subject-matter which, in my opinion, must be looked at in drawing the line. .... I know that the Court of Exchequer think that it would be desirable if the law upon this point were settled by making no contract by a corporation valid unless under seal. However that may be, I think that we may, in accordance with de The question which has arisen, and as to which there has been a conflict of opinion between the Courts of Queen's Bench and Exchequer, has been with reference to the extent of the exceptions to this rule. At different periods it has been made to depend upon the frequency of the subject-matter, upon its insignificance, upon the contract having been executed by one of the contracting|cided cases, give judgment in this case for the plaintiff.” parties, or upon its recognition, so as to operate as an estoppel by reason of an action having been brought upon it by the corporation. But several of these elements are now to be excluded from the inquiry; and in the last case upon the subject (Henderson v. The Australian Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company, 1 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 322; 24 L. J., Q. B., 322) this simple principle was laid down, at all events with regard to a trading corporation-that wherever a contract is essential to its purposes and object, it may be enforced, although it be not under seal. In that case a company had been incorporated by charter for the purpose of conveying the royal mails, passengers, and goods in their steam-vessels between Great Britain and Australia, and they made a parol | agreement with the plaintiff that he should bring home one of their ships from Sydney, it being supposed to be unseaworthy and uninsurable: the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract, which was admitted (on demurrer to the replication) to have been made for the express purpose of preserving the ship, and maintaining the communication and carriage of the mails, cargo, and passengers between Great Britain and Australia. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The following is part of the luminous judgment delivered on that occasion by Mr. Justice Erle:-"This contract is binding upon the defendants, although not under seal, upon the ground that it is directly connected with the purposes of the incorporation, which is the maintaining and navigating vessels for the conveyance of passengers -this contract being for the purpose of fetching home one of these vessels. The authorities upon this subject are rather conflicting as to the reason of the exception, but I find none which conflict with the principle laid down by my Brother Wightman in Clarke v. The Guardians of the Cuckfield Union, (16 Jur., part 1, p. 686; 21 L. J., Q. B., 349, S. C.) . . . . This principle does not at all conflict with those cases in which corporations have been held not liable upon contracts not under seal, which are chiefly cases of municipal corporations; for instance, The Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton, (6 M. & W. 815). I think that the notion that a set of contracts are to have their validity depend upon the frequency or insignificance of their subject-matter is so pernicious a doctrine that it ought not to be adhered to. That ground was originally propounded with reference to municipal corporations, and applied to small services; but I cannot think that the Courts meant to lay down such a principle of law as applicable to corporations generally. Indeed, the question of insignificance is quite disposed of by the fact, that in first applying this principle to trading corporations they were allowed to draw bills not under seal, and such an act cannot be considered as an insignificant matter; and I think the rarity of the occurrence cannot be any criterion as to a seal being necessary. It is the nature of the contract and its .... It will be observed that in the above case the consideration for the contract was executed, but no stress was laid on that fact in the judgment. In respect, however, of the contract having been executed, it resembles (among other decisions) a recent case in the Exchequer, of The Australian Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company v. Marzetti and Others, (24 L. J., Ex., 273), in which it was held that a contract made by a corporation, although not under seal, being executed, could be enforced by them. In that case Pollock, C. B., said—“ It has been established by authorities that a corporation may, in respect of matters for which it was created, contract without seal." But in another recent case in the same court (Smart v. The Guardians of the West Ham Union, 10 Exch. 869) it was held that an action was not maintainable by a collector of poor-rates against a board of guardians for unpaid poundage, he not having been appointed under seal. In this case also he had performed the services which entitled him to the poundage; and on this being urged, and Beverley v. The Lincoln Gas-light and Coke Company (6 Ad. & El. 829) being cited to shew that the consideration being executed, the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the quantum meruit, Parke, B., said "That case was decided with reference to the doctrine of a power to contract by implication. In some cases, as, for example, the notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, there is a power to contract by parol by implication." And in delivering judgment the same learned judge observed-"With respect to the case of Clarke v. The Guardians of the