in this form is really personal, and limited only during coverture. [The COURT referred to Beckett v. Tasker, 56 L. T. Rep. 636; 19 Q. B. Div. 7; and to Re Lynes; Ex parte Lester and Co., 68 L. T. Rep. 739; (1893) 2 Q. B. 113.] Carrington for the respondent.-The appellant's contention in this case seems to be that the decision in Re Lynes; Ex parte Lester and Co., was wrong. The husband's death and consequent removal of restraint upon anticipation does not make the separate property liable to execution: Pelton v. Harrison (No. 1), 65 L. T. Rep. 514; (1891) 2 Q. B. 422. A bankruptcy notice must call upon the debtor to pay "in accordance with the terms of the judgment," and must also be in accordance with the prescribed form. The prescribed form is not in accordance with the terms of a judgment in the form laid down in Scott v. Morley, and it would appear to be impossible to issue a good bankruptcy notice upon a judgment in that form. Muir Mackenzie replied. A WILLIAMS, J.-This was an appeal from a decision of the registrar of the Portsmouth County Court, refusing to make a receiving order on a petition against a widow of the name of Mrs. Hewitt. Now, the debt upon which this petition was based was a debt upon a judgment which was obtained against Mrs. Hewitt and her husband during her husband's lifetime, and the act of bankruptcy upon which the petition was founded was the non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice requiring Mrs. Hewitt to pay that debt. great many questions have been raised, but I only propose to deal with one of them, which in my judgment is sufficient to dispose of this case. I am of opinion that no bankruptcy notice could be properly issued on that judgment against Mrs. Hewitt. It was conceded, and it is necessarily conceded, that if Mrs. Hewitt had continued a married woman, and her husband had not died, no such bankruptcy notice could have been issued. That is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Lynes; Ex parte Lester; but it was argued that that case has no application here, because in that case the proceedings were sought to be taken against a married woman, and that in this case this lady has since the judgment become a widow, and therefore the case has no application. I do not agree with that. It was said that the case which was put before us came within the very terms of clause (g.) of sect. 4 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, which runs, "If a creditor has obtained a final judgment against him for any amount, and execution thereon not having been stayed, has served on him in England, or, by leave of the court elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act, requiring him to pay the judgment debt in accordance with the terms of the judgment," and that the sole meaning of the decision in Re Lynes; Ex parte Lester, was that the plaintiff, the creditor there, by the notice issued, had not complied with the form (form 6), and that for that reason the bankruptcy notice was bad. and I think the argument went a step further, and admitted that it would not have been proper so to draw the notice as to make it comply with that form 6. It is. however, not very important whether this was admitted or not, because the judgment of the Court of Appeal went upon no such technical matter at all; it went upon matter of substance Vol. LXXII., 1844. [IN BANK. The The meaning of that judgment is, that when you have got a judgment against a married woman, although in a sense it may be called a personal judgment, subject to a limitation as to the mode of execution, it is not such a judgment as that a bankruptcy notice can issue upon it-meaning, as I understand, that the judgment is not such a judgment as that you can call upon the married woman, the judgment debtor, to pay. Let us look and see what the form of the judgment in Scott v. Morley is. [Reads it.] Under those circumstances it is quite plain that, if you issued a bankruptcy notice under that judgment, the defendant might fail to do anything in compliance with the notice, and yet might have complied with every word of the judgment. But it was said that, although that is true of a married woman. it ceases to be true the moment she becomes a widow. That really depends upon whether, upon her becoming a widow, you could issue execution on this judgment as it stands. Now it was stated that Lindley, L.J. had, in the case of Holtbey v. Hodgson, said that upon the death of the husband such an execution could issue, and undoubtedly Lindley, L.J. does say so. words are: "Suppose her husband were to die, the restraint would be gone, the judgment would bind her, and execution could be issued upon it." If that is right, Mr. Mackenzie would be, I agree, in a position to say that the effect of the death of the husband would be that the woman, the judgment debtor, could not fail to comply with the notice unless she also failed to comply with the judgment. But, as I understand, that is not so. It seems to me that the case of Pelton v. Harrison, and the case of Beckett v. Tasker, both are authorities to show that the judgment in the Scott v. Morley form is a judgment which is limited to the separate property. If that is so, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the death of the husband, no bankruptcy notice could properly be issued on this judgment. Having said that, I do not propose to deal