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was entitled, it is plain that before the next person could receive a shilling the whole of the debts should be paid, and the personal representative would receive it chargeable with those debts. Now, see whether this case is not even stronger when the same individual is clothed with all these capacities. He takes the fund for his own benefit, and for this reason: as the personal representative of B., he takes it for the benefit of her estate; and he takes it as the representative of A. as his estate; and he takes it for the benefit of the three children, or for the benefit of B., who was entitled to their shares. Each estate in respect of which he claims he must be considered as treating as an estate for the benefit of those for whom he receives the money, or, in other words, he is a trustee for himself. In considering the matter in various points of view, it comes to the same proposition: that he must be considered as retaining for the benefit of each personal estate represented by himself. So I would consider this case if there was no authority, but we are not left without authority; and I cannot distinguish the case from The AttorneyGeneral v. Malkin.'

A question arose whether the principle of these decisions could be reviewed with reference to the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, ss. 14 and 18, and was finally disposed of in the case of Attorney-General v. Cleave (31 L. T. N. S. 86). The facts were these: A testator bequeathed a sum of money to a person for life, and after her death to her children absolutely. The life tenant died in 1870. Two of her children predeceased her, leaving their father, who also predeceased the tenant for life, their sole next of kin, and the executors of his will paid legacy duty on the value of the reversionary interests of his children. The Crown claimed legacy duty upon the

passing of the children's interests to their father. The claim was resisted on the ground that the reversionary interests were successions within the meaning of the Succession Duty Act, and fell within the provisions of ss. 14 and 18 of that Act. The Court were unanimously of the opinion that legacy duty was payable upon each devolution, and gave judgment accordingly.

Where there is a gift of a charge on real estate to the owner of or person entitled to the real estate, and the charge merges, there is a satisfaction of a legacy within the meaning of the Schedule, Part III. of the 55 Geo. III. c. 184.

In the case of The Attorney-General v. Metcalfe (6 Ex. 26), Lord Eardley and his son by deed, in 1800, conveyed certain real estates to trustees, to the use (subject to a term to secure a rent charge of £2000 to the son during their joint lives) of Lord Eardley for life, remainder to the son for life, remainder to the first and other sons of the son in tail, remainder over; with a joint power to revoke such uses and declare others. In 1814 they executed this joint power by deed, which recited that Lord Eardley was not possessed of personal property sufficient, in the event of his death, to discharge all the debts he might probably owe, and such legacies as he might probably leave, without a sale of his family pictures, plate, &c.; and that therefore the son had agreed, for the accommodation of Lord Eardley, to join him in charging the said lands with £50,000, to be raised after Lord Eardley's death, and applied in augmentation of his personal estate, and that Lord Eardley had agreed to charge the estates with £20,000 to be raised after Lord Eardley's death for the use of the son; and that it had been agreed that the pictures, &c., should be assigned to trustees. The deed then went on to revoke the

former uses; and it was thereby directed that the estates should be to the use of the trustees upon trust (among other things) within six months after Lord Eardley's death, to raise by sale such sum not exceeding £50,000, as should be necessary to make good the deficiency of Lord Eardley's personal estate in payment of his debts and legacies, and in aid of the same. The estates were

then settled as before to the use of Lord Eardley for life, with remainder to his son and his issue, with remainder in undivided thirds to his three daughters, Lady Saye and Sele and two others, for their lives respectively, remainder to their sons in tail: and Lord Eardley assigned all his pictures, plate, &c., to trustees, to go as heir-looms. Lord Eardley by his will and codicil gave, amongst other legacies, to his executors two sums of £10,000 in trust for his daughter Lady Saye and Sele, to be subject to her appointment. The son died without issue in the lifetime of Lord Eardley, whose personal estate, after his death in 1824, was not sufficient for payment of his debts and legacies without a part of the £50,000 out of which it was necessary to provide for the payment of the legacies to Lady Saye and Sele. The respective estates tail in the undivided thirds of the estates were barred by virtue of common recoveries ; and a partition was made, one share being limited to such uses as Lady Saye and Sele and her husband, and their eldest son, or the survivors of them, should jointly appoint; and it was agreed that instead of raising the legacies they should be charged upon the estates in proper proportions. The sums apportioned to the other daughters and their sons were paid at once to the trustees, leaving a large amount to be, and which was in January 1827 charged on Lady Saye and Sele's own share of the estates, the same being secured by a term

created for the purpose, and vested in the trustees. Lady Saye and Sele, by virtue of the power in her father's will, appointed by deed the sums received by the trustees on account of her legacies to her husband, and directed that the residue should be paid, in default of her further appointment, to her husband: she died in 1834 without having made any further appointment. Lord Saye and Sele and his son, in 1836, by deed conveyed the estates, subject to the said term, to the use of themselves and the survivor in fee. On the death of Lord Saye and Sele in 1844, his son became seised of the said estates, and as residuary legatee of his father entitled to the residue of the legacies charged thereon; and the trustees at his desire, in July 1845, surrendered the estate, in lieu of selling it to realise the amounts charged upon it; so that the term created in January 1827 became merged in the inheritance. The Crown claimed legacy duty on the two sums of £10,000 so satisfied: and it was held that legacy duty was payable; that the £50,000 stipulated for by the testator as a fund for the payment of his debts and legacies was personal estate; and that the fact that the legacy and the land upon which it was charged had devolved upon the same person, whereby it became unnecessary for the trustees to realise the money by the sale of the land, was equivalent to satisfaction of the legacies within the meaning of the Schedule, Part III. of the Act of 55 Geo. III. c. 184. In giving judgment, Pollock, C.B., said that by the arrangement between Lord Eardley and his son, "Lord Eardley transfers in trust a certain portion of his personal estate, and receives in return a power to charge the estate; that is, in substance, a mortgage, which therefore is personal estate." Parke, B.: "The transaction is equivalent to this: Lord Eardley being possessed of valuable ornamental furniture,

transferred it to his son for a mortgage of the estate by the latter. That being so, that mortgage was personal property, and all the legacies payable by means of that mortgage would be payable out of personal estate. I think this charge of £50,000, or so much of that sum as would be required to satisfy the legacies left by him under his will, was meant to be personal estate, and always was personal estate, and consequently it falls within the 55 Geo. III. c. 184: and the only question is, whether that is paid or satisfied. Part of it has been paid or satisfied out of what was clearly the personal estate of the testator, irrespective of this mortgage. With respect to that, the defendants admit there is no question. The remainder is satisfied by a compromise with the person who was entitled to the real estate and has paid off the mortgage. It comes, therefore, to just the same thing; and I think clearly the duty attaches." Alderson, B., and Martin, B., were of the same opinion.

The Manner in which the Duty is Payable.

A gift of a legacy or share of residue to a person absolutely is chargeable with duty on the corpus or capital value—and this although the gift may be liable to be defeated by a contingency. See sec. 17 of the 36 Geo. III. c. 52.

A gift to a person with a general power of appointment of property which in default of appointment would belong to such person, is to be regarded as an absolute gift. See sec. 18, Part iii. of the 36 Geo. III. c. 52.

It is scarcely necessary to add that in the case of an acquisition of a share of residue under intestacy the duty is similarly payable upon the capital value.

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