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continues in active service in India until the time of his death.

The personal assets of a British testator having a foreign domicil are not subject to legacy duty, although such assets are afterwards remitted to this country by an executor who has proved the will abroad to executors who have proved the will in England, and are administered under a decree of the Court of Chancery here. See Jackson v. Forbes (2 Cr. & J. 382), which in effect overruled the decision in Attorney-General v. Cockerell (1 Pri. 165); and Attorney-General v. Beatson (7 Pri. 560).

The question of domicil with respect to legacy duty became clearly settled in 1845 by the case of Thomson v. The Advocate-General (12 Cl. & Fin. 1, &13 Sim. 153), in the House of Lords, which was a writ of error from the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in Scotland, given for the Crown on an information for legacy duty. John Grant, a native of Scotland, died domiciled in Demerara, possessed of personal property in Scotland. The plaintiff had proved the testator's will, so far as related to his Scotch property, out of which, in pursuance of the will, legacies had been paid to Scotch legatees. The case was twice argued, the second time before the judges, and the following question was put to them by the House: A., a British-born subject, born in England, resided in a British colony. He made his will and died domiciled there. At the time of his death he had debts owing to him in England. His executors in England collected these debts, and out of the money so collected paid legacies to certain legatees in England. The question is, are such legacies liable to the payment of duty? In answer to which, Sir N. Tindall, C.J., delivered the unanimous opinion of the judges who had heard the case argued, that such

legacies were not liable to the payment of legacy duty. "It is admitted in all the decided cases, that the very general words of the statute, 'every legacy given by any will or testamentary instrument of any person,' must of necessity receive some limitation in their application, for they cannot in reason extend to every person, everywhere, whether subjects of this kingdom or foreigners, and whether at the time of their death domiciled within the realm or abroad. And as your lordships' question applies only to legacies out of personal estate strictly and properly so called, we think such necessary limitation is that the statute does not extend to the will of any person who at the time of his death was domiciled out of Great Britain, whether the assets are locally situate within England or not. For we cannot consider that any distinction can be properly made between debts due to the testator from persons resident in the country in which the testator is domiciled at the time of his death, and debts due to him from debtors resident in another and different country; but that all such debts do equally form part of the personal property of the testator or intestate, and must all follow the same rule, namely, the law of the domicil of the testator or intestate. And such principle we think may be extracted from all the later decided cases, though sometimes attempts have been made, perhaps ineffectually, to reconcile with them the earlier decisions. There is no distinction whatever between the case proposed to us and that decided in the House of Lords, The AttorneyGeneral v. Forbes (2 Cl. & Fin. 48), except the circumstance that in the present question the personal property is assumed to be, for the purpose of the probate, locally situate in England at the time of the testator's death. But that circumstance was held to be imma

terial in the case of Re Ewin, where it was decided that a British subject dying domiciled in England, legacy duty was payable on his property in the funds of Russia, France, Austria, and America. And again, in the case of Arnold v. Arnold (2 My. & Cr. 256), where the testator, a natural born Englishman, but domiciled in India, died there, it was held by Lord Cottenham, C., that the legacy duty was not payable upon the legacies under his will, his lordship adding: 'It is fortunate that this question, which has been so long afloat, is now finally settled by an authoritative decision. of the House of Lords.' And as to the arguments at your lordships' bar on the part of the Crown, that the proper distinction was, whether the estate was administered by a person in a representative character in this country, and that in case of such administering the legacy duty was payable, we think it is a sufficient answer thereto, that the liability to legacy duty does not depend on the act of the executor in proving the will in this country, or upon his administering here: the question, as it appears to us, not being whether there be administration in England or not, but whether the will and legacy are a will and legacy within the meaning of the statute imposing the duty. For those reasons we think the legacies described in your lordships' question are not liable to the payment of legacy duty." Lords Lyndhurst, C., Brougham, and Campbell were of the same opinion, and it was therefore held that the duty was not payable.

In practice, each particular question of domicil must be decided by a consideration of all the circumstances of the life and conduct of the individual. The only principle which can be laid down as governing all questions of domicil is this, that where a party is alleged

to have abandoned his domicil of origin and to have acquired a new one, it is necessary to show that there was both the act and the intention. The leading case is Udney v. Udney (Sco. App. 1869, vol. i. 441).

The general question of domicil is scarcely within the scope of a work like the present: it will be sufficient to say that it is to be found fully treated of in Dicey's Law of Domicil.

The 45 Geo. III. c. 28, imposed the first charge of 'duty on legacies charged upon or made payable out of any real estate, or out of any moneys to arise from the sale of real estate.

The liability to legacy duty of immovable property, such as leasehold property and real estate pur autre vie (see section 20), is not affected by domicil. See Chatfield v. Berchtoldt (L. R. 7 Ch. App. 192).

The same remark applies to legacies charged upon or made payable out of any real estate or any moneys to arise from the sale of real estate. The liability of such legacies to duty is determined by the local situation of the property out of which they are made payable.

The definition of "a legacy" within the meaning of the Legacy Duty Acts is given in the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 76, s. 4, which applies to all legacies paid after the date (4th August, 1845) when it it was passed.

The devolution of personal estate under a partial or total intestacy is also liable to duty under the Legacy Duty Acts. See 55 Geo. III. c. 184, Schedule, Part III.

Since the 19th May, 1853, the date of the Succession Duty Act, no person has been chargeable, under the Legacy Duty Acts, with duty not then already due in respect of any leasehold hereditaments. See 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, s. 19.

It has been decided that the forgiveness of a debt due to a testator is clearly "a legacy."

In The Attorney-General v. Holbrook (3 Yo. & Jer. 114), which was an information for legacy duty on the amount of principal and interest unpaid on a certain bond, a verdict was taken by consent for the Crown, subject to the opinion of the Court. The will of the testator contained the following words: "And moreover I hereby forgive the bond debt, both principal and interest, due to me and entered into by James Willis and my brother James Holbrook with and for him, for the said James Willis's paying to me the principal sum of £4000 and interest at £4 per cent., being the appraised value of my late brewhouse, buildings, &c.; and do order the said. bond at my decease to be delivered up and cancelled.” The bond, dated in 1787, was the joint and several bond of James Willis and James Holbrook. The interest was paid by Willis up to his death in 1807, and by his executors up to 1811, when the testator died. The question for the Court (in 1823) was whether or not the principal sum was liable to legacy duty, and if so, whether or not the interest which had accrued due thereon was also subject to duty. The Court considered it extremely clear that this was a legacy within the Acts of Parliament, the language of which was large enough to comprehend the case of the forgiveness of a debt. But as to the interest the Court thought the Crown was not entitled, since in the case of a simple bond when the sum of money is appropriated to a legatee, it is his from the time of the death of the testator, and being his then, if it has produced any interest subsequent to that time, it is the consequence of the property having attached to him at the time of the death of the testator, and does not form any part liable to duty: that in fact,

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