Q.B. Div.]

shall hear the case of the defendant and of the plaintiff in the action, and also of the assignor disputing such assignment or of the person making such opposing or conflicting claim, and shall give such judgment therein as shall finally determine the rights and claims of all parties, as if the same had been an ordinary action into which a third party had been introduced by counterclaim.

Cagney for the plaintiffs.--It is submitted that this is not a case in which there should be a new trial, and that the decision of the County Court judge dismissing the interpleader summons was right. The plaintiffs and Walton and Lee are not claiming the same sum of money, and Order XXVII.. r. 13 of the County Court Rules 1889 does not apply. [He was stopped.]

Ernest Pollock, for Walton and Lee, was not called upon.

Moyses for the defendant.-All the parties were represented when the interpleader summons was granted, and no objection was then raised. The defendant is willing to pay the commission to the party who is entitled to it, and this proceeding is the easiest way of determining which that party is. The same course was taken in Barnett v. Brown and Co. (6 Times L. Rep. 463) in which the facts appear to be exactly similar to the present case. [WRIGHT, J.-The parties in that case appear to have agreed that the dispute should be settled in that way, but in the present case they do not.] The question to be decided is which firm of estate agents brought about the sale. [WILLS, J.-That may be the question to be decided in the County Court, but that is not the question for us here. WRIGHT, J.-What jurisdiction was there to issue the interpleader summons] That point is not before the court now, but it is submitted that the County Court Rules 1889, Order XXVII., r. 13, confers the power. These were not separate claims, but claims in respect of the same debt.

WILLS, J.-In this case there appears to have been a series of mistakes made in the County Court. The action was brought by Greatorex and Co. to recover from the defendant Mrs. Shackle certain commission which they alleged to be due to them on the sale of a house belonging to her. Walton and Lee, another firm of auctioneers and house agents, claimed commission from Mrs. Shackle in respect of the sale of the same property. The defendant applied ex parte in the County Court in the action brought against her by Greatorex and Co. for an interpleader order, and her application was granted. The trial of the action and of the interpleader issue came on together, and the objection was then taken on behalf of Walton and Lee as well as of the plaintiffs that there was no jurisdiction to make the interpleader order. The County Court judge came to the conclusion that that objection was well founded and dismissed Walton and Lee from the proceedings and gave them their costs. I think that on that point the judge was quite right, and his order seems to me to a just one, for the plaintiffs claimed a sum of 25l. 12s. 6d., whilst Walton and Lee only claimed 251. Then the County Court judge was asked to grant a new trial on what are certainly very extraordinary grounds: first, that Walton and Lee ought to have been retained as parties to the issue: that, in my opinion, is clearly wrong; secondly, that

[Div.

material facts were not brought before the court, which is no ground for a new trial; thirdly, that Walton and Lee were not entitled to any costs against the defendant, which again is no ground; fourthly, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to more than 251., which will not do at all; and lastly, that if the judgment stood there would be an error or miscarriage of justice, which is not a ground for new trial. The judge apparently granted a new trial because he thought that sect. 89 of the Judicature Act 1883 applied, and that the case came within Order LVII., r. 13, of the County Court Rules 1883. But he had decided that it did not, and that the two claims were not in respect of the same subject-matter. 1 think that the County Court judge had on these grounds no jurisdiction to order a new trial, and that his order must therefore be set aside.

WRIGHT, J.-I am of the same opinion. It may be that the defendant has a real grievance as to the amount of costs which she has to pay to Walton and Lee, and her contention may be right that they ought to have applied summarily to have the interpleader order set aside, but that is not before us now. It is clear that the enactments which have been relied upon have no application in this case. These were not opposing or competing claims, and the parties were not claiming the same money. It is clear that the judge had no power to order a new trial, thereby setting aside his former order.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitor for the plaintiff, Albert Myers. Solicitor the defendant, Arthur Cayley. Solicitors for Walton and Lee, Bell, Brodrick, and Gray.

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY

DIVISION.

DIVORCE BUSINESS.

Dec. 17, 1894, and Jan. 21, 1895.

(Before the PRESIDENT (Sir F. H. Jeune.) MEREDYTH v. MEREDYTH AND LEIGH. (a) Divorce-Variation of settlements-22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 5-Possible issue of future marriagePersonal interest in settled property confined to petitioner and respondent-Respondent's interest extinguished-Order that trustees reconvey property to petitioner absolutely.

