venience that resulted from the bidder's retractation of his bidding, a condition, which originated with Lord St. Leonards, is now usually inserted, that no person shall retract his bidding. In his well-known treatise, (Sugd. V. & P. 20, 11th ed.; Conc. View, 11), Lord St. Leonards says that he always considered that this condition could not be enforced; it has, however, in the case of a sale by order of the Court, heen held binding upon the solicitor of a mortgagee, with whose consent the estate had been put up for sale. (Freer v. Rimner, 14 Sim. 391). Whilst upon the subject of the duties of auctioneers, it may be mentioned, that a question has been raised, but never actually decided, how far the authority of an auctioneer to sell extends to enable him to do all things, even to the drawing up of special conditions of sale, which may be necessary for the carrying the sale into effect. Lord Ellenborough, however, seems to have thought that it was the auctioneer's duty to draw up such conditions, inasmuch as, in a case before his Lordship, (Denew v. Daverell, 3 Camp. 451), he left it to the jury to say what damages the vendor had incurred by the neglect of the auctioneer in going to a sale of leaseholds without a condition to provide that the purchaser should not be entitled to demand the title of the original lessor. (Pike v. Wilson, 1 Jur., N. S., 60).

The particulars should give such a clear and accurate description of the property as may be readily understood by ordinary persons; for if obscurely worded, the Court will be very unwilling to support the vendor's title, or to hold any purchaser under them to his bargain. (Taylor v. Martindale, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 663). At the same time, small variations in a general description of land are not material, (Calverley v. Williams, 1 Ves. jun. 211), inasmuch as it is impossible, as was observed by Lord Thurlow, when the question is upon the selling an estate upon articles by auction, that all the little particulars relative to the quantity, title, and situation should be so specifically laid down as not to call for some allowance and consideration when the bargain comes to be executed. (Calcraft v. Roebuck, 1 Ves. jun. 223). It is the obvious duty of a vendor to make himself fully acquainted with all the peculiarities and incidents of the property which he is going to sell; and when he describes the property for the information of the purchaser, it is his duty to describe everything which it is material to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property. It is not for him just to tell what is not actually untrue, leaving out a great deal that is true, and leaving it to the purchaser to inquire whether there is any error or omission in the description or not. (Per Sir R. T. Kindersley, V. C., in Brandling v. Plummer, 2 Drew. 430).

In preparing particulars of sale it is well to remember, that in contracts for the sale of real estate an agreement to make a good title is always implied, (per Lord Wensleydale in Doe v. Stanion, 1 M. & W. 701); that an agreement of purchase means primâ facie a purchase of the fee, (per Coltman, J., in Worthington v. Warrington, 5 C. B. 644); and that an agreement to sell land, without expressing the nature of the interest intended to be parted with, will be construed as referring to and importing the whole of the vendor's interest in the premises, (per Sir J. Wigram, V. C., in Bower v. Cooper, 2 Hare, 410); and that nothing which flows out of that interest as an incident is to be done away by loose expressions, to be construed by facts more loose, (per Lord Eldon in Church v. Brown, 15 Ves. 268). An infringement, indeed, of the rule, "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cœlum," is of itself sufficient to avoid the contract between vendor and purchaser. (Pope v. Garland, 4 Y. & C. 403). It is not necessary to make any distinct reference in the particulars as to the existence of mines upon the land intended to be sold, the mine being parcel of the

C.

soil, and the ownership consequently in the owner of the soil. (Rogers v. Brenton, 17 L. J., Q. B., 39). But with respect to mines lying under or near a railway, on lands taken by a railway company under the provi sions of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, & Vict. 20, it is by the 77th section enacted, that the company shall not be entitled to any mines, except only such part thereof as shall be necessary to be dug or car ried away or used in the construction of the works, unless the same shall have been expressly purchased. Any reservation of mines and minerals should, however, be mentioned, (Seaman v. Vawdrey, 16 Ves. 392); as also the reservation of any right of way, (Oldfield v. Round, 5 Ves. 508), of sporting, (Burnell v. Brown, 1 J. & W. 168), or of cominon every third year, (Gibson v. Spurrier, Peake's Ad. C. 50). Any liability, too, to repair the chancel of a church, (Forteblow v. Shirley, cited in Binks v. Lord Rokeby, 2 Swanst. 223), and the existence of easements or rights prejudicially affecting the property proposed to be sold, to a material extent, should also be stated. (Shackleton v. Sutcliffe, 1 De G. & S. 622). It is the duty of the purchaser, when there are outstanding leases, of which he has notice, to ask and ascertain what the terms are upon which the property is out on lease, so that he may know precisely the nature of the property which he purchases; that is, whether he has certain rights upon it, or whether his rights are in any manner restricted. (Pope v. Garland, 4 Y. & C. 401). When the estate sold is fen land, and so described, the particulars need not mention drainage and embanking taxes with which it is charged by a local but public act of Parliament. (Barraud v. Archer, 2 Sim. 433). Neither is it indispensable to allude to quit rents, rent-charges when of small value, Esdaile v. Stephenson, 1 Sim. & S. 12), or heriots due in respect of free lands held in fee-simple of a manor, (Damerell v. Protheroe, 10 Q. B. 20).

