had in contemplation such contracts only as w [*12 ] whose account the policy shall be 9. Every other aleatory [*13] land befe is no rent to s the one the statute of was entitled to it the maintenance ess than that which argument did not vary majority have any greater as such, than the parent in oe supposed that a husband or afe or his child, or a child that of any interest in property dependent otancy which a person may have as the il not give him an insurable interest in the gh the premature death of the latter might perty which might otherwise devolve upon him. acy of the ancestor does not vary the rule d. Suppose A. to be possessed of a ship, hout issue; that A. has twenty children, ars of age, and B. is ninety years of age; will never come into possession, yet this 39 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 26; 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 78. On the other hand, suppose the case of an heir-at-law te worth 20,000l. per annum, who is ninety years testate, and incapable from incurable lunacy man who will deny that such an heir-atcceeding to the estate; yet the law rest, or anything more than a mere of one E. S., who was then living, in conto be paid in manner therein mentioned, . in October following, G. F. agreed that hs after the death of E. S. he would, in case as such devisee, convey the said premises to the d title thereto; and in case he should not become e, or should not be able to make a good title to the six calandar months from the decease of the said ild then repay the said sum of 20007. to the plaintiff, rest. assurance on the life of G. F. was assigned by deed to the security for the payment of the 20007., and upon this deed, e defendant was a party as surety for the payment of the prethe insurance office, the action of covenant was brought. The not turn upon the policy, but it was objected that the whole action was void; first, as being the sale of a pretended title under 52 H. 8, c. 9; and, secondly, "because that at the time of the making the said contract for securing the said benefits to the said plaintiff upon the decease of the said E. S., the said plaintiff had not nor had he at any time any interest in the said event, or in the life or death of the said E. S., whereby by force of the stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 38, the said agreement was void and of none effect," or that it amounted to a policy of insurance by the plaintiff on the life of E. S., in which life he had no insurable interest. The first objection was overruled in the course of the argument. As to the second, the judgment of the Court was delivered by Lord Campbell, C. J., to the following effect:-" Although the contract may resemble an insurance on the life of E. S., in that the plaintiff advances money for a benefit to be received from G. F. upon her death, yet it has circumstances which are not incidents *to a life insurance. The intention of G. F. is to obtain a present sum of [ *18 ] money; the intention of the plaintiff is to obtain the assignment of an expected devise, and if there should not be such a devise, a repayment of the money without interest. The death of E. S. is made important only for the purpose of ascertaining whether there be or be not the (e) Lucena v. Crawford, 2 Bos. & P. 324. and unmarried." They had one son, and no other children; and the marriage *having been dissolved by Act of Parliament, the [*15] plaintiff married again, and effected a policy with the Asylum Life Office on the 13th of February, 1826, for two years upon the life of his son, to provide against his death before he attained the age of twenty-one years. The son did attain that age on the 2nd of June, 1827, and on the 5th of January following made his will, and thereby gave all his real and personal estate to his father, and appointed him sole executor, and died on the 11th of the same month. In an action against the office, Lord Tenterden nonsuited the plaintiff, on the ground that, not having any pecuniary interest in the life of his son at the time when he effected the policy, the same was void under the statute; giving him liberty to move to enter a nonsuit if the Court should be of opinion that he had an insurable interest. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Bailey, J. said, "It is enacted by the 3rd section of the 14th Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 3, that no greater sum shall be recovered than the amount of the value of the interest of the insured in the life or lives. Now, what was the amount or value of the interest of the party insuring in this case? Not one farthing. Certainly it has been said that there are numerous instances in which a father has effected an insurance on the life of his son. If a father, wishing to give his son some property to dispose of, make an insurance on his son's life in his (the son's) name, not for his (the father's) own benefit, but for the benefit of his son, there is no law to prevent his doing so; but that is a transaction quite different to the present; and if a notion prevails that such an insurance as the one in question is valid, the sooner it is corrected the better." In the argument upon this case it was urged that by the statute of Elizabeth, (d) a father falling into poverty in his old age, was entitled to a maintenance by his son if able to support him, and that the maintenance [*16] which the *parish must give, may be much less than that which a son would be ordered to pay. But this argument did not vary the decision. Neither can a child who has attained his majority have any greater insurable interest in the life of his parent, as such, than the parent in the life of the child; but it must not be supposed that a husband or father may not insure the life of his wife or his child, or a child that of his parent, when he is possessed of any interest in property dependent upon the life in question. 12. The mere chance or expectancy which a person may have as the heir or next kin of another will not give him an insurable interest in the life of his ancestor, although the premature death of the latter might deprive the former of property which might otherwise devolve upon him. The idiocy or incurable lunacy of the ancestor does not vary the rule which has been thus illustrated. Suppose A. to be possessed of a ship, limited to B. in case A. dies without issue; that A. has twenty children, the eldest of whom is twenty years of age, and B. is ninety years of age; it is a moral certainty that B. will never come into possession, yet this (d) 43 Elizabeth, c. 2, s. 7; 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 26; 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 78. is a clear interest. On the other hand, suppose the case of an heir-at-law of a man who has an estate worth 20,0007. per annum, who is ninety years of age, upon his death-bed, intestate, and incapable from incurable lunacy of making a will. There is no man who will deny that such an heir-atlaw has a moral certainty of succeeding to the estate; yet the law will not allow that he has any interest, or anything more than a mere expectation.