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officers are paid; and it offers a premium for bringing in new risks, The only condition of membership is a certain condition of health and probability of duration of life. The case presented is not that of an organization whose primary object, is social, literary or benevolent, and to which a feature of mutual insurance is added for the purpose of mutual aid. Such associations may exist which can not be said to be carrying on the business of insurance, and with which, we suppose, it was not the intention of the legislature to interfere.

We think that plaintiff is entitled to judgment, and it is so ordered. All the judges concur.

NOTE.- Article 8, Wag. Stats., under which defendant justifies, is entitled "Benevolent, Religions and Educational Associations." Section 1 (as amended, see act of 1874, p. 22), reads: "Any lodge of Freemasons, or Odd-Fellows, divisions of Sons of Temperance, Grange, subordinate grange or county council of Patrons of Husbandry, or any other association organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or any library company, school, college or other association organized for the promotion of literature, science or art, or any gymnastic or other association organized for the purpose of promoting either of the objects above named, and for all similar purposes, by whatever name they may be known, consisting of not less than three persons, and also any association of merchants and others in any incorporated city, organized not for pecuniary profit, but as a board of trade, or chamber of commerce, or exchange, or under any other name, for the general promotion of trade and commerce, or of any special branch thereof, in such city, consisting of not less than nine persons, may be constituted and declared a body politic and corporate, with all the privileges, and subject to all the liabilities and restrictions contained in this act" (chapter).

Sec. 2 provides for filing articles and petitions for incorporation with circuit court.

Sec. 3 provides that the circuit judge, if he "shall be of the opinion that said articles of association be not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the United States, or of this state," shall permit the articles to be filed with the clerk, and issue a ce rtificate of incorporation in prescribed form." Sec. 4 provides for amendments to articles of association. Sec. 5 provides for churches becoming incorporated. Sec. 6 provides for corporate meetings. Sec. 7 authorizes raising of money; 8, for record of proceedings; 9, fees of clerks. In 1874 (p. 23), a new section was added authorizing colleges to confer degrees, and in 1877 three new sections were added, providing for the consolidation of companies and the merger of their charters. This is the substance of article 8 as it is now in force.

The sections of the insurance laws (ch. 76, art. 2, Wag. Stats.), in point are:

"Sec. 1. That any number of persons not less than thirteen may associate and form a company for the purpose of making assurance upon the lives of individuals, and every assurance pertaining thereto, or connected therewith, and to grant, purchase and dispose of annuities and endowments of every kind and description whatsoever."

Sec. 4 requires corporators to file in the office of superintendent of insurance a declaration containing copy of proposed charter.

Sec. 10 requires the superintendent to submit the charter to the attorney-general of the state, who examines it, and if found by him correct, he returns it to the superintendent; the superintendent then delivers certified copy to corporators, and they become a body corporate, authorized to receive subscriptions.

Secs. 11 and 12 provide that when the company has subscriptions, or proposals for insurance of a prescribed character and amount, and that it has certain amount of moneys or stocks or bonds, and has deposited with the superintendent a certain amount of securities, he shall issue a certificate of authority to commence business, which is filed with the recorder of the county, and is the authority of the company.

Secs 19 and 21 prohibit any home companies from doing business in the state until they make a deposit of securities with the superintendent.

Sec. 36, as amended (see acts of 1874, p. 81, § 3), provides that "No company shall transact in this state any business mentioned in the first section of this act, unless it shall first procure from said superintendent a certificate stating that the foregoing requirements have been complied with, and authorizing it to do business. * Every such company shall be required to procure annually, for the use of its agents and solicitors, copies of a renewal certificate of authority hereinafter provided for."

(Before the amen lment of 1874, sec. 36 read: "no such company mentioned in the 13th section of this act shall transact in this state any business mentioned in the first section thereof, unless," etc. The companies mentioned in the thirteenth section are stock and mutual companies.)

The 46th sec. (Wag. Stats., p. 756, ch. 76), reads: "No company organized under the provisions of this act shall undertake any business or risks, except as herein provided," etc. As amended in 1874 (acts 1874. p. 81, § 5), sec. 46, reads: "That no individual or association of individuals, under any style or name, shall be permitted to do the business mentioned in the first section of this act within this state, unless he or they shall first fully comply with all the provisions of the laws of this state governing the business of life assurance."

Sec 53. repeals the old assurance laws (chs. 67 and 90 G. S. 1865), and all other acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the act.

THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF REASONABLE BELIEF.

Two cases of some importance, on the subject of the effect, in the eye of the law, of reasonable belief, as affording an excuse for a certain course of action, are reported in the current number of Cox's Criminal Cases. One of them is a decision of the Queen's Bench Division in this country, and in it the question arose as to how far reasonable belief may be an answer to an action for malicious prosecution. The facts of the case to which we refer (Lowe v. Collum, 13 C. C. C. 641) were briefly as follows: The plaintiff and defendant had a serious dispute about business matters. The defendant received a letter threatening his life, which letter, after showing it to his wife and son, he forwarded to the authorities at Dublin Castle, together with a letter, stating that he believed the threatening letter to have been written by the plaintiff, and enclosing another admittedly in the handwriting of the plaintiff. In consequence of this, criminal proceedings were instituted by the Government, and the plaintiff was prosecuted at Petty Sessions; and on the hearing of the summons, which, however, was dismissed, the defendant gave evidence as a witness against the plaintiff. He had, also, sworn an information against him. The plaintiff then brought the present action for maliciously causing the summons to be issued. One of the issues knit on the pleadings was whether the defendant did the act mentioned in the plaint: and this issue seems to have been submitted

to the jury by the learned judge who tried the case (Mr. Sergeant Armstrong), with the observation that there was evidence proper for their consideration to sustain the affirmative of that issue-namely, the defendant's act in swearing the information, followed by the prosecution in fact. On this portion of the case Mr. Justice Fitzgerald's observations are worthy of notice: "If the first issue had been left to the jury with that instruction only, I should have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that in this particular case the instruction was erroneous. The case is peculiar. There is no doubt that the prosecution was in fact instituted and carried on, and the summons sued out at the instance of the public prosecutor and not the defendant, and further, that the actual position of the defendant in making his information was a witness alone. Prima facie, therefore, he is not responsible for the prosecution, and the mere making of the information, followed by the subsequent proceedings at Petty Sessions, would not make him liable. He may, however, on other grounds be answerable. The defendant set the authorities in motion by his letter to the Chief Secretary, and if he then entertained the opinion and did believe that the letter called the threatening letter was in the plaintiff's handwriting, and laid the case before the authorities with a view to bring the offender to justice, he would not be responsible for the prosecution that followed, even though it was clear he was mistaken, and though the opinion he entertained should subsequently appear to have been unreasonable. But if, on the other hand, the defendant, by a statement willfully false-that is to say, by representing the letter in question to be in the handwriting of the plaintiff, when he either knew it was not, or did not believe that it was-induced the public prosecutor to enter on the enquiry and institute an unfounded prosecution, then he may justly be held responsible for the consequesnces." This latter section of the learned judge's judgment is certainly necessary as a safeguard to the somewhat sweeping doctrine laid down. It would perhaps not have been too much if the doctrine had been a little further qualified by an allusion to what we take to be the undoubted law, as laid down in Perryman v. Lister, R. L. 3 Ex. 197namely, that the absence of inquiry is an element in determining the question of reasonable and probable cause. Although the decision of the Exchequer Chamber in that case was finally reversed in the House of Lords (L. R. 4 H. L. 535), yet this test was accepted as a correct one by their Lordships, while under the circumstances of the case, reversing the judgment for the defendant. Some test of this sort ought, in our opinion, be applied, for otherwise the mere fact of the honesty of the belief would justify an obstinate and vindictive person, who sincerely believed in some delusion, in persecuting a perfectly innocent person. In such a case as this, the protection afforded to a witness might easily be made a method of injustice.

These views will be found, to some extent, endorsed in the judgment of Lord Justice Brett in the other case to which we have alluded, which is reported in the same number of the criminal cases. Clark v. Molyneux, 14 C. C. C., p. 10. The general result of that case may be shortly stated as follows: In an action for libel and slander, the judge ruled that the occasions of publication were privileged, and left the question to the jury whether the defendant honestly and reasonably believed his statement to be true. It was held by the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, that this was a misdirection, and that there must be a new trial; because it had not been explained to the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, and because the reasonableness of the defendant's belief was immaterial. It is, however, chiefly for the observations of Lord Justice Brett that the case is valuable in the pres

