them it appears to be a just and honest contract, it work people, and the hours for the suspending of work, and the general discipline and management of their works in conformity to law, for twelve calendar months, in conformity with the resolutions of a majority of the obligors present at a meeting to be held for the purpose of carrying the agreement into effect. The condition of the bond was, that if the obligors should for twelve calendar months carry on, or wholly or partially sus- Bonds made of fraud, to the intent to delay, hinder, pend the carrying on, of their works, in regard to the or defraud creditors, are by the 13 Eliz. c. 5, (made perseveral matters aforesaid, in conformity with the resolu-petual by the 29 Eliz. c. 5), declared to be void. Until tions in that behalf of a majority of the said obligors, very recently, bonds upon usurious contracts were by &c., the bond was to be void in regard only to the the 12 Ann. c. 16, utterly void. This act, however, topersons so performing the condition, but otherwise to gether with all the then existing laws against usury, remain in force. "The question for our consideration," were repealed by the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90. said Crompton, J., "is, whether a bond of this nature can be enforced at law. I am of opinion that the bond is void as being against public policy. I think that combinations like that disclosed in the pleadings in this case were illegal, and indictable at common law, as tending directly to impede and interfere with the free course of trade and manufacture." Lord Campbell, C. J., however, though he concurred with his Brother Crompton in considering the bond void, expressed himself as not prepared to say that the combination which had been entered into between the parties to the bond would be illegal at common law, so as to render them liable to an indictment for a conspiracy; and after criticising the dictum of Grose, J., in Rex v. Mawbey, (6 T. R. 619), from which the Lord Chief Justice fairly said such a doctrine might be deduced, and alluding to the 3rd section of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, as coming very near, but not going to the full length of rendering the bond illegal, he proceeded-" I am therefore obliged to bring the bond within the category of written instruments which are not avoided by positive statute, and are not so far illegal at common law as that the framing of them is a criminal offence, but which cannot be enforced by action, being considered void as against public policy. I enter upon such considerations with much reluctance, and with great apprehension, when I think how different generations of judges, and different judges of the same generation, have differed in opinion upon questions of political economy, and other topics connected with the adjudication of such cases; and I cannot help thinking that where there is no illegality in bonds and other instruments at common law, it would have been better that our Courts of justice had been required to give effect to them, unless where they are avoided by act of Parliament. By following a different course, the boundary between judge-made law and statute-made law is very difficult to be discovered. But there certainly is a large class of decisions, which will be found collected in the report of the recent Bridgwater case in the House of Lords, (Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1), to the effect, that if a contract or a will is, in the opinion of the judges before whom it comes in suit, clearly contrary to public policy, so that, by giving effect to it, the interests of the public would be prejudiced, it is to be adjudged void. When I look at this bond, I have no hesitation in concluding that the association which it establishes ought not to be permitted, and that the enforcing of the bond will produce public mischief. I therefore feel compelled, as a judge, to say that it is void." (Hilton v. Eckersley, 24 L. J., Q. B., 360). A bond to restrain a person from trading in a particular place, if made upon a reasonable consideration, is good; but not if it be on no reasonable consideration, or to restrain a man from trading at all. The law, as was rightly said by Parker, C. J., afterwards Lord Macclesfield, and one of the ablest of our great equity judges, presumes all restraints of trade to be bad; but if the circumstances are set forth that presumption is excluded, and the Court is to judge of those circumstances, and determine accordingly; and if upon Two or more obligors may bind themselves jointly in a bond, or they may bind themselves jointly and severally; in which last case the obligee may sue them all jointly, or, at his election, simply sue any one of them. (5 Bac. Ab., by Gwillim & Dodd, 810). Where, however, two are jointly bound, and one dies, the obligee must sue the survivor, and cannot maintain an action against the executor or administrator of the deceased obligor; but otherwise if the two obligors are bound jointly and severally. (Towers v. Moor, 2 Vern. 98). In a recent case at