced the marriage to be null and void. (Bartlett (falsely called Rice) v. Rice.) Post-nuptial settlement-Separate property of wife received by husband-Settlement by him of his own property-Proviso for cesser of husband's life interest on bankruptcy - Validity-" Purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration.-Where a husband, who has received property of his wife belonging to her for her separate

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122

estate, by a post-nuptial settlement settles his
own property, the court will regard the property
so settled, to the extent of the value of the pro-
perty received by the husband from the wife, as
in substance the property of the wife, and a trust,
therefore, of the income of such property in
favour of the husband until bankruptcy will be
valid as against his trustee in bankruptcy. By
sect. 3 of the Married Women's Property Act
1882, any money or other estate of the wife lent
or intrusted by her to her husband for the pur-
pose of any trade or business carried on by him,
or otherwise, is to be treated as assets of her
husband's estate in case of his bankruptcy. Held,
that the section only applied where the property
of the wife had been lent to the husband for the
purpose of his trade or business. A "purchaser
in good faith and for valuable consideration,"
within the meaning of sect. 47 of the Bankruptcy
Act 1883, is a person who has acquired for valu-
able consideration property, the title to which is
affected with some infirmity, without notice of the
existence of such infirmity. It is sufficient for
the purposes of this section if the purchaser alone
acts in good faith. (Mackintosh v. Pogos9.) page 251
INCLOSURE ACTS.

Rules for construction-Separate ownership of sur-
face and minerals-Right to work minerals-Right
of support-Damage to surface-Compensation.-
In the construction of Inclosure Acts, the rules by
which the court is guided may be stated as
follows: Where the ownership of the minerals and
of the surface is severed, the primâ facie and
strong inference is that the owner of the surface
shall enjoy the surface allotted, and shall have the
common right of support for his tenement. In
order to rebut it, the burden lies on the owner of
the minerals to show affirmatively and by clear
words that he has the right of letting down the
surface, but express words are not required. The
presence or absence of a compensation clause is an
important element; the primâ facie inference in
favour of the surface owner is strengthened by the
absence of any provision for compensation; the
presence of a limited compensation clause is not
of itself sufficient to rebut the inference.
Earl of Dudley.)

INCOME TAX.

(Bell v.

Company resident in England-Railway abroadDirectors in England-Basiness carried on partly in England and partly abroad-" Foreign possessions."-A company resident in England carrying on business partly in England and partly abroad is chargeable for income tax under case 1 of sched. D., s. 100, of 5 and 6 Vict. c. 35.-A company formed for the purpose of carrying on a railway in Brazil, whose board of directors in London controlled the management of the railway and made contracts in England for the purchase of rolling stock and other materials necessary for the railway, held to be carrying on business partly in England and partly abroad. (The San Paulo Brazilian Railway Company Limited, apps., v. Carter, Surveyor of Taxes, resp.)

Divorce Annuity to wife-Payment-MistakeDeduction of past income tax.-Where the court has ordered a husband to pay and secure to his wife, who has obtained a decree absolute for the dissolution of the marriage, an annuity for her life, and that order has been carried into effect by a deed, the trustees of the deed, in the absence of special words to the contrary, may deduct income tix. Held, however, that the trustees' right was li nited to deducting the income tax in the future, and that they could not, because they had made a mistake, deduct the past income tax. (Warren v. Warren.) Exemption Public library - Urban authorityLiterary or scientific institution.-The exemption from duty which is granted by sect. 61, r. 6, of the Income Tax Act 1842, in favour of "any building the property of any literary or scientific institution," does not apply to a building appro

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INFANT. Legacy by parent to infant-Other provision for maintenance-Incorporation of sect 43 of the Conveyancing Act 1887. A testator bequeathed a legacy to his infant son to be paid to him at twenty-one. He also bequeathed a legacy to an infant daughter absolutely He gave his residue upon trust for all his children equally, and declared that his trustees might raise and apply any part not exceeding one moiety of the expectant share of any child for his or her advancement, preferment, or benefit. The will contained no express provision for maintenance. Held, (1) that the clause providing for advancement, preferment, or benefit could not be regarded as a provision for maintenance; (2) that sect. 43 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 must be taken as being incorporated in the will, but that there was not, by reason thereof, any such provision for maintenance as to exclude the operation of the rule that legacies to infant children by parents or persons in loco parentis carry interest from the death of the testator, and that, therefore, the legacies to the infant son and daughter respectively carried interest by way of maintenance from such date. (Re Moody; Woodroffe v. Moody.)