with the other questions at all. I do wish, however, to say that, even if there were not this difficulty in the way, I think that there is a very considerable difficulty in making this lady a bankrupt upon this particular debt at all, and it must not be supposed, because I do not go into that part of the question. that I at all indicate an opinion that she could be made a bankrupt in respect of this debt. I wish just to put in one other shape the same ground of judgment which I have already tried to express, and that is it is perfectly plain bankruptcy law, and has been cited again and again, that you cannot have a bankruptcy notice effectively issued so that non-compliance with it operates as an act of bankruptcy, unless the creditor who holds the judgment, or who issues the notice, is in a position to issue execution upon it, and in my judgment, notwithstanding the death of the husband in this case, the creditor is not in a position to issue execution upon that judgment in the sense in which the expression is used with regard to an act of bankruptcy. It is quite true that the effect of the judgment is to give the creditor a right to issue execution against certain property, but it gives the creditor no right to issue execution personally, and unless there is that right to issue execution personally, in my judgment, the decisions upon this section have shown there is no right to issue a bankruptcy notice at all. KENNEDY, J.-I need not add anything to the judgment which has been pronounced, because I concur not only in the result, but in the reasoning. I will only say that, upon the decision in Re Lynes; Ex parte Lester, it seems to me to be clearly there stated, not merely as a matter of form, but as a matter of principle, that an application of this kind should not succeed, because, in the words of Lord Esher, this judgment is not against her personally, but is against her separate property. And Smith, L.J. in the same way says: "Here the judgment is against the married woman's separate property, not against her personally, and yet the bankruptcy notice requires her to pay the debt personally. The notice is, therefore, not in accordance with the terms of the judgment, nor is it justified by sect. 4, sub-sect. 1. It seems to me that that decision was based upon a matter of principle more than of form, and is a strong authority against this appeal. Appeal dismissed. Solicitor for the appellant, Maurice Mosely. Solicitors for the respondent, Prior, Church, and Adams, for Goble and Warner, Fareham. Supreme Court of Judicature. COURT OF APPEAL. Dec. 13 and 20, 1894. (Before Lord HALSBURY, LINDLEY and SMITH, L.JJ.) SIDEBOTHAM v. HOLLAND. (a) APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Landlord and tenant-Notice to quit-ValidityTerm commencing in middle of quarter-Notice terminating on anniversary of commencement of term-Number of days- Parol agreement – Demise-Statute of Fruds. By an agreement dated the 19th May 1890 the plaintiff agreed to let, and the defendant to take, a certain house " as yearly tenant, commencing on the 19th day of May instant, at the clear yearly rent of 451.; the sum of 41. 78. 6d. as the apportioned part up to the 24th day of June next being paid on the signing hereof, and the future rent to be paid by equal quarterly payments in advance if demanded on the usual quarterly days of payment, the first payment being considered as due in advance if demanded on the 24th day of June next, and each succeeding quarterly payment to become payable in advance if required upon the first day of such quarter." By a notice dated the 17th Nov. 1893 the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to quit the house on the 19th May next." Held, that the tenancy commenced on the 19th May 1890, and not on the 24th June 1890. Held also, that, although notice to quit on the 18th May would have been a good notice, the notice to quit on the 19th was also a good notice, that being the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced. Decision of Bruce, J. reversed. (a) Reported by W. C. Biss, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [CT. OF APP. Held also, that it was not necessary that there should be 183 clear days between the date of the notice and the date it expired. The defendant alleged that, in consideration of a loan, the plaintiff promised verbally that the tenancy should continue until 1895. Held, that the conversation only amounted to a verbal agreement, and not a demise, and therefore it was void under the Statute of Frauds. Decision of Bruce, J. affirmed. a THIS was an action of ejectment brought by landlord against his tenant, the principal question being whether a notice to quit was valid or not. By an agreement, dated the 19th May 1890, between the plaintiff Thomas Sidebotham of the one part and the defendant Ellen Holland of the other part, the plaintiff agreed to let and the defendant to take the beerhouse known as the Grapes Inn, at Weaste, Salford: As yearly tenant commencing on the 19th day of May instant, at the clear yearly rent of 451., the sum of 41. 78. 