the Rolls, of a bond by three obligors, whereby they bound themselves "jointly," and their heirs, executors, and administrators "respectively," to pay, and which was conditioned to be void if they, or either of them, their heirs, executors, or administrators, paid, Sir J. Romilly, M. R., said "I am of opinion that this is a joint and several bond, and that (one of the obligors having died) the obligee is a several creditor of the estate of the deceased obligor. I do not doubt or dispute the doctrine, that the intention of the parties must govern, but that intention must be ascertained from the instrument itself, and not from evidence to be drawn from other sources. In this case the three persons bound themselves jointly, and their respective heirs, executors, and administrators. That is somewhat ambiguous; literally it is, that during their lives they are all jointly liable, but when one dies his several estate and heir is to be liable to pay the debt. It is contended that no such bond can exist. I am placed in this dilemma: either I am to say that the word 'jointly' is to control the word severally,' or that the word 'severally' is to control the word jointly. I hold it to be an obligation to pay by each." (Tippins v. Coates, 18 Beav. 403). Perhaps the principle upon which a Court of equity acts in construing bonds to be joint and several, which in form were only joint, has never been better expressed than by Lord Thurlow. "I do not," he said, "by any means conceive that parties are to be presumed to mean a joint and several bond in all cases where they happen to be persons ignorant of the legal effect of these instruments. Wherever there are circumstances appearing on the face of the bond to shew that it was intended to be joint and several, though in point of form it was only a joint bond, there is no difference between a Court of law and a Court of equity: the former would consider it as a joint and several bond as readily as the latter; but upon the head of mistake a Court of equity would go further than a Court of law, and if an instrument were really intended to be different from what it appears to be, it is a very proper subject for the interference of the Court *" "That is a notion," said Lord Eldon," which I think was not correct, that where a man executes a bond, meaning it to be the Court has construed a bond several in bankruptcy, and several * Ex parte Symonds, (1 Cox, 200). For cases where the against creditors in administration of assets, see Burn v. Burn, (3 Ves. 575); and where a joint bond has been considered from intention as joint and several, see Thomas v. Frazer, (3 Ves. 399). joint bond of himself and another, and not his several bond, it would not be his several bond. But the cases go further. In such a case, however, unless there is something special, the man who had become so severally bound has a right to have that bond delivered up, for his intention was not to become a mere several obligor, but to be a joint and several obligor; and the rights are different both in law and equity, for if he is only a several obligor, he has no remedies over against any one; but if he is a joint and several obligor, or only a joint obligor, there is right of contribution against the other sureties in equity, from the earliest times, and of exoneration from the principal.' (Underhill v. Horwood, 10 Ves. 226). And this last observation of Lord Eldon naturally brings us to the consideration of the important subject of the right of contribution as between co-sureties. The whole doctrine of principal and surety, with all its consequences, including the most important, the right of contribution, rests upon the established principles of a court of equity, and not upon contract, except as it may be so represented upon the implied knowledge of those principles. There is no express contract for contribution, bonds generally, if not universally, being joint and several. The contribution results from the maxim, that equality is equity, proceeding, where the instruments are several, upon the ground that a surety will be entitled to every remedy which the creditor has against the principal debtor, to enforce every security and all means of payment, to stand in the place of the creditor, not only through the medium of contract, but even by means of securities entered into without the knowledge of the surety, he having a right to have those securities transferred to him, even though there was no stipulation to that effect, and to avail himself of all those securities against the debtor. This right of a surety also stands, not upon contract, but upon a principle of natural justice, the same principle upon which one surety is entitled to contribution from another. The creditor may resort to either for the whole, or to each for his proportion, and as he has that right, if he, from partiality to one surety, will not enforce it, the Court gives the same right to the other surety, and enables him to enforce it. Natural justice requires that the surety, having become security with others, shall not have the whole thrown upon him by the choice of the creditor not to resort to remedies in his power, the effect of recourse to which would be an equal contribution*. Courts of common law have of late years assumed, to the great regret both of common-law and equity judges of eminence, (Lord Eldon in Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. 