We have received two letters (one of which appeared in our last number) from correspondents in different parts of the country on the subject of the Succession Duty Act, from which we are glad to find that we had been misinformed as to the line of conduct adopted by the commissioners with regard to the discretionary power conferred on them by the 41st section, which enables them to commute a duty presumptively payable for a sum to be presently paid. It appears that the commissioners take the very reasonable course of commuting the duty whenever a good ground is shewn for requesting the commutation. It also appears from these communications, that in two instances the view advocated in our article of the 27th ult., viz. that where a tenant for life and remainderman convey property to a purchaser in fee, it remains liable to pay succession duty on the death of the tenant for life, has been advanced and carried out to its consequences, in practice, as between vendor and purchaser. Our able correspondent "Observer" considers that the act is clear on this point; and certainly we have never felt so much doubt on the subject as the tone of our former article might seem to imply. We understood, however, that more than one conveyancer of eminence to whom the point had been mentioned had expressed some surprise at the idea of its being requisite for a purchaser to take any precautions against liability to the duty in such a case. We, therefore, brought forward the case more with the view of directing the attention of practitioners to a point not unlikely to be overlooked in conveyancing practice, than of stating our own impressions upon it. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. By G. J. P. SMITH and W. B. BRETT, Barristers at Law. Reg. v. The Mayor, &c. of Chester.-(Mandamus or quo warranto-Election of councillor-Vacancy by mayor going out of office-5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, $8. 26, 47).. Caswell v. Worth.-(7 & 8 Vict. c. 15, ss. 21, 59, 60 COURT OF EXCHEQUER. ....... By W. M. BEST, Barrister at Law. Watson v. Lane.-(17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 33-Statement of grounds in rule for new trial) COURT OF ADMIRALTY. By A. WADDILOVE, D. C. L. The Leda.-(Salvage-Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104-Jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty) 114 116 118 119 119 The same correspondent has favoured us with some brief observations on different clauses of the act which have given rise to some difficulty in his mind; and as the act is one of such general interest and importance, we shall proceed to consider them. The 12th section, after providing that where a person takes a succession under a disposition made by himself, if at the date of the disposition he shall have been entitled to the property expectantly on the death of a person dying after the time appointed for the commencement of the act, and such person shall have died during the continuance of the disposition, then he shall be chargeable with the duty at the same rate as if no such disposition had been made, provides that "a successor shall not in any other case be chargeable with duty upon a succession taken under a disposition made by himself, and no person shall be chargeable with duty upon the extinction or determination of any charge, estate, or interest created by himself, unless at the date of the creation thereof he shall have been entitled to the property subjected thereto expectantly on the death of some person dying after the time appointed for the commencement of this act." Our correspondent suggests that the last clause is surplusage; and Mr. Thring, in his valuable edition of the Succession Duty Act, adopts nearly the same view, observing, that the benefit accruing to a person on the determination of a charge, estate, or interest created by himself is taken under a disposition made by himself, and so included in the preceding words of the present section. He then proceeds to contend, that though the clause in question appears to imply that a person who, at the date of the creation of any charge, estate, or interest created by himself, is entitled to the property expectantly on the death of a person dying after the commencement of the act, is to pay duty on its extinction or determination, yet that such implication cannot prevail against the express our own. 9 Our correspondent suggests that the words "by him," in the 18th section, (“surrendered by him or extinguished"), were inserted by mistake. We apprehend they were introduced designedly, with a view to such cases as the following:-Suppose that property stood limited to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to C. in fee, and that B. during the life of A., and before the act came into operation, surrendered to C., and that the parties survive the commencement of the act, the section in question clearly exempts B. from liability to duty; but we apprehend that the words “ "by him" were inserted to prevent C., in the event of B. surviving A., from escaping the payment of any duty in respect of B.'s life estate-i. e. from claiming to be exempt from duty until the death of B. words in the prior part of the section, and that the created by the successor himself upon the succession.” enactment comes to this-that the case will not be It does not appear, therefore, that the creation of any taken out of the 34th section of the act. The point derivative interest by the successor himself can postappears to deserve consideration. On referring back pone the payment of the duty on his succession. There seems, then, to be considerable difficulty in ascertainwe find the 