By an indenture of settlement made in contemplation of his marriage with the respondent the petitioner conveyed to trustees his interest in certain hereditaments upon trust, subject to payment to the respondent of a yearly rentcharge -(1) for his own use for life, (2) for the use of the first and every other son of his marriage with the respondent, (3) for the use of the first and every other son of the petitioner by any subsequent marriage, (4) for the use of the petitioner's brother with remainder to the first and every other son of the said brother, (5) for the use of the daughters of the marriage of the petitioner and respondent, with (6) remainder to himself. Provision was also made for the maintenance of the petitioner's children by this or any future marriage.

(a) Reported by H. DURLEY GRAZEBROOK, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,

Div.]

There was no issue of the marriage, which was dissolved on the ground of the respondent's adultery; and the brother of the petitioner died a bachelor.

The Court, upon the petitioner's application to vary the settlement, made an order, under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1859 (22 & 23 Vict. c. 61), s. 5, that the trustees reconvey the settled property to the petitioner.

THIS was a motion to confirm the registrar's report upon a petition for variation of marriage settlements, and, further, for an order that the trustees of the settlement reconvey to the petitioner the whole of the trust funds absolutely.

The petitioner, Sir Henry Bayly Meredyth, Bart., was married to the respondent, Kathleen Meredyth, on the 27th Oct. 1886, and the only child of the marriage was born and died in 1890.

On the 15th March 1894 the petitioner obtained a decree nisi dissolving his marriage on the ground of his wife's adultery with the co-respondent, Richard Cecil Leigh, and that decree was made absolute on the 26th Sept. 1894.

By an indenture of settlement, bearing date the 26th Oct, 1886, and made in contemplation of the marriage, the said petitioner conveyed to the trustees his interest in certain hereditaments upon trust, subject to the payment to the respondent of a yearly rentcharge: First, for his own use for life; secondly, for the use of the first and every other son of the marriage; thirdly, for the use of the first and every other son of the petitioner by any subsequent marriage; fourthly, for the use of William Clayton Meredyth, the brother of the petitioner, with remainder to his first and every other son; fifthly, for the use of the daughter of the said marriage. Provision was also made for the maintenance of the children of the said intended marriage or of any other marriage of the petitioner, and power of appointing new trustees was vested in the petitioner and respondent jointly and in the survivor.

William Clayton Meredyth, the petitioner's said brother, died in 1888, without having been married.

By another ante-nuptial settlement, dated the 26th Oct. 1886, certain sums were assigned on behalf of the respondent to the trustees upon certain trusts, under which the respondent was in possession of an income of about 2381. 10s. per annum during her life derived from the said sums and from after-acquired property brought into settlement by her; and, on the death of her mother, aged about fifty, the respondent would become entitled to an additional income of about 3161. per annum during her life.

The petitioner, respondent, and trustees were represented before the registrar upon the petition to vary the settlements, and the registrar reported that the court should order that the powers of the respondent in regard to appointing new trustees should cease and determine and that the trusts of the settlement be applied as if the respondent were then dead, and had died in the lifetime of the petitioner.

In the petition there was also a prayer that the trustees should be ordered to reconvey the whole of the trust funds to the petitioner absolutely, and, upon this, the registrar reported as follows:

It is for the consideration of the court whether such order should be made, having regard to the

[Div.

trust in favour of the children of a subsequent marriage of the petitioner and the decision in the Appeal Court in Paul v. Paul (45 L. T. Rep. 437; 47 L. T. Rep. 210; 20 Ch. Div. 742)."