169; Lord Wensleydale in Davies v. Humphries, 6 M. & W. 168), a jurisdiction upon this subject, the difficulties in doing full justice between the parties being almost insurmountable. The remedy at law for contribution is founded upon the principle that one pays that to which all are liable, but it goes no further. If, therefore, one obligor be insolvent, contribution for his share cannot be recovered against the other; it is the subject-matter of proceeding in equity, and not at law. (Per Holroyd, J., in Collins v. Prosser, 1 B. & Cr. 688; see also Cowell v. Edwards, 2 B. & P. 269). In equity, observed Bayley, J., (Browne v. Lee, 6 B. & Cr. 697), in the case of Peter v. Rich, (1 Ch. Rep. 34), decided early in the reign of Charles I, where one of three sureties had paid a sum of money, it was held that he was entitled to recover one moiety from another of the co-sureties, the third having become insolvent. "But I think," the learned judge continued, "that at law one of three sureties can only recover against any one of the others an aliquot proportion of the money paid, regard being had to the number of sureties." It is now clearly settled, that where a co-obligor is a mere surety and insolvent, or has not paid anything, and the demand is accordingly restrained as a demand against the principal, the general rule of a Court of equity, that a plaintiff suing on a joint and several bond must bring forward all the obligors, principals, and sureties, is dispensed with. (Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. 326; see also Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk. 405, and Angerstein v. Clark, 2 Dick. 738). Though, however, a principal obligor is insolvent, and so stated in the bill, he may be made a party to a suit, and must pay his own costs of being brought before the Court; and the same rule applies, though with less force, to the case of an insolvent surety. (Hitchman v. Stewart, 3 Drew. 271). A surety is entitled to interest from his co-sureties upon any sums he may have paid. In a case at the Rolls, before Sir Lloyd (afterwards Lord) Kenyon, on a bill filed by a surety against his co-surety and the principal for a contribution from the co-surety in respect of money actually paid by the plaintiff, the decree ordered that the co-surety (the principal debtor being insolvent) should pay unto the plaintiff one moiety of what should be found had been paid by him for principal and interest, at the rate of 41. per cent. from the time of payment. (Lawson v. Wright, 1 Cox, 217). And this decision of the Master of the Rolls has been recently cited with approbation, and followed, by Sir R. T. Kindersley. (Hitchman v. Stewart, 3 Drew. 271). The principle to be extracted from the case before the Vice-Chancellor is, that where one of several sureties has paid the principal debt, and some of the co-sureties are insolvent, he is entitled, as against the solvent sureties, to be repaid their numerical shares of what he has paid, with interest from the time of payment, although the bond may not contain any express indemnity so as to carry interest as on a specialty. "It appears to me," said the Vice-Chancellor in his judgment, "that it is just, that when several persons concur in being sureties for a principal debtor, whatever view a Court of law may take, on which I give * Sir Samuel Romilly's argument in Craythorne v. Swin- no opinion, a Court of equity will take this view, that burne, (14 Ves. 162), approved of by Lord Eldon, and eulo- there is among them all an implied agreement to indem gised by Lord Brougham, in his judgment in Hodgson v. Shaw, nify each other; each agrees that, as among them, he (3 My. & K. 181), "as luminously expounding the doctrine will bear his aliquot part of the debt, and on that prinof the Court." See also the judgment of the Court of Ex-ciple it is, I think, that Lawson v. Wright (the case chequer in Davies v. Humphries, (6 M. & W. 168), delivered before Sir' Lloyd Kenyon) must have been decided. by Lord Wensleydale, (then Mr. Baron Parke), who, echoing Finding that decision, and finding it founded on what I the language of Sir Samuel Romilly, said, "The right of contribution is founded, not originally upon contract, but think a sound equity, and no decision against it, I canupon a principle of equity, though it is now established to not do better than follow it." (Hitchman v. Stewart, be the foundation of an action, as appears by the cases of 3 Drew. 275). Cowell v. Edwards (2 B. & P. 269) and Craythorne v. Swinburne." To quote one more authority. "If we take." observed Eyre, C. B., "a view of the cases both in law and equity, we shall find that contribution is bottomed and fixed on general principles of justice, and does not spring from