(e) 13. Neither can an expectant devisee insure the life of his testator, so as to secure the value of a promised devise; but it has been thought that a purchaser from him of the subject of the expected devise might do so. In a late case there was an agreement made between G. F. of the one part, and the plaintiff of the other part, in *which, after reciting that G. F. was in expectation of becoming entitled to certain [*17] hereditaments at A., as devisee of one E. S., who was then living, in consideration of the sum of 20007., to be paid in manner therein mentioned, viz., 5007. down, and 15007. in October following, G. F. agreed that within three calendar months after the death of E. S. he would, in case he should become entitled as such devisee, convey the said premises to the plaintiff and make a good title thereto; and in case he should not become entitled as such devisee, or should not be able to make a good title to the said premises within six calandar months from the decease of the said E. S., that he would then repay the said sum of 20007. to the plaintiff, but without interest. A policy of assurance on the life of G. F. was assigned by deed to the plaintiff as a security for the payment of the 20007., and upon this deed, to which the defendant was a party as surety for the payment of the premiums to the insurance office, the action of covenant was brought. The case did not turn upon the policy, but it was objected that the whole transaction was void; first, as being the sale of a pretended title under the 32 H. 8, c. 9; and, secondly, "because that at the time of the making of the said contract for securing the said benefits to the said plaintiff upon the decease of the said E. S., the said plaintiff had not nor had he at any time any interest in the said event, or in the life or death of the said E. S., whereby by force of the stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 38, the said agreement was void and of none effect," or that it amounted to a policy of insurance by the plaintiff on the life of E. S., in which life he had no insurable interest. The first objection was overruled in the course of the argument. As to the second, the judgment of the Court was delivered by Lord Campbell, C. J., to the following effect :-"Although the contract may resemble an insurance on the life of E. S., in that the plaintiff advances money for a benefit to be received from G. F. upon her death, yet it has circumstances which are not incidents *to a life insurance. The intention of G. F. is to obtain a present sum of [*18] money; the intention of the plaintiff is to obtain the assignment of an expected devise, and if there should not be such a devise, a repayment of the money without interest. The death of E. S. is made important only for the purpose of ascertaining whether there be or be not the (e) Lucena v. Crawford, 2 Bos. & P. 324. and unmarried." They had one son, and no other children; and the marriage *having been dissolved by Act of Parliament, the [*15] plaintiff married again, and effected a policy with the Asylum Life Office on the 13th of February, 1826, for two years upon the life of his son, to provide against his death before he attained the age of twenty-one years. The son did attain that age on the 2nd of June, 1827, and on the 5th of January following made his will, and thereby gave all his real and personal estate to his father, and appointed him sole executor, and died on the 11th of the same month. In an action against the office, Lord Tenterden nonsuited the plaintiff, on the ground that, not having any pecuniary interest in the life of his son at the time when he effected the policy, the same was void under the statute; giving him liberty to move to enter a nonsuit if the Court should be of opinion that he had an insurable interest. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Bailey, J. said, "It is enacted by the 3rd section of the 14th Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 3, that no greater sum shall be recovered than the amount of the value of the interest of the insured in the life or lives. Now, what was the amount or value of the interest of the party insuring in this case? Not one farthing. Certainly it has been said that there are numerous instances in which a father has effected an insurance on the life of his son. If a father, wishing to give his son some property to dispose of, make an insurance on his son's life in his (the son's) name, not for his (the father's) own benefit, but for the benefit of his son, there is no law to prevent his doing so; but that is a transaction quite different to the present; and if a notion prevails that such an insurance as the one in question is valid, the sooner it is corrected the better." In the argument upon this case it was urged that by the statute of Elizabeth, (d) a father falling into poverty in his old age, was entitled to a maintenance by his son if able to support him, and that the maintenance which the parish must give, may be much less than that which a son would be ordered to pay. But this argument did not vary the decision. [*16] Neither can a child who has attained his majority have any greater insurable interest in the life of his parent, as such, than the parent in the life of the child; but it must not be supposed that a husband or father may not insure the life of his wife or his child, or a child that of his parent, when he is possessed of any interest in property dependent upon the life in question. 12. The mere chance or expectancy which a person may have as the heir or next kin of another will not give him an insurable interest in the life of his ancestor, although the premature death of the latter might deprive the former of property which might otherwise devolve upon him. The idiocy or incurable lunacy of the ancestor does not vary the rule which has been thus illustrated. Suppose A. to be possessed of a ship, limited to B. in case A. dies without issue; that A. has twenty children, the eldest of whom is twenty years of age, and B. is ninety years of age; it is a moral certainty that B. will never come into possession, yet this (d) 43 Elizabeth, c. 2, s. 7; 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 26; 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 78. |