16 2. If executor quâ executor, why not executor of executor, or administrator; in short, legal personal representative for the time being? 3. If executor not quâ executor, then a bare implied authority at common law or in equity-not within the statute of Henry VIII; and if a plurality of executors, all must join, proving and non-proving &c. 4. Proceeds of realty to be administered not on legal, but on equitable principles-contrary, therefore, to the ordinary course of executorial administration. 5. If executor be the only proper hand to receive the money, payment to the executor and devisee jointly must be wrong on any principle. 6. If executor misapply the money, he could not be charged as executor; he must be charged as trustee by implication. 7. If no distinction between a devise upon trust to pay debts, and a devise subject to a charge of debts, then in either case the money would be payable to executor. 8. Equity follows the law; if a charge of debts imports a power in executor to work it out, it must have the same import at law and in equity. 9. Innumerable titles depend on the doctrine that the devisee may sell and mortgage without the executor. 10. If a charge of debts, without more, implies a power of sale in the executor, the judicature is stultified in the numerous cases in which the question has been, whether, there being an express authority or direction to sell, the executor was the person impliedly authorised to execute it. These are evidently rough notes, but they contain much that is worthy of the deepest consideration by those whose duty it is to settle the principles on which the titles to landed property in this country depend. The learned author gives some replies, for which the reader is referred to the book itself. The confidence of the author appears, however, to have wavered as he proceeded, for at p. 110 he remarks, "that the rule, however qualified, will not be without inconvenience in practice;" and he suggests, that when a testator wishes to provide for the payment of debts out of his real estate, he should make some clear and well-guarded provision for the purpose, and not rely upon a mere general charge. In this suggestion the writer, in the present state of the authorities, most heartily concurs. J. W. P.S.-Since the above was written, the writer has been gratified to find, from the Weekly Reporter of last Saturday, (p. 280), that in Eitesford v. Armstead, before Sir W. P. Wood, V. C., on the 31st January, 1856, that most eminent equity judge has taken the view above suggested of the case of Robinson v. Lowater. "The case of Robinson v. Lowater," says his Honor, "is an authority that you must look to the parties having the ownership of the estate at the time, and they are the persons who would have to apply the fund under the power given to raise the charge.' SHORT NOTES IN CONVEYANCING.-No. 4. AGREEMENTS FOR THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, AS AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. By the 1st section of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3-a statute which it is now placed beyond doubt (Ash v. Abdy, 3 Swanst. 664) originated with Lord Chancellor Nottingham, though it afterwards received some additions and improvements from the judges and civilians of the day, and amongst others, so runs the popular tradition, from Sir Matthew Hale and Sir Leoline Jenkins-it is enacted, that all leases, estates, interests of freehold or terms of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, to, or out of any messuages, manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, made or created by livery and seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorised by writing, shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only, and shall not, either in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect, any consideration for making any such parol leases or estates to the contrary notwithstanding. By the 2nd section the statute makes an exception in favour of parol leases not exceeding three years, at rents not less than two-thirds of the improved value; and by the 3rd enacts, "that all grants, assignments, and surrenders shall be made by deed or note in writing." By the 4th it provides, that no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement made upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, unless the agreement upon which such action be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised. Whilst by the 17th it declares, that no contract for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandises, for the price of 10. or upwards, shall be allowed to be good except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part of payment, or that some note or memorandum of the bargain in writing be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto properly authorised. In collecting and slightly noticing the leading decisions upon the Statute of Frauds, as it affects agreements for the sale of real property, it is proposed to make slight incidental allusion to decisions which have regard to the sale of pure personalty. The intention of the Legislature, as was well observed