contract, though contract may qualify it." (Dering v. The Earl of Winchilsea, 1 Cox, 321). COMMISSIONER TO ADMINISTER OATHS IN CHANCERY.The Lord Chancellor has appointed John Harry Jonathan Woodward, Gent., of March, Cambridgeshire, to be a Commissioner to administer oaths in the High Court of Chancery in England. SIR,-Permit me to offer a few remarks upon your useful article in THE JURIST for the 19th inst. on the Succession Duties Act. My experience does not bear out the statement that the commissioners uniformly decline to act upon the power to commute duty given them by sect. 41, for an instance of their acting upon that power has occurred within my knowledge. On that occasion they simply required that the application should be in writing, and state why it was desired to commute the duty. The reason assigned was, that the property was sold by the tenant for life and those entitled in remainder, and the purchaser wished to have it discharged from the duty, and upon this they commuted it. words "by him," after “surrendered," in the next to Commentaries on the Common Law, designed as Intro- The words quoted from the 15th section seem to me to meet completely the case of an extinction of a charge, estate, or interest, (the natural determination of which would occasion a succession), by the person entitled to it joining with those entitled to the property subject to it in conveying the property to a purchaser. If the property is discharged from this charge, estate, or in- THE term "common law" is used by Mr. Broom to terest, the discharge must have been effected by its signify that particular portion of municipal law which surrender or extinction, and this produces an accelera- is administered by the common-law tribunals. In 1756 tion of possession to the successional estate; and I can--just one century ago-Mr. Viner's "ample benefacnot imagine that any such acceleration, whatever may tion" to the University of Oxford for promoting the have been the mode of extinction of the particular study of the law was happily followed by the appointestate, or interest, or charge, is not within the terms of ment of Blackstone as the first Vinerian professor, and sect. 15. the publication of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, containing, as he mentions in his preface, the substance of the course of lectures read by him in Oxford. From the preface to Mr. Broom's volume it would seem that his work also owes its origin chiefly to the experience derived from his able and well-recognised efforts as the lecturer to the inns of court on the different branches and departments of common law. Blackstone's work has, from its intrinsic merit, found its place in the lawyer's library, but its primary object was directed towards giving the gentleman and student in Oxford a knowledge of our law and constitution, then first inrolled amongst the liberal sciences "by general academical authority." So, although Mr. Broom indulges in the hope that his work will aid in spreading a sound knowledge of legal principles "amongst the educated classes of the country,' yet he may with greater confidence rely upon its being acceptable to the Profession. You appear to me to have taken a great deal more trouble than the argument, founded upon the possibility of the proceeds of the sale of settled real estate being re-invested in the purchase of other lands to be settled to similar uses, deserves. The cases contemplated by sect. 42, in which the charge of duty is transferred to the substituted property, are such as that upon the exercise of the powers specified the purchaser is in by a title paramount, or at all events not derived from the successor's interest. Had not the act anticipated the case, it would seem the execution of the power would have defeated the duty attached to the successor's interest, unless, indeed, the fact of that duty having attached would have worked a suspension of the power. You seem to have allowed some weight, too, to the argument, that in some cases the duty might possibly be payable twice over, were lands settled in substitution for lands sold, and in respect of which the duty It is not, however, our desire to institute any comhas been paid. Now, not to rely upon the relief ob-parison between the old Commentaries and the new : not tainable under the 36th and 37th sections, I think the only are their respective fields in a great measure difduty could not attach on the substituted lands in the ferent, but an exposition of the common law as it is in case supposed. To determine the question, the mate- 1856 is wanted almost as much now as Blackstone's rial inquiry will be, who would be the predecessor in Commentaries were required in 1756. All modernised the substituted settlement? Surely not the vendor of Blackstone's Commentaries, however ably executed, the substituted property, and clearly not the person have the same disadvantage which architectural restowho enjoys the particular estate. It must, then, have rations have. There is the mixture of the old building been the successor himself. But by sect. 