Cuckfield Union, I must say that I am not satisfied with the observations of my Brother Wightman, for if that case be correctly decided, the effect would be to overrule several previous decisions of this Court." In the case of Clarke ferred to, Wightman, J., held that the guardians were v. The Guardians of the Cuckfield Union, so often reliable to a tradesman for goods sold and work done in fitting up a union workhouse, although there was no contract under seal, as a board of three guardians had express power to make all necessary contracts, and the required that they should provide the articles in quespurposes for which the guardians were incorporated tion; and in delivering judgment his Lordship said"The result of the cases to which I have referred appears to be, that whenever a corporation is created for particular purposes, which involve the necessity for frequently entering into contracts for goods or works the corporation is created into execution, a demand in essentially necessary for carrying the purposes for which respect of goods or works which have been actually supplied to and accepted by the corporation, and of which they have had the full benefit, may be enforced by action of assumpsit, and the corporation will be liable, though the contract was by parol only, and not by deed," It seems impossible to reconcile these cases, and therefore, until a Court of error has solved the question, parties seeking to enforce a parol contract made by a corporation should avoid the Exchequer, and by all means resort to the Court of Queen's Bench. 26 Court Papers. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. LORD CAMPBELL, C. J., said, (Jan. 19)-All cases in the Special Paper and Crown Paper will in future be taken in their order, unless application is made to the Court upon sufficient ground for their postponement before the day on which they come on for argument. If in any case the counsel on one side is present he will be heard; if the counsel on neither side is present the case will be struck out. Applications for the postponement of cases made on the day on which they ought to be argued produce great inconvenience, and are unjust to the parties who are to argue the cases which immediately follow. Therefore the Court will, with the exception stated, uniformly and rigidly take the cases in their order, and dispose of them. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. There are only three things essentially necessary to a bond, namely, writing, sealing, and delivery: signing, at least in former times, was unnecessary. (4 Cruise, by White, 91). The Statute of Frauds has been considered as not to extend to bonds. Any words which shew the intention of a person to bind himself will be sufficient to constitute a bond. The want of a consideration to a bond affords, according to Lord Kenyon, no ground of objection. (Fellowes v. Taylor, 7 Durn. & E. 477). When a bond is assigned it must be sued for in the name of the original obligee, the person to whom it is assigned being rather an attorney than an assignee. A Court of equity will protect the assignment of a chose in action, as much as the law will that of a chose in possession. (Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wms. 199). The Special Paper will be taken on Monday and that the debt and cause of action in the declaration Tuesday next. EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. SITTINGS IN ERROR. The Court of Error will sit upon errors from the Court of Queen's Bench on Friday and Saturday, the 1st and 2nd February; on errors from the Court of Common Pleas on Monday, the 4th February; and on errors from the Court of Exchequer on Tuesday, the 5th February. LAW APPOINTMENTS. ROBERT PASHLEY, Esq., Q. C., has been appointed Assistant Judge of the Middlesex Sessions. Mr. Pashley was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple in 1837. William Carpenter Rowe, Esq., Q. C., Recorder of Plymouth, has been appointed Lord Chief Justice of Ceylon. Mr. Rowe was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple on the 12th February, 1830, and went the Western Circuit. Peter Benson Maxwell, Esq., of the common-law Bar, has been appointed Recorder of Penang. The salary is stated to be 2000l. a year, with a prospect of promotion to the Bench in India. Mr. Maxwell was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple on the 19th November, 1841, and went the Home Circuit. He was one of the commissioners selected by the Duke of Newcastle, in the autumn of 1854, to inquire into the state of the hospitals at Sctuari. SHORT NOTES IN CONVEYANCING.-No. 2. The stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3, provides that all actions of debt upon any bond shall be brought within twenty years after the cause of such actions or suits. To an action for debt on a bond bearing date on a day more than twenty years before the commencement of the action, the defendant pleaded mentioned did not accrue at any time within twenty, years next before the commencement of the suit. Replication, that the debt and cause of action did so accrue. At the trial the bond was produced, and appeared to be a post-obit bond; and it was proved that the person upon whose death the sum secured was made payable died within twenty years; the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict. (Tuckey v. Hawkins, 4 C. B. 655). It should be remembered that in actions on bonds damages cannot be recovered beyond the amount of the penalty. (Branscombe v. Scarborough, 13 L. J., Q. B., 