Inderwick, Q.C. and Priestley, for the petitioner. -It is not unreasonable, in the circumstances of this case, that the property should be reconveyed to the petitioner. In Paul v. Paul (ubi sup.), referred to by the registrar, it was held that the next of kin are persons having an interest under the settlement, although to a certain extent they are volunteers. The order now asked for would be for the benefit of one of the parents, within the terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1859 (22 & 23 Vict. c. 61), s. 5. Johnson v. Legard (3 Mad. 283) puts the law, as administered by the Court of Chancery very clearly (at p. 301). The case of Clayton v. Earl Winton (Ib. 302) is very like the present case. Re Cullin (14 Ir. Ch. Rep. 506), decided by Longfield, J., does not seem consistent with other reported cases. It seems to draw a distinction between a daughter and a son, and between a settlement by a husband and a settlement by a wife. Hastings v. Orde (11 Sim. 205) is very much in point. [The PRESIDENT. The question is not what the effect of the divorce is, but what the effect of the divorce ought to be made to be under the Act. I never could quite make out how Paul v. Paul (ubi sup.) could be reconciled with Hastings v. Orde (ubi sup.).] It was in consequence of the views of the Court of Chancery, and the impossibility of that court dealing with marriage settlements, that the Legislature conferred power upon this court to put the parties to a marriage settlement in the same position, after divorce as they were in before marriage so far as this could fairly be done, having regard to vested interests. In the present instance, there is no human being living who is interested in the settlement apart from the persons before the court; and therefore it is very difficult to see how any harm can be done. It is the petitioner's own settled property that we are dealing with. The cases of next of kin are much stronger than the case of children unborn of a future marriage. Smith v. Smith and Graves (57 L. T. Rep. 375; 12 P. Div. 102) was another case of next of kin. This case is really almost a matter of first impression. In almost every reported case there has always been some person who has had a vested right. Here there is no person who has personally any vested right. The trustees in this case take no active part in the matter. [The PRESIDENT.-I think there is a distinction between this case and cases of next of kin.] Cur. adv. vult.

Jan. 21, 1895.—The PRESIDENT.-By a settlement made on his marriage with the respondent, the petitioner in this case settled certain property on himself for life, with remainder to the sons of his marriage with the respondent, remainder to the sons of any subsequent marriage, remainder to a brother of the petitioner and the sons of that brother, remainder to the daughters of the marriage of the petitioner and respondent, with ultimate remainder to himself. The marriage has been dissolved; there is no issue of it; the brother has died unmarried; and I am now asked, under sect. 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1859, to make an order which will have the effect of putting an end to the settlement and restore the property affected by it to the petitioner. It is clear that

recourse must be had to the powers conferred by the section which I have mentioned if the wish of the petitioner is to be effected. The decision of Lord Ellenborough, in Clayton v. Earl Winton (3 Mad. 302), explained by Fry, J. in Gale v. Gale (36 L. T. Rep. 690; 6 Ch. Div. 144, 150), shows that a conveyance by the petitioner to a purchaser for valuable consideration would not, even if the respondent were dead, confer a good title. Nor could the petitioner, as the law now stands, according to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Paul v. Paul (45 L. T. Rep. 437; 47 L. T. Rep. 210; 20 Ch. Div. 742) claim to set aside the settlement on the ground of the children of the second or subsequent marriage being volunteers. In the case of Hastings v. Orde (11 Sim. 205), in which, after a divorce by the House of Lords, Shadwell, V.C. held that the divorced wife was not bound by ante-nuptial settlement made by her, the decision appears to have turned on the fact that the wife at the time of the marriage was an infant. I am not aware of any case similar to the present, in which the court has been asked to deal with a settlement. There is undoubted power to deal with the capital of a settled fund for the benefit of a party to a dissolved marriage in such manner as the alteration of circumstances by the dissolution renders proper: (Ponsonby v. Ponsonby (51 L. T. Rep. 174; 9 P. Div. 122.) At the same time, the court will not disturb settlements further than the alteration of circumstances warrants, and will respect the interests of those whose conduct has not been impugned. The case of Noel v. Noel (10 P. Div. 179) is an illustration of the care exercised in carrying out these principles. But in this case the effect of the dissolution of marriage has been, in the circumstances which have occurred, to render the rights of the children of a future marriage of the petitioner the sole limitation upon the absolute enjoyment of the property which he brought into settlement. Is it not, therefore, reasonable that the power of the court should be exercised in the way the petitioner asks? I think that it is. There is no living person whose interests can be prejudiced, and the only persons who, if they come into existence, will be affected are children for whom the petitioner may naturally be expected to provide. As the main objects of the settlement have been frustrated by the divorce, I think it would be unfortunate that the petitioner should remain unable to deal with the property in question by way of resettlement, or otherwise, solely on account of provisions in the settlement which can only be regarded as subordinate and speculative. It appears to me that this is a case in which the power conferred by the Legislature may be properly exercised. I think, therefore, that there should be an order upon the trustees to reconvey the property to the petitioner for his

own use.

Solicitors for the petitioner, Hargrove and Co.

[ADM.

(Before BRUCE, J. and TRINITY MASTERS.) THE STRATHGARRY (No. 2). (a) Salvage-Towage agreement-Half an hour for fixed sum-Refusal to extend the service. The master of a vessel whose engines had broken down entered into an agreement with a passing steamship for half an hour's towage at a fixed sum. The hawser broke immediately after the completion of the agreed time, and the steamship refused to continue the towage.