6d. as the apportioned part up to the 24th day of June next being paid on the signing hereof, and the future rent to be paid by equal quarterly payments in advance if demanded on the usual quarterly days of payment, the first payment being considered as due in advance if demanded on the 24th day of June next, and each succeeding quarterly payment to become payable in advance if required upon the first day of such quarter. On the 17th Nov. 1893 the defendant was served with the following notice bearing that date: As solicitor for and on behalf of Mr. Thomas Sidebotham, your landlord, I hereby give you notice to quit and deliver up the peaceable and quiet possession to him on the 19th of May next of the Grapes Inn and premises in your occupation, situate 320, Eccles New-road. Weaste, Salford, and which you now hold of him as tenant under agreement dated 19th May 1890. The tenant refused to quit, and the present action was brought. The defendant relied upon the following grounds: (1) That, in consideration of her advancing 100l. to the plaintiff in the month of Sept. 1892, he promised that, although she was but a yearly tenant, she should remain in possession until Nov. 1895; (2) that by the agreement the tenancy commenced upon the 24th June, and that the six months' notice served upon the 17th Nov. 1893 to quit upon the 19th May 1894 was more than a month prior to the 24th June, and therefore bad; and (3) that, if the tenancy commenced on the 19th May, as the plaintiff alleged, the notice to quit was equally invalid, because it was not a notice to quit expiring upon the last day of some year of the tenancy. The action was heard by Bruce, J. without a jury at the Liverpool Assizes on the 9th Aug. 1894, when his Lordship gave judgment in favour of the tenant as follows: BRUCE, J.-In this case the principal question raised is, whether the notice to quit was a good notice or not, and the main question with reference to that depends upon the date of the termination of the tenancy. It is quite clear upon the authorities that, in ordinary cases, where a tenant comes in in the middle of a quarter and afterwards pays from that time to the beginning of the succeeding quarter, and after that pays half-yearly, his tenancy begins from the regular quarter to which he paid up. Now, in this case, the tenant entered on the 19th May, and the agreement is dated the 19th May, and it is said by the agreement that he is to pay 4l. 78. 6d. from the 19th May up to the 24th June, and the future rent is to be paid by equal quarterly payments in advance if demanded on the different quarter days of payment. The first payment was due on the 24th June, and each quarterly payment became payable in advance if demanded on the first day of the quarter. If there were no other words than those, I think it is quite clear on the authorities that the tenancy would be a tenancy from the 24th June, and determinable as on the 24th June. The tenancy would be a tenancy from the usual quarter-day. But Mr. McCall contended, in the present case, that there was an express term in the agreement that the defendant should be a yearly tenant, commencing on "the 19th day of May instant;" that those words govern the contract, and, notwithstanding the provision in the agreement that, after the 24th June, the rent should be paid on the usual quarter-days, the agreement must be considered as an agreement from the 19th May, and that notice to quit should be a half-year's notice, terminating on the 19th May. I cannot assent to that argument. I feel some difficulty in the matter, because there is no case exactly bearing on the present point; but it does seem to me that the reasonable thing is in favour of treating this as a tenancy from the 24th June. My attention was called to the circumstance, which I think is not an unimportant one, that the rent if demanded was to be paid in advance by equal quarterly payments, so that, if the tenancy is to be regarded as a tenancy from the 19th May, the tenant on the last quarterday of the tenancy might be called upon to pay in advance the rent up to the 24th June, although he would be liable to be turned out on the 19th May. The agreement makes no provision for his getting back any proportion of the rent, and, looking at the whole agreement, I am of opinion that the intention of the parties expressed by the agreement was that the tenancy was a tenancy as from the 24th June. Therefore I have come to the conclusion that the notice which has been given is not a good notice because it did not terminate-it was not made to terminate on one of the usual quarter-days. But, more than that, another point was raised that the notice which was given was a notice to quit on the 19th day of May next." The tenancy was stated in the agreement as commencing on the 19th May; so, apart from the point I have just decidedthat the tenancy is a tenancy from the 24th June -if the tenancy is to be treated as commencing on the 19th May, the 19th is the first day of the tenancy, and therefore the notice to quit ought to be a notice to quit on the 18th, because the yearly tenancy, if it commenced on the 19th, would terminate on the 18th of the following year; and I do not think a notice to quit the day after the end of the term can be treated as a good notice. Now that determines one question in the case; but evidence was given by the defendant on another point which now becomes material. It was contended by the defendant, that, even if the notice to quit was a good notice according to the agreement of the 19th May, still it did not operate, because an agreement had been made that the tenancy should be a tenancy to continue at all events until the year 1895. Now with