12 he will with the new master's handiwork, and either the contrast not be liable to duty, unless, when he made the dispo- between the two is too evident and discordant, or the sition, he was entitled to the property comprised in the merging and mixing of the work of the two epochs is so succession expectantly on the death of any person who complete that the sanction of authority which might shall die during the continuance of the disposition made be afforded by the original work is lost. Nevertheless by him; by which I understand, during the continuance modernised Blackstones we have had, and must have. of the estates created by him in favour of other per- Stephen offered himself as the first martyr to black sons. Now, in the case supposed, the duration of the brackets. It was a question between typography, coninterest under the new settlement is co-extensive with science, and foot-notes. The last, however, were exthat of the interest subject to which the successor cluded, and conscience asserted its rights over type, was entitled to the property when he made the dispo- style, convenience, and readableness. sition. I am a warm admirer of the act as a specimen of draftsmanship; but yet I cannot help regarding the third clause of the 12th section as redundant, and the Mr. Broom states precisely the law as it is, with less of disquisition in his text than is found in Blackstone. His object has been "to present explanatory comments on the law, illustrated by cases selected in 2 discharge precisely the same functions as the chiefs on circuit; and indeed, when a chief and a puisne go the same circuit, they preside alternately on the crown and civil side of the courts in the respective towns which they visit. There is, therefore, no distinction whatever between them in itinere. The Nisi Prius 'sufficient number, and with sufficient care, to enable 'the reader to pursue for himself in detail the matter 'debated or touched upon in the text." To those who know the author's other works, it is unnecessary to say that scrupulous accuracy is exhibited throughout the whole work, and that both old authorities and the latest cases are ably collected and digested to bearSittings after Term are regulated by the stats. 18 Eliz. upon and support his propositions. The portly volume is divided into four books, treating of the following subjects:-1. Of legal rights and remedies. 2. Of contracts. 3. Of torts, (a most valuable treatise). 4. Of criminal law. The common law is, and has been, of a very shifting character lately; but it is, therefore, all the more necessary to have such a volume as this, which, while it indicates in the most positive shape the safe anchorage of legal principles, also represents faithfully the force and direction of the varying stream and currents as they affect the jurisprudence of the day. A Letter to Lord Lyndhurst on the House of Peers in its THE object of this pamphlet is the very proper one of improving the House of Lords as a tribunal of appellate jurisdiction, and to rescue it from that scandal which has fallen upon it from high as well as from low quarters. Mr. Macqueen proposes to relieve the chiefs of our common-law courts from going circuits, and from presiding over the Sittings after Term, and, after having made them Peers for life, to transfer their valuable services to the House of Lords during its legal session. The following is the substance of his plan, and also contains some remarks upon life peerages, which are interesting just now, from the elevation of Mr. Baron Parke to such a dignity: c. 12; 12 Geo. 1, c. 31; 24 Geo. 2, c. 18; 1 Geo. 4, cc. 21, 55; and 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 7. It is true, that as a general rule a chief presides at these sittings, but it is not unusual for a puisne to take his place during a portion of them; and now, by the Common-law Procedure Act, 1854, sect. 2, two judges 'may sit at the same time for the trial of causes pend‘ing in the same court. It may, however, be said that the chiefs generally try the special jury causes, which involve questions of considerable importance; but it is to be remembered that special jury causes are tried on circuit indiscriminately before a chief or a puisne, ' and that the law involved in them is seldom of greater difficulty than in other causes, although the amount in dispute may be larger.' 6 6 "The presence of an accomplished Scotch judge, of much forensic and judicial experience, would be of the greatest advantage, not only in administering, but in improving, the laws of both countries, and gradually assimilating them. The inconvenience of two codes is so great, that a patriotic Scotchman (were it not for the chivalry inseparable from the Celtic nature) might almost regret the failure of Edward to anticipate the Union by four centuries. A Scotch judge, such as I have described, would, in all Scotch causes, prevent misapprehensions, or the imagination of them, sometimes as bad as the reality. He would explain the doctrines, the forms, and the practice of his own court, and the phraseology of Scotch law, puzzling to those who know not its learned original. "He would check the glosses of counsel, to whom ques'tions are sometimes put, which no doubt are ably answered; but it would be better that the Court of "Adopting Lord Lyndhurst's words of weight, the last resort had within itself the means of elucidation. question is, how to proceed in the manner that For this reason, by the suggestion of Lord Brougham, 'most corresponds with the ancient constitution of the Indian judges always attend on Indian appeals in the House.' 1. The three chiefs of the common-law courts Privy Council. But the Scotch judge would be of 'might have life peerages, and they might sit in the inestimable value on Colonial appeals, and appeals House throughout the legal year, except in term time, from the Channel Islands; in short, wherever Roman 'when they must of course preside in their own tribu- law arose. There is scarcely any English case in nals. 2. The Lords Justices in equity and the Master which that law has not some operation. The law of of the Rolls might have life peerages, and they might England,' says Chief Justice Holt, is built upon the sit in the House at least as often as they now sit in ruins of the civil law.' Another suggestion may be 'the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 3. The 'offered. A Scotch judge would be scarcely less useful 'Lord Justice General and Lord Justice Clerk of Scot-in the new Divorce Court, (if such a court is ever to land, both privy councillors, might have life peerages; be established); for it was but last summer that Lord and they, or one of them, might sit in the House of Lyndhurst declared his opinion, that he saw no reason 'Lords throughout the legal year. 4. All members why the law of divorce, which gives entire satisfacof the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council nottion in Scotland, should not succeed quite as well in 'elevated to the peerage might be summoned by writ England. An admirable court for this purpose might under the Great Seal, constituting them (as in the easily be carved out of the law peers, and the judges 23 Edw. 3; see the writ to Gilbert de Thornton, of the Privy Council brought back from Downing'supra) members of the Court of Parliament, not assist-street. ants or advisers merely. 5. Similar writs might be "Life peerages would not be an innovation. The sent to the other equity judges, who might be sum-Lords have just reported their opinion to the Crown, 'moned on special occasions. 6. All business now done that the original dukedom of Montrose, created in in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council might 1488, was but for the life of the grantee. It is not 'hereafter be done in the Court of Parliament. questioned that life peerages were known in Scotland. It is certain that they existed in England. The lesser barons suinmoned after Magna Charta were often for life. The reign of Henry III is no doubt obscure. Then it was that the change took place, solving a mystery in the Rolls of Parliament that puzzled and baffled the committee appointed to inquire into and "I do not consider it essential to the due adminis-report on the dignity of the peerage. In the reigns 'tration of justice that the chiefs of our common-law of Edward I, II, and III, of Richard II, and of courts should either attend the assizes, or preside over Henry IV, banneretages were given to the sons of the Nisi Prius Sittings after Term. Puisne judges' peers, to judicial dignitaries, and to military and na "With respect to Ireland, the state of business there is unknown to me, and I am unable to suggest what 'would be convenient. "But in so far as the chiefs of the English common'law courts are concerned, an able and experienced 'member of the common-law Bar writes: 6 6 , Feb. 2, 1836. val commanders, Bannerettes were temporary mem'bers of the Upper House. They might, however, be 'hereditary, and those came in time to be considered as barons. But they seem to have been more usually 'for life, or for a single Parliament, or durante officio. 'None of these could be members of the Lower House. 'Bannerettes were not, originally, military dignitaries; 'they were conferred on grave chief justices. Ban'nerettes were the last in the first order of the State. At the Court of Common Pleas, held on the 1st inst., his Honor the Chief Justice, after an impressive introductory address, promulgated the following modifications of the existing rules touching the qualifications of barristers: 1st. That from and after the date hereof every barrister who may hold her Majesty's commission as a law officer of the Crown within the Leeward Island Government shall be considered as qualified for admission to practise in the several courts of this island. A Hull merchant, who had lent the king a sum of 'money for his foreign wars, was made a bannerette by Edward III*. The revival of life peerages need not 'inspire a fear of inundation.' They may be limited 'to those who hold, or who have filled, high appoint'ments. The House would not suffer by the resto'ration