2nd section providing, that "a dispo-ing the precise effect of the latter part of the 12th secsition of property," whereby any person shall become tion. Can it be the meaning of the act, that where a beneficially entitled to any property, or the income successor creates a determinable interest in his succesthereof, &c., shall confer a succession. Then the 5th sion, such as to take effect in possession at the time section provides that the extinction or determination when the succession in its natural course would have come into possession, he is to pay the duty in full, of any charge, estate, or interest determinable by the leaving the donee of that interest not liable to duty? death of a person dying after the commencement of the Mr. Thring observes, that some difficulty may arise in act shall be deemed to confer a succession. Here the adjusting the limits of the operation of sects. 5 and 20; increase of benefit arising from the extinction or deter- and the difficulty in the case we are considering is submination of a charge appears to be treated as something stantially the same. We submit the point to the connot included in the 2nd section; or, in other words, rather hear others than hazard any decided opinion of sideration of our readers, as one on which we would a succession arising from the extinction or determination of such charge, estate, or interest as is mentioned in the 5th section is there treated as distinct from a succession arising under such disposition as is mentioned in the 2nd section. If, then, the 12th section had stopped short before the words given above in italics, it might have been argued that the exemption conferred by it extended only to cases falling under sect. 2, and not to cases falling under sect. 5. It was well, then, for the sake of clearness, to advert expressly to the latter class of cases. The section, therefore, goes on to confer in terms the same exemption to the latter class of cases as had just before been applied to the former; and the fair construction of these enactments, if taken alone, would, on the principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," seem to be, that where such charge, estate, or interest as is mentioned in the 5th section is created by a person who at the time of such creation is entitled to the property expectantly on the death of a person dying subsequently to the commencement of the act, such person will be chargeable with duty on the determination or extinction of the charge, estate, or interest, if he be the person who receives the benefit of such determination We think that the expression in sect. 4, "any disor extinction. There is, however, a difficulty in recon- position of property taking effect upon the death of ciling this view with the 34th section, which provides, any person dying after the time appointed for the comthat in estimating the value of a succession, no allow-mencement of this act," has a much more extended ance shall be made in respect of any incumbrance viz. a testamentary disposition. We think that if, for signification than that suggested by our correspondent, thereon created by the successor; for it is not to be instance, property was settled by deed or will on A. supposed that the Legislature intended a successor to for life, and after his death to such uses as B. should pay the full duty on his succession as if unincumbered, appoint, with limitations in default of appointment, and then a further duty on the determination of an the series of limitations subsequent to the life estate incumbrance. But it will be observed that the one sition of property taking effect on the death of A., and would, including the power, be considered a disposection speaks of a charge, estate, or interest"-the that the power would be such a one as is contemplated other only of an "incumbrance;" and it would seem by the 4th section. The case of a testamentary disso far that it might be plausibly contended that the position is no doubt included in the words of the secmeaning of the act is, that a successor may give to tion, but does not seem to be by any means the only another person an estate, charge, or interest, such that kind of disposition to which they are applicable. the donee becomes liable to succession duty; and that ready access to the Law Journal to be shortly informed It may be useful to such of our readers as have not such a case is without the 34th section; that in such a of the nature of the case In re Micklethwaite, (25 L. J., case the donee has to pay succession duty, and the donor Ex., 19), referred to by our correspondent. In that to pay a further succession duty when the derivative case the father-in-law of A. B. covenanted with the interest determines; and that sect. 34 only applies to a trustees of A. B.'s marriage settlement to pay them case of an incumbrance not making the incumbrancer 5007. a year during the lives of A. B. and his wife, liable to succession duty; as, for instance, a simple with a proviso for determining this payment in the mortgage of the reversion. The 20th section, however, event of A. B. becoming entitled in possession to cerenacts, that the duty is to be paid when the successor, tain family estates. It was held that A. B., on so or any one in his right, becomes entitled in possession, coming into possession, was entitled, under sect. 38, to and provides for a postponed duty only in the case of an allowance in respect of the 5007. a year, as property there being "any prior charge, estate, or interest not of which he was deprived on taking his succession. 