ent connection. After alluding to the fact of the communication being privileged, he proceeds: "If he does not use the occasion for the reason for which the privilege was given, but uses it for some indirect and wrong reason or motive of his own, then there is malice. There are certain tests as to when malice exists. It is not malice as in pleading that is to be understood by the expression in cases of this kind, but it means a wrong feeling in the defendant's mind. There are two tests to show whether there is malice, when defamatory statements have been published on a privileged occasion. If it is proved that the defendant stated what he knew at the time to be false, then everybody assumes the existence of malice, and that he acted from a wrong motive, and no one inquires what the motive was. But, supposing it is not proved that the defendant knew at the time that what he stated was false, still he may not be acting for the reason for which the privilege was given; and if from anger or any wrong motive he states as true what he does not know to be true, the jury may infer that he did not make the statement for the true reason, but that he made it from an indirect motive; and if he has acted for any other reason than that for which the privilege is given, he would not be protected." His Lordship further observes-and this part of his judgment clearly would seem to be in support of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald's statement-"I apprehend that if he did believe the statements to be true, and if want of belief in their truth was the only thing tending to show malice alleged against him, the only question would be, not would a reasonable man believe the statements to be true, but did the defendant believe them. The test of stupidity and obstinacy is not a fair one-for stupidity or obstinacy would only be evidence tending to show that the belief was not genuine." However this may be, in our humble opinion it is quite possible that honesty and stupidity, or vindictiveness, may co-exist to such an extent as ought to render a person liable in damages, even though he might really believe in the truth of his statements. The rule, at any rate, laid down in Perryman v. Lister would seem to be a sound one, and not lightly to be overlooked.

An interesting and instructive case on this subject will be found reported in the New Zealand Jurist, New Series, Vol. I, p, 21, which would seem to point to the fact that juries in the colonies are permitted at least as wide a latitude as would be allowed in this country. In that case, Blakely v. Rolland, an action for malicious prosecution, Williams, J., observes-, "The reasonableness of belief was admitted by the defendant to be a question for the jury, but he contended that in the present case there was no dispute at all as to the facts, or as to inferences of facts, as all the evidence was adduced by the plaintiff, and there was no conflict of evidence. It seems to me that although the facts are undisputed, yet there may be various inferences from these facts, and that such inferences were rightly left to the jury." It may be questioned whether this decision is sustainable in point of law. The true doctrine, in our opinion, as to the province of a jury in cases of this nature will be found decided in a recent American case, reported in the April number of the Virginia Law Reporter, Vol. II, p. 217. In that case, Womack v. Circle, Burks, J., says-"The question of probable cause is a mixed proposition of law and fact. The existence of the facts and circumstances is a question of fact for the jury, their sufficiency a question of law for the court. It was so held by Lord Mansfield and Lord Loughborough in the celebrated case of Johnston v. Sutton, 1 Term R. 510." This, in our opinion, is the correct statement of the law. The New Zealand case, if followed, would place the jury in a position which trenches too closely on the province of the judge. Lord Chelmsford's dictum in Lister v. Perryman (p. 535) is-" No definite rule can

be laid down for the exercise of the judge's judgment. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances, and the result is a conclusion drawn by each judge for himself, whether the facts found by the jury, in his opinion, constitute a defence to the action. The verdict in cases of this description is only nominally the verdict of a jury." In conclusion, we may observe that in Coulter v. The Dublin and Belfast Junction Railway Company, 9 I. L. T. Rep. 212, Barry, J. has very lucidly pointed out the distinction between the evidence of malice supplied in an action for malicious prosecution by the absence of probable cause, and that supplied in an action for libel by the unexcused publication of defamatory matter; showing that, in the former, if the judge decides that there is a want of probable cause, that want is merely evidence from which the jury may infer malice, while, in the latter, if the judge decides that there was no lawful excuse for the publication, the jury must, from its defamatory nature, infer that the defendant was actuated by a malicious motive.-[Irish Law Times.

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POLICY OF INSURANCE-VOIDABLE-CONTRACT.A policy of insurance provided that on the failure of the assured to pay an installment of the premium note, the policy should be void during the continuance of such non-payment: Held, the policy was not rendered void by such non-payment, but simply voidable by the company, and the premium note was not void nor voidable by the payee thereof, and the company might maintain its suit upon the note. By the terms of the policy, if the assured paid the note without suit, such payment restored the suspended animation of the policy, and if he paid it at the end of an execution the payment would have the same effect. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-American Insurance Co. v. Henley.

