CT. OF APP.]

66

taken of it by the other members of the court. The facts are admitted and are as follows: The plaintiff is a bona fide holder for value against whom no suggestion of negligence can be made. He seeks to recover from the defendant, the acceptor of the bill of exchange, 3500l., which was its face value when he became the holder. The bill was drawn by Mr. Francis Charles Scott Sanders and accepted by the defendant. Francis Charles Scott Sanders has since been convicted of forgery. When the defendant accepted the bill it was a bill for 500l. only, and afterwards and before indorsement was fraudulently altered by the drawer into a bill for 3500l. The defendant pleaded this alteration as a defence to the whole action, but, in the alternative, whilst denying the liability, paid 500l. into court. The plaintiff replied that the defendant ought not to be admitted to say that the bill was altered in material particulars, and thereby made void, because such alterations were made easy, and every opportunity for them was given by the culpable negligence of the defendant in accepting the bill in the form in which he accepted it, and on the bill stamp on which it was drawn, and without the said negligence the alteration could not and would not have been made. The bill was dated, London, 8th Sept. 1890, and bore a 21. stamp, an amount sufficient to cover 40007. A stamp of 58. was the proper stamp for a bill for 5001, such as the bill was when presented to the defendant for acceptance. In the left-hand corner were, at the time of the acceptance, the figures 500 preceded by the sign for pounds, "£." Between the £," however, and the figures was a space left sufficiently wide to admit of any other figure being with ease interpolated. The figure 5 was boldly written, and was somewhat larger than the two ciphers which followed it. The body of the bill was in three lines; in the first were the words "Three months after date." These words commenced in the middle of the paper and terminated at the extreme end, leaving no room for anything to be inserted. On the second line were the words, "Pay to me on my order the sum of," but the word "of" was not at the end of the paper, as the word date in the line above, but after the word "of" was left ample room for the interposition of any word. On the third line were the words, "Five hundred pounds for value received," but this third line did not extend back as far as the word " pay" in the line above, but ample space was left for the insertion of a word of eight or nine letters before the word "Five," and such word, when inserted, would just bring the third line immediately below the line above. Sanders, having obtained the defendant's acceptance to the bill so drawn, inserted the figure 3 between the sign£," for pounds, and the figures "500,” and in the body of the document added the words "three thousand" between the word "of " in the second line, and the words "five hundred" in the third, writing the word "three" in the second line and the word "thousand" in the third, and in this form negotiated the bill. That it was easy so to alter the document will be clear upon its inspection, and is conclusively proved by what has actually happened. There can be no doubt but that Sanders expressly prepared the bill with a view of doing that which he subsequently did. The questions which arise are these: (1) Did the defendant, the acceptor, owe any duty

[CT. OF APP.

to the subsequent holders of the bill? (2) Was there any breach of that duty, or, in other words, was there such negligence by the defendant in accepting the bill, framed as it was, which disentitled him to set up its alteration in material particulars as a good answer to an action brought on the bill by a bona fide holder for value? (3) Was what happened the proximate effect of such breach of duty? The principle in regard to negligence having legal consequences appears to be this: (1) There must have been a failure to exercise that care, prudence, or diligence which a man of average care, prudence, or diligence would exercise in the case; (2) and that general proposition means specifically, (a) that the negligent person at the time must owe some duty either to the person affected by the alleged negligence or to the public of which he is one, and (b) that the result has come about in, or in immediate connection with, the negligent act or omission. There is a subordinate question with regard to the effect of sect. 64 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 which I will deal with after I have disposed of the above questions. The learned judge in the court below held that the defendant did owe a duty to subsequent holders not to be guilty of negligence with reference to the form of the instrument, but he considered that accepting a bill in a form facilitating forgery was not enough, and that he must negligently so accept it, and that the defendant in this case had not been negligent. I agree with the learned judge when he holds that the defendant did owe a duty to subsequent holders, but I disagree with him in respect of the negligence. I should have thought that the accepting a bill in a form facilitating forgery was in itself strong evidence of negligence. In considering the question of duty, it is important to bear in mind that bills of exchange are a part, and a very important part, of the mercantile currency of the world; they are negotiable instruments which are intended to pass by written transfers, and are created for the purpose of readily passing from hand to hand. Happily, bills of exchange generally pass through the hands of honest people and are seldom fraudulently dealt with; they may, however, fall into the hands of dishonest people, and by prudent persons are therefore so drawn as to render any tampering with them well-nigh impossible. Crime is the exception, but I expect, if bills were often framed as the one in this case, crime would be of frequent occurrence. It would be passing strange if a person who accepts a negotiable instrument, such 38 a bill of exchange, and who then permits it to go forth on the credit of his name he being the person personally liable to all subsequent holders, should not owe to those subsequent holders the duty of taking reasonable care that the document should be so framed, when accepted, as not to offer obvious opportunities for the commission of a crime. If this had been res integra I should, without hesitation, have thought the duty contended for existed; but there is no lack of authority on the subject. If the Master of the Rolls is correct in holding that the acceptor of a bill of exchange owes no duty to subsequent holders for value, that holding means the reversal of numerous cases hitherto recognised. In Young v. Grote (ubi sup.) it was assumed that the customer owed a duty to his banker, and that he was guilty of negligence in not drawing his