66 The words to which our correspondent refers in the 21st section, "except in the case of a successor who shall have been competent to dispose by will," &c., appear to have been intended to include the class of cases in which it was most reasonable that the duty should be a continuing charge. They will, observes Mr. Thring, include a general power of appointment by will, and exclude an estate tail. It certainly, however, seems not unlikely that questions may arise as to their precise meaning. Would a particular power to appoint by will come within them? NOTES OF THE WEEK. Parliamentary. Notice of motion has been given for the re-appointment of the committee on the subject of Public Prose-title depends, but of the consequence in point of law. to amend the law of partnership. for the incorporation and regulation of joint-stock companies and other associations. to amend the acts relating to the metropolitan police. (The object of the new measure is to place the undivided control of the metropolitan police in the hands of one commissioner instead of two. There are to be two assistant commissioners). to allow execution to issue in any part of the United Kingdom upon judgments or decrees obtained in England, Scotland, and Ireland. In equity it is considered, as good sense requires it should be, that no man can be held, by any act of his, to confirm a title unless he was fully aware at the time not only of the fact upon which the defect of (Cockerell v. Cholmeley, 1 Russ. & M. 425, per Sir J. Leach, M. R.) It follows, therefore, that if a deed of confirmation is executed under a mistake, and the party confirming being dead, there is a probability from circumstances that he would not, or a doubt whether he could, have raised any question upon the mistake, it is doubtful whether a Court of equity would permit parties claiming under him to take advantage of the mistake. (Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Bligh, 1). "To have any effect or validity as a deed of confirmation," said Lord Chancellor Manners in Dunbar v. Tredennick, "it must be shewn that the party was fully acquainted with his rights; that he knew the transaction to be impeachable which he was about to confirm; and that with this knowledge, and under no influence, he freely and spontaneously executed the deed." (2 Ball & B. 317). Where a lease made by a tenant for life is void as being bad for not conforming to a power, nothing done afterwards will amount to a confirmation. When it is voidable only, acceptance of rent, with other cirto amend the law relating to cheques on bankers, cumstances, may be a confirmation. (Per Lord Eldon so as not to make it imperative on them to pay a in Bowes v. The East London Waterworks Company, crossed cheque, although made payable to the bearer. Jac. 331). In a case where a tenant for life made a A bill relating to county courts, and reducing the lease exceeding his power, with a covenant for quiet fees therein, is about to be brought before the House of enjoyment for himself and those claiming under him, Lords by the Lord Chancellor. Lord Brougham ex- and he and the remainderman subsequently conveyed pressed a strong opinion (Feb. 4) that there should be the estate in fee subject to the tenants' leases, it was an appeal in cases of insolvency, so as to produce uni-held that this did not amount to a confirmation of the formity in the administration of justice by the sixty between him and the tenants, nor any stipulation belease by the remainderman, there being no contract county courts scattered throughout the country. SHORT NOTES IN CONVEYANCING.-No. 3. CONFIRMATIONS. A CONFIRMATION is defined by Sir Edward Coke to be a conveyance of an estate or right in esse, whereby a voidable estate is made sure and unavoidable, or whereby a particular estate is increased. (Co. Litt. 295. b.) tween the tenant for life and remainderman, that the latter should not impeach the lease. (Branger v. Gages, 7 Ir. Eq. Rep. 283). But where a party took a lease of an infant's lands, and the infant on coming of age mortgaged the property to the lessee, by deed, referring to the lease, this Lord Abinger held to be a confirmation of the lease. (Story v. Johnson, 2 Y. & C. 586). In a case where a trader sold an estate, and conveyed it as tenant in fee-simple, with the usual covenant for further assurance, and became bankrupt, and it was afterwards considered that he was tenant in tail only, the Court of Appeal in Bankruptcy ordered that the commissioner should be at liberty to execute to the purchaser a deed of confirmation. (Ex parte Fripp, in re Phelps, 1 De Gex, 293). Quælibet confirmatio aut est perficiens, crescens, aut diminuens. "If," said the Court in Beaumont's case, "a feoffee upon condition makes a feoffment over, and the feoffor confirms his estate to him and to his heirs, ista est confirmatio perficiens; for it doth not make transmutation of the estate, but corroborates and perfects the estate, and makes it simple and absolute where it was An appointment by the will of a married woman before conditional." Confirmatio crescens is, when it may be confirmed by a codicil. Where a married enlarges the estate of him to whom the confirmation is woman by her will appointed and devised certain made; as, to an estate at will, to increase it for years; property, and "other hereditaments (if any) which to an estate for years, to increase it for life; to an estate she had any power to appoint or devise," and afterfor life, to increase it to an estate in tail; or to an estate wards, when a widow, by codicil confirmed the will, in tail, to increase it in fee. Diminuens, as where the it was held by the Master of the Rolls that the will, lord confirms the estate of his tenant who held by as