TENDER-SUFFICIENCY OF REFUSAL.-Tenders are to be considered strictly, and if they are not legal in every respect, even a court of equity will not support them nor supply defects. The refusal of a tender must be absolute, and a refusal "till I consult my attorney," does not amount to a refusal in law. It is the duty of the debtor who owes money to seek his creditor and pay his debt wherever the creditor may be found in the state. Where the note upon which a tender was made was deposited in bank, in a sealed envelope: Held, that the bank had no authority to break the envelope, and was not authorized to receive the money due upon the note, and a tender to the bank was therefore insufficient. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.— King v. Finch.

RAILROADS-NEGLIGENCE- PLEADING.-It is well settled that a person may set a fire on his own premises for any lawful purpose, and is not liable for the injury such fire may inflict upon the property of others, unless he is guilty of negligence in permitting the fire to escape; that is, in keeping, taking care of and controlling such fire. 107 Mass. 494; 44 Barb. 424. Hence, where the charge was that the defendant" set fire to rubbish and trash along and upon the grounds which the defendant used for the purpose of operating trains of cars upon its road, which fire did communi

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CHATTEL MORTGAGE WITHOUT ACTUAL CONSIDERATION-RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE. Where a chattel mortgage not securing negotiable paper is given for a sum named, but really to secure future advances, and none have been made, an assignee, though taking it for value and in good faith, supposing it to have been given for an actual indebtedness, has no rights superior to those of the mortgagee. Opinion by COOLEY, J.— Judge v. Vogel.

REMOVAL OF FENCE-SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARIES-DEDICATION. In an action against highway commissioners for removing plaintiff's fence, evidence that a survey had been made with plaintiff's consent to fix the line of the highway, and that plaintiff promised to remove his fence accordingly is admissible as showing not a dedication by parol, but one by unequivocal present conduct, involving the concurrent action of the land owner and the highway authorities in determining the lines by a survey made for the express purpose. Opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J.-McMillan v. McCormick.

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CONTEMPT OF COURT FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.-1. The conveyance and transfer of his property, by a husband, in anticipation of his wife's filing a libel against him for a divorce and alimony, and with intent to prevent the execution of any decree for alimoney that she might obtain, are a fraud upon her for which she might in proper form have redress. Burrows v. Purple, 107 Mass. 428, 435. 2. But such acts could not of themselves constitute a contempt of court, because a person can not be in contempt of court for disobedience of an order not yet passed, and of which therefore he can not have had notice. Thompson v

Basillkew, 3 Ch. Rep. 114; Winslow v. Nayson, 113 Mass. 411; In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 169. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.-Stuart v. Stuart.

INSURANCE-EVIDENCE- DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.—In an action upon a policy of insurance covering the "fixed and movable machinery, engine, lathes and tools," of the plaintiffs, who were manufacturers of machinery made of cast iron, it was Held (1), that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the parties intended to include wooden patterns which were necessary to make the castings for the machinery, under the general term of "tools," there being no ambiguity in the terms of the policy, and no claim that its meaning was modified by any understood or established usage. 2. That the term "tools" may be interpreted as covering all patterns which from their size and shape admit of being applied and managed by the hands of one man. Opinion by AMES, J.-Lovewell. v. Relief Ins. Co.

CHECK-CONSIDERATION— INSTRUCTION. — In an action of contract by the indorsee of a check drawn by defendant in favor of one C, in payment of a balance of account claimed by him and supposed by the defendant to be due him for services, it appeared that the plaintiff held the check merely for collection for C, and that C was to be paid a specified sum per month. The defendant claimed and offered evidence tending to show that C did not render the service; that if he rendered any service he had been paid in full for it when the check was given, and that, if not, the services were of less value above the amount already paid him than the amount of the check. The court instructs the jury that the same defense was open to the defendant against the plaintiff as against C; that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show a sufficient consideration for the check; that if C had broken his contract for services with the defendant, the defendant was entitled to have damages for such breach set off against the check by way of recoupment or defense in whole or in part. Held, that this instruction was not open to exception. Opinion by SOULE, J.-Magen Furnace Co. v. Boston Soapstone F. Co.