reference to that, if it is to be treated as a mere agreement, [CT. OF APP. it is void under the Statute of Frauds. That was admitted by Mr. Shee, but Mr. Shee contended it was not a mere agreement, but that it was an actual demise. I cannot put that construction upon the conversation that took place. It is quite clear, according to the case of Edge v. Strafford (1 Cr. & J. 391), that, although the words used may amount to a demise, yet to constitute a demise there must be an actual entry in pursuance of the agreement to make it a demise. Now, I think it is obvious that it never could have been intended by the parties that the tenant should put an end to the agreement of the 19th May. If the conversation which took place is a demise it put an end to the existing agreement, and put an end to the defendant's interest under the agreement of the 19th May, and she took under the new demise, which would operate from the date of the verbal agreement constituting a new term lasting from that date until 1895. I do not think that it is at all a reasonable construction to be put upon it, and I should hold, if it were necessary to do so, that there was no demise to supersede the agreement of the 19th May 1890, or make it a tenancy terminating in 1895. The result will be, that I shall give judgment for the defendant, with costs. From this decision the plaintiff appealed. McCall, Q.C. and Roskill for the plaintiff.-If nothing had been said with reference to the commencement of the tenancy it might have been held to have commenced on the first usual quarter-day: Kemp v. Derrett, 3 Camp. 510; Doe d. Holcomb v. Johnson, 6 Esp. 10; Doe d. Savage v. Stapleton, 3 C. & P. 275. [LINDLEY, L.J. referred to Doe v. Lines, 11 Q. B. 402.] But this judgment cannot be upheld without striking out of the written agreement the words" commencing on the 19th day of May inst." Bruce, J. said that if the tenancy ended on the 19th May, then the tenant might have paid in advance to the 24th June, but the Apportionment Act 1890 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 35) would apply, and prevent that: Hartcup and Co. v. Bell, Cababé & Ellis, 19. As the tenancy would only expire at midnight on the 18th, the tenant could not be compelled to leave before that time, and this notice is good, as the 19th commences the first moment after midnight on the 18th, although a notice to quit on the 18th would also be good: Doe d. Cornwall v. Matthews, 11 C. B. 675; Poole v. Warren, 8 Ad. & Ell. 582, 587. Then it is said that there must be 183 clear days between the date of the notice to quit and the day for which notice is given, and that here that was not the case. But, if the days are counted in the usual way, namely, by including the day at one end, either the 17th Nov. or the 19th May, there were 183 days between those dates. There is no authority to show that there must be 183 clear days: Morgan v. Davies, 39 L. T. Rep. 60; 3 C. P. Clayton v. Blakey, 8 T. R. 3; Sm. L. C., 9th edit., J. W. Mansfield and E. F. Spence (Shee, Q.C. with them) for the defendant. - Where the tenancy commences in the middle of a quarter and rent is payable for the broken period and afterwards on the usual quarter-days, then the tenancy must terminate on a quarter-day: 66 Doe d. King v. Grafton, 18 Q. B. 496; Doe d. Holcomb v. Johnson (ubi sup.). 66 But, if the term commenced in May, it commenced on the 19th May and not from," and therefore the notice to quit ought to have been for the 18th May, as that was the last day of the tenancy. A tenant is entitled to stay until the very last moment of the day for which notice is given: Page v. More, 15 Q. B. 684; Leake on Contracts, 3rd edit., p. 729; Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant, 15th edit., pp. 161, 373; Clayton's case, 5 Co. 1. 66 In Ackland v. Lutley (9 Ad. & Ell. 879) Lord Denman said (p. 894): The general understanding is, that terms for years last during the whole anniversary of the last day from which they are granted." Then the number of days which elapsed between the date of the notice to quit and the day mentioned is not 183. Where the tenancy does not commence on one of the usual quarter-days the tenant is entitled to 183 clear days' notice. [SMITH, L.J. referred to Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 714.]: Right v. Darby, 1 Term R. 159; Anon. 3 Dyer, 345. The plaintiff is not entitled to take advantage of the Statute of Frauds to prevent the defendant enforcing his promise to allow her to remain until Nov. 1895: Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Company, 54 Doe d. Phillip v. Benjamin, 9 Ad. & Ell. 644; The verbal agreement operated as a demise, and a new lease was granted until Nov. 1895, the term created by the written agreement being impliedly surrendered. LINDLEY, L.J.