confirmed, only passed such hereditaments as were knight's service, to hold in socage, or to hold by less subject to her power. "There is no question," Sir rent, or for tenant in ancient demesne to hold at the Jolin Romilly said, "but that the will of a married common law. (9 Rep. 142 a.) woman may be confirmed by a codicil; but the point is, can such a will be converted into anything else by the codicil? In fact, the will of a married woman is only the exercise of a power-testamentary in its nature, it is true, but it nevertheless operates only as the exercise of a power, just in the same way as if the appointment had been made by deed. All these questions are questions of construction; and there can be no doubt that a codicil would confirm the will of a married woman, and would set right anything informal in it; but it has not the effect of extending the operation of the will so as to make it include that which was not included in the power given to the married woman to make the will.` I look at the case in A confirmation does not strengthen a void estate. "There can be," said Lord Mansfield in Doe v. Butcher, (1 Dougl. 53), no confirmation of a thing absolutely void." So, if a lease be absolutely void, acceptance of rent afterwards does not amount to a confirmation; as if a lease be upon condition for non-payment to be void. (3 Com. Dig. 138). The proper technical words for a confirmation are, "ratify," ""approve," and "confirm." But Littleton says that the word "dedi," or the word "concessi," has the same effect in substance, and shall enure to the same intent as the word "confirmavi." (4 Cruise, by White, 83, citing 9 Rep. 142 a.) 1856. the same light as if it were a man's will, who, having a I believe almost than in any other in the country. . . . . power to appoint, had made his will in exercise of it, The functions of the district agent would be to get up and had said, as to all my estates over which I have the case prior to the trial; properly to investigate it; power of appointment, I appoint the same to A. B.' If and in cases of a serious nature, such as rape, murder, he had made no other will, but by a codicil had con- robbery, and some of those cases, he should conduct firmed this disposition, it could not be said that that the case before the committing magistrate. . . . . . I disposition included other lands not comprised in the do not at all say that he should be a barrister; I rather power, but vested in him; these would be excluded, just repudiate the notion; I say a practical man well acas much as they would be if they had been disposed of customed to the working and the practice of the criby a technical designation of the lands." (Du Hour-minal law. I think that the district agent melin v. Sheldon, 19 Beav. 391). Confirmations by deed which do not take effect as original conveyances require a thirty-five shilling stamp, as being deeds not otherwise charged, nor expressly exempted from all stamp duty. J. P. P. PUBLIC PROSECUTORS. (Continued from p. 46). James Hemp, Esq., for nineteen years Assistant Clerk of Arraigns at the Central Criminal Court, and also Deputy Clerk of Assize on the Oxford Circuit, examined. .... I think that at present there is a great evil in the system of criminal procedure. There is an absence of responsibility on the part of those who have the conduct of the early stage of the prosecution up to the time of the trial, and there is also a want of uniformity in the general practice with regard to indictable offences. I do not think that the appointment of a public prosecutor to conduct the case in court would lead to any advantage, but I think that the appointment of a district agent might be attended with considerable benefit. . . . I think it would remove the principal evil, namely, the want of responsibility on the part of those who now conduct the prosecutions. . . ... I think first of all that a private prosecutor, where he employs his own attorney, is necessarily, more particularly in London, put to great expense; that the allowance at the Central Criminal Court, for instance, to an attorney for a prosecution is almost absurd. Beyond the allowance of 21. or 37. which he has for the brief, he very frequently has to pay to the attorney a bill of 50l. or 601.. In the case of a poor person, unless the magistrate's clerk takes up the case, or it is taken up by a speculative attorney, who may attend at the petty sessions or at the police court for that purpose, there may possibly be a failure of justice. Where it is taken up by a spe: culative attorney I think it is a great abuse; and where it is conducted by the magistrate's clerk I do not think it is always efficiently conducted. ..... I do not myself recollect any case where there was collusion between the prosecutor and the party charged. Not of the party charged being bought off?-Excepting in cases of conspiracy and perjury at the Old Bailey; that is, not collusion between the party charged and the prosecutor before preferring the indictment, but where a prosecutor originally prefers a charge from some corrupt motive, for the purpose of ultimate compromise and benefit to himself. That has been done frequently in cases which have been mentioned by my Lord Campbell-cases of gaming-houses, brothels, perjury, and conspiracy. In your experience, if district agents were appointed, would it tend to diminish the expense of criminal prosecutions?