On a sale of copyhold lands, if the fines be certain, or if there be none, or only a small fine payable on descent or alienation, the fact should be stated in the particulars. If, however, the fine be not certain, or of such a character as to give increased value to property sold as copyhold, there would seem no necessity for alluding to the fine otherwise than in general terms, as, "subject to the usual fines," in which case the purchaser would take subject to the ordinary rule respecting uncertain fines, now generally, though im properly, termed arbitrary. On account of the little dependence to be placed on the rolls in many manors, and the difficulty in others of ascertaining the customs, it is desirable to avoid details; and no reference, there fore, should be made to the customs of the manor of which the land intended to be sold is parcel*.

A person contracting to purchase leasehold property is held to contract with notice of the clauses in the lease. (Walter v. Maunde, 1 J. & W. 181). When the lease is stated, it is the business of the intended purchaser to look at it, and see whether there is any covenant that may materially influence his judgment as to the value. "If," said Sir W. Grant, "the circumstance that the land was in lease had been concealed, that would be a different consideration; but, upon analogy to other cases, if the intended purchaser has notice that the estate is in lease, he has notice of everything contained in the lease; if, for instance, there is a covenant to renew, the purchaser cannot object that he had no notice of that particular covenant. (Per Sir W. Grant in Hall v. Smith, 14 Ves. 433;

sonable fine arbitrable upon the value." Although in modern times a practice has grown up fixing the uncertain fine at two years' value of the land, yet the older decisions limit the uncertain or reasonable fine to one year's value. (Popham. Lancaster, (12 Car. 1), 1 Ch. Rep. 96; Middleton v. Jackson, Id. 33; Willowe's case, 13 Rep. 1).

*The old law writers describe a fine uncertain as "a rea

22

Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. jun. 437). So, therefore, on a sale, in lots, of premises, the particulars of which state them to be held under one lease, reserving rent, and that the purchaser of one lot is to be exclusively subject to the rent, the other purchasers cannot object to the title on the ground of a clause of re-entry on non-payment contained in the lease. (Walter v. Maunde, 1 J. & W. 181). If a vendor offers property for sale, describing it as being let on a lease, containing all the usual covenants to repair, knowing that there is no person who can be made liable upon the covenants, that would be considered as a delusive representation on the part of the vendor; for a representation that the lease contains the usual covenants to repair is likely to lead the purchaser to conclude that those covenants will be duly performed. (Per Sir G. J. Turner, V. C., in Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare, 620). But when leaseholds are sold by auction, and the lease, containing the ordinary covenant to repair, is produced and read to the bidders, if any of the buildings demised and described in the lease have been pulled down before the sale, the purchaser is not bound to complete the purchase, even although the building pulled down be not described in the particulars of sale. (Granger v. Worms, 4 Camp. 82). And here it may be remarked, that whenever a lease contains unusual covenants, the circumstance should be stated. (Conc. View, 19). It should also be borne in mind, that, primâ facie, a man who agrees to take an underlease must know that he is bound by all the covenants contained in the original lease. (Cosser v. Collinge, 3 My. & K. 283). A purchaser, however, cannot be compelled to take messuages which in the particulars of sale had been described as held for the residue of a term of ninety-nine years, but the title to which proved to be an underlease for a term less by three days than the term of ninety-nine years granted by the original lease; for a title under an underlease cannot be considered as substantially the same thing as an assignment of the original term in the property; and among the inconveniences incident to an underlease, as distinguished from an assignment of the original term, it is sufficient to mention, that if the under-tenant were to tender the rent to the head landlord, he would not be bound to accept that tender. (Madeley v. Booth, 2 De G. & S. 718).