In consolidated suits instituted by the above and other salvors the defendants urged that, as regards the first salvors, the service resulted in no benefit, and that the sum claimed was excessive.

Held, that, although no benefit had resulted from the service, the agreement had been duly carried out; it was not, under the circumstances, manifestly unfair or unjust, and therefore the stipulated sum must be paid.

SALVAGE suits (consolidated).

The plaintiffs were the owners, master and crew of the steamships Hawkhurst and Medoc; the defendants were the owners of the steamship Strathgarry, her cargo and freight.

The two actions were consolidated by an order of Bruce, J., dated the 28th Feb. 1895, and reported 72 L. T. Rep. 202.

The facts appear in the judgment.

The value of the Medoc was 40,0001., her cargo 50,1231, and freight 23261.; of the Hawkhurst 30,0001., her cargo 20,000l., and freight 20007.; of the Strathgarry 38,500l., her cargo 42347., and freight 10141.

April 29, 30.-Sir Walter Phillimore, Laing, and Butler Aspinall for the owners, master, and crew of the Medoc and Hawkhurst.

Aspinall, Q.C. and Balloch, for the owners of the Strathgarry, her cargo and freight, contended that no salvage services were in fact rendered to the Strathgarry, that no benefit resulted from the towage, and that the agreed sum was excessive.

Besides the cases referred to by the judge the following were cited:

The Renpor, 48 L. T. Rep. 887; 5 Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 98; 8 P. Div. 115;

The Alfred, 50 L. T. Rep. 511 5 Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 214;

The Prinz Heinrich, 58 L. T. Rep. 593; 6 Asp.
Mar. Law Cas. 273; 13 P. Div. 31;

The Phantom, L. Rep. 1 Adm. Ecc. 58;
The Medina, 35 L. T. Rep. 779; Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 305; 2 P. Div. 5;

Asp. Mar.

The Cargo ex Woosung, 35 L. T. Rep. 8; 3 Asp.
Mar. Law Cas. 239; 1 P. Div. 260 ;
The Mark Lane, 63 L. T. Rep. 468;
Law Cas. 540; 15 P. Div. 135;
The Rialto, 64 L. T. Rep. 540; 7 Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 35; (1891) P. 175;

The Edenmore, 69 L. T. Rep. 230; 7 Asp. Mar.
Law Cas. 334; (1893) P. 79;

The Benlarig, 60 L. T. Rep. 238; 6 Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 360; 14 P. Div. 3;

The Kate B. Jones, 69 L. T. Rep. 197; 7 Asp. Mar.

Law Cas. 332; (1892) P. 366;

Kennedy's Law of Civil Salvage, pp. 204-8-9-10. May 1.-BRUCE, J.-In this case the Strathgarry, a large screw-steamship of 4992 gross (a) Reported by BASIL CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