CT. OF APP.]

cheques on them with ordinary care. It is true that was a case between customer and banker, but it appears to me, if there was a duty, then a fortiori there must be a duty between the acceptor of a bill of exchange and subsequent holders when the instrument in question is created for the purpose of passing from hand to hand. In Swan v. North British Australasian Company (7 H. & N., at p. 182) Blackburn, J., speaking of Young v. Grote, says: "It may be that case is to be supported on some of the grounds stated by Williams, J. in Ex parte Swan, or upon the broader ground, apparently supported by the authority of Pothier in the passage cited in Young v. Grote, that the person putting in circulation a bill of exchange does by the law merchant owe a duty to all parties to the bill to take reasonable precautions against the possibility of fraudulent alteration in it. It is not necessary in this case to inquire how that may be." By which I understand the learned judge to mean that it was not necessary, because they were not then dealing with negotiable instruments. But it is impossible not to see that, in the case of negotiable instruments, Blackburn, J. thought this duty did exist. I can find no case where it has been doubted but that a party putting in circulation a bill of exchange owes a duty to subsequent holders to take reasonable precautions a ainst fraudulent alteration. Baxendale v. Bennett (ubi sup.) was a case where the defendant drew a bill, without a drawer's name, addressed to himself, and then wrote what was in terms an acceptance across it. In this condition it was stolen, filled up with a drawer's name, and transferred to the plaintiff, a bona fide holder for value. The bill, it is to be observed, was never issued, and that may account for what Brett, L.J. says (at p. 532): "There must be a neglect of some duty owing to some person; here how can the defendant be negligent who owes no duty to anybody? Against whom was the defendant negligent, and to whom did he owe a duty? He put the bill in a drawer in his own room; to say that was a want of care is impossible; it was not negligence for two reasons : first, he did not owe any duty to anyone; and, secondly, he did not act otherwise than in a way an ordinary careful man would act." This may very well be in a case where the bill is obtained by the commission of an offence, and then becomes circulated against the will of the acceptor. It is very like the case of a bill being stolen from you in the street with violence, and subsequently being circulated. In such a case it would be difficult to say the acceptor had been wanting in any reasonable precaution, or owed any duty to anybody. Bramwell, L.J. does not seem to doubt the existence of a duty if the instrument had been voluntarily parted with, but founds his judgment on the fact that the bill had been obtained by the commission of a crime and against the will of the defendant. Ingham v. Primrose (7 C. B. N. S. 82) proceeds on the ground that the acceptor owed a duty to the bona fide holder for value, and though this case has been severely criticised on the point of the negligence relied on, it has not, so far as I know, ever been questioned on the point of duty. The judgment of the court (Erle, C.J., Willes and Byles, JJ.) was delivered by Willes, J. In Société Générale v. Metropolitan Bank (27 L. T. Rep. 849) the duty was assumed, and I know of no case where it was ignored. I

[CT. OF APP.