-The express statement in this agreement, that the tenancy is to commence on the 19th May, is too clear and unambiguous to warrant any inference which might otherwise have been drawn from the stipulation that the rent is to be paid by equal quarterly payments in advance if demanded on the usual quarter-days. In the absence of any express statement as to the commencement of the tenancy, it might have been held to commence on the 24th June: (see Doe d. Holcomb V. Johnson (ubi sup.); Sandell v. Franklin (32 L. T. Rep. 309; L. Rep. 10 C. P. 377.) It is true that, if the tenancy commences on the 19th May, the last quarterly payment to be made in advance on the previous Lady-day will not be a full quarter's rent, but only a proportionate part of it-viz., an apportioned part of it for the time which will intervene between Ladyday and the 19th May. But this circumstance only shows that the agreement is not very accurately drawn. The inaccuracy does not justify the conclusion that the tenancy did not commence on the day expressly mentioned for its commencement-viz., on the 19th May 1890-and [CT. OF APP. that the time which intervened between that day and the 24th June was not part of the tenancy. Treating the tenancy, then, as commencing on the 19th May 1890, the question is, whether a notice to quit on the 19th May 1894, given by the landlord on the 17th Nov. 1893, is a good notice. It is a six calendar months' notice to quit on the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced. Why, then, is it bad? The notice is said to be bad because it expires one day too late. The contention is that, as the tenancy commenced on the 19th, and not from the 19th, the notice should have been to quit on the 18th, and not on the 19th. Having regard to the decision in Clayton's case (ubi sup.), I think that, although the agreement was signed on the 19th, and the tenant can hardly in fact have been in possession the whole of that day, yet, in point of law that day must be treated as the first day of the tenancy and as part of the term for which the house was agreed to be let. The tenancy cannot, therefore, be treated as commencing on the 20th to the exclusion of the 19th. One year from that day would expire at midnight of the 18th of the next May: (Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick, 1 E. & B., 816; Ackland v. Lutley, ubi sup.) If, therefore, notice to quit on the 18th were given, it would no doubt be good. Indeed, it is well settled that a notice ought to expire on the last day of the current year: (see Right v. Darby, ubi sup. ; Doe d. Robinson v. Dobell, 1 Q. B. 806; I Wms. Saunders, 5th ed. 276 c.) But, although a halfyear's notice to quit on the 18th would be correct, it does not follow that a notice to quit on the 19th, which is the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced, is bad, and I am clearly of opinion that it is not. I have looked at all the decisions which were referred to in the argument and at many more, and I can find none in which it has been held that a half-year's notice to quit on the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced is bad. I should be very much surprised to find such a case. The validity of a notice to quit ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw. Moreover, if hypercriticisms are to be indulged in, a notice to quit at the first moment of the anniversary ought to be just as good as a notice to quit on the last moment of the day before. But such subtleties ought to be, and are, disregarded as out of place. There are several decisions in which notices like the present have been held sufficient. In Kemp v. Derrett (3 Camp. 510) a yearly tenancy began on the 29th Oct.; it was determinable at any time on a three months' notice to quit. Lord Ellenborough said, “I am quite clear that the notice should have expired on the 29th Jan., 29th April, 29th July, or 29th Oct.” Again, in Doe d. Cornwall v. Matthews (ubi sup.) a yearly tenancy commenced on the 7th May 1850; a six months' notice to quit on the 7th May 1851 was held good. The rent was payable quarterly, but none was ever paid. Roe d. Durant v. Doe 6 Bing. 574) and Papillon v. Brunton (5 H. & N. 518) are again cases in which the tenancy began on (or perhaps from) a usual quarter-day; the notice was to quit on the anniversary of that day, and the notice was held good. In those cases a notice to quit on the day before the anniversary would be bad: (see Page v. More (ubi sup.). In Right v. Darby (ubi sup.) and Morgan v. Davies (ubi sup.) the notices were too short, and were bad on that ground, but no one sug. 66 In gested that they were bad because they were notices to quit on the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced. In Page v. More (ubi sup.) a notice to quit on the right day was bad; but it was given by the landlord, and it was to quit at noon, which was too soon. Bythewood & Jarman's Conveyancing (4th edit., vol. 3, p. 276) the rule is thus laid down: "Iti.e., the notice to quit-must generally be a halfyear's notice, and must expire at the period of the year at which the tenancy commenced; and it is immaterial whether the letting was from one of the general quarter-days or from any other day." For these propositions several authorities are cited, the more important of which I have noticed when considering the validity of a notice to quit given in time and expiring on the anniversary of the commencement of a tenancy. I can find no distinction ever drawn between tenancies commencing at a particular time or on a particular day or from the same day. At," "on," "from," or "on and from" are for this purpose equivalent expressions. Any distinction between them for such a purpose as this is far too subtle for practical use: (see Doe d. Strickland v. Spence, 6 East, 120.) In an action for double rent it is, however, necessary to be more particular: (Page v. More, ubi sup.) So it is when the number of days has to be counted. In the absence of authority compelling me