by Littledale, J., in Smith v. Surman, (9 B. & Cr. 572), was to comprehend within the 4th and 17th sections of the statute the subject-matter of every parol contract, the uncertainty in the terms of which was likely to produce perjury or subornation of perjury. Hence it becomes difficult to consider either section quite apart from the other. In 1775, Lee, C. J., and Dennison, J., decided that a mere license was no lease nor uncertain interest in land, and therefore not within the 1st section; ( Wood v. Lake, Say. 3; 13 M. & W. 848); but the correctness of their decision has been doubted. (See Sugd. V. & P. 96, 11th ed., and the cases there cited; Sugd. Concise Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 850). View, 74; also Mr. Baron Alderson's observations in "The right interpretation of the 4th section," said Lord Wensleydale, "is, that an agreement which cannot be ther. No doubt it may have, as an agreement in fact, enforced on either side is as a contract void altogesome operation in communicating a license, but such license would be countermandable." (Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W. 257). It should, however, be observed, that a license is only countermandable when it is executory, not so when executed. (Winter v. Brockwell, 8 East, 310, per Lord Ellenborough, citing Mr. Justice Haughton's dictum in Webb v. Paternoster, Palm. 71). As a general rule it may be laid down that an easement can be conferred only by an instrument under seal. (Ruffey v. Henderson, 21 L. J., Q. B., 52, per Coleridge, J., citing Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838). An agreement conferring an exclusive right to the vesture of the land during a limited time and for given purposes is a contract or sale of an interest concerning lands; (per Lord Ellenborough in Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 611; see also Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W. 248; and Lord Denman's observations in Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & El.760); as also, as was decided by 1856. Lord Alvanley and the Court of Common Pleas, is a part of the subject it may be right to mention, that in written agreement for the sale of growing hops; (Wad-a case where there was an agreement to let land rent dington v. Bristow, 2 B. & P. 455); but this decision free, on condition that the proposed vendor should has been disapproved of, (Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & have a moiety of the crops, and while the crop was in W. 503), as well as the dictum of Mansfield, C. J., that the ground it was appraised for both parties, the agreehe could not see how a sale of growing turnips could be ment, in the opinion of Buller, J., did not relate to distinguished from the decision of the same Court as any interest in the land, which remained altogether to growing hops. (Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 46; unaltered by the arrangement concerning the crops. Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & Cr. 835; and see also Dunne (Poulter v. Killingbeck, 1 B. & P. 398). v. Ferguson, 1 Hayes, 541). Growing timber and poles confer, however, an interest in land; (Teal v. Auty, 2 Br. & B. 99, cited by Hullock, B., in Scovell v. Borall, 1 Y. & J. 399); and a mere parol contract for the sale of growing underwood was pronounced by Alexander, C. B., to be in direct violation of the Statute of Frauds. (1 Y. & J. 398). Growing fruit, also, on the ground that it would not pass to an executor, but to the heir, and could not be taken by a tenant for life, has been held to be a species of interest concerning lands within the 4th section. (Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 505). Where, too, a plaintiff was possessed of a farm upon which were growing crops, and the defendant had agreed by parol to take the farm, and with it the young crops, and pay for them, and for certain work, labour, and materials done and ex-produced therefrom at 17. 18. the Winchester bushel, pended by the plaintiff in making the land ready for tillage, Lord Lyndhurst, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, said, "The crops at the time of the bargain and sale were an interest in the land, and to allow the plaintiff to recover upon this bargain and sale, and to have the price regulated by it, would be in direct opposition to the statute, because it would be giving effect to an action upon a verbal contract for an interest in lands." (The Earl of Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 Cr. & M. 109). Growing crops of corn and emblements* generally are not to be considered a sale of an interest in land within the meaning of the 4th section, but a contract for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise, within the 17th; and for this reason, that such an interest goes to the executor, and not to the heir, and anything which goes to the executor, and not to the heir, may be taken in execution. (Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & Cr. 840). Neither does the 4th section apply to sales of potatoes to be taken out of the land by the purchaser immediately, the land in such a case being