Mere carelessness, where there is no breach of duty to be careful, is not sufficient. In the words of Blackburn, J., in Swan v. North British Australasian Company (ubi sup.), cited with approval by Cockburn, C.J. in Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais Company (3 C. P. Div., at page 42), “a person who does not lock up his goods, which are consequently stolen, may be said to be negligent as regards himself, but, inasmuch as he neglects no duty which the law casts upon him, he is not in consequence estopped from denying the title of those who may have, however innocently, purchased those goods from the thief except in market overt.” I come to the conclusion, therefore, that there must be a duty, and I agree with Charles, J., in the court below, in holding that a person who signs a negotiable instrument with the intention that it should be delivered to a series of holders does incur a duty to those who take such negotiable instrument not to be guilty of negli gence with reference to its form. I now come to the second question, viz., assuming a duty, was there any breach of such duty-such negligence in accepting the bill in the form in which it was, as disentitled the defendant to set up its alteration as a good answer to the action by a bond fide holder for value? The negligence must be in the transaction itself. Blackburn, J., so says in Swan v. North British Australasian Company (2 H. & C. 175). Here the negligence alleged is negligence in accepting the bill in its then form, and is, therefore, in the transaction itself. What is the negligence alleged against the defendant? It is accepting a bill of exchange framed in such a way as to give obvious opportunities for its fraudulent alteration should it come into the hands of a dishonest person. It is the absence of such care as a reasonably prudent person would and ought to take when accepting a negotiable instrument. There is a stamp sufficient to cover eight times the amount of that for which the bill is drawn. There is a space between the "£" and the "500" sufficient for the insertion of one, if not two, figures without any chance of detection-a most suspicious space which, in my judgment, should have attracted the attention of any ordinary prudent man; and then, in the body of the instrument, there are spaces appropriately left, for the insertion of any words that it may suit a dishonest person to interpolate; the unaccountably early termination of the second line, and space left after the word of," and the late commencement of the third line with the word "five," a space being left before it to insert other words, and by so doing make the third line start evenly with the second. I cannot help thinking these ought to have been observed, and have at once induced the defendant to pause before he placed his signature as acceptor to that document. It is not only one suspicious circumstance; there are a combination of them. To hold a person accepting a bill of exchange so framed not negligent, and therefore not liable to a boná fide holder for value, would tend to impair the negotiability of such instruments. This case is very like the case of Young v. Grote. There the plaintiff left cheques, signed in blank, with his wife for her to fill them up according to her need. She filled up one so imperfectly as to enable the bearer to alter the 501. for which it was given to 3501.; and it was held that the plaintiff was estopped from setting up against the defendant,

66

CT. OF APP.]

the banker who had acted with ordinary caution in paying the cheque in the usual course of business, that his agent had only drawn the cheque for the smaller sum, inasmuch as it was his negligence, through his agent, that enabled the fraudulent holder to cheat the banker. It is true this was a case between a customer and his banker ; but, if I am right in holding that an acceptor of a bill of exchange owes a duty to subsequent holders such as I have described, it does not seem to me that this case is not in principle as applicable to a bill as to a cheque drawn by a customer on his banker. It was said that it was difficult to extract the principle from Young v. Grote, and that the authority of the case had been impaired by adverse comments at different times made with regard to it. It may be that estoppel is not the correct legal ground upon which to rest the decision in that case. No doubt various reasons have been assigned for the conclusion arrived at. I adopt the language of Cleasby, B., in Halifax Union v. Wheelwright (ubi sup.), where he says: "But these various reasons for the conclusion only show how incontestable the conclusion itself is; and it is perhaps only an application of one of those general principles which do not belong to the municipal law of any particular country, but which we cannot help giving effect to in the administration of justice, viz., that a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong, a man cannot complain of the consequence of his own default against a person who was misled by that default, without any fault of his own." This is the principle which I have always attributed to Young v. Grote, and is a principle which I consider most applicable to the case with which I am dealing, and which, if applicable, cannot be controverted. Young v. Grote, though criticised in regard to the particular circumstances of the case, is a binding authority, has been recognised in numerous cases by judges of the highest authority, and as recently as 1891 in the House of Lords in the case of Vagliano v. The Bank of England (ubi sup.). The case of Société Générale v. Metropolitan Bank (27 L. T. Rep. 849) was cited. The material alteration there was the adding the letter " y" after the word eight; it was said a space had been left sufficient to enable the "y" to be introduced, and that was negligence which enabled the parties to commit a forgery. The court did not consider that there was sufficient proof of negligence. Young v. Grote and Ingham v. Primrose were referred to, but the court thought those cases entirely different. Bovill, C.J. said you cannot prevent the possibility of a person committing a forgery: "Parties cannot prevent forgeries being committed; they must use reasonable care not to afford opportunities for it "-and he then says that leaving a space for a word or figure, as in the case before him, would not in his opinion amount to negligence. Here," he says, "the printed form was filled up with "eight days," and it was said there was negligence in allowing sufficient space for the addition of the letter "y," but I cannot, sitting as a jury, say there was negligence enabling the forgery to be committed. It would be ridiculous to expect all persons to exclude such a possibility as that. This was the usual course of filling up blanks in a form, and a man is not to assume forgery will be committed." He finds no fault with Young v. Grote and Ingham v. Primrose, but distinguishes them from the case