INSURANCE. LIFE.

Warranty of truth of statements in the proposalStatements offered as a consideration of the contract-Truth of statement a condition precedent. -In the proposal to an insurance company for an insurance on his life, the assured had made certain statements as to his health and previous applications for insurance, and had also agreed that these statements were by him "warranted to be true, and were offered to the company as a consideration of the contract." A policy was afterwards issued by the company in consideration of the application for the policy, which was thereby made a part of the contract, and of the payment of the premium. In an action upon the policy by the administrator of the assured: Held, that, by the agreement in the proposal, the truth of the statements, therein warranted, was a condition precedent, and that, the statements being in fact untrue, the defendants were not liable under the policy. (Hambrough v. The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.)

.:.

MARINE.

General average-Payment in cash to insurance broker-Bill of exchange-Custom.-Policies of insurance upon certain of the plaintiffs' ships were effected with the defendants by a firm of insurance brokers on behalf of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs subsequently authorised the brokers to settle their claim against the defendants under these policies, and to receive payment in cash in accordance with the recognised custom. Instead of cash the brokers took a bill of exchange at three months in payment of a general account including the plaintiffs'. This bill they afterwards discounted, and it was eventually paid by the defendants. The brokers failed without having paid the plaintiffs. In an action by the plaintiffs to recover the amount due to them from the defendants, Held, that the taking of the bill was not within the authority conferred upon the brokers by the plaintiffs, that it was contrary to the recognised business custom, and even when discounted it did not constitute a payment to the insured. (Hine Brothers v. The Steamship Insurance Syndicate Limited; The Netherholme, Glen Holme, and Rydal Holme.)

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79

Insurance-Time policy-" Hull and machinery of a steamship- Disbursements-" Warranted uninsured "-Honour policies.-An insurance by a time policy upon the "hull and machinery" of a steamship held, in the absence of any evidence as to any special meaning attributed in the insurance trade, as between assured and assurers, to the expression "hull and machinery," to be an insurance upon the hull and upon the machinery in the ordinary sense of those words, and not to cover disbursements." In a policy upon hull and machinery valued at 10,0001,"5000l. warranted uninsured," quære, whether the assured would commit a breach of the warranty by effecting p.p.i. policies. (Roddick v. The Indemnity Mutual Marine Insurance Company Limited.)

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Insurance on freight under charter-party-Loss of freight-" Cancellation" of charter-party-Delay through peril of the sea-Frustration of adventure.-A policy of insurance upon freight under a charter-party provided that "no claim arising from the cancelling of any charter, nor for loss of time under a time charter," should be allowed. While proceeding to the port of loading, the vesse! stranded and was so damaged that the voyage contemplated by the charter-party became impossible. The charterers did not load under the charter-party. The charter did not contain a "cancellation" clause, and the parties did not agree to rescind the contract. Held, that the charter had not been "cancelled within the meaning of the policy, and that the insurers were liable. (Jamieson v. The Newcastle Steamship Freight Insurance Association.) 195, 648 Policy on freight-Attachment of risk-Policy partly written and partly printed-Construction. By a policy of marine insurance upon freight of

meat valued at 3000l.," the underwriters were to be liable for any loss occasioned by breaking down of machinery until final sailing of vessel, the ship called Hydarnes, lost or not lost, at and from Monte Video to any ports or places in any order in the River Plate and thence to the United Kingdom This part of the policy was written. Then followed a clause to the effect that the assurance should commence upon the freight and goods or merchandise from the loading of the said goods on board the ship at Monte Video. With the exception of the words "Monte Video" this clause was in print, being part of the form of policy generally used by the defendants, an insurance company. After discharging her outward cargo at Monte Video, the ship proceeded to the River Plate to obtain a cargo of frozen meat, but her refrigerating machinery broke down under such circumstances that she was unable to take any frozen meat on board, so that the adventure, so far as the carriage of meat was concerned, had to be abandoned. By the contract under which she was to have taken a cargo of frozen meat, the shipowners, the assured, became entitled to freight on all carcases shipped. At the date of the policy it was known to both assured and underwriters that there was no proper appliances at Monte Video for loading frozen meat, so that the ship could not possibly take any frozen meat on board at that port. In an action by the assured upon the policy: Held, that, in construing the policy, so much of the printed clause in the document as was insensible should be rejected, and that the risk attached at Monte Video and did not depend upon the loading of the cargo. (The Hydarnes Steamship Company . The Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company.)