considered as a mere warehouse for the potatoes until the purchaser can remove them; (Parker v. Staniland, 11! East, 366); nor to a contract for the sale of potatoes at so much per acre, for whether at the time of sale they were covered with earth in the field or in a box, still, according to Lord Ellenborough, it was a sale of a mere chattel; (Warwick v. Bruce, 2 Mau. & S. 208); nor to an agreement for a cover of potatoes, where the vendor was to raise the potatoes from the ground at the request of the purchaser, and where, therefore, the effect of the contract was to give to the buyer a right to all the potatoes which a given quantity of land should produce, but not to give him any right to the possession of the land itself; (Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & Cr. 831); nor to a contract to sell the potatoes growing on a certain quantity of land, the purchaser to have them at digging time, and which was described by Lord Wensleydale as merely a contract for the sale of goods and chattels at a future day, the produce of certain land, and to be taken away at a certain time. (Sainsbury v. Matthews, 4 M. & W. 347). A parol agreement for the sale of crops would, it may here be observed, be good between an outgoing and the incoming tenant, because in that case there would be no sale of any interest in the land, for that would come from the landlord. (Mayfield v. Wadsley, 3 B. & Cr. 367). And whilst upon this * As to what is comprised under the term "emblements," see Graves v. Weld, (5 B. & Ad. 105). When the contract is not for growing trees, but for timber at so much per foot-that is, the produce of the trees when they shall be cut down and severed from the freehold the true construction of the bargain is, that it is a contract for the future sale of the timber when it shall be in a state fit for delivery; and the vendor, so long as he is felling it and preparing it for delivery, is doing work for himself, and not for the purchaser; and the result, therefore, is, that the contract is for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise within the 17th, and not of an interest in land within the 4th, section. (Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & Cr. 568). And where a plaintiff agreed to supply the defendant with a quantity of turnip-seed, and the latter agreed to sow it on his own land, and sell the crop of seed Lord Tenterden said, "According to good common sense, this must be considered as substantially a contract for goods and chattels, for the thing agreed to be delivered would, at the time of delivery, be a personal chattel. The case, therefore, comes within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds; and the contract, being verbal only, and for goods of more than 10%. value, is not binding.' (Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & Cr. 448). "The Sales in bankruptcy (Ex parte Cutts, 3 Deac. 267) and by auction, both of lands (The Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. sen. 218; 12 Ves. 472) and goods, (Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. & Cr. 945), are within the statute; but sales, as also purchases, under a decree of the Court of Chancery, are of necessity excepted. (The Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. sen. 218; 12 Ves. 472). Agreements by deed are not within the statute, which, in the opinion of Lord Wensleydale, was never meant to apply to the most solemn instrument which the law recognises. (Cherry v. Heming, 4 East, 638). object of the statute," said the present Lord Chancellor, (then Rolfe, B.), "was to prevent matters of importance from resting on the frail testimony of memory alone. Before the Norman time signature rendered the instrument authentic. Sealing was introduced because the people in general could not write. Then there arose a distinction between what was sealed and what was not sealed, and that went on until society became more advanced, when the statute ultimately said that certain instruments must be authenticated by signature. That means that such instruments are not to rest on parol testimony only, and it was not intended to touch those which were already authenticated by a ceremony of a higher nature than a signature or s mark." (Cherry v. Heming, 4 Exch. 636). An agreement for a lease, it is clear, must be in writing, for it is a contract for an interest in land. In an action for debt on an indenture for rent it was pleaded, that whilst the defendant was in the occupa tion of the demised premises, and before the rent became due, it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the plaintiff should make certain alterations, and, in consideration thereof, the defendant should relinquish his interest under the indenture, and accept a fresh lease for seven years at an increased rent, and until such lease should be tendered to the defendant, he should hold the premises as tenant from year to year at the increased rent; that the plaintiff executed the alterations; that the defendant relinquished his interest under the indenture, and held the premises under the agreement, and that no new lease was executed; and 16 (To be continued). Correspondence. 