of learning and talent. On the contrary, it 'would gain a prodigious accession of authority; and 'we should no longer have blundered and abortive acts of Parliament. The Court of Parliament might thus 2ndly. That any gentleman who shall hereafter 'always be supplied with a full complement of the very bonâ fide serve gratuitously under articles of service best description of judges for an appeal tribunal. The 'old idea that such judges ought necessarily to inhale courts of Antigua for a period of five years shall be or apprenticeship in the office of a practitioner in the 'the atmosphere below seems exploded. That atmo-eligible for admission as a barrister of such courts, pro'sphere generates certain prepossessions which affect vided he give six months previous notice of his intenthe judgment, and which can be got rid of only by the tion to apply for such privilege; that he produce a 'operation of a wider and more varied experience, such certificate of such bonâ fide study or gratuitous service, 'as a Court of universal jurisdiction alone can commu- and of correct moral conduct, under the hand and seal 'nicate." of such practitioner; and be subject to undergo an examination as to his legal attainments, by one or more practitioners of the Antigua Bar, as the Chief Justice for the time being may be pleased to direct. GENTLEMEN CALLED TO THE BAR. THE following gentlemen have been called to the degree of Barrister at Law: LINCOLN'S INN.-Clement T. Swanston, jun., Esq., B.A.; Martindale E. Vale, Esq., B. A.; Francis V. Hawkins, Esq., B.A.; Henry Denne, Esq., B.A.; Henry O. Barker, Esq., B.A.; George V. Yool, Esq., M.A.; William B. D. D. Turnbull, Esq.; Arthur T. Watson, Esq., M.A.; Robert T. Gurdon, Esq., M.A.; William L. Cabell, Esq., M.A.; John M. Hayman, Esq., M.A.; George G. Elger, Esq., M.A.; Bingham A. Ferard, Esq., M.A.; Andrew R. Scoble, Esq.; Cecil H. Russell, Esq., M.A.; John C. Wilson, Esq., B. A.; and William N. Lawson, Esq., B.A. The relaxation of the rule requiring English qualification to practise in our local courts affords proof of the anxiety of our Chief Justice for the welfare of the country. We are jealous that the Bar should be constituted of right men; for Blackstone tells us that the law is a science which distinguishes the criterion of right and wrong; which teaches to establish the one, and prevent, punish, or redress the other; which employs in its theory the noblest faculties of the soul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart: a science which is universal in its use and extent, accommodated to each individual, yet comprehending the whole community; and we therefore desire that its professors should be men, not of talent only, but of the highest principle and integrity. This alone constitutes a guarantie to the public against the abuse of a position largely influential for good on the one hand, but also for evil on the other, according to the moral standing of the practitioner. The Bar has, however, been deprived within the last few years, from one cause the altered condition of the colony in respect to the or other, of many of its distinguished members; and as income of the superior classes would seem to operate against the selection of the law as a profession, on account of the expense attending the English curriculum, we think the relaxation has been wisely conceded to GRAY'S INN.-Hampson William Whitmarsh, Esq., tunity thus afforded to them of coming to us may be the necessity of the case, and we trust that the opporand William Andrews Holdsworth, Esq. MIDDLE TEMPLE.-Robert Marshall Straight, Esq.; Henry Gawtress, Esq.; John Dickie, Esq., Queen's College, Cambridge; Thomas Henry Derbishire, Esq.; William Thomas Image, Esq., B.A., Trinity Hall, Cambridge; Thomas Eyre Foakes, Esq.; Henry Gardner, Esq.; and John Richard Andrews, Esq. INNER TEMPLE.-T. Henry Baylis, Esq., M.A.; Frederick C. J. Millar, Esq., B.A.; James Bevan Bowen, Fsq., M.A.; Edmund C. Law, Esq., B. A.; Frederic Hyman Lewis, Esq.; Benjamin Leigh Smith, Esq.; Edgar Skipper, Esq., LL.B.; Charles W. Walker, Esq., B.A.; William Brandt, Esq., B. A.; and Richard Hambly Andrew, Esq. embraced by gentlemen of the sister colonies within the new rule. This will aid us in our present difficulty, The following are instances of peerages for life in the and we shall, as said the Attorney-General in his reply ' reign of Richard II and subsequently, viz. : 1377. Earl of Huntingdon. 1543. Earl of Thomond. 'Lord Coke recognises life peerages. Life peerages to females, and to males with remainders over, are common and recent." to the Court, hail their arrival with much satisfaction, and be glad to extend to our new friends the hand of good fellowship. The second branch of the relaxation, which provides for the admission of students after five years' study with a local barrister, while guardedly worded, and very properly so, opens the field of ambition to young men of ability and character, and gives reasonable assurance that the Bar, after the lapse of a few years, will be strengthened by accessions from this source. |