INTERPLEADER.

Principal and agent-Sale of house-Claims by agents for commission. Two estate agents claimed from the defendant commissions of different amounts in respect of the sale of her house. The defendant paid a sum of money into court, and, upon her application, the County Court issued an interpleader summons to determine which of the agents was entitled to this

103

Charge Separate property of married woman— Contingent remainder in fee-Delivery in execution.-A judgment creditor obtained and duly registered a judgment against a married woman, entitled under her marriage settlement to a life interest in real estate for her separate use without power of anticipation, with remainder in fee in default of children of the marriage, of whom there were none; and subsequently brought an action claiming to be entitled by virtue of his judgment to a valid charge on her contingent remainder in fee under sect. 13 of stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. Held, that sect. 1 of stat. 27 and 28 Vict. c. 112, applied, although the contingent remainder could not be delivered in execution, and that the judgment gave the judgment creditor no charge thereon. (Hood-Barrs Cathcart.)...

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

...

v.

Interest disqualifying-Bias-Justice belonging to privileged class for whose benefit proceedings are taken-Merchant Shipping Act 1854.-C., an unlicensed pilot, was convicted by a court of summary jurisdiction under sect. 361 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, of having continued in charge of a ship after a qualified pilot had offered to take charge of her. M., one of the six justices who sat to hear and determine the case, was a duly qualified pilot and licensed for the same pilotage district, but for more than forty years he had been a choice" pilot, that is, a pilot chosen and engaged beforehand by shipowners, and for the last nineteen years he had been, and was at the date of the conviction, in the service of a large steamship company, who were entitled to his exclusive services, and who never employed unlicensed pilots. Held, that, as M. belonged to a small class of privileged persons for whose protection the proceedings were taken, there was such a reasonable apprehension of bias as to disqualify him from sitting, and that therefore the conviction was bad. (Reg. v. Huggins and another, Justices of Gravesend; Ex parte Clancey.) Jurisdiction-Bona fide claim of right. The appellant was summoned for that he, being an unauthorised person, did dig and take turf sods and loam from Banstead Common contrary to one of the bye-laws. At the hearing it was proved that the appellant was authorised by the bailiff of the lord of the manor, and that the right had been exercised for several years. The case of Robertson v. Hartopp (62 L. T. Rep. 585), which was an action brought on behalf of the tenants of the manor of Banstead to restrain the lord from inclosing and digging up the waste so as to interfere with the rights of common, was cited, and the justices, having regard to that decision, found as a fact that the appellant was an unanthorised person within the meaning of the byelaws, and convicted him. Held, that, there being a bona fide claim of right set up which was not obscure or impossible in law, the justices were estopped from inquiring into the merits of the claim; that their jurisdiction was ousted; and that they had no right or power to make further inquiry, and ought not to have been influenced by the judgment in Robertson v. Hartopp. (Scott, app., v. Baring, resp.)...

LANDLORD AND TENANT. Ejectment-Relief against forfeiture for nonpayment for rent-Right of mortgagee by sub-demise -Common Law Procedure Act 1852.-By sect. 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 the proceedings in ejectment for nonpayment of rent under that section are subject to the following proviso: "Provided that nothing herein con

583

193

495

tained shall extend to bar the right of any mortgagee of such lease, or any part thereof, who shall not be in possession, so as such mortgagee shall and do, within six months after such judg ment obtained and execution executed, pay all rent in arrear, and all costs and damages sustained by such lessor and perform all the covenants and agreements which on the part and behalf of the lessee are and ought to be performed." Held, that a mortgagee of a lease by sub-demise was, according to the settled practice in equity, entitled to relief upon the terms of the above proviso, unless a right in some third party had accrued between the date of the judgment and the application for relief. (Newbolt v. Bingham and others.) ...

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...page 852

Lease-Implied covenant for quiet enjoyment-Termination of landlord's interest-Duration of covenant. The law imports a covenant for quiet enjoyment where the relation of landlord and tenant is established by an instrument, whether such instrument be under seal or not; but such implied covenant terminates with the interest of the landlord. So that, where a landlord lets premises for a term exceeding the time for which he has any interest therein, no covenant for quiet enjoyment is to be implied for the period in excess of the landlord's interest. (Baynes and Co. v. Lloyd and another.) 505

Option to determine by notice Sufficiency of notice given by lessee.-The plaintiff was tenant to the defendant under a lease for twenty-one years which provided that, if the lessee should be desirous of determining the demise at the end of the seventh or fourteenth year, "and of such desire shall give to the lessor six calendar months' notice before the end of either such period, then the term should be determined. More than six calendar months before the end of the first seven years the plaintiff wrote to the defendant. "I see that my first seven years will be determined on the 25th Dec., 1894. I find that I am paying too high a rent, and considerably higher than any of the adjoining houses are able to let for now. understand that the rent is 50l. too high, and I shall not be able to stop unless some reduction is made. I give you an early intimation of this, so that you may have ample time to consider what course you would like to adopt. Held that the letter was a sufficient notice to determine the term at the end of the first seven years. (Bury v. Thompson.) 187 Notice to quit-Sufficiency of notice.-The plaintiffs were the landlords of certain premises, and the defendant was their tenant under an agreement determinable by six months notice. On the 11th Jan. 1892 the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs as follows: "I hereby give you notice that I wish to terminate my tenancy of the offices at 1, East Parade, Leeds. Will you kindly let me know when my tenancy will expire?" The plaintiffs in reply wrote: "On referring to your agreement, we find that six months notice must be given, to terminate on the 1st July in any year; you therefore hold the rooms until July 1893." Held, that there was a good and valid notice to terminate the tenancy, and that the plaintiffs had treated it as such. (General Assurance Company v. Worsley.).

Validity Term commencing in middle of quarter-Notice terminating on anniversary of commencement of term -Number of daysParol agreement-Demise-Statute of Frauds. By an agreement dated the 19th May 1890 the plaintiff agreed to let, and the defendant to take, a certain house as yearly tenant, commencing on the 19th day of May instant, at the clear yearly rent of 451.; the sum of 41. 7s. 6d. as the apportioned part up to the 24th day of June next being paid on the signing hereof, and the future rent to be paid by equal quarterly payments in advance if demanded on the usual quarterly days of payment, the first payment being considered as due in advance if demanded on the 24th day of June next, and each succeeding quarterly payment

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to become payable in advance if required upon the first day of such quarter.' By a notice dated the 17th Nov. 1893 the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to quit the house on the 19th of May next." Held, that the tenancy commenced on the 19th May 1890, and not on the 24th of June 1890. Held also, that, although notice to quit on the 18th May would have been a good notice, the notice to quit on the 19th was also a good notice, that being the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced. (Sidebotham v. Holland.) ... Right of distress-Tenancy of farm-Termination of tenancy-Occupation by agreement of part of farm Right to distrain on such part for rent due for whole farm.-Where the tenant of a farm, by agreement made with his landlord before the expiration of the tenancy, agrees to retain and occupy part of the farm, and under such agreement continues in occupation of such part after he has given up possession of the remainder on the termination of the old tenancy, the landlord cannot distrain upon the part of the farm so retained for rent previously due in respect of the whole farm, upon the ground that a new tenancy has been created in such part, and the tenant is not, as to such part, holding over within the meaning of the statute 8 Anne, c. 14, s. 6. (Wilkinson v. Peel and others.) Specific performance-Lease-Agreement by infant and adult to grant-Repudiation-Injunction.The plaintiff by his writ claimed specific performance of an agreement in writing dated the 5th Oct. 1894, and made between the plaintiff and the defendants by their agent for a lease to the plaintiff of the ground floor of a certain house, or, in the alternative, damages. He also claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants until the trial of the action or further order from leasing the premises to any person other than the plaintiff. The plaintiff then moved for an interlocutory injunction in the terms of the writ. One of the defendants was an adult, but the other was an infant about nineteen years of age. They were joint tenants of the house in question. In Jan. 1895 the defendants repudiated the agreement. They opposed the motion for an interlocutory injunction on the ground that the infant defendant, acting on behalf of himself and the adult defendant, had purported to enter into an agreement dated the 11th Sept. 1894 for the lease of the premises to another person. Held, that specific performance against the infant defendant could not in any event be granted, and that upon the evidence before the court no case had been made out for granting specific performance against the adult defendant; that the only remedy of the plaintiff was by way of damages; and that, if it would not be proper to grant specific performance, it followed that it would be wrong to grant an injunction. (Lumley v. Ravenscroft.)

LANDS CLAUSES ACT. (See ARBITRATION.)

LEGACY.

Practice-Legacy to children to be paid at eighteen years of age-Payment out to children who had attained eighteen, but were under twenty-oneLiberty for children under eighteen to apply for payment of their shares on attaining eighteen, Where a testator gives a legacy to children to be paid to them when they respectively attain the age of eighteen years, and directs that their respective receipts at that age shall be sufficient discharges for their shares notwithstanding their minority, the court will order payment of their shares to such children as have attained eighteen, and give liberty to those under eighteen to apply for payment of their shares when they respectively attain eighteen. (Re Denekin; Peters v. Tanchereau.)...

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LIBEL.

Absolute privilege-Official document-Publication by Secretary of State in the course of his official duties Admissibility of evidence.-A written communication from a Secretary of State to his under-secretary, made by him in the course of carrying out his official duties as Secretary of State, cannot be used as evidence in a civil action, nor can secondary evidence of its contents be given. Therefore an action of libel founded upon such a communication cannot be maintained, and may be dismissed as vexatious. (Chatterton r. The Secretary of State for India in Council.) page 858 Privileged occasion-Excess of privilege-Malice.In an action brought in respect of a libel which has been published on a privileged occasion, a finding by the jury that there has been an excess of privilege, there being no evidence of malice, is immaterial. Excess of privilege, if that expression be used as meaning that words have been used of a strength beyond the exigency of the occasion, may be evidence of malice; but no inference of law can be drawn from such a finding that the defendant has been guilty of malice. (Nevill v. The Fine Art and General Insurance Company Limited.)

Publication in pursuance of order of magistrates - Defamatory statement for facilitating the administration of justice.-The head constable of a city, acting under the directions of its watch committee and magistrates, drew up a report containing a list of all the publichouses in the city (about 2500 in number) in respect of which a renewal of licence was to be asked for at the approaching general annual licensing meeting. Besides the names of the public-houses, the report contained columns with dates and other details of information which would be useful to the magistrates at the licensing meeting. One such column contained, opposite to the name of the public-house of which the plaintiff was licensee, the objections to the renewal of its licence, notice of which had been served by the police. Acting also in accordance with the directions given him, the head constable sold copies of this report to persons who had business at the licensing meeting. The County and Borough Police Act 1856, s. 7, and the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, s. 191, provide for the obedience by a borough constable to lawful directions of the justices and the watch committee of a borough. In an action of libel brought by the plaintiff against the head constable in respect of his publication of the above-mentioned objections: Held, that the occasion of the publication was privileged. (Andrews and another v. NottBower.)

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(See DEFAMATION.)

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LICENCE TO FISH.

Using more than one rod and line.-A licence to fish with a rod and line within the limits of a fishery district is granted for each rod and line used, and is not a general licence. More than one rod and one line may be taken, but not more than one rod and one line may be used at a time. (Combridge, app., v. Harrison, resp.)

LICENSING ACTS.

Appeal to quarter sessions-Costs of licensing justices opposing appeal-Discretion of justices of quarter sessions-Mandamus-9 Geo. 4, c. 61, 8. 29. By virtue of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts 1879 and 1884, sect. 31 of the Act of 1879 applies to all appeals to quarter sessions from courts of summary jurisdiction, and therefore, where licensing justices can be regarded as parties to an appeal within sect. 31, sub-sect. 5, of the Act of 1879, they have not an absolute right to costs under sect. 29 of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. But, if the licensing justices are not parties to the appeal, they are still entitled, under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 29, to the costs and charges incurred by them by reason of the notice of appeal served

525

530

592