It is extremely difficult to lay down any certain definite rule which shall determine what misstatement or misdescription in the particulars shall justify a rescinding of the contract, and what shall be the ground of compensation only. It is a safe rule to adopt, that where the misdescription, although not proceeding from frand, is in a material and substantial point, so far affecting the subject-matter of the contract that it may reasonably be supposed that but for such misdescription the purchaser might never have entered into the contract at all, in such case the contract is avoided altogether, and the purchaser is not bound to resort to the clause of compensation. (Per Tindal, C. J., in Flight v. Booth, 1 Bing. N. C. 376). Under such a state of facts the purchaser may be considered as not having purchased the thing which was really the subjeet of the sale; as, for instance, when the subjectmatter of the sale was described to be a "free publichouse," while the lease contained a proviso that the lessee and his assigns should take all their beer from a particular brewery, in which case the misdescription was held to be fatal. (Jones v. Edney, 3 Camp. 285; 1 Bing. N. C. 377). So, where the particulars represented the house proposed to be sold as calculated for an extensive business in various trades, in the particulars specifically enumerated, and wherein it was superadded that "no offensive trade is to be carried on, and that the premises cannot be let to a coffee-house keeper or a working hatter," and the original lease, when produced, appeared to prohibit, amongst others,

the businesses of fruiterer, vintner, baker, herbseller, brewer, fishmonger, and coffee-house keeper, the Court of Common Pleas held that there was such a material discrepancy between the particulars and the lease as to entitle a purchaser to rescind his contract. (1 Bing. N. C. 370). Thus, also, where leaseholds were sold by auction under the Court of Chancery, and in the particulars were described as a bonded sugar refinery, and the lease was referred to, which, however, contained no such restriction, but the abstract shewed a prior agreement for the lease of the premises to be used for refining sugar in bond, and the purchaser accepted the title, paid his purchase money into court, and was let into possession, and the lessors afterwards instituted a suit to rectify the lease by introducing the restriction, Sir John Romilly, M. R., refused to part with the purchase money until the result of the suit was known. "If," he said, "I were to allow the vendors to succeed in compelling the purchaser to complete, I should be giving the vendors the purchase money, which the purchaser might not be able to recover back, and yet he might not be able to obtain that which he had purchased; for the dock company, (the lessors), who have instituted a suit, may succeed, and then the vendors will not have had that which they have contracted to sell." (Bentley v. Craven, 17 Beav. 204). Where, however, the particulars of sale erroneously, but without any fraud, described a part of the property as customary leasehold, holden of a certain manor, and renewable every twenty-one years, at a customary fine and an annual rent of 10s., and the property proved to be holden only for the residue of a lease of twenty-one years, at a rent of 10s., without any customary right of renewal; and one of the conditions of sale fixed the time at which any objections to the title of the vendor should be taken, and enabled him at any time after the delivery of such objections to vacate the sale; and another condition provided that the purchaser should accept the existing lease and the assignment to the vendor as a sufficient title to the leasehold property; and a further condition stipulated, that if, through any mistake, the estate should be improperly described, or any error or misstatement be inserted in the particular, such error or misstatement should not vitiate the sale, but the vendor or purchaser should allow or pay compensation; upon a bill by the purchaser against the vendor, Sir W. P. Wood, V. C., held that the purchaser was entitled to specific performance of the contract, with compensation for the absence of any customary right of renewal, the same being a misstatement or misdescription within the last-mentioned condition. (Painter v. Newby, 11 Hare, 26). When no practical difficulty or injury is caused by the misdescription, or the defect simply arises from a mere clerical error, a purchaser is bound to complete his contract. Thus, where a lessor, being in possession of a lease of certain houses, granted an underlease of one, being No. 7, to a gentleman of the name of Mackenzie, who subsequently assigned it to Lord Walsingham, and the lessor, by his will, demised the leasehold to trustees, who, under an order of the Court, sold No. 7 to a purchaser, No. 7 in the particulars of sale being described as leased to Mr. Mackenzie, and on investigating the title it appeared that the parcels set out in the underlease to Mr. Mackenzie were by a clerical mistake the parcels of No. 6, and the trustees after the sale obtained an order of the Court to correct this mistake by authorising an assignment to the tenant of No. 6, and a new underlease, with proper parcels, to the tenant of No. 7, the Court overruled an objection to the title by the purchaser of No. 7, and compelled him to complete his purchase. (Grissell v. Peto, 2 Sm. & G. 39). And a purchaser who bought a house, described in the particulars of sale as No. 39, Regency-square, Brighton, was held by Sir J. Parker, V. C., bound to complete, inasmuch as

that number was the description by which the house was known, though, in fact, it was situated out of the square. (White v. Bradshaw, 16 Jur. 738). But where the particulars of sale described a house as "No. 58, Pall-mall, opposite Marlborough House," when the house was in reality not in Pall-mall, but was situate behind No. 57, Pall-mall, having an entrance, with a door, which for many years bore the description of No. 58, and a separate passage, about sixty-five feet long, and three feet eight inches wide, across the ground floor of No. 57, between the basement and upper stories of No. 57, and the particulars indicated no peculiarity in the access to the house, and the objection on this point having been taken as soon as it was known, Sir J. Stuart, V. C., decided that the purchaser was entitled to have the contract rescinded, on the principle that what was presented to the purchaser as the subject-matter of his contract was something entirely different from what must have been understood from the description in the particulars of sale. (Stanton v. Tattersall, 1 Sm. & G. 529).