247). Bonds void in law may be enforced as agreements in equity, subject to the effect of the equitable circumstances under which they were made. But where an instrument purporting to be a bond was executed by the obligor, blanks being left for the name of the obligee, and therefore void in law, the House of Lords held the intended bond inoperative in equity as an agreement, there being no second contracting party; and at the same time the House of Lords further held, that when a party joins as surety in a bond, he ought to be informed of the nature of the obligation, the name of the obligee, and the relation in which he stands to the principal obligor. (Squire v. Whitton, 1 H. L. C. 333). A bond given in consideration, either in the whole or in part, of future cohabitation, is void; or, to state the rule in other words, if the security is of such a nature as to hold out an inducement, or constitute to either party a motive, to continue an illicit connexion, the instrument will be void. (Hall v. Palmer, 3 Hare, 536; Franco v. Bolton, 3 Ves. 376). Where, however, a man had seduced an innocent woman, and, having had a bastard by her, gave her a writing obliging himself to pay a specified sum of money, after his death, for the purchasing an annuity for the woman and the child for their lives, and the man died, Lord King held that a Court of equity would compel a performance of the agreement. (The BLACKSTONE defines "a bond" to be "a deed whereby Marchioness of Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. Wms. 432; the obligor obliges himself, his heirs, executors, and see also, upon this subject, Priest v. Parrot, 2 Ves. sen. administrators, to pay a certain sum of money to an- 160, and Lady Cox's case, 3 P. Wis. 339). And where other at a day appointed. If this be all," he cona bond had been given to a kept mistress for the maintinues, "the bond is called a single one, simplex obli- tenance of herself and provision for her child, Lord gatio; but there is generally a condition added, that Talbot refused to set the bond aside. (Craig v. Rooke, if the obligor does some particular act the obligation Cas. t. Talb. 153). So also Sir J. Trevor refused relief shall be void, or else shall remain in full force: as pay-against a bond to pay 400l. to a woman whom the plainment of rent, performance of covenants in a deed, or repayment of a principal sum of money borrowed of the obligee, with interest, which principal sum is usually one-half of the penal sum specified in the bond." BONDS. tiff kept as a mistress, but at the same time intimated, that had the obligee been a common strumpet, he should have thought it reasonable that the Court should relieve. (Whaley v. Norton, 1 Vern. 484). In a still earlier case, where a plaintiff had seduced his wife's sister, and 26 and the transaction is concealed from the privity of the wife; the son shall be relieved, and why? Because the bond is a fraud upon the marriage contract. It may have been agreed between the father and the son; and perhaps the father, in consequence of that agreement, settled more than he could afford; but if the effect is to alter the condition in which the wife would otherand this not so much for the sake of the husband as for the sake of the wife and her family." (Williamson v. Gibson, 2 Sch. & L. 363). Where also a widow gave a bond to a female acquaintance to pay her 1007. if she married again, and the acquaintance gave a bond to the widow to pay her executors the like sun if she should not marry again, and the widow soon afterwards remarried, the Court decreed her bond to be delivered up. (Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215). had several children by her, and gave her some bonds for payment of money as a provision for her and her children, and these bonds being sued, he brought a bill suggesting that the bonds were given for no valuable consideration, the then Lord Keeper (Sir Nathan Wright) dismissed the bill, with costs. (Spicer v. Hayward, Pre. Ch. 114). Where, too, a person gave a voluntary bond during his cohabitation with a wo-wise be, such a bond is not allowed to have operation, man previously of a very loose life, and afterwards another bond expressly securing a continuance of the connexion by an annuity in the event of separation, and a bill was filed by the executor to have the bonds delivered up, it was dismissed by Sir A. Macdonald, C. B., with costs-the first bond being considered unimpeached; the latter void at law pro turpi causâ. (Gray v. Watkins, 5 Ves. 286). Following out the principle established by the early cases, Sir J. Leach | decided that a bond for securing a provision for a woman, who had been seduced by the obligor, and for her children, given after the cohabitation had determined, is good, notwithstanding the obligor was married when the connexion commenced. (Knye v. Moore, 2 Sim. & S. 260). In a case before Lords Commissioners Maynard, Keck, and Rawlinson, where the bill was, to be relieved against a bond, drawn in the common form, for payment of money, but proved to be made on an agreement that the plaintiff should either marry her servant, or should, by way of forfeiture, pay him the sum of money mentioned in the condition of the bond, the Court decreed the bond to be delivered up to be cancelled, it being contrary to the nature and design of marriage, which ought, their Lordships intimated, to proceed from a free choice, and not from any compulsion. (Key v. Bradshaw, 2 Vern. 102). Lastly, a bond which had been secretly given by a young