66 TO THE EDITOR OF THE JURIST." SIR,-The case of Myers v. Willis (2 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 41) suggests some questions upon the Ship Registry Acts. To two of them I would wish to call attention. that the result was, that the defendant became tenant estate will be a sufficient consideration for the promise from year to year, and all his interest under the inden- if the first purchaser succeed in procuring an actual conture was surrendered to the plaintiff by act and opera- veyance from the original vendor. (Seaman v. Price, tion of law. And the Court of Exchequer held that Ry. & M. 195). When a contract merely relates to the plea could only be proved by an agreement in the investigation of a title, and the parties agree that writing, since the stipulation as to the yearly tenancy in case the title should turn out to be defective the was part of the agreement for a future lease, and defendant shall pay all the costs of the investigation, such agreement was required by the Statute of Frauds the contract does not relate to any interest in land, to be in writing. (Foquet v. Moor, 7 Exch. 870). An and is not within the statute. (Per Alderson, B., in assignment of a lease must be in writing, (Poultney Jeakes v. White, 8 East, 878). An agreement, howv. Holmes, 1 Str. 404), as also must an agreement to ever, for the sale of a milk-walk, by which a plaintiff convey an equity of redemption, because a Court of contracted to let the defendant into occupation of preequity treats the equity of redemption as the land it-mises of which the plaintiff was tenant, and the defendself, or at all events as an interest in land. (Massey v. ant agreed to pay the rent, rates, and taxes, is a conJohnson, 1 Exch. 255, per curiam). So likewise an tract concerning an interest in land requiring a memoagreement to endeavour to procure a landlord to accept randum in writing under the 4th section. To ascera substituted tenant has been held to be within the tain," said the present Chief Justice of the Common statute; (per Jervis, C. J., citing Cocking v.. Ward, 1 Pleas, "what was the nature of the contract, we must C. B. 858, in Smart v. Harding, 15 C. B. 652; 24 look, not at the declaration only, but to the evidence L. J., C. P., 78); as must an agreement for an abate- also upon the subject. Nobody can doubt that the ment of rent; (O'Connor v. Spaight, 1 Sch. & L. 306); plaintiff, being tenant from year to year of the premises but an agreement by an outgoing tenant to take the where he carried on his business, agreed to assign his tenant's fixtures at a valuation is not a sale of an inte- interest therein to the defendant. The case is clearly rest in land within the 4th section. ( (Hallen v. Run- within the mischief of the statute." (Smith v. Harder, 1 C., M., & R. 277). So also an agreement by the ding, 15 C. B. 659; 24 L. J., C. P., 76). lessee of a house and his partner in trade to pay the J. P. P. lessor annually, during the residue of the lessee's term, 101. per cent. on the cost of new buildings, if the lessor would erect them, has been decided as not required by the statute to be in writing, for that though the partner quitted the premises, he was liable on the collateral agreement during the residue of the term. (Hoby v. Roebuck, 7 Taunt. 156; see also the judgment in Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 899). Where, however, a plaintiff agreed to let a house to the defendant, and to sell him certain furniture and fixtures therein, and to make certain alterations and improvements in the house, and the defendant contracted to take the house, and to pay for the furniture and fixtures and alterations, the Court of Common Pleas held that this was an agreement relating to an interest in land within the 4th section. "The principal subject-matter of the agreement," said Lord Truro, (then Wilde, C. J.), "was the occupation of the premises. It was with a view only to that, that the defendant contracted to pay for the improvements and alterations, which were obviously desirable to him only in connexion with his occupation of the house. The consideration was entire for the letting of the house with the alterations." (Vaughan v. Hancock, 3 C. B. 769; see also Mechelen v. Wallace, 7 Ad. & El. 49). Where, too, a plaintiff, being possessed of a messuage and premises for the residue of a certain term of years, agreed with the defendant to relinquish possession to him, and to suffer him to become tenant of the premises for the residue of the term, in consideration of the defendant paying a sum of money towards completing certain repairs of the premises, the Court of Exchequer held that this was a contract within the 4th section. "Perhaps," said Lord Wensleydale," if the declaration had stated an agreement to relinquish the possession merely, it might not have amounted to a contract for an interest in land; but it goes on to allege that the plaintiff was to suffer the defendant to become tenant thereof for the residue of the term. Now, he could not become tenant for the residue of the term except by an assignment, and that would be a contract for an interest in land within the statute, and ought to be reduced into writing." (Buttemere v. Hayes, 5 M. & W. 459). It would seem that an agreement by a lessee for the transfer of his interest in a term not exceeding three years, which not being in writing is invalid as an assignment by reason of the statute, cannot operate as an underlease; (Barrett v. Rolph, 14 M. & W. 348); but a transfer in writing of a parol agreement to purchase an One of them is the right of the mortgagee of a British ship to receive freight. I have heard it stated to be the practice of some gentlemen, since the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, to take, in addition to a mortgage in the statutory form, a separate deed, (which would probably be considered liable to stamp duty), assigning the freight and insurance of and upon the ship, and containing the other terms of the transaction. In the course of the argument in this case, Briggs v. Wilkinson (7 B. & Cr. 30) being cited, Williams, J., observed, "The mortgagee is now entitled to the profits of the ship, but only to the extent of his debt;" and Dean v. M'Ghie (4 Bing. 45) seems to support this observation. What is meant by the qualifying words, "only to the extent of his debt," is not very apparent. They may mean that the mortgagee is not entitled, after his own demand has been satisfied, to retain the profits as against the mortgagor; or they may have reference to the principle of the decision in Irving v. Richardson, (2 B. & Ad. 193). It is to be observed that in these two cases the 45th section of stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 110, (which resembles sect. 45 of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 89, and sect. 70 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854), appears to have been differently regarded. In the former case the question of freight was distinctly before the Court, and though the mortgage was silent on the subject, the mortgagee, having taken possession of the ship, was considered entitled to it. If that case be law, it would seem that there is no necessity to take an express assignment of freight on the occasion of a mortgage. During the argument of Myers v. Willis the Lord Chief Justice suggested, whether, if the case were at Nisi Prius, the presiding judge might have left it to the jury to say whether the bill of sale (which on the face of it was an absolute one) was in effect a mortgage; and in delivering judgment he said, "It seems to me strange indeed if a Court of equity would not have interfered, and said that the ship must be returned to the original owner on repayment of the money lent;" and Crowder, J., seemed disposed to concur in this view. The case of Langton v. Norton (5 Beav. 9) is an instance in which the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to interfere in this manner was expressly asserted, although not exercised; but it would scarcely be safe to rely upon the authority of that case, for it appears to have been doubted by Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, L. J., in Hughes v. Morris, (2 De G., Mac., & G. 349). It seems difficult for any Court to assume the right in question in the face of the words of sect. 38 of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 89, that "when and so soon as" the required particulars have been entered in the customs' register, "the bill of sale shall be valid and effectual to pass the property thereby intended to be transferred, to all intents and purposes, and against all and every persons, except" some who should first perfect a subsequent bill of sale in another particular. The same difficulty does not appear to arise upon the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854. Feb. 1, 1856. Yours, &c., CHANCERY EASTER HOLIDAYS. W. WHEREAS by the 1st article of the 8th of the General Orders of the High Court of Chancery of the 8th May, 1845, it is provided that the Easter Vacation is to commence and terminate on such days as the Lord Chancellor shall every year specially direct: now I do hereby order that the Easter Vacation for the present year shall commence on Thursday, the 20th day of March next, and terminate on Saturday, the 29th day of March next, both days inclusive; and that this Order be entered with the Registrar, and set up in the several offices of this Court. (Evidence of H. Reynolds, Esq., Solicitor to the Treasury, continued from p. 55). Do you recollect, some years ago, a trial which excited a good deal of attention at Stafford. The circumstance consisted of Socialist agents endeavouring to prevent people from working for a certain sum of money? -I took no part in that prosecution. With regard to the Chartist trials, will you state what was the course which you took?-The course then was, that we received information from the Secretary of State that certain persons had assembled under circumstances which were supposed to amount to the crime of high treason; that they were about to levy war against the Queen; they were taken into custody, and taken to Bow-street for examination. The police in communication with our office furnished us from time to time with a statement of the evidence which could be adduced in support of the charge; we attended before the magistrates, conducted the case before the magistrates, and when the men were ultimately committed for trial we got up the case for the prosecutions, and, I believe, succeeded invariably in every case. Sir John Jervis was Attorney-General, and I believe those prosecutions were almost uniformly, if not entirely, conducted with success; they were for several offences, not for high treason; they were under the late act for feloniously compassing to levy war against the Queen. Do you ever interfere in grievous cases of murder?Yes, frequently; I should say that most of the important cases for murder which have occurred within the metropolitan district for the last few years have been prosecuted in our office. We prosecuted the Mannings, and also Belany for the murder of his wife, and the Goodes; the cases of burking, and other similar cases, were presented by us. Will you take any one case, and state what your first step was, and how you proceeded?-The course was very similar to that which I mentioned just now with regard to the prosecutions of the Chartists. We receive a letter from the Secretary of State, directing us to take charge of the prosecution of certain parties. In some cases they are already committed to Newgate; in other cases the examination of witnesses against them is going on before the police court. If they are already committed to Newgate we obtain a copy of the depositions from the magistrates, and lay them before counsel to advise as to the sufficiency of the evidence, and to prepare the indictment. Then we conduct that case before the grand jury, and on the trial at the Old Bailey, or wherever it is. Are you ever applied to to take up cases in remote districts?-There is a great distinction between London and country cases. Cases in the country, however important, have not, as a general rule, been prosecuted by our office. For instance, in the case of Rush, in Norfolk, which was a very important case, and difficult to get up, we did not prosecute. The only case of late in which we had the prosecution was that of the Birds, on the western circuit. That was a case of starving to death?-Yes; they were originally indicted for murder before Mr. Justice Talfourd, and acquitted; they were afterwards indicted for assaults, and then a very important question of law arose, which it was desirable to have discussed before the Court of Queen's Bench; and I presume on that account alone we were directed to prosecute. I should state that I have no knowledge of the grounds upon which the Secretary of State directs us to prosecute; we are simply directed to prosecute. . . . .... Do you ever receive orders to take up cases where children have been ill-used in the metropolis?-I cannot remember any case at present, but I think such a case would come within the principle of our prosecutions if it were one of very great public interest. In Jane Wilbred's case did you pay the costs of the prosecution?-I think not; I do not recollect it.... We do not, as a general rule, take the directions of the Attorney-General. If a case presents any points of great difficulty, we generally lay the case before the Attorney-General to advise us what to do. . . . . In state prosecutions, of course, he would be consulted throughout. The Solicitor-General for Ireland.—I suppose, in addition to conducting criminal prosecutions as solicitor to the Treasury, you have other very important duties with reference to the civil rights of the Crown?-Most important duties. I am solicitor to the Treasury, and for the offices of the Chief Secretaries of State, the War Department, the Board of Trade, the Board of Control, and several others; in short, the criminal part of our business is almost the least important that we have. We have to watch all claims for peerages, cases of patents, cases before the Privy Council, where applica tions are made regarding public servants abroad, and a great variety of cases; and in a multiplicity of cases we have to advise. (To be continued). 16 WILLIAM JAMES, Nayland, Suffolk, builder, Feb. 22 and WILLIAM BOWMAN, Sloane-street, St. Luke's, Chelsea, HENRY BARNES, Winchester, wine merchant, Feb. 22 at MORTON ANDREW EDWARDS, Dean-street, Soho, RICHARD MINIFIE, Honiton, Devonshire, baker, Feb. 21 CHARLES PHillips Edney and ALFRED RAINS, MEETINGS. Devonshire, wine merchant.-George Hannaford, St. Mary Church, Devonshire, baker.—Benjamin W. Bowring, Sydling St. Nicholas, Dorsetshire, miller.-Owen Williams, Manchester, corn dealer.-John Jauncey Randle, Walsall, Staffordshire, licensed victualler.-Geo. Ridge and Thos. Jackson, Sheffield, stationers. PETITION ANNULLED. George Wells, Worcester, licensed victualler. Thos. Clutterbuck Croome and Henry Harris, Cainscross, near Stroud, Gloucestershire, attornies and solicitors, (under the style or firm of Croome & Harris). The Queen has been pleased to confer the honour of knighthood upon George Bramwell, Esq., one of the Barons of her Majesty's Court of Exchequer. The Right Hon. Sir John Jervis, Knt., Lord Chief Justice of her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, has appointed John Calver Brook, Gent., of Diss, Norfolk, to be one of the Perpetual Commissioners for taking the acknowledgments of deeds to be executed by married women, in and for the county of Norfolk. MEMBERS RETURNED TO SERVE IN PARLIAMENT.