(To be continued).

J. P. P.

more unequivocal is the injury sustained by women in the lower classes, for whom no such provision can be made by their parents, who possess no means of appeal to expensive legal protection, and in regard to whom the education of the husband and the habits of his associates offer no moral guarantie for tender consideration of a wife.

That whereas it is customary in manufacturing districts to employ women largely in the processes of trade, and as women are also engaged as sempstresses, laundresses, charwomen, and in other multifarious occupations which cannot here be enumerated, the question must be recognised by all as of practical importance.

That newspapers constantly detail instances of marital oppression, "wife-beating," being a new compound noun lately introduced into the English language, and a crime against which English gentlemen have lately enacted stringent regulations.

But that for the robbery by a man of his wife's hard earnings there is no redress; against the selfishness of a drunken father who wrings from a mother her children's daily bread there is no appeal. She may work from morning till night to see the produce of her labour

To the Honourable the House of Commons in Parliament assembled, the Petition of the undersigned Women of Great Britain, married and single,

Humbly sheweth,

That the manifold evils occasioned by the present law, by which the property and earnings of the wife are thrown into the absolute power of the husband, become daily more apparent. That the sufferings thereupon ensuing extend over all classes of society. That it might once have been deemed for the middle and upper ranks a comparatively theoretical question, but is so no longer, since married women of education are entering on every side the fields of literature and art, in order to increase the family income by such exertions. That it is usual, when a daughter marries in these ranks, to make, if possible, some distinct pecuniary provision for her and her children, and to secure the money thus set aside by a cumbrous machinery of trusteeship, proving that few parents are willing entirely to intrust the welfare of their offspring to the irresponsible power of the husband, to the chances of his character, his wisdom, and his success in a profession.

That another device for the protection of women who can afford to appeal exists in the action of the courts of equity, which attempt, within certain limits, to redress the deficiencies of the law; but that trustees may prove dishonest or unwise in the management of the funds intrusted to their care, and courts of equity may fail in adjusting differences which concern the most intimate and delicate relation of life: that legal devices, patched upon a law which is radically unjust, can only work clumsily, and that here, as in many other departments of justice, a clearance of the ground is the chief thing necessary. That since this is a truth which has gradually come to be recognised in regard to protective restrictions upon trade, to titles of property in land, and to the legal machinery for conveying such property from one owner to another, &c., we would hope that before long it will also come to be recognised in matrimonial legislation.

That it is proved by well-known cases of hardship suffered by women of station, and also by professional women earning large incomes by pursuit of the arts, how real is the injury inflicted.

That if these laws often bear heavily upon women protected by the forethought of their relatives, the social training of their husbands, and the refined customs of the rank to which they belong, how much

cases are within the knowledge of every one.

That the law, in depriving the mother of all pecuniary resources, deprives her of the power of giving schooling to her children, and in other ways providing for their moral and physical welfare; it obliges her, in short, to leave them to the temptations of the street, so fruitful in juvenile crime.

That there are certain portions of the law of husband and wife which bear unjustly on the husband, as, for instance, that of making him responsible for his wife's debts contracted before marriage, even although he may have had no fortune with her. Her power, also, after marriage, of contracting debts in the name of her hus band, for which he is responsible, is too unlimited, and often produces much injustice.

That in rendering the husband responsible for the entire maintenance of his family, the law expresses the necessities of an age when the man was the only moneygetting agent; but that since the custom of the country has greatly changed in this respect the position of the female sex, the law of maintenance no longer meets the whole case. That since modern civilisation, in indefinitely extending the sphere of occupation for women, has in some measure broken down their pecuniary dependence upon men, it is time that legal protection be thrown over the produce of their labour, and that, in entering the state of marriage, they no longer pass from freedom into the condition of a slave, all whose earnings belong to his master, and not to himself.

That the laws of various foreign countries are in this respect much more just than our own, and afford precedent for a more liberal legislation than prevails in England; and your petitioners therefore humbly pray that your honourable House will take the foregoing allegations into consideration, and apply such remedy as to its wisdom shall seem fit.

And your petitioners will ever pray. List of Signatures sanctioning the above. Anna Blackwell. Anna Mary Howitt. Isa Blagden. Anna Jameson. Elizabeth Barrett Browning. Sarianna Browning. Mrs. Carlyle. Mary Cowden Clarke. Charlotte Cushman. Amelia B. Edwards. Eliza F. Fox. Mrs. Gaskell. Matilda M. Hays. Mary Howitt.

Geraldine Jewsbury.
Mrs. Loudon.
Mrs. Lovell.
Harriet Martineau.
Hon. Julia Maynard.
Mary Mohl.

Bessie Rayner Parkes.
Mrs. Reid.
Barbara Leigh Smith.
Miss Sturch.