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INSURANCE-"OTHER INSURANCE"-MISREPRESENTATION.-1. The stipulations in a policy against other insurance are not violated by "other insurance" which is not legal insurance. The true issue is whether the policy which is said to violate the stipulation was really binding on the insurer. 2. When the insured signs a printed form of application filled up by the agent of the company which he was not asked to read, and which he is not given time to read intelligently, the fact that such form contains a misrepresentation of a material fact will not necessarily defeat a recovery where the insured appears to have acted in good faith, and to have answered truly and frankly all inquiries made of him by the agents of the company at the time of the insurance. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Dahlberg v. St. Louis F. & M. Ins. ADMINISTRATION-SURETIES-LIABILITY-SETTLEMENT.-1. In a proceeding under the statute (Wag. p. 81, sec. 67), to ascertain the amount in the hands of an administrator when his term expires, and to order the rendition of the same to his successor and to enforce the order against his sureties, where there are two successive bonds, and the sureties on each bond are liable for the total defalcation, the sureties on both bonds are properly made parties to the proceeding, and judg· ment may be rendered against all for the amount found due. 2. Where money is paid on the general liability by one who is a surety on both bonds, in the absence of any directions, it will be applied on his liability on the oldest bond. 3. The annual sworn settlement of the administrator is competent, in such a proceeding, as an admission, though it is not conclusive. Statements in it may be contradicted by the party by whom it is offered. Affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Lewis v. Gambs et al.

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ADMISSIONS-ESTOPPEL-PARTITION AGAINST MINOR DEFENDANTS.-1. Admissions made in ignorance of one's legal rights, without any intention of influencing the conduct of another, and which are not shown to have had that effect, do not estop the person making the incautious admission afterwards to assert the truth. 2. Proceedings in partition against minor defendants who were not served with process are void, and could not be cured by any proceedings under the act of Nov. 21, 1857. Acts 1857, adj. sess. p. 52. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.Hall v. Cavenaugh.

WHERE THE MAKER OF A NEGOTIABLE NOTE IS DEAD, the note should be presented at maturity to his administrator, if he can be found with reasonable exertion; and, if no effort be made to make demand upon the administrator, the fact that the notary to whom the note was given for presentment did not

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[In response to many requests from lawyers in all parts of the country, we have decided to commence again the publication of questions of law sent to us by subscribers. We propose to make this essentially a subscriber's department-i. e., we shall depend, to a large extent, upon them to edit this column. Queries will be numbered consecutively during the year, and correspondents are requested to bear this in mind when sending answers.]

QUERIES.

37. SURETIES-CONTRIBUTION. A B C & D were sureties on E's bond as administrator of an estate. D sold said administrator (E) real estate, the debts not yet having been paid, receiving therefor moneys belonging to said estate. At the time there was in the hands of the administrator assets in the shape of notes amply sufficient to pay all indebtedness of the estate, which were subsequently converted by the administrator to his own use. A judgment was taken on the bond for the remaining debts, and execution paid by each of the sureties-the administrator being insolvent. Can the sureties, A B & C, recover of D. their co-surety, the money received by him to the amount they paid. F.

BOOK NOTICE.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL AND EXECUTION SALES. By DAVID RORER, of the Iowa Bar. Second Edition. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1878. It seems more proper to speak of this as a new work than as a second edition of the author's treatise on judicial and execution sales, published several years ago. The first edition has had such a complete revision as to render it hard to recognize. The principles stated have been re-examined and more thoroughly discussed. A large number of new cases have been added. Its size is increased by over two hundred pages. Much of it has been re-arranged, and most of it re-written. Its index has been made more complete than ever. Under these circumstances it can not be doubted that the favor which was extended to this work on its first appearance will be doubled in the reception of the present edition. The profession are indebted to the author for a book on a branch of the law which other treatises on the shelves of a lawyer's library do not fully enter into. The matter of this treatise is of daily concern to the practitioner, and we know of no other work which can take its place.

NOTES.

In the case of State ex rel. Circuit Attorney v. Citizens Benefit Association, published in this issue, the Court of Appeals rendered a verbal decision on the 18th inst. The defendant applied for an appeal to the Supreme Court. The application was resisted on the ground that a judgment of ouster against a corporation for usurpation of a franchise was not within any of the causes or cases enumerated in sec. 12, art. 6, of the Constitution granting appeals or writs of error. The court held the point well taken and refused an appeal.

In an address before the Iowa Bar Association, delivered last month, and which has since been published in pamphlet form (Mills & Co., Des Moines, Ia.), Judge Dillon gave an interesting historical sketch and description of Westminister Hall and the English Inns of Court. It is there where the Judges of England have sat and the lawyers have been trained for centuries, and to the American lawyer there is an interest attaching to these places which makes Judge Dillon's sketch highly entertaining and not uninstructive. As Thackeray says of them: "These venerable Inns which have the Lamb and Flag and the Winged Horse for their signs, have attractions for the persons who inhabit them, and a share of rough comfort and freedom, which men always remember with pleasure. I don't know whether the student of law permits himself the refreshment of enthusiasm, or indulges in poetical reminiscences as he passes by historical chambers, and says, 'Yonder Eldon lived-upon this side Coke mused upon Lyttleton-here Chitty toiledhere Barnwell and Alderson joined in their famous labors-here Byles composed his great work upon Bills, and Smith compiled his immortal Leading Cases -here Gustavus still toils, with Solomon to aid him'; but the man of letters can't but love the place which has been inhabited by so many of brethren, or peopled by their creations as real to us at this day as the authors whose children they were-and Sir Roger de Coverly walking in the Temple Garden, and discoursing with Mr. Spectator about the beauties in hoops and patches who are sauntering over the grass, is just as lively a figure to me as old Samuel Johnson rolling through the fog with the Scotch gentleman at his heels on their way to Dr. Goldsmith's chambers in Brick Court; or Henry Fielding, with inked ruffles, and a wet towel around his head, dashing off articles at mid

night for the Covent Garden Journal, while the printer's boy is asleep in the passage."

The Law Times, of a recent date, contains a short sketch of the history of the law as to admitting evidence touching the disposition, motives and character of witness and prisoners. It has, during the last few years, undergone considerable changes. In Queen Caroline's case, 2 Br. & B. 284, the common law judges having been summoned by the House of Lords, laid down the following rule, which touches but does not decide the point in question: "If, on the trial of an action or indictment, a witness, examined on the part of the plaintiff or prosecutor, upon crossexamination by defendant's counsel, state that at a time specified he told A that he was one of the witnesses against the defendant, and, being re-examined by the plaintiff's or prosecutors counsel, states what induced him to mention that to A, the plaintiff's or prosecutor's counsel can not further re-examine the witness as to such conversation, even so far only as it relates to his being one of the witnesses." The ruling of eight judges against one (Best, J., dissenting), was confirmed by the house. In the eighth year of William III, Sir John Friend was indicted for treason. A Capt. Blair, who had received some kindnesses from the accused, was the chief witness against him. Another witness was called who knew nothing against the accused personally, but was able to confirm the statements of the first, so far as to prove that the statements were not a recent invention. 13 Howell's State Trials, 32 Gilbert & Buller, are conflicting authorities on the rule as to whether, in answer to proofs of statements made by a witness in variance with his testimony at the trial, evidence may be given by the party who called the witness that he confirmed the same thing on other occasions, and is still consistent with himself. Russell, Vol. 3, p. 593, holds that the better opinion seems to be that evidence is not admissible, except in cases where counsel on the other side impute a design to misrepresent from some motive of interest or relationship. Even during the Stuart State Trials it was allowed to discredit a witness by proving subornation or corruption. Thus, on his trial for high treason, A. D. 1679, Richard Langhorne, after arguing that Oates and Bedlow, having received pardons, were to be treated as approvers, continued: "I desire to know whether they have not received any rewards or gratifications for the discovery they have made, and the service they have done." Mr. Justice Pemberton replied: "Do you think, Mr. Langhorne, that the King will bribe his witnesses?" But Lord Chief Justice Scroggs put the first part of the question to Oates, who, however, evaded it; and Lord Chief Justice North told the prisoner, if he could suppose there was any subornation or corruption, to call his witnesses and prove it. R. v. Langhorne, 7 Howell, 446. In Lord Stafford's case, evidence was admitted to show that a witness had offered a bribe, the object being to show that he was so affected towards the party accused as to be willing to adopt any corrupt course in order to carry out his purpose. 7 Howell, S. T. 1400. Even the turbulence of the Popish plots and the highhanded proceedings of Chief Justice Jefferies and Scroggs did not upset the practice of calling witnesses to character. One Benjamin Harris, a bookseller, was indicted for causing to be printed and sold a libel, entitled "An appeal from the country to the city for the representation of His Majesty's personal liberty, property and the Protestant religion." One neighbor was called who looked upon him as a fair conditioned, quiet, peaceable man, and so reputed among his neighbors. Another neighbor had never heard of him that he was wont to oppose or scandalize the king or government.

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