to decide differently, I hold the objection that the notice was bad because it was a notice to quit on the 19th instead of the 18th May is untenable. Then it was said that where the tenancy is not from one of the usual quarter-days there must be 183 clear days between the day on which the notice is given and the day on which the tenancy expires. There were, however, 183 days in this case if the time is reckoned in the usual way-that is, counting in one of the extremes and excluding the other; and I can find no case which decides that both extremes must be excluded. In 1 Wms. Saunders, 5th ed., 276 c, it is said that a half-year's notice must consist of 182 days, except when the rent is payable on the usual quarter feast days, when notice on one feast day to quit on the next but one is sufficient. If 182 days' notice are enough, it is plain that this notice was long enough. Lastly, it was urged that the notice was bad because the lessor had promised for valuable consideration not to turn the tenant out before 1895. This is the defendant's real defence to this action. Unfortunately, however, the promise was a verbal one; it was not to be performed within a year, and the Statute of Frauds precludes the defendant from enforcing it. Under these circumstances it is impossible to hold the notice bad on this ground. An argument was advanced that this verbal agreement created a new lease until Nov. 1895, and that the term created by the written agreement of 1890 was impliedly surrendered. But it is familiar law that whether an agreement operates as a demise or as an agreement only depends on the intention of the parties. Now, in this case it is plain that no new lease was ever thought of or intended by either party, and it would not be right to invent one in order to get the defendant out of the difficulty in which the absence of a written agreement places her. In my opinion, therefore, the appeal ought to be allowed, and judgment be entered for the plaintiff, with costs [CT. OF APP. here and below. Lord Halsbury concurs in this judgment. 66 SMITH, L.J. (after referring to the facts and the grounds of defence above mentioned, continued)-As to the first defence, the plaintiff, though denying the promise, also set up the Statute of Frauds, and if sects. 1, 2, and 4 of that statute had been pleaded in the reply instead of only sect. 4 (though, from the course this case took at the trial, it must, I think, be treated as if all three sections had been pleaded), the point upon the statute is a good one, and Bruce, J. was right in deciding against the defendant upon this point. As to the second ground of defence. I am of opinion that Bruce, J. was mistaken in holding that the tenancy commenced on the 24th June 1890. He appears to have arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the express terms of the agreement that the defendant should become tenant as yearly tenant commencing on the 19th day of May instant," because he thought that, if he held otherwise, the tenant being under obligation to pay rent in advance, she might have to pay rent between the 19th May and 24th June, when she had been turned out upon the 19th May. But it has been pointed out that the Apportionment Act would apply; and even if it did not, as a six months' notice was necessary, when the quarterly rent payable in advance became due, the tenant would obviously refuse to pay rent for the period during which the notice to quit would prevent her occupying the premises, viz., between the 18th May and the 24th June. I cannot doubt that under the agreement by its express terms the tenancy commenced on the 19th May 1890. I cannot hold, as I was invited to do by the plaintiff's counsel, that when a written agreement states that a person shall become a yearly tenant" commencing on the 19th May," that it means that he shall become such tenant commencing on the day after the 19th May," or, in other words, as the plaintiff contends, “commencing from the 19th May." This being so, the third defence arises, which is certainly technical, viz., that, although a full six months' notice to quit has been given for the 19th May, which was the anniversary of the day upon which the tenancy commenced, it is nevertheless a bad notice to quit, because it is not a notice expiring on the last day of the year of the tenancy, but upon the day after. It appears, upon looking into the old authorities, that at one time what was to be considered a reasonable notice to quit was not settled, but subsequently it became settled law that in cases of yearly tenancies half a year's notice, expiring at the period of the year at which the tenancy commenced, was the reasonable notice to be given, and in the case of Doe d. Shore v. Porter (3 T. Rep. 13) Lord Kenyon, over 100 years ago, laid it down that a tenant from year to year cannot be dispossessed without a six months' notice ending at the expiration of a year of his tenancy; and, indeed, I take this to be familiar knowledge. It has also been settled that the notice to quit must be given half a year before the expiration of the then current year of the tenancy, except when the rent is payable on one of the usual feast days, in which cases what Tindal, C.J., in Roe d. Durant v. Doe (6 Bing. 575) calls "a customary half-year's notice, will suffice, if given on or before one of the feast days in the earlier half of the tenancy, to quit 66 |