woman to a man conditioned to pay him a sum of money if she did not marry him on her father's death, he giving a bond to the like effect, was set aside by Lord Hardwicke, principally on the ground that it was a fraud upon the father. (Woodhouse v. Shipley, 2 Atk. 535; see also Cock v. Richards, 10 Ves. 428). A bond executed for a sum of money lost at billiards has been held void. (Kenny v. Browne, 3 Ridg. P. C. 514). And where a father had given his bond to secura an annuity to his son until he should be in possession of a living of a certain value, and an agreement of the same date recited the bond, declaring that the son would forthwith enter into orders and accept such living, Lord Eldon expressed a strong opinion, that, upon grounds of public policy, by the effect of the agreement the transaction was illegal. (Lord Kircudbright v. Lady Kircudbright, 8 Ves. 51). Bonds in fraud of marriage agreements are set aside in equity upon the ground of public policy, and as introductive, to use Lord Talbot's expression, of infinite mischief. (Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves. sen. 276; Law v. Law, 3 P. Wms. 394). "The Court of Chancery," said Lord Hardwicke, " has been extremely jealous of any contract of this kind made with a guardian or servant, especially with a servant, in respect of the marriage of persons over whom they have an influence, and by rules established, not regarding whether the match is proper or no, if brought about by a marriage brocage contract, sets it aside, not for the sake of the particular instance or the person, but of the public, and that marriage may be on a proper foundation. (Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. sen. 506). Where a bond was given to the wife's father, in order to obtain his consent to the marriage of his daughter, to repay part of the portion if the daughter died without issue, where the daughter was entitled to her portion by a collateral ancestor, Lord Keeper Cowper held the bond to be in the nature of a brocage bond, and decreed it to be delivered up to be cancelled. (Keat v. Allen, 2 Vern. 588). In a case in 1686, before Lord Jeffries, where the bill was, to be relieved against a marriage brocage bond, and it appearing that the marriage was brought about without the consent of the young woman's parents, who were then living, his Lordship, for that reason alone, decreed the bond to be delivered up, ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL terming it a sort of kidnapping, and saying, "that there was a material difference where the parties were at their own dispose, and where their parents were living; though," he added, "such a bond was in no case to be countenanced." (Drury v. Hooke, 1 Vern. 412). Sir J. Trevor, who had been Master of the Rolls during the time Lord Jeffries held the Great Seal, probably had this decision of his chief in remembrance, when fourteen years later, a second time Master of the Rolls, Sir J. Trevor not merely decreed a marriage brocage bond to be delivered up, but a gratuity of fifty guineas, actually paid, to be refunded. (Smith v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392). The circumstances of the case upon which he made the order are, however, not known. A bond given as a remuneration to an obligee for having assisted the obligor in effecting an elopement and a marriage, without the consent of the friends of the wife, was declared by Sir M. Smith, M. R., void, though given voluntarily after the marriage, and without any previous agreement for the same. On the cause being reheard before Lord Redesdale, who affirmed the Master of the Rolls' decree, the Irish Chancellor said, "A father prevails on his son, previous to his marriage, to enter into a voluntary bond; the son does so, (To be continued). JUSTICE. of the Daily News; but as the matters upon which it THE following letter has been addressed to the Editor make no apology for transferring it to our columns:treats may not prove uninteresting to our readers, we SIR,-The coming session will probably open with the usual promise of law reforms, to close with the usual performance. Much will be said about a digest of the statute law, a criminal code, the registration of titles, the simplification of the real property law, the fusion-or confusion-of law and equity, and a bill will be introduced to abolish the Ecclesiastical Courts, as has been customary for the last twenty years or so. Without meddling with these questions, which are annually ventilated during the session, to be returned to their shelves at its termination, I purpose, with your permission, briefly to call attention to a practical question, apparently of small dimensions, never, as far as I am aware, mooted in Parliament, but nevertheless seriously affecting the interest and convenience of the whole country. It is simply this-whether the existing arrangements for the trial of causes and of criminals 25 in London and throughout the country are the most convenient possible for the public? I deal with no principles of law-I propose no changes in the constitution of any of our tribunals-I seek neither to enlarge nor to contract the jurisdiction of our judges, nor to force upon them equity or anything else that may be inconvenient; but taking them as I find them, I desire to make them as useful as possible. As it is, I undertake to shew that the times and places in which civil and criminal justice are administered by the commonlaw judges are, in many respects, so absurdly ill-chosen and inconvenient that nothing