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tables annexed to the Act in exactly the same manner as a legacy given by way of annuity. The 36th and 37th sections contain the same provisos as to contingencies as the 8th section of the 36 Geo. III. c. 52. The succession duty in respect of real estate is, however, payable by eight equal half-yearly instalments, and not by four equal yearly instalments. The first instalment is to be paid at the expiration of twelve months after the successor becomes entitled to the receipt of income. If a successor entitled only to a limited interest in a succession or real property dies before some of the instalments of the duty become due, any instalment not due at his decease ceases to be payable. If a successor who is competent to dispose by will of a continuing interest in the real property, the subject of his succession, dies before some of the instalments of the duty become due, the instalments not due at his decease are a continuing charge upon his interest, and must be paid as they fall due by the owner for the time being of the property. See sec. 21.

The words "competent to dispose by will" in the proviso of this section have reference to the quantity of interest in the property, and not to the personal capacity of the successor; consequently duty is chargeable notwithstanding the successor may be, by reason of infancy, lunacy, coverture or the like, incompetent to make a will. In The Attorney-General v. Hallett (2 Hurlst. & Norm. 368), A., being seised in fee of an estate, died in August, 1853, intestate, and among his heirs were a person of unsound mind and a married woman; and it was contended that, inasmuch as by reason of these disabilities they were personally incompetent to dispose by will of a continuing interest in the property, they were therefore not chargeable with duty. But the

Court of Exchequer held the Crown entitled to judgment. Pollock, C.B., said: "If one meaning only can be applied to certain words, it must be presumed that that was the meaning intended; but where the words admit of several meanings, whether in an Act of Parliament or any other instrument, if one of them leads to a manifest absurdity, we are bound to adopt that meaning which does not. Nothing can be more absured than to suppose that the Legislature intended that this tax should be payable in the case of a sane and not of an insane person, there being no reason why it should not be paid by the one as well as by the other. The inconvenience and litigation which would follow, upon making the liability turn upon whether the party was competent to make a will, in the sense of intellectual competency, is quite manifest." Bramwell, B., observed: "The defendant is compelled to admit that the words 'competent to dispose by will of a continuing interest' include competency in respect of interest; and he says that they also mean the personal competency of the individual, and therefore if any successor is personally incompetent on account of the state of his mind, he is within the proviso of the section. If that be so, I do not see why he should not have gone farther and contended, that if a successor died in prison, where no pen, ink, or paper were allowed, he would also be within the proviso; for in that case he would have been physically incompetent, as in this he was mentally incompetent to make a will. Indeed, if the defendant's argument is good, it would follow that if there was any lucid interval, not merely after the succession vested, but if the party was ever sane after he attained the age of twenty-one years; or if he was sane for fifty years before the succession, but afterwards became insane, those would be

cases within the proviso. Again, suppose the successor was incompetent to make a will by reason of his not having attained the age of twenty-one years. These considerations show that the Legislature never could have meant what is contended for by the defendant."

A tenant in tail who disentails the property the subject of his succession, is a successor "competent to dispose by will of a continuing interest." See Lord Lilford v. Attorney-General (L. R. 2 Eng. & Ir. H. L. App. 63).

It may be scarcely necessary to say that a tenant for life, having a general power of appointment, is a successor "competent to dispose by will of a continuing interest."

Although in a case where a successor is his own predecessor, it is necessary to refer to the disposition by which he acquired the power to confer a succession on himself, in order to ascertain the rate of duty, the interest of which he is possessed is to be determined by the disposition made by himself. He may have been "competent to dispose by will of a continuing interest" under the disposition which regulates the rate of the duty; but if he is only tenant for life under the disposition made by himself, his succession is only a life interest, and should he die before some of the instalments become due, they will cease to be payable.

In the case of a succession comprising timber, the yearly rental which the land in its uncultivated state is capable of producing, is to be reckoned as part of the annual value of the real property. The net moneys derived from sales of the timber, when they exceed £10 in any one year, are chargeable with duty upon the interest of the successor in such moneys (sec. 23). The "net moneys" are to be ascertained by deducting from the gross proceeds of sale all expenses in connection

with the sale, and all the expenses of the year in which the sale takes place, in connection with the growth of the timber, and also the expenses, so far as borne by the successor, of felling and bringing to market and repairing damages to property. (See sec. 23.) The duty only attaches to timber which was actually growing on the land at the time when the property became a succession in possession, and not to timber planted by the successor.

Coppice and underwood do not come within the definition of "timber." They are capable of yielding a yearly profit, and the yearly profit which they yield furnishes the material for arriving at their "annual value."

An advowson is real property, but no duty is payable in respect of a succession in an advowson until a sale is made. The sale must be "by or in concert with the successor for money or money's worth." When the sale is effected, the duty is payable upon the amount or value for which the advowson or any right of presentation or interest out of it is disposed of. See sec. 24.

The forms in use in connection with the Succession Duty Act are:

No. 4. For an account of personal property where the duty is chargeable on the capital value. No. 5. For an account of personal property where the duty is chargeable by way of annuity. No. 6. For the account of real property.

No. 7. For the second and subsequent instalments of duty on real property.

These forms can be obtained on personal application at the Legacy and Succession Duty Office, Somerset House, London, where also the duty can be paid. If the parties reside in the country the forms can be

obtained from the Collector of Inland Revenue, or at any post-office issuing money orders, and when properly filled up they should be transmitted by post, addressed "The Controller of Legacy and Succession Duties, Somerset House, London," for examination, and when the accounts are found to be correct, instructions for the payment of the duty will be given.

The instructions generally necessary for preparing a form of receipt or an account are printed on these forms. It is necessary, however, to remark that section 22 provides that in estimating the annual value of real property, not of a fluctuating character, an allowance is to be made for all necessary outgoings.

The successor to land is never charged for a greater sum than the value of his life interest: the assessment of the annual value is only in order to fix the duty at the estimated value of his life interest. The question then turns on the meaning of the words "annual value of the land" in the 21st section, and "an allowance for all necessary outgoings" in the 22nd section. The term "annual value of land is not a term of art, but means in common parlance the rack rent or the value of the gross produce of the land, minus all payments, expenses, interest, labour, and charges on the land, or on the tenant. This has been the mode in which it has been treated in legislation, and in the construction of Acts of Parliament. Thus, in the income tax on land, which is a charge on the annual value of land in each year, certain rules are laid down to ascertain the annual value. By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, s. 60, Schedule A, No. 1, the annual value of lands, &c., shall be understood to be "the rent by the year, at which the same are let at rack rent." Also under the Parochial Assessment Act (6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 96), the net annual value is to be the

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