which the subject was beset, the Government were probably reluctant to enter on it, and it became utterly impossible for others to deal effectually with the question. Although it was generally felt and admitted that some legislative measures of a general and comprehensive nature would soon become indispensable, yet still, in the meantime, nothing was attempted. While we were acting with such supineness, the French Government had adopted various regulations similar to those urged by me, such as the fixing of fares and charges, the principle of periodical revision, and the audit of accounts, in their Railway legislation, which have been applied to all the Lines made and projected in that country: a contrast to our legislation, little to our credit.

The cry set up by the Railway authorities, that the employment of capital should not be interfered with, and that full scope should be afforded to enterprise, was slavishly echoed by parties from whom better things might have been expected! Why, the whole system of ceding Lines in perpetuity, is an interference with the free employment of capital and unrestricted enterprise ! A Company obtain by their Act a monopoly of the traffic on the Line to be constructed by them. That competition, by which the rights of capitalists and the public interests are reconciled, where enterprise is left free, is excluded from undertakings which place the public under the control of the proprietors of a Railway. When a landlord embarks money in the improvement of his estate, or a manufacturer in erecting a mill, the returns are not regulated by the amount of outlay, but by the prices at which other landowners and manufacturers offer

C

their commodities for sale. the monopoly of a Line; high in consequence of the secure low fares, the public may long be without any remedy. Those who raised this cry were not themselves its dupes. Many years had not passed from the first opening of Railways, before a magnificent scheme of combination began to be formed by the leading Companies, to exclude the possibility of future interference with their monopoly. A statement was read to Mr. Gladstone's Committee, by Captain Laws, the present Manager of the Great Northern Line, who was present at one of the Meetings where this scheme was sanctioned, that "by the statements made at Railway Meetings held at York, Gainsborough, and Lincoln, within the last fortnight, (this evidence was given on the 22nd April, 1844,) it appears a combination now exists between the London and Birmingham, the Amalgamated Midland, the York and North Midland, and all the Lines in connexion, and that are to be in connexion, north of York to Edinburgh; and that they had only to stand firm to themselves, and any competition would be very harmless; and that an extension of the same combination had already passed through Committee in the House of Commons from York to Scarborough, and Leeds to Bradford; and that, in the ensuing session of parliament, powers were to be sought to make a Line from the North Midland, near Swinton, and the Midland Counties from Nottingham, to meet at Lincoln, and another Line from a point north of Swinton to a point on the Sheffield and Manchester Line, called Peniston Moor, which, with the Sheffield and Manchester, and

But the Railway starts with and if the charges are too neglect of the legislature to

Sheffield and Rotherham, would become a part and parcel of the same interest. And, extensive as this combination appears, there is (provided parliament grant the powers) nothing impracticable in it, as it was stated that all the new capital would be guaranteed by the existing Lines, and that the London and Birmingham had offered to subscribe largely to that object. Were such a combination to exist, it would completely defeat any limit of dividend or check from competition; for, however threatening a new Line might appear before parliament, if this combination were allowed to extend themselves east and west from Lincoln to Manchester, and north and south from London to Edinburgh, they could perfectly defeat any competing Line, and very soon drive them into their own terms, and thus establish the privilege exclusively of fixing the rates and carrying the traffic by a circuitous route, not only through the Midland Counties districts, but also the Eastern; for in the event of the NorthEastern extending, as they intend, their Line to Boston or Lincoln, they could divert, by various means of delay, &c., the greater part of the traffic from thence, or any direct Line north and south." This scheme forms a very instructive commentary on the position that the liberty of enterprise demands that there should be no restrictions on Railway Companies.

The Act for the Regulation of Railways, passed in 1842, commonly known by the name of Lord Seymour's Act, had reference merely to matters of police, and modes of procedure, in disputes between Railways and other interested parties.

But in 1844 the Government took a step from which

important results were anticipated. On the 5th February of that year, Mr. Gladstone, as president of the Board of Trade, moved the appointment of a Select Committee, to consider whether any and what new provisions ought to be introduced into such Railway Bills as might come before the House, during that or future sessions, for the advantage of the public, and the improvement of the Railway system. The Committee appointed in pursuance of that motion took much valuable evidence, which, accompanied by a Report, was in the course of the session laid before the House. The Act of the 7 & 8 Victoria, cap. 85, to attach certain conditions to the construction of future Railways, was passed in pursuance of the recommendation of the Committee. The Act by no means answered the expectations of those who were anxious for an effectual remedy for the evils of our Railway system, which had already made themselves severely felt. It provided that, after a lapse of twenty-one years, when the dividends should equal or exceed ten per cent., the Lords of the Treasury, on giving three months' notice, might revise the scale of tolls, fares, and charges; but as the Act contained no provision for subjecting the accounts of Companies to an effectual audit, the public had no means of knowing when the nett receipts of a Company equalled or exceeded ten per cent.; and as Companies were left at full liberty to adjust in what manner they pleased the principle on which dividends should be calculated, no advantage could be taken of the power of revision. Companies had it completely in their power to keep parliament and the public in the dark as to the real state of their affairs.

Bad, therefore, as matters were before, the Act of the

7 & 8 Vict. cap. 85, may be truly said to have made them infinitely worse. Parliament, it is true, had before granted to Companies applying for Bills everything which they chose to demand, with but few stipulations in favour of the public, and those of little value. But there was always a probability that the legislature might one day awaken to a sense of its duties, and endeavour to make the stipulation in the Liverpool and Manchester and other Railway Bills, that the excess of profits above ten per cent. should belong to the public, effectual for its object. There was always hanging over the heads of the Companies a danger that parliament might impose conditions on them, by which their dividends could have been fixed at ten per cent., or even reduced below that amount, and such a system of control established as would have rendered it impossible for them to evade or disregard these conditions. Besides, that prolific source of abuse, the creation of new shares to be divided among the Proprietors at par, when selling in the market at cent. per cent. premium, for their exclusive benefit, had never, I believe, been before recognised in any single case, and was considered of doubtful legality. But all doubt. upon the subject was removed by the Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, that followed the Act of the 7 & 8 Vict., by which the past and the future were equally legalized. The power of interference with a view to make the 10 per cent. condition effectual in behalf of the public, which it was notorious had been utterly disregarded by Joint Stock Companies, and particularly by the Liverpool and Manchester Company, was thereby renounced. With the evidence before him of the many shifts to which Companies were in the habit of re