fares would amount to 15s. for the first class, and 9s. 10d. for the second, But their tariff was first raised for these classes to 16s. 6d., and 12s.; and by a recent alteration they are now raised to 20s. and 14s. 8d. The fares to Maidstone, which about a twelvemonth ago, were raised to 9s. for first class, and 6s. 6d. for second class, have been recently raised to 11s. and 8s. It may serve to give an idea of the extravagance of these rates, to state that the coach fares to Maidstone have long been lower by more than 50 per cent. It may be true that the real balance of receipts over expenditure for the half-year ending 31st July, 1847, only amounted, as has been affirmed, to £69,197, without allowing for numberless outlays, which, though actually charged against capital, ought to have been charged against revenue; and that this forms a low half-yearly return for £8,000,000: but are people to be subjected for ever to higher fares than their neighbours, because a Company has chosen to invest money injudiciously? The question ought always to be, not what a Company has expended, but what rate of fares would af ford an adequate remuneration for similar works from time to time, according to the variation in the cost of construction. To adopt any other principle, is to give to Companies an arbitrary power of subjecting particular districts to burdens and disadvantages, from which other districts are exempt, and thus lowering the value of property in one district, and raising it in another, at their pleasure.

Much evidence was also taken on the defects of the existing system of legislation with regard to Railway and other so-called Private Bills, and on the systems pursued by foreign Governments and Legislatures respecting Rail

ways. Whether, and how far the Railway Board, which has since been appointed, will be suffered to remedy the evils pointed out by most respectable and competent witnesses, and thereby answer the expectations of the country from its formation, remains to be seen. One great purpose for which the Board was deemed necessary, the supervision and control of existing Railways, with a view to the protection of the public from an unjust and capricious exercise of the powers committed to them by the legislature, has yet been very inadequately answered.*

The extraordinary depression of Railway Shares since 1845, amounting in the principal Lines to upwards of cent. per cent., has naturally led the public and proprietors to reflect on the causes of this peculiar state of things. The latter find that purchasers will no longer be contented with accounts of the continuance for years of a certain rate of dividend, but wish to ascertain the precise source whence the dividends have been paid, in order that they may give a price corresponding to the actual income which they can hope to draw permanently from the Lines. This has led some proprietors, at the recent periodical meetings of Companies, to put questions to Directors, indicative of

* It has been contended by some, that a fair construction of the 7 & 8 Vict. necessarily gives an audit of the accounts of Companies; for when a certain end is prescribed, the means by which that end can alone be attained must be assumed as equally prescribed; and it is clear, that without an audit it never can be known whether the nett profits of a Company equal or exceed 10 per cent. The provision in the Act is a farce, if the only means for giving it effect are withheld. Whether they who entertain this opinion are correct as to their law is a point on which I shall not pretend to decide; but if the opinion is not in accordance with law, this only proves that law and common sense are not always identical.

much uneasiness as to their future prospects. The Directors, on their part, begin to retort on the proprietors the advantages they derived from extension shares during the palmy days of the Railway market; and Chairmen of different Companies begin even to throw the blame on each other, as well as on the legislature, of the construction of Branches and Extension Lines, to which the reduced dividends are ascribable. A few specimens from some of the speeches of Chairmen, by way of illustrating these remarks, may not be unseasonable. Thus, for instance, Mr. Hudson is reported to have stated, at the half-yearly meeting of the Midland Company, on the 19th February, 1848, "That several meetings of Railway Companies had recently taken place of a tumultuous character, and that the Directors had been called to account for having reduced their dividends. That might have been the position of the Directors of that Company; but in such case they could meet them with the same confidence of receiving their approbation as heretofore. If that consequence had happened as a result of having projected many of their Branches, their Directors would not have been liable to blame for that extension of the Railway system, and the rapidity with which the new works were undertaken and executed. The legislature and public opinion had forced these new undertakings upon them ; for if they had not thrown out these new Arms and Branches, the proprietors would have found their property irretrievably injured." Mr. Hudson had a little before congratulated the Company on the success with which he had resisted the low tariffs which had been imposed upon other Companies, because it had enabled the Di

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rectors to maintain their rate of dividend. And he no doubt means to say here, that if he had not thrown out new Arms and Branches, the legislature would have enabled other parties to supply the wants of the country at a cheaper rate, and have thus prevented him from continuing the high fares for which he takes credit. The new Lines," he goes on to say, "might be at first a charge upon the old ones, because a traffic could not be in a moment got upon the rails. It usually took three years to develope the resources of a Line; but as the Directors were enabled to open these new Lines, the holders of stock would come in for a dividend immediately. If, then, they received a smaller dividend for a time, it would be upon a larger capital, and they must bear in mind who had received those shares. The proprietors had received them, and they must recollect that a part of their profit had been derived from this source, whether they had retained or sold these extension shares." It must be small consolation to the proprietor of 1848 to learn that the proprietor of a former year, in whose shoes he may stand, received a benefit from the sale of shares for undertakings which have had the effect of lowering his receipts. French Government, as we have seen,* refused to allow existing proprietors to issue shares at par when at a premium in the market, precisely because the interests of future proprietors would thereby be injured.

The

To understand the full force of these passages of the speech of Mr. Husdon, we must bear in mind, that the Midland Company own part of a main trunk Line; and provided they keep within their maximum, which is an extravagant one, * See page 34.

can charge with impunity very high fares, so long as they are not exposed to competition. So far from lowering their fares, at the time when other Companies submitted to reductions, they were in a condition even to increase their fares, often in consequence of these very reductions. As was stated by Captain Laws, in his evidence before the Committee of 1844, the passenger to York "does not know where the money is distributed," and when one part of the Line makes a reduction, another part can say, "You have reduced your rate 2s. 6d. ; we can put that on ours." To keep up these high fares, however, Arms and Branches must occasionally be thrown out, in order to occupy the ground which competitors might otherwise seize; and rival Companies in existence must be purchased on almost any terms. The system on which the Midland Company acted in their various purchases, amalgamations, and extensions is very graphically described by this intelligent witness. How far the Great Northern will interfere with the success of this magnificent system of monopoly, remains to be seen.

On the other hand, the Chairman of the Great Western, Mr. Charles Russell, at a meeting on the 23rd of February, 1848, also complains, like Mr. Hudson, of the necessity imposed on that Company by the legislature of entering into extensive engagements; but while he takes credit to himself for having, in his place in parliament, endeavoured to curb the speculations of 1845-6, he blames the Chairman of the Midlands for the encouragement he afforded them. "If," said Mr. Russell, "their engagements were extensive, (and he did not deny that

Fifth Report, Railways, (1844,) Min. of Evid. p. 503.