66

[CT. OF APP.

with which he was then dealing. Negligence must depend on the particular circumstances of each case; it is a matter of more or less. I can quite understand that in the case of Société Générale v. Metropolitan Bank the interpolation. of the letter "y." on a printed form of bill was thought insufficient evidence of negligence. It may be that neither one of the matters relied upon alone would be sufficient in itself to constitute negligence, but it is their combination; they act and react on one another, and in the aggregate, in my judgment, show such a want of reasonable care on the part of the defendant as disentitles him to set up the forgery. It is said it is no want of reasonable care not to anticipate a forgery; but that is not, in my opinion, the right test; I should rather ask if it is not a want of reasonable care not to take reasonable and usual precautions against it, in the case of a negotiable instrument which is to pass indiscriminately from hand to hand. If it is suggested that the conduct of the defendant is as consistent with non-negligence as with negligence, I say it is not. Granted that the burden is on the plaintiff of proving negligence, I say he has done so. If it is said the drawer Sanders may have used devices to induce the defendant to accept the bill, such as covering over the spaces with his hand, I reply that there is no such evidence, and, if there was, such conduct, ought to have aroused his suspicion. The defendant, I presume, is a man of experience, and has probably accepted many bills before. The defendant, by his want of care and caution, has enabled Sanders to commit this forgery, and whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third party, he who has enabled such person to occasion the loss must sustain it: (Halifax Union v. Wheelwright (ubi sup.) The third question is, whether the breach of duty or negligence was the proximate cause of what happened, i.e., leading the plaintiff into the mistake or belief that the bill indorsed to him was for 3500l. The point made was, that there was the interposition of a crime, and that the crime was the proximate cause, and not the negligence of the defendant. This, in my judgment, is untenable. It might as well be said that in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Dock Company (3 H. & C. 596), where a sack fell from a house and injured a passenger in the street, through the negligence of the defendants' servants, that the sack was the proximate cause of the injury and not the negligence. Parke, B., in the case of Bank of Ireland v. Trustees of Evans's Charity (ubi sup.), drawing the distinction between direct and remote negligence, says: Now, when the intervention of the new cause is the result that might be anticipated from the particular negligence in the case, there the negligent person would be liable to answer for the neglect; but, when the result is not the necessary or ordinary or likely result of that negligence, then the loss must lie where it falls, according to the general principle of law. Here the forgery is the result to be anticipated from the alleged negligence, and therefore the negligent party, i.e., the defendant, must answer for the neglect. Both in Young v. Grote, Ingham v. Primrose, and Société Générale v. Metropolitan Bank, in all which cases crimes were interposed, it was not held nor suggested that the neglect was not the proximate cause. The only other point is that arising

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CT. OF APP.]

under sect. 64 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882. That section has no application to this case so far as the 30007. is concerned. Before the Act a material alteration, by whomsoever made, was a complete defence, and avoided and discharged the bill except as against a party who made or who assented to the alteration. Now, under the proviso to sect. 64, a holder for value may, where a bill has been materially altered, but the alteration is not apparent, avail himself of the bill as if it had not been altered, and it was under this proviso that Charles, J. held that the defendant was liable to pay the plaintiff the 500l., although he did not consider there was any negligence entitling the plaintiff to recover the whole amount of the altered bill. I agree with Charles, J. on the stamp objection. For the reasons given, agreeing with Charles, J. on the question of duty. but disagreeing with him on the question of negligence, I am of opinion that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff for 35001.

RIGBY, L.J.-Two questions arise upon this appeal, the one being a question of fact and the other a question of law. Both questions have been elaborately argued before us, and I think it right that we should decide both questions. I agree entirely with the judgment of the Master of the Rolls upon both questions. First of all, I will state what is my judgment upon the facts of the case. The facts are not very clearly shown, but the onus of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence. It is quite probable that some device was used to conceal from the defendant the condition of the bill when he accepted it, and, in my opinion, it is impossible to say that the plaintiff has proved any negligence in this case. Then, as to the alleged duty of the acceptor, it is said that his duty is not to facilitate or make easy the commission of a fraud. That is a difficult proposition to deal with. Any person who accepts a bill or signs a cheque may be said, in a certain sense, to facilitate the commission of a fraud. I cannot, therefore, see any value in such a proposition. Again, the breach of duty must be the proximate, or the direct and immediate, cause of the loss. In all such cases as this, the direct and immediate cause is the commission of a crime. That being so, the alleged duty would be a duty to prevent the commission of a crime. But for the crime of Sanders in this case no one could have been deceived. Suppose that one of the indorsees of a bill committed a forgery, and that subsequent indorsees were thereby deceived; it seems to me that it would be difficult to say that his crime was the immediate and direct result of that which is said to be the negligence of the acceptor. I do not believe that there is any such rule or principle at all as is asserted by the appellant. A man might so draw a bill or cheque as to make a mistake as to its true amount natural and easy, but I fail to see that there is any duty to prevent the commission of a particular kind of fraud such as forgery. It is said to be a rule of the law merchant. If it were, it ought to be found in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 which is a code of the law merchant in respect of bills of exchange; but it is not to be found in that code. I do not believe that it is a rule of the law merchant. The question of alteration is dealt with in sect. 64 of the Act, which provides that a bill which is materially altered without the assent of all parties is avoided, except

[Q.B. DIV.

as against the party privy to such alteration and subsequent indorsers, but that, if the alteration is not apparent, a holder in due course may enforce payment of it according to its original tenor. Those provisions do not, however, prevent the doctrine of estoppel from applying in proper cases. Before concluding, I think that I ought to deal with the case of Young v. Grote (ubi sup.), which has never been expressly overruled. In that case the facts were all known; there a cheque was signed in blank and left in the hands of an agent who was ignorant of business, and the case may be supported upon the ground that confidence was reposed in the agent. In Swan v. North British Australasian Company (ubi sup.) Blackburn, J. deals very carefully with the case of Young v. Grote (ubi sup.). It is clear that Pothier, in the passages cited in that case, is dealing only with the case of principal and agent. With respect to Young v. Grote I think that we may say quot judices tot sententiæ. It seems to have been found to be impossible to extract any principle from that case which is easy of application, and that shows, in my opinion, that there must be some vice about the decision. I do not now attempt to overrule Young v. Grote, but I think that it contains no principle which is applicable to the present case. The appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the appellant, Smith, Fawdon, and Low, for Owen March, Rochdale. Solicitors for the respondent, Saltwell, Tryon, and Saltwell.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Wednesday, Dec. 11, 1894.

(Before WILLS and WRIGHT, JJ.) EVANS (app.) v. OWEN AND ANOTHER (resps.). (a) Fishing district-Certificate of Secretary of State -Tributary Tributaries of Definition of tributaries—The Salmon Fishery Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 71) s. 22-The Freshwater Fisheries Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 39), s. 7. The limits of the river Severn and of the Severn Fishery District were defined by the certificate of the Secretary of State, dated the 20th Sept. 1882, as "so much of the river Severn and all of the tributaries of the said river Severn as is situate within the counties of and also all streams, together with their estuaries and tributaries flowing into the said estuary of the said river Severn.

On an information, charging the respondents with unlawfully taking trout within the district without a licence, it appeared that the offence charged was committed in a streamlet which runs into a brook called the Cain, which brook runs into the river Vyrnuy, which river flows into the river Severn.

Held, that this streamlet was within the limits of the Severn Fishery District, and that the words in the certificate, "all of the tributaries," mean and include all streams that flow into the Severn, and all tributaries of tributaries. Merricks v. Cadwallader, (46 L. T. Rep. 29) distinguished.

(a Reported by HENRY LEIGH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Q.B. Div.]

CASE stated by justices.

At a petty session held at Llanfyllin, in the county of Montgomery, on the 29th May 1894, an information was preferred by the appellant David Evans, a water bailiff of the Severn Fishery Board, duly authorised by and on behalf of the said board to lay the same, against the respondents John Owen and John M. Jones, under sect. 22 of 36 & 37 Vict. c. 71, as amended by sect. 7 of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 39, charging "that the respondents, on the 19th April 1894, at the parish of Llanfyllin, in the borough and county aforesaid, "being a place within the Severn Fishery District, did unlawfully take trout by means other than or otherwise than a properly licensed fishing weir, fishing mill-dam, fixed engine, instrument,net, or device."

The justices dismissed the charge, being of opinion that the place where the trout were taken was not within the Severn Fishery District.

On the application of the appellant, who was dissatisfied with the decision, being of opinion that it was erroneous in point of law, the justices stated a case.

Upon the hearing of the information it was proved, on the part of the appellant, and found as a fact that a certificate dated the 20th Sept. 1882, a copy of which was annexed to and formed part of the case, was given under the hand of the Chief Secretary of State, who, by virtue of the powers intrusted to him by the provisions of the Salmon Fishery Acts 1861 to 1876, thereby declared and certified that the limits of the river Severn and of the Fishery District of the River Severn, should include the following: "So much of the river Severn and all of the tributaries of the said river Severn as is situate within the counties of Gloucester, Worcester, Salop, Stafford, Montgomery

and also together with their estuaries and tributaries flowing into the said estuary of the said river Severn within the above limits, and being within the said counties."

It was also proved on the part of the appellant, and found as a fact, that from and after the 7th April 1879 it was illegal to fish for or take trout in the Severn Fishery District without a licence, and that the board of conservators of the Severn Fishery District determined to issue licences to all persons fishing for trout or char within the Severn Fishery District.

It was then proved on the part of the appellant, and found as a fact, that on the day mentioned in the information the respondents did take trout by means other than a properly licensed fishing weir, fishing mill-dam, fixed engine, instrument, net, or device," namely, with their hands, in a streamlet which runs into a brook called the Cain, and which brook runs into the river Vyrnwy, which river flows into the river Severn. It was contended on the part of the respondents that the limits of the Severn Fishery District were confined to the river Severn and its direct tributaries, and did not include streamlets, rills, brooks, or streams running into such tributaries, and that the streamlet in which the respondents took the trout was not within the Severn Fishery District, and therefore not under the jurisdiction of the Severn Fishery Board, and 80 persons fishing therein did not require a licence.

The justices were of opinion that the streamlet in which the respondents took the trout was not

[Q.B. DIV.

within the limits of the Severn Fishery District, and dismissed the information.

The question for the court was whether or not the streamlet was within the Severn Fishery District as defined by the above-mentioned certificate.

Willis Bund for the appellant.-The justices were wrong in the decision they came to. The meaning of tributaries is not confined to the direct tributaries of a river, but includes also streamlets and brooks running into the direct tributary. The case of Hall v. Reid, which is only reported as a note to Harbottle v. Terry (48 L. T. Rep. 221; 10 Q. B. Div. 134), is an authority on this point. In that case Field, J. defined a tributary as "that which contributes to," and stated that he saw no necessity for putting the limitation suggested upon that word, namely, that it only included direct tributaries. Counsel thought it right that, as no one represented the other side, he should direct the attention of the court to the case of Merricks v. Cadwallader (46 L. T. Rep. 29; 51 L. J. 20, M. C.), but submitted that it was distinguishable.

No counsel appeared for the respondents.

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WILLS, J.-This is a perfectly clear case, and in my opinion the magistrates were wrong in the decision they arrived at. The Secretary of State's certificate defines the fishery district of the river Severn as including "so much of the river Severn and all of the tributaries of the said river" as are situated within certain counties, and also "all streams together with their estuaries and tributaries" which flow into the Severn. The certificate thus throws into the district of the Severn Fishery Board all the tributaries of the river Severn. A tributary is a thing which contributes, and I am at a loss to understand how it can be maintained that a stream is the less a tributary of the river Severn because, before it reaches the Severn, it passes through a stream with another name. Merricks v. Cadwallader is clearly distinguishable from the present case, for in the former case the Secretary of State by his certificate defined the district as so much of the river Severn and of the rivers Vyrnwy and Teme, and of all other tributaries of the river Severn are situate in certain counties. And it is pointed out by Grove, J. in his judgment in that case, that by naming specifically two rivers which are direct tributaries it was intended by the certificate to limit the meaning of the words "all other tributaries" to tributaries of the same nature as the two which were specified, viz., those which flow directly into the river Severn, thus applying the ejusdem generis doctrine to the words "other tributaries." But that doctrine does not apply here. In the present case-and no doubt on account of the decision in Merricks v. Cadwallader, for the object of these Fishery Acts is the protection of fish-larger and more comprehensive language was adopted in the certificate. Therefore. I am clearly of opinion that in this case tributary must be taken to mean and include not only direct tributaries, but also tributaries of such tributaries. For these reasons I think the justices were wrong in the conclusion they came to, and this appeal in my opinion must succeed. The case must therefore go back to the justices with this intimation of our opinion.