-Certainly not; it would tend to increase the expense of criminal prosecutions, but it would be for the benefit of the public. I think, on the Oxford Circuit, and in reference most particularly to the county of Stafford, a great public benefit would be obtained. I have only knowledge with regard to that circuit. I think there are some counties on the Oxford Circuit where little or no change is desirable. There is more crime in the county of Stafford than in any other county in the circuit, and should be totally unfettered in his choice of counsel; that he should choose his own counsel, because he would be responsible to the Crown for the proper and efficient discharge of his duties. . . . . . I think the practice in the Mint system is rather bad. In the cases prosecuted by the Mint, up to the time of trial, I do not think they could be much better managed; but in court it has been a matter of observation, not only of myself, but of others, that those cases are not ordinarily so well conducted as other cases which come from private instruction. I do not know how that arises..... I do not think, as a general rule, the police take up cases which should not be taken up; and it would be subject to the discretion of the district agent afterwards whether or not he should proceed with the charge. . . . . . I think it would be well that the judge should have power either to allow or to disallow the expenses of their witnesses. . . . . I think that in all cases where witnesses are called to facts on behalf of the prisoner, the judge should have it in his power to allow their expenses, whether bound over or not. I think that the judge should always have a discretion as to allowing any expenses. ... Robert Marshall Straight, Esq., further examined. Mr. Straight said-I wish to be permitted to make one addition to the evidence which I gave at the last meeting of this committee. I referred to several stages of the prosecution; but I omitted to mention one, and perhaps the most important-namely, that of trial. I wish to bear my testimony to the efficiency with which tained in the case, and I am fortified in that by what cases are now prosecuted upon trial by the counsel reLord Campbell has said to-day. I am also desirous of allowances made in respect of counsel's fees, the duties explaining to the committee what is the amount of the of whom have been described by Lord Campbell to-day that at the Lent Assizes in 1855, upon the Home Ciras having been performed to his satisfaction. I find cuit, 283 prisoners were committed for trial. My clerk has ascertained for me what was the amount of fees paid to counsel in respect of those prisoners. It is a rough calculation, but it is substantially correct; it amounts to 3971. only*. I was also desirous of asceramounted to 4731. I ought to state, that I quite containing what the allowances to attornies were; those citors are not called upon to pay sums of money out of cur with Mr. Hemp, that occasionally, although solipocket, as the question was put to me upon the last occasion, they do not make a profit out of prosecutions by being allowed such full costs as in some cases they tional cases. Upon the last occasion I stated that I ought to have. I think this happens only in excepthought there were some defects in the preliminary Mr. Phillimore's bill; I did not understand what the stages of the prosecution. At that time I had not seen *The witness afterwards transmitted to the committee the following return:--Home Circuit, Lent, 1855. Number of prisoners Number of prosecutions Number of prosecutions in which professional assistance was rendered Total amount of allowance to attornies Total amount of allowance to counsel 283 265 216 £461 416 MARSHALL STRAIGHT. 1856 Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, to direct that all the powers or duties exercisable by the court' or ‘a judge,' under any of the sections of the same act, shall, as regards matters and district agent was, or what were to be his functions. I have now seen the bill, and I think the appointment of district agents, with the duties defined by the bill, would conduce to the more effective administration of justice, and to obviate the defects referred to. I, how-proceedings in the said Court of Passage, be exercisable ever, think it has escaped the notice of this committee, that it will be highly inconvenient if these district agents are appointed for too large districts. If a district agent is appointed for the whole of a county, it will be inconvenient and expensive; for it must be recollected that the witnesses must be seen by the district agent before they go to court; and if he performs his duty, he will examine those witnesses to see whether what they state is true. Henry Reynolds, Esq., Solicitor to the Treasury, examined. We have had several prosecutions, but they are principally directed by the Home Office. The other branches of the Government which are placed under our legal care also send directions for prosecutions; but even in those cases they frequently go through the Home Office. We are employed by the Board of Trade, for instance, in cases under the Mercantile Marine Acts. .... The course we follow is this:-In cases where the parties are in custody, we attend the police courts at which they are brought up, and have the depositions taken; then, if the parties are committed for trial, the depositions are sent and examined in our office. If we consider that no further evidence is necessary, the counsel for the Crown are instructed to draw the indictments; we prepare the briefs; and then the prosecutions are conducted by permanent counsel, who in the Central Criminal Court are appointed for that purpose. In cases in the country the directions of the Attorney-General are taken as to the counsel to be employed.... I was in all the cases of the Chartist trials in 1848; they were in London. (To be