-The James Rand, Longton, Staffordshire, grocer, March 1 at Right Hon. Henry Labouchere, one of her Majesty's 11, Birmingham, last ex.-Daniel Gardner, Banbury, Ox- Principal Secretaries of State, for the borough of Taunfordshire, pump maker, Feb. 22 at 11, London, aud. ac.-. ton. George Ridley, Esq., for the town of NewcastleJeremiah Challenger Wooster, Long-lane, West Smithfield, upon-Tyne, in the room of John Fenwick Burgoyne fancy cabinet manufacturer, Feb. 22 at 11, London, aud. ac. Blackett, Esq., who has accepted the office of Steward -George Butcher, Cornhill, London; Northern Wharf, of her Majesty's Manor of Northstead. The Right King's-cross, Middlesex; and Ruardean, Gloucestershire, coal Hon. Matthew Talbot Baines, Chancellor of the merchant, Feb. 22 at 11, London, aud. ac.-Jas. T. Murray, Duchy of Lancaster, for the borough of Leeds. Samuel Lower James-street, Golden-square, pianoforte maker, Feb. 23 Warren, Esq., Q. C., for the borough of Midhurst, in at 11, London, aud. ac.-Larratt D. Shields, Lime-street, the room of the Right Hon. Spencer Horatio Walmerchant, Feb. 22 at 2, London, aud. ac.-Thomas Bain, pole, who has accepted the office of Steward of her Tavistock Hotel, Covent-garden, and John Cowan, Church- Majesty's Chiltern Hundreds. John Villiers Stuart cottage, De Beauvoir-square, Islington, merchants, Feb. 22 at Townshend, commonly called Viscount Raynham, for 2, London, aud. ac.-F. Ricketts and T. James, Moorgate- the borough of Tamworth, in the room of John Townsst., merchants, Feb. 22 at half-past 11, London, aud. ac.J. Farman, Portobello-terrace, Notting-hill, builder, Feb. 29 hend, Esq., now Marquis Townshend, summoned to at 12, London, aud. ac.-H. Kelly, Arthur-street and Broad. the House of Peers. Philip Wykeham Martin, Esq., street, Bloomsbury, builder, Feb. 22 at 1, London, aud. ac.- for the city of Rochester, in the room of the Hon. Mary Shooter, Sheffield, licensed victualler, Feb. 23 at 10, Francis John Robert Villiers, who has accepted the Sheffield, aud. ac.-Wm. Pickering, Piccadilly, bookseller, office of Steward of her Majesty's Chiltern Hundreds. March 11 at 12, London, div.-Daniel Davis, Newington- Adam Black, Esq., for the city of Edinburgh, in the causeway, glass merchant, March 4 at 1, London, div.-E. room of the Right Hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay, Carter, Murray-street, Hoxton, builder, March 6 at 11, Lon- who has accepted the office of Steward of her Madon, div.-Richard Brierley Fletcher, Shaw Edge, Crompton, jesty's Manor of Hempholme. Sir Andrew Agnew, Lancashire, cotton spinner, Feb. 28 at 1, Manchester, aud. ac.; Bart., for the county of Wigton, in the room of John March 6 at 12, div.-J. G. Hopkinson, Nottingham, beer-house Dalrymple, commonly called Viscount Dalrymple, who keeper, March 4 at half-past 10, Nottingham, aud. ac. and has accepted the office of Steward of her Majesty's div.-Anne Staveley, Nottingham, bookseller, March 4 at half-past 10, Nottingham, aud. ac. and div.-John Withers Manor of Northstead. The Right Hon. Spencer HoTaylor, Nottingham, hosier, March 4 at half-past 10, Not-ratio Walpole, for the University of Cambridge, in the tingham, aud. ac. and div.-J. Haywood, Derby, ironfounder, room of the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn, deceased. March 4 at half-past 10, Nottingham, div.-Gaskell Johnson, Liverpool, coal merchant, March 4 at 11, Liverpool, div. CERTIFICATES. To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on or before the Day of Meeting. Alfred Watts and Thomas Whitney, Southampton and Freemantle, Hampshire, carpenters, March 5 at 2, London.Robert John Ward, Croydon, common brewer, March 5 at half-past 1, London.-Thos. Purdy, Great Yarmouth, wine merchant, March 5 at 1, London.-Sadler Smith, Holywellrow, Shoreditch, carman, March 5 at 12, London.-John Pym, Portobello-wharf, Upper Ground-street, Blackfriars, coal merchants, March 4 at 2, London.-Thos. Monk, Tipton, Staffordshire, boiler makers, March 6 at half-past 10, Birmingham.-J. Barlow, Birmingham, brassfounder, March 6 at half-past 10, Birmingham. To be granted, unless an appeal be duly entered. George Hill, Kentish-town, builder.-Henry Miles and Charles Miles, Old-road, Limehouse, and Giles-row, Cambridge-road, Mile-end-road, drapers.-J. May, Barnstaple, Devonshire, manufacturer.-Benjamin Vickers, Newton Bushell, NEW STAMP DUTIES. Recently published, in 8vo., price 8s. 6d. boards, TILSLEY'S NEW STAMP ACTS of 1850, 1853, and 1854; with Notes and Explanatory Observations, and Tables of all the Stamp Duties payable after the 10th October, 1854; together with a Digest of Cases. By HUGH TILSLEY, Assistant Solicitor of Inland Revenue. Sixth Edition. Also, by the same Author, in 8vo., price 17. 118. 6d., A TREATISE on the STAMP LAWS; with Tables of In 8vo., price 10s. boards, A TREATISE on the LAW of EQUITABLE MORT- Deposits, &c., and an Index. By SAMUEL MILLER, Esq., Barrister at Law. |