Page images

Sec. 22. Duty on property not reduced into money. 23. Duty on legacies not satisfied in money.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors]

24. Legatees refusing to allow duty, liable to pay the costs of any suit.

25. In administration suits, the Court to provide for the payment of duty.

26. Executors, &c., may pay legacies and duty in part.

27. No legacy liable to duty to be paid without a receipt duly stamped. Copy of entry at the office of payment of duty to be evidence. 28. Penalty of 10l. per cent. for paying or receiving legacy without stamped receipt.

29. Receipts to be stamped within twenty-one days after date; and after that time on payment of penalty; but none to be stamped unless duty be paid.

30. Mistakes in paying duty may be rectified by the Commissioners.

31. Persons paying or receiving legacies contrary to this Act indemnified on discovering the other offender.

32. If legatee be an infant or absent, money to
be paid into the Bank. See also 37 Geo.
III. c. 135.

33. Power to the Commissioners to compound
the duty. See also 43 Vict. c. 14, s. 11.
34. If legacy be refunded, duty to be repaid.
35. Executors, previous to retaining their own
legacies, to transmit particulars, &c., to the
Commissioners. See also 28 & 29 Vict. c.
104, Part V.

36. Repealed. See 35 & 36 Vict. c. 63 (Statute
Law Revision).

Sec. 37. If probate or administration be revoked, any duty which has been improperly paid to be returned, or if properly paid to be allowed.

[ocr errors][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small]

38. Persons swearing falsely, guilty of perjury. 39. Penalty of 500l. for altering receipts.

40. Repealed. See 34 & 35 Vict. c. 116.

41. Receipts duly stamped under this Act not liable to receipt duty.

42. Repealed. See 35 & 36 Vict. c. 63.

43. Repealed in effect.


See 31 & 32 Vict. c.

44. Repealed. See 34 & 35 Vict. c. 116.

45. Repealed. See 34 & 35 Vict. c. 116.

[merged small][ocr errors]

46. Temporary.

47. Limitation of actions.

[ocr errors]


The statutes relating to legacy duty in Ireland areThe 54 Geo. III. c. 92.

The 56 Geo. III. c. 56, ss. 115, 128.

The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 82;

which last assimilated the rates of stamp duties in Ireland with those in Great Britain, and consequently made the Schedule to the 55 Geo. III. c. 184, to be as applicable to Ireland as to England.

The 54 Geo. III. c. 92, is, like the 36 Geo. III. c. 52, in Great Britain, the Act that contains the principal regulations for the management and collection of the legacy duty in Ireland.

The history of these Acts is clearly and concisely

considered by Lord St. Leonards, in his judgment in the case of Cleland v. Ker (6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 288), which arose upon sec. 6 of the 54 Geo. III. c. 92. A legacy was charged by a testator upon real and personal estate. The latter proving insufficient, the legacy was satisfied out of the real estate exclusively. It was held by Blackburn, M.R., and Sir Edward Sugden, C., that the legacy was chargeable with duty, notwithstanding the exemption. The Lord Chancellor, after most lucidly analysing the Irish Acts, and comparing with them the English Act upon the subject, considered that the exemption ought to be rejected. The whole section was the same as the 119th section in the 52 Geo. III. c. 126, which had been copied word for word from the 36 Geo. III. c. 52, an Act which was confined to legacies payable out of personal estate, and had been, inadvertently as he supposed, imported from that Act to this (54 Geo. III. c. 92), which extended to legacies charged on real estate.

The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 82, s. 38, which further defined a legacy, was extended by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 76, s. 4, which applies to Ireland.

The subsequent Acts apply equally to Great Britain and Ireland.

It may now be taken for granted that the liability of movable property to legacy duty depends upon domicil. If a person, whether a British-born subject or a foreigner, dies domiciled here, all such property, wherever situate, is liable to the duty; and if he dies domiciled abroad is exempt from the duty; for movable property follows the person, and is considered situate wherever the owner

of it is domiciled. When, therefore, this Act speaks of persons, it must be considered as speaking of persons domiciled in this country, that being the limit of the sphere of the enactment.

In Re Ewin (1 Cr. & J. 151), it was held that America, Austrian, French, and Russian stock, the property of a testator domiciled in this country, is liable to duty; and so in Re Coales (7 M. & W. 390), where a testator domiciled in England made his will, and died in England, and by his will disposed of certain Government notes of the East India Company issued at Calcutta (the amount of which was receivable only under an Indian probate), and appointed an English executor; the executor executed a power of attorney to an agent in India, who thereupon obtained letters of administration with the will annexed in India, under which he received the amount of the notes, and remitted it to the executor in England, who paid it to the legatees. It was held that legacy duty was payable.

Although there may be a manifest intention to acquire a foreign domicil, yet the actual acquisition must be proved in order to exempt property from the operation of this Act. In The Attorney-General v. Dunn (6 M. & W. 511), a British subject domiciled and having real and personal estate in England, went abroad, and purchased in 1828 the title, castle, and estate of Rasina in the States of the Church. He hired Italian domestic servants, male and female, whom he kept at Rasina till his death; he spent large sums in repairs there, which repairs were in progress at the time of his death: he did not make it his constant residence, but from 1828 to 1831 sometimes lived there, and at other times resided in furnished lodgings in different towns in Italy. In 1831 he came to England. In March, 1832,

he sent some plate, books, and wearing apparel to Rasina; in September, 1832, he made his will in England, and left England for Italy, in different parts of which he lived till 1834, when he died. It was held upon these facts that, notwithstanding they indicated an intention to change his domicil, there was no evidence that the testator had actually acquired a foreign domicil; that his English domicil therefore remained, and that legacy duty was consequently payable on the bequests contained in his will.

In The Attorney-General v. Napier (6 Exch. 217), it was decided that a British subject does not lose his English domicil by being on duty in India in Her Majesty's service; and that the whole of his property, though, as in this case, chiefly situate out of England, is liable to legacy duty. But a British subject, by employment in the military service of the East India Company, acquired an Indian domicil. In Craigie v. Lewin (3 Curt. 435), a Scotchman in the Company's service, returned home on leave of absence, animo manendi, but with no intention of abandoning his commission it was held that, notwithstanding the animus manendi, the original domicil did not revive but the Indian domicil remained, the officer still holding his commission and being liable to be called upon to return to do his duty in India. The same rule, it would seem, would apply in the case of British subjects in the civil service of the Company.

This distinction, however, between British subjects in the service of the East India Company and that of Her Majesty seems to be done away with by the Act for the better government of India (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106), except in the case of a person who was in the service of the East India Company prior to August, 1858, and

« PreviousContinue »