but long habit could make them tolerable. For the trial of important metropolitan causes (and this category includes a great number of country causes, which increased facilities of travelling bring to London) sittings are held after each of the four terms, three of which cannot exceed twenty-four days each, and the fourth six days. During the rest of the year the judges are sitting in banc, four at a time in each court, or are occupied in going the circuits. It should be added, that small common jury causes are taken during term before one of the puisne judges of each court, who also sits at chambers. These arrangements are for the most part of very ancient standing-the sittings after term date from the reign of Elizabeth; the circuits are much more ancient; and for many centuries comparatively few changes have taken place in the times when, and the places where, assizes have been held, and yet most other things have changed. Remote and dreary wilds, through which the judges and bar wended their tedious way on horseback, protected by an armed escort from robbers, are richly cultivated, thickly populated, and within a few hours' journey of London. Great cities have waned, villages have grown to undreamt-of dimensions, vast changes have taken place in the distribution of the population and of commerce. Above all, railways have totally upset all former tables of time and distance, fundamentally changing the relations of provincial towns to London and to each other. Under these circumstances, it would be truly miraculous if the times and places most convenient for holding trials 200 years ago continued to be the most convenient now. In the first place, sir, the time allowed for the trial of metropolitan (i. e. London and Middlesex) causes is insufficient. The consequence is, either a long list of remanets, or an unseemly scramble through the cause list, in which the end of justice most eagerly sought would seem to be the bottom of the paper. It is true that the judges have endeavoured in a very praiseworthy spirit to meet this evil, by occasionally employing an extra judge of each court; but inasmuch as it is generally uncertain when he will sit, and what causes he will take, the benefit of his services is in some degree neutralised, by the inconvenience, against which it is impossible to guard, of counsel being sometimes required in two places at once, and clients being either without counsel, or represented by vicarious advocates imperfectly instructed. But if the sittings are not long enough to try all the causes ready to be tried at their commencement, the total absence of sittings in London during a large portion of the year is attended with the additional evil of forcing a large number of London causes to be tried, at vast inconvenience, in the country. There are no sittings for the trial of metropolitan causes between the beginning of July and the end of November-an undoubted and serious inconvenience. What, then, are the fifteen judges doing all this time? The answer is, during part of it they are on circuit, the rest is the long vacation. Admitting the plea of long vacation, I deny that during the residue of this time all the judges are necessarily occupied in the best possible manner in going circuit. Two of them are on the Home Circuit; and what, sir, is the Home Circuit? In reality, nothing more nor less than sittings out of London for the trial of London causes, with infinite inconvenience and expense to everybody concerned, and with benefit only to the railway companies and lodging-house keepers. At the last assizes for Croydon upwards of 200 causes were entered-all, with scarcely an exception, London causes. For the purpose of trying them, judges, judges" clerks, barristers, barristers' clerks, attornies, attornies clerks, plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, &c., all removed from London to Croydon, either to lodge at the latter place, or to rush backwards and forwards between the two daily. Some notion may be obtained of the extra expense of this proceeding if we bear in mind that for every day until his cause is tried (and these assizes lasted twenty days) the attorney charges three guineas for attendance, in addition to travelling expenses, and "scientific" witnesses often a great deal more. Why this daily rushing from London to try causes at a wretched, windy little court in a country town? The reason is, sir, that the judges must go to Croydon because they have been in the habit of going to Croydon, and as consequently they cannot stay in London, the Londoners must go to them. How many, if any, of these 200 causes were really Surrey causes-that is to say, originating out of the metropolitan district-it is needless to inquire, for since the railway every one of them might have been tried more conveniently in London, and the only reason why causes ever should have been tried at Croydon has ceased. The same observations are applicable to every other assize town on the Home Circuit. Among the inconveniences of the arrangements by which causes are forced into the country may be noted the restriction of the choice of counsel to the members of one circuit. In London the services of (for example) the Attorney-General or Sir F. Thesiger are available for the ordinary fee, whereas they are not to be had at Croydon without an additional retainer of 300 guineas. But passing the limits of the Home Circuit, let us glance at the towns in which assizes are held throughout the country. At Liverpool there are two only in the year, