other than by steam; and cracks in the walls of the house already made by the defendant's works are to be increased; and it may be that his wife and daughter throughout that period are to continue to be made ill as heretofore. Can anyone truly say that this is a small injury to the plaintiff's legal rights? Moreover, how are these injuries to be put into money, and upon what principle are these damages to be assessed, so as to represent the continuing injury to the plaintiff? To guess at them is not assessing them at all. In order to constitute a real assessment, it appears to me that the principle of purchasing the plaintiff's interest in his lease for the unexpired term will have to be adopted as the basis upon which the assessment is to be made, and, as I have before stated, this is never sanctioned by the court at the instance of a tortfeasor. The assessment upon the facts found will manifestly not result in a small money payment. In my judgment, for the reasons above, this is clearly not a case in which damages should be granted to the plaintiff in substitution for the injunction which he asks for, which is an injunction to restrain the continuance of the existing nuisance. If the remedies the defendants are about to apply to the steam will abate the nuisance, well and good, and the injunction will not injure them; but if, on the other hand, a nuisance still continues, in my judgment this case is by no means brought within the exception to the ordinary rule which I have endeavoured to express, and therefore the judgment of Kekewich, J., wherein he awarded damages in substitution for an injunction, must be reversed and an injunction as prayed for be granted. As regards the case of the reversioners, the Meux Brewery Company, this appears to me to give rise to a discussion of a somewhat academic description so far as the defendants are concerned, when an injunction has been granted against them in the case of the tenant Shelfer. It may, however, be of moment to the plaintiffs, the reversioners, for the reasons pointed out by Mr. Warmington, and more especially as the works of the defendants as regards engine power are about to be enormously enlarged, which obviously will increase the present continual injury to the fabric of the house. There is evidence that the defendants are committing, and are proposing to continue to commit, acts which will cause injury to the fabric of the plaintiff's house of a permanent character, and for which a jury would be well warranted in finding an injury to the reversion. I agree with what Lord Halsbury and Lindley, L.J. have said upon this matter, and that an injunction should be granted as in the case of the tenant. These appeals, for reasons above stated, must be allowed with costs. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Hunter and Haynes. Solicitors for the defendants, Ashurst, Morris, Crisp and Co. [CT. OF APP. Nov. 30 and Dec. 7, 1894. Re HAWKINS; Ex parte TROUP. (a) APPEAL IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy-Petitioning creditor's debt-Judgment debt-Judgment obtained upon a compromise-Power to go behind the judgment-Unfair compromise Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 7, sub-sect. 3. When a petitioning creditor's debt is a judgment debt which has been obtained upon the compromise of an action, the Court of Bankruptcy may inquire into the whole of the circumstances relating to the cause of action and to the compromise, and may refuse to make a receiving order if it is satisfied that there was no good cause of action, and that the compromise was not fair and reasonable. So held by Lord Esher, M.R. and Lopes, L.J.; dissentiente Rigby, L.J. THIS was an appeal by the petitioning creditor from the refusal of the registrar to make a receiving order. Captain Troup was the holder of a bill of exchange, which Hawkins had signed as acceptor for 500l., and he brought an action against Hawkins to recover the amount with interest. While the action was pending, a compromise was agreed to by the solicitors representing Troup and Hawkins respectively, by which judgment was signed for 500l., upon the terms that 3001., only should be payable upon that judgment. A bankruptcy notice was served upon Hawkins in respect of that judgment; and, upon non-compliance with the terms of that notice, a petition in bankruptcy was presented against Hawkins. At the hearing before the registrar the whole of the transactions with regard to the bill of exchange and the compromise was inquired into, and the registrar found the facts to be as follows: One Ward was the drawer of the bill of exchange; he had obtained the signature of Hawkins, as acceptor, by fraud; being largely indebted to Troup, he indorsed the bill to him; before taking the bill from Ward, Troup's solicitor made inquiries of Hawkins's then solicitors, and was told that it was fraudulent; when the action was brought against Hawkins, he had changed his solicitors, and his former solicitors refused to give up the papers belonging to him. The Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52) provides : Sect. 7, sub-sect. 3. If the court is not satisfied with the proof of the petitioning creditor's debt, or of the act of bankruptcy, or of the service of the petition, or is satisfied by the debtor that he is able to pay his debts, or that for other sufficient cause no order ought to be made, the court may dismiss the petition. The registrar refused to make a receiving order, and Troup appealed. Nov. 30.-Lawson Walton, Q.C. and Gregson Ellis for the petitioning creditor.-First, the registrar had no right to go behind the judgment and enter upon the inquiry whether the petitioning creditor would have succeeded in the action if it had been tried out. The judgment was a compromise of a disputed claim, and there was therefore sufficient consideration for it to support the (a) Reported by J. H. WILLIAMS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. bankruptcy petition, even though the creditor could not in fact have succeeded if the action had gone on to trial. In support of his decision, the registrar relied upon Ex parte Kibble; Re Onslow (32 L. T. Rep. 138; L. Rep. 10 Ch. 373). That case is distinguishable from the present one. There the court held that the action in which the judgment had been obtained was not of a kind that could be maintained; in this case there was a prima facie cause of action which was a valid one or not according to the view which the jury might have taken of the disputed facts. No collusion is suggested here between the plaintiff and the defendant in making the compromise. There is no case reported in which, upon the hearing of a bankruptcy petition founded upon a judgment which was a compromise of a disputed debt, the registrar has gone behind the judgment. Ex parte Lennox; Re Lennox (54 L. T. Rep. 452; 16 Q. B. Div. 315) was a case of a consent judgment. They argued, secondly, that if the registrar had power to go behind the judgment, he was not justified upon the facts in his finding that the bill was made fraudulently and taken by the petitioning creditor with notice of the fraud. Sir Henry James, Q.C. (Herbert Reed, Q.C. and Carrington with him) for the debtor.-The question here ought not to be considered as if it arose merely between the debtor and this creditor. It concerns the whole body of the debtor's creditors, because, if this creditor is right in his contention and the debtor adjudged bankrupt, the position of the other creditors is altered, perhaps against their will. It is submitted therefore, first, that a compromise judgment means a judgment founded on a debt, and as there was no debt in this case, there can be no valid compromise; and, secondly, even supposing that there is a valid compromise between the parties to it, it will not prevent the court, in the case of a bankruptcy petition founded upon it, from going behind the judgment. A court of bankruptcy cannot set aside a judgment, but in every case of a petition founded on a judgment the court can inquire whether there was a good debt, notwithstanding the judgment: Re Fraser; Ex parte The Central Bank of London, 67 L. T. Rep. 401; (1892) 2 Q. B. 633. There is a case where the court went behind a judgment founded on a compromise, and refused to admit a proof founded on it: Ex parte Banner; Re Blythe, 44 L. T. Rep. 908; 17 There is no difference in principle between that case and this one. The court, it must be admitted, could go behind a judgment obtained in invitum for the whole amount of the debt; why cannot it go behind a judgment obtained by agreement for part of the debt? The fact of there being a compromise does not create a new debt. [CT. OF APP. order was made upon the ground that Troup had recovered judgment for 500l. against Hawkins upon a bill of exchange. Undoubtedly that judg. ment, as between Hawkins and Troup, was a final judgment and a standing judgment. The registrar, however, thought that he was bound, upon certain allegations which were made, to go behind the judgment and inquire how it was obtained, in order to see whether, according to the rules which have been laid down in bankruptcy, the judgment ought to be treated as a debt upon which a receiving order should be made, or, what is the same thing, a judgment which could be relied on in bankruptcy proceedings as a binding judgment. The registrar then received evidence as to all that happened leading up to the judgment, and upon that evidence he came to certain conclusions of fact. Upon those conclusions he refused to make a receiving order. It does not follow from that, that Hawkins may not be made a bankrupt upon another petition by someone else, and in that case the question would arise whether, if Troup proposed to prove as a creditor in that bankruptcy, he had a proper debt provable in bankruptcy. For the present, however, the question is whether Troup had a good petitioning creditor's debt. Now, it was proved to the satisfaction of the registrar that Ward had obtained the acceptance of Hawkins to this bill by fraud. That being so, Hawkins would not be liable upon the bill except in the case of a bona fide holder for value without notice of the fraud. It was further proved to the satisfaction of the registrar that Jackson, who was acting for Troup to obtain payment of a large debt due from Ward, took this bill from Ward under circumstances which affected him with notice that the acceptance had been obtained by fraud. I agree with those conclusions. For the purposes of this case the result is the same as if Troup himself had taken the bill with notice of the fraud, he having intrusted Jackson with the whole matter. If that were the whole case, it would be the ordinary case in which, on going behind the judgment, it would be found that there was nothing to support the judgment, so that it would not be a good petitioning creditor's debt. But then it is said that this judgment was founded upon the compromise of a doubtful claim, and it was argued that, as soon as that was proved, no further inquiry could be made as to anything that happened before. We have now been sitting in this court for a long time to administer the law under the Bankruptcy Acts, and it has been principally decided and interpreted in this court. We have, thinking we were bound to do so by the earlier decisions of Mellish, L.J., and James, L.J. many times said that, where the debt relied upon in the court of bankruptcy is a judgment debt, the court is not bound by that judgment, although that judgment is, and must be, binding between the parties for any other purpose. The court will go behind the judgment, and I think the cases show that a consent judgment does not prevent the court of bankruptcy inquiring further; and I am of opinion that a compromise judgment does not, of itself, bind the court. We have laid it down that we will go into the whole transaction because it is said, it is not merely a dispute between the two parties, but is a matter which will affect, and very materially affect, others. In bankruptcy the matter is not tried simply between the two parties, it will affect the rights of all the creditors who are not present at the time when it is decided whether a man shall be made a bankrupt or not. Therefore we have said that the court of bankruptcy will go into the whole matter and see whether, on the whole, it is not only right as between the parties, but also is fair to the whole body of creditors, that the man, on that transaction between him and the petitioning creditor, should be made a bankrupt. When a man is made a bankrupt each creditor is materially affected, for he cannot then by his own diligence recover the whole of his debt; then the most diligent creditor is placed upon an equality with the most idle creditor. We must therefore, in my judgment, inquire not only into the immediate cause of the judgment, but into the whole of the previous transaction which led up to the judgment. We ought then to say whether, looking at what took place previously and to the compromise which produced the judgment, we are of opinion that the compromise was a just and proper one. There is one case, I know, in which it has been said that the court will go behind a compromise judgment, and will inquire into the compromise. The compromise must be considered as one of the facts of the case, and there must, in my opinion, have been a reasonable doubt as to the rights of the parties, in order to make the compromise a fair one. If the court comes to the conclusion that it was a reasonable compromise, then the court will act upon the judgment; but, if the court thinks that it was not a reasonable compromise, although not a fraudulent one, then it will not act upon the judgment. For instance, I know that we have said that, although both parties to the compromise knew all the circumstances when they agreed to the compromise, yet if the court thinks it was a compromise which ought not to have been made, it will not bind the whole body of creditors by a foolish and improper compromise. Still more, if the court finds that the compromise was made when one party knew, and the other did not know, all the circumstances of the case; in that case, even if there is no fraud, there cannot be a fair compromise. In this case, Jackson knew that he had notice which would make it impossible to succeed in the action, if the bill was obtained by fraud from Hawkins. Jackson knew that; he knew that the other side would not, if they also had known it, unless they were absolutely ignorant of their duty to their client, ever have compromised, knowing that the action was a hopeless one. Hawkins's solicitors did not know the circumstances. One side knew enough to make the case hopeless, and the other side did not know the circumstances of the case. Under these circumstances I have the strongest opinion that it was an unfair compromise. If it was an unfair compromise-I do not say fraudulent-it is one to which the Court of Bankruptcy will not give effect. This judgment, therefore, was either founded upon a cause of action which was no cause of action at all, or it was founded upon an unfair compromise, and in either case the court will not allow the judgment to be utilised for the purpose of making a man a bankrupt. I have not quoted all the cases, because I have had to state this law so often that I do not think that I ought now to have to quote a long series of judgments, many of them my own. I have the strongest [CT. OF APP. possible conviction that the law of bankruptcy, as administered by this court, is as I have now stated it, and therefore I am of opinion that this appeal ought to be dismissed. LOPES, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. Two questions arise on this appeal. The first question is, whether the registrar had any discretion to go behind this judgment; and the second question is, whether, if he had such a discretion, he rightly exercised it. Now, it is clear that the registrar has a discretion to go behind a judgment and refuse to make a receiving order. The rule is defined in sect. 7, sub-sect. 3, of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, which says: "If the court is not satisfied with the proof of the petitioning creditor's debt, or of the act of bankruptcy, or of the service of the petition, or is satisfied by the debtor that he is able to pay his debts, or that for other sufficient cause no order ought to be made, the court may dismiss the petition." It is clear, therefore, that the court is entitled to go behind the judgment and to inquire, notwithstanding the judgment, whether there is a good debt, and this at the instance of the debtor, and although the judgment cannot be set aside. I cannot state the law on that subject so well as it has been stated by the Master of the Rolls in Ex parte Lennox (ubi sup.). He there says: "It seems to me that the question is, not so much what is the right of the debtor, or what the conduct of the debtor or of the creditor has been, but rather whether the court ought to exercise this great power, which deals not only with the particular debt of the petitioning creditor, but with the whole class of the creditors of the debtor, including the petitioning creditor, whether the Court of Bankruptcy ought to exercise its power and authority when there are the strongest grounds for believing that there is no petitioning creditor's debt upon which it can be put in motion, and the whole foundation upon which the court is authorised and empowered to do such a thing as to make a receiving order, or declare a man a bankrupt, is that a petitioning creditor's debt exists. It is not denied that, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, upon the suggestion of another creditor, this very petitioning creditor's debt, if the allegations now made were then made, must be inquired into, and that, if what is now stated were then proved, the debt would no longer be considered a debt in the Court of Bankruptcy, although judgment had been obtained for it. The petitioning creditor's debt, upon which the bankruptcy proceedings had been founded, would then be struck out altogether, and he would have no claim to interfere in the proceedings, and the court would find itself in this position, that it had used its authority to declare a man a bankrupt upon a debt alleged to exist when there was really never any such debt at all. I cannot help thinking that this goes a long way to show that the court would be placed in an entirely false position. So far as the debtor is concerned, it might well be said that it was his own fault. Why did he consent to the judgment? But 1 do not think that the power of the Court of Bankruptcy is to be exercised merely by way of punishment against the debtor." Then come these words: The court ought not to be forced to act when, according to its own rules the very foundation of its action is cut away. I think it ought in such a case to hold its hand at the very earliest stage of the proceedings, and to decline to com In exercise its jurisdiction." I cannot express my views more clearly than they are expressed in the passage which I have read. It is, therefore, I say, clear that the court of bankruptcy is not bound by a judgment, but is entitled to investigate all the facts of the case whenever, but not before, a primâ facie case, impeaching the judgment, is made out. Otherwise a man might defeat all his other creditors by allowing judg ment to go by default or consent. The principle appears to me to be this: that it would be unjust and impolitic to allow a man to be subject to the pains and penalties of bankruptcy unless it is established that there were good grounds for so doing from the existence of a good petitioning creditor's debt, and unjust to the general body of creditors to permit one creditor by means of a judgment which had no solid foundation, to obtain an undue advantage over them and obtain payment of his alleged debt to their prejudice. So much for the general rule. In this case it is said that, although that may be true with regard to an ordinary judgment, a judgment founded upon a promise between the parties stands in a different position and ought not to be subject to the same investigation as may be applied to a judgment not so obtained. I see no such distinction. my opinion a judgment may be inquired into whether it be a judgment obtained by compromise or consent, directly, but not before, it is made out that either the one or the other has been improperly or unfairly obtained. I do not go the length of saying that it need be made out that it is fraudulent; it is sufficient, in my opinion, if it is made out that it was improperly or unfairly obtained. Then comes the other question, whether the registrar has rightly exercised that discretion. I am of opinion that he has. I think that the compromise was not fairly obtained. I mean that there was an amount of knowledge of the circumstances of the case on the one side which was not shared in by the other side and was not communicated to the other side, and that that made it an unfair compromise. It seems to me that it might be described as impar congressus. What were the circumstances? Upon the facts I think that both Troup and Jackson knew that Ward was a disreputable and unreliable person, and a man from whom they ought not to have taken a bill without the most careful inquiries. Jackson, before taking the bill, inquired of Hawkins's solicitors and was told that the bill was fraudulent. When the compromise took place Jackson knew all that, whereas Hawkins's then solicitors knew very little about the matter. In my opinion it would be wrong and unjust to say that, under those circumstances, the compromise was fairly obtained. The registrar came to that conclusion, and I am unable to disagree with him. Jackson, in my opinion, perfectly well knew that the action could not be successfully maintained against Hawkins. In these circumstances I think that we are entitled to hold that the judgment obtained by that compromise was an unfair one, and that we are fairly entitled to go into that judgment and, having ascertained the circumstances, to say that this application for a receiving order ought to be dismissed. RIGBY, L.J.-This is a case of great importance with regard to the administration of the bankruptcy law, and also to the persons whose conduct has been impugned with accusations of [CT. OF APP. fraud. I therefore think it my duty, as I differ in my view of the facts and also to some extent as to the law, to go at some length into my reasons for so differing. First, then, with regard to the general doctrine. There is no doubt that there is a discretion with reference to the granting of a receiving order, but not an arbitrary discretion. It is a judicial discretion, and if for any reason the Court of Appeal differs from the discretion as exercised by the registrar, it is the duty of that court to overrule the registrar. Nevertheless, there is a discretion, and that is important in the consideration of the matter. Now, with reference to the law of bankruptcy on the subject. We all know that the Court of Bankruptcy has been considered from the first as a court, not only of law, but of equity. The Court of Bankruptcy has always freely resorted to the doctrines of courts of equity to guide it in its decisions. Unless, however, there be some statutory addition to the law of bankruptcy, it must be founded either on the common law or on equity. I do not think that there is a bankruptcy equity differing from the equity of the old Court of Chancery or of the present Chancery Division, that is, the equity which is now administered by all the branches of the High Court. In my opinion, the bankruptcy jurisdiction is made up of the common law jurisdiction together with the equit able jurisdiction, and additions to that jurisdic tion made by statute, but by statute only. Now to consider the origin of this doctrine of going behind a judgment debt--a doctrine from which I do not wish to be supposed in any way to differ, for it is founded on equity and justice—in the Court of Chancery it was well established that, in respect of voluntary debts, that is, debts not actually founded on a valuable consideration, though they might be specialty debts, the court did not allow the voluntary creditors to compete with creditors who had given good and valuable consideration. In its origin the doctrine of going behind a judgment was only an application of a well-known principle of courts of equity that the court must look to see whether there was a consideration, and, in the earlier cases, that was the way in which the rule was expressed. The court may inquire into the consideration for the judg ment debt, and, if it finds that there was no consideration, it must treat it, like any other voluntary debt, as not entitling the judgment creditor to enter into competition in bankruptcy with other creditors for valuable consideration. With reference to that part of the jurisdiction, it will have to be considered, when the case arises, whether that has not been entirely displaced by subsequent legislation. The Bankruptcy Act 1869 contained a new enactment with reference to the ranking of creditors. It was decided in Ex parte Pottinger; Re Stewart (38 L. T. Rep. 432; 8 Ch. Div. 621), that there had been a statutory alteration in the bankruptcy law with reference to the consideration for debts, and I think it a question worthy of great consideration whether the bankruptcy jurisdiction to inquire into the consideration has not been done away with by the Bankruptcy Act 1869 and subsequent Acts as interpreted in Ex parte Pottinger; Re Stewart (ubi sup.). Apart also from the question of consideration there was another doctrine which, so far as I can see, forms the whole doctrine of the Court of Bankruptcy upon the subject, viz., that under no circumstances could a debt obtained by fraud be treated as a valid debt in competition with other creditors. Now fraud might be of two kinds. The fraud which was first adverted to, according to my recollection of the order of the decisions, was that which is a fraud upon the creditors, viz., where the bankrupt collusively allowed judgment to be signed for the purpose of making that appear to be a debt which was not really a debt. That was a fraud, and a very gross fraud, upon the bankruptcy court, whose doctrine was that there should be equality only between real creditors, and not between them and fictitious or collusive creditors. That was the doctrine of the bankruptcy law. In an early statute, which has been repealed, but the repeal of which in no way alters the doctrine of the Court of Bankrupty, it was expressly provided that creditors in bankruptcy proceedings must make an affidavit as to the truth and reality of their debt. That was discussed in Ex parte Bryant (1 V. & B. 211), and it was laid down then, and has been the law ever since, and is now the law, that a creditor in bank. ruptcy must be a true and real creditor and the debt must really be owing. So much, then, for the acknowledged doctrine of the Court of Bankruptcy which depends upon the principle that no one should, by collusion, create debts which were not real debts, or act in any way to get payment of a debt which was not really a debt. That has never been changed, and is equally the law now. The principle is a true and equitable one, and will, I hope, always be maintained to the utmost extent. That question does not arise in this case, because, whatever else may be said of the proceedings which led up to the judgment, they were in no sense collusive proceedings, and were not intended by the parties to create a fictitious debt for the purpose of altering the administration of the assets in bankruptcy. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the matter was fought, and that, so far from wishing to make Troup appear to be a creditor when he was not, the other side would, if they had seen their way to do so, have absolutely refused to pay him a penny or to submit to judgment upon any terms. There is, however, another point remaining. If a debt has been obtained by fraud, it is not in truth and reality a debt at all. According to my reading of the decisions, however, the doctrine stops there. I find no jurisdiction in the Court of Bankruptcy to inquire into the fairness or reasonableness of a compromise, provided that it is not tainted with fraud. To hold that there was such jurisdiction would be to introduce into the law of bankruptcy with respect to judgment debts an exception which is not to be found in it, and to affect many creditors, not being judgment creditors, whose debts, if their origin might be inquired into, might turn out to be within the rule which, as I understand, the other members of the court think applicable to this compromise. At present, as I understand the law, a voluntary debt, if created honestly and not with the intention to create the mere appearance of a debt in bankruptcy, though there is no consideration for it at all, may be proved in bankruptcy. Undoubtedly, also, there are many improvident bargains which a debtor may enter into, which in the ordinary course of business or transactions between man and man he has chosen to enter into, creating debts which will prejudice the [CT. OF APP. claims and dividends of other creditors, and which are admitted in bankruptcy. The court cannot look behind transactions, which are in themselves legal and binding in the absence of fraud, merely because they are improvident and because they might materially diminish, or altogether destroy, the rights of other creditors in bankruptcy. In his judgment, in Ex parte Kibble; Re Onslow (ubi sup.), Mellish, L.J. gives an illustration of a gambling debt which might become the subject-matter of a judgment. That is not a mere illustration, but arose out of the case of Ex parte Marson (3 Mont. & A. 155), which was there cited, in which it was decided that an acknowledgment for a gambling debt did not create a debt which would really and truly exist between the debtor and creditor. I am, however, dealing with cases which are not against the policy of the law, but cases of mere acts of improvidence. A man may give 10,000l. for a horse which is not worth 100%., being persuaded that it will bring him in a great fortune; but, unless fraud can be shown, that is a perfectly good transaction, though it may have a most pernicious effect on the rights of all his other creditors if he becomes a bankrupt. I am unable, therefore, to accept as a test the fairness of any transaction, whether a compromise or any other transaction. According to my view of the cases, it must be shown, not only that there was inequality in the transaction, but also that there was fraud, which is a very different matter. There is, indeed, one case, with which I agree, where there was a compromise and a judgment in pursuance of that compromise, and, nevertheless, the court went behind the judgment and the compromise, and inquired into the truth and reality of the transaction. That was the case of Ex parte Banner; Re Blythe (ubi sup.), and if ever there was a case of fraud, that was one. It was a blackmailing action by the plaintiff, and most justly and properly, upon that ground, and upon the ground of fraud, the Court of Bankruptcy went behind the judgment and the compromise upon which it was founded. That is the extent to which the court has gone in dealing with a case of compromise. The real question, in my opinion here is, whether the compromise, made in a proper action against the debtor, by which it was agreed that judgment should be signed for 500l., upon the terms that 3001. only should be recovered upon it, was obtained by fraud. I have been unable, upon the facts of the case, to arrive at the conclusion that the compromise was obtained by fraud. I will go further and say that it was not obtained through any inequality of knowledge between the parties. It appears to me to be irrelevant to consider what would have been the finding of a court upon the evidence as it ultimately came out before the registrar. I consider the real question in this case to be whether the compromise was an actual compromise as distinguished from a compromise which was not really one at all. It was a compromise in an action upon a bill of exchange. There is no doubt that the bill was in fact signed by the debtor. Prima facie, therefore, he was liable; but, if it were shown that the signature was obtained by fraud and the plaintiff had notice of that before he took the bill, there would have been a good defence. I accept the finding of the registrar that the plaintiff had sufficient notice, |