continued). BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT. By an Order in Council, (30th January, 1856), the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, is extended and applied to all the courts of record esta blished under the provisions of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, (County Courts Act), in respect of actions upon bills of exchange and promissory notes where the plaintiff claims a sum not exceeding 50%. It is also directed that the powers and duties incident to the provisions of the said Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, with respect to matters in the said courts of record, shall be exercised by the judges of the said courts respectively, or their respective deputies, for the time being, or in their absence by the respective clerks of the said courts for the time being; and that the enactments, Secretary of State's orders, practice, and forms in force and used in the said courts of record, shall be adopted with reference to proceedings had under the said last-recited act, so far as the same are applicable, mutatis mutandis*. By another Order in Council of the same date it is directed, "that within one month after this Order shall have been made and published in the London Gazette, all the provisions of the said Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, contained in the sections numbered respectively 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, in the printed copy of the said act, except so much of sect. 1 as provides for the mode of fixing the amount of costs to be indorsed on the writ of summons under that section, shall extend and apply to the said court of record of the borough of Liverpool, called the Court of Passage, as to matters and proceedings in that court. And her This Order, although not so expressly stated, cannot come into force until a month shall have elapsed from its publica tion in the London Gazette. and exercised by the court' or assessor;' and that all the powers or duties exercisable by the Masters of the superior courts, or any three of them, under the 1st section of the said act, shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said Court of Passage, be exercised and exercisable by the registrar of the said court, subject to the approval of the said assessor." By another Order of the same date it is ordered, "that within one month after this Order shall have been made and published in the London Gazette, all the provisions of the said Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, (except such as are contained in the sections numbered respectively 8, 9, and 10, in the copy of the said act printed by her Majesty's printer), shall extend and apply to the said court of record within the city of Manchester, as to matters and proceedings in the said court. And her Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all the authorities, powers, or duties exercisable by the court, or a judge, or any number of judges, under any of the sections of the said Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, hereby extended and applied to the said court of record within the city of Manchester, shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said court of record, be exercisable and exercised by such court or the recorder thereof; and that all the authorities, powers, or duties exercisable by a Master, or any number of Masters, under any of the sections of the said act as aforesaid, shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said court of record, be exercisable and exercised by the registrar of the said court of record or his deputy; and that all the authorities, powers, and duties exercisable by a sheriff under any of the sections of the said act as aforesaid shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said court of record, be exercisable and exercised by the Serjeant-atMace of the said city of Manchester." And by another Order of the same date it is ordered, "that within one month after this Order shall have been published in the London Gazette, all the provisions of the said Common-law Procedure Act, 1854, (except such as are contained in the sections of the said act numbered respectively 2, 17, 75, 76, 77, 95, 97, 98, and the whole of the 99th section, except so much thereof as explains the meaning of the word 'action,' and also except sects. 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, and 107, in the copy of the said act printed by her Majesty's printer), shall extend and apply to the said court of record within the city of Manchester, as to matters and proceedings in the said court. And her Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all the authorities, powers, or duties exercisable by the court, or a judge, or any number of judges, under any of the sections of the said Common-law Procedure Act, 1854, hereby extended and applied to the said court of record within the city of Manchester, shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said court of record, be exercisable and exercised by such court or the recorder thereof; and that all the authorities, powers, or duties exercisable by a Master, or any number of Masters, under any of the sections of the said act as aforesaid, shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said court of record, be exercisable and exercised by the registrar of the said court of record or his deputy; and that all the authorities, powers, and duties exercisable by a sheriff under any of the sections of the said act as aforesaid shall, as regards matters and proceedings in the said court of record, be exercisable and exercised by the Serjeant-at-Mace of the said city of Manchester." |