tonnage, with engines of 500-horse power, on a voyage from Cardiff for Buenos Ayres, on the 1st Nov. 1894, when in the Atlantic, off the coast of South America, had her intermediate and high-pressure cylinders disabled, and she became in consequence unable to work her engines. On the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Nov. steps were taken by those on board to lead steam pipes into a lowpressure cylinder, and attempts were made to get the engines to work with that cylinder, but without success. During this time the Strathgarry was drifting with the wind, and in the main in a southerly and westerly direction, although during the last twenty-four hours the drift of the vessel was north-west. On the morning of the 5th Nov. the steamship Hawkhurst, in answer to rockets from the Strathgarry, steamed towards her and came up to her about 4 a.m., and remained by her till daybreak, about 5.30. The master of the Strathgarry then came on board the Hawkhurst, and he told the master of the Hawkhurst that his engines were disabled, and he thought if the Hawkhurst would tow his ship for half an hour he would be able to get his engines to turn round, and so resume the voyage. The engineer of the Strathgarry was confident that if he could get a tow ahead for half an hour so as to move the propeller round he would be able to create a vacuum and proceed under steam with the low-pressure cylinder alone. The master of the Hawkhurst proposed to tow the Strathgarry to Rio, but the master of the Strathgarry declined that offer until he had made the trial to see whether he could get his ship's engines to start with the half-hour's tow. The master of the Strathgarry asked what was to be paid for the half-hour's towage. The master of the Hawkhurst asked 10007.; the master of the Strathgarry said 5007. The master of the Hawkhurst then suggested 7501. or arbitration; the master of the Strathgarry declined that offer, and said he would give 5001. or nothing. The master of the Hawkhurst agreed to the sum of 500l., and this memorandum was drawn up and signed by the master of the Strathgarry:-"S.s. Hawkhurst, lat. 17° 17′ S., long. 38° W., November 5, 1894. To Captain Ransom,-I hereby accept your offer to tow the s.s. Strathgarry for the space of half an hour for the sum of 5001. sterling.-L. WHITE, master Strathgarry_s.s." The hawser of the Strathgarry was then brought on board the Hawkhurst and made fast. The Strathgarry is a very heavy ship. She had turned on her beam. She had a tendency to come up with her head, and in the condition in which she was, her screw not revolving, it seems to have been difficult, indeed impossible, to prevent her sheering. She did sheer heavily. The towage continued for a little more than half an hour, when the towing hawser carried away the manilla spring attached to the hawser, recoiled across the deck of the Hawkhurst, and swept everything before it. It did damage to the stanchion, skylight, and steering gear of the Hawkhurst, estimated roughly at 1007., and, unfortunately, killed the chief officer and seriously injured one of the passengers and an able-bodied seaman. The efforts of the engineer of the Strathgarry to get his engines to work were unsuccessful. The master of the Strathgarry asked the master of the Hawkhurst to again take him in tow, but the master of the Hawkhurst declined. In his evidence he said: "I declined

[ADM.

to have anything more to do with him in consequence of my accident, and the serious loss of life and the bad steering of his ship-in fact, the unmanageableness of his ship. She would. not do anything." But about this time the Medoc hove in sight. She is one of the Messageries Maritimes, a steamer of 3571 tons gross, with engines of 350-horse power nominal. She was on a voyage from Rio to Corunna, with mails and a valuable cargo. The Medoc, observing signals flying from the Strathgarry and the Hawkhurst, made towards them. She sent a surgeon on board the Hawkhurst, which had been signalling for a surgeon to attend to the injured men; and before her boat had returned from the Hawkhurst the master of the Strathgarry came on board the Medoc and asked to be towed to Rio. The master of the Medoc said he deemed it impossible to tow him to Rio because of the distance and because he would meet a heavier sea between St. Thomas and Abrolhos, but he offered to tow him to Bahia, and ultimately it was agreed that the Medoc should tow the Strathgarry to Bahia. The master of the Strathgarry having no hawser fit for the towage, the master of the Medoc supplied two hawsers, and they were made fast between the vessels. About noon the towage commenced. One of the hawsers parted about 4.45, and the towage was continued with one hawser until 5 a.m. on the morning of the 7th Nov., when the vessels approached the harbour of Bahia; and, without entering into details of the manœuvres adopted to get the Strathgarry into port, I may say that, with some difficulty and after the hawsers had parted more than once, the Strathgarry was brought to a safe anchorage in Bahia on the 7th Nov. The first question to be determined is, what amount of salvage reward should be awarded to the Medoc. The Elder Brethren are of opinion that the Strathgarry, when taken in tow by the Medoc, although not in a position of immediate danger, was yet in a hopeless condition, drifting towards a dangerous coast, and that she had no means of getting into safety except by receiving some such assistance as the Medoc rendered her. If she had been allowed to drift for another twenty-four hours she would, according to the statement of her master, have been taken out of the track of steamers, and her chance of being picked up would have been more uncertain. Although the weather might be described as fine, yet the towage was a difficult service, owing to the size of the Strathgarry and the great difficulty of steering her. There must always be risk in towage services of this nature, because, although the weather was fine, there is always a swell during the trade winds in the South Atlantic. The Strathgarry was towed by the Medoc about 250 miles. Taking into consideration all the circumstances and remembering that the Medoc deviated from her course and incurred loss by reason of the damage to her hawsers, I think I should award the Medoc the sum of 20001. The case of the Hawkhurst

remains to be considered. The question is, whether the agreement should be upheld. That involves the consideration of the rule which should guide the court in upholding or setting aside an agreement of this character. I think I may take as my guide the observations of the present Master of the Rolls in the case of Akerbloom v. Price (44 L. T. Rep. 837; 4 Asp.

Mar. Law Cas. 441; 7 Q. B. Div. 132, 133): “The fundamental rule of administration of maritime law in all courts of maritime jurisdiction is that, whenever the court is called upon to decide between contending parties upon claims arising with regard to the infinite number of marine casualties, which are generally of so urgent a character that the parties cannot be truly said to be on equal terms as to any agreement they may make with regard to them, the court will try to discover what in the mildest sense of the term is, under the particular circumstances of the particular case, fair and just between the parties. If the parties have made an agreement, the court will enforce it, unless it be manifestly unfair and unjust. If it be, the court will disregard it, and decree what is fair and just. This is the great fundamental rule. In order to apply it to particular instances the court will consider what fair and reasonable persons in the position of the parties respectively would do or ought to have done under the circumstances." A number of cases have been cited during the argument. In some of them slightly different language has been used by the judges. Sometimes the word "exorbitant has been used, sometimes the word "inequitable;" but in substance all the cases are, I think, consistent with the rule laid down in Akerbloom v. Price (ubi sup.) as the fundamental rule. The question, therefore, to be determined is whether the agreement was manifestly unfair or unjust. At first sight a bargain to pay 5001. for towage lasting only half an hour may seem to be manifestly unfair and unjust. But the circumstances of the particular case must be considered. The duration of the salvage services in many cases is not the true criterion of their value. [His Lordship having reviewed the circumstances in which the agreement was entered into, as before stated by him, and what occurred during the towing by the Hawkhurst, continued:] If the towage had been successful in making the engines work, could anyone say that 500l. would have been too high a price for it? I cannot, I think, as regards the Hawkhurst any more than as regards the Strathgarry, take into consideration the events that happened after the agree ment was made; but the events that actually did happen are only illustrations of the risks incidental to such services as the Hawkhurst rendered. Can I say that it is manifestly unfair or unjust on the part of the master of the Hawkhurst, before entering upon a service that involved or might have involved such risks, to bargain that he should be paid 5001.? The value of the Hawkhurst, her cargo and her freight, was 52,000l., and it seems to me not unreasonable that a master, having such an amount of property intrusted to his care, should not undertake to render a service certainly involving some risk to his ship and cargo without a payment securing some substantial advantage to the owners. It must be remembered that the 500l. was only to be paid on condition of a stipulated service being rendered. The towing hawser parted just after the expiration of the stipulated half hour's towage. If it had parted during the half hour and the towage had been discontinued, the 500l. would not have been due. In the result, having given the whole case peculiar consideration, I have come to the conclusion that I cannot say the agreement was manifestly unfair or

[ADM.

In an action in rem for damage by collision the defendants, owners of the Norwegian steamship Jacob Christensen, appealed against a decision of the registrar refusing to give directions as to the mode of trial on a third-party notice.

The Jacob Christensen was placed by the defendants in the hands of H. S. Edwards and Sons for repairs, and she was moored alongside their quay in the Tyne. Rough weather coming on, she became in danger of being damaged, and tugs were engaged to moor her in a safer position on the south side. This was done in the interest of the owners, and with the approval of the master. While being towed across, the collision with the plaintiffs' steamship Mid Surrey occurred.

The defendants served a third-party notice on Edwards and Sons, who appeared under protest, under Order XVI., r. 48, claiming indemnification against liability in the action.

D. Stephens, for the defendants, in support of the appeal.

J. A. Hamilton for the third parties.

Butler Aspinall for the plaintiffs.

In addition to the cases in the judgment the following were cited:

The Cartsburn, 41 L. T. Rep. 710; 4 Asp. Mar.
Law Cas. 202; 5 P. Div. 35;

Spiller v. Bristol Steam Navigation Company, 50
L. T. Rep. 400; 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 228; 13
Q. B. Div. 96;

The Bianca, 48 L. T. Rep. 440; 5 Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 60; 8 P. Div. 91.

BRUCE, J.-I have come to the conclusion that I must affirm the decision of the registrar. [The learned Judge stated the facts and continued:] The owners of the Jacob Christensen contend that their vessel was not under their control, or under the control of their agents, at the time of the collision, and that they are not liable to the plaintiffs; that the negligence which caused the collision, if there was any, was the negligence of Messrs. Edwards and Sons or their agents; but, on the authority of The Ruby Queen (Lush. 266), The Lemington (32 L. T. Rep. 69; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 475), The Ticonderoga (Swabey, 215), and some other cases which were cited, it was alleged that, as a maritime lien attached to the (a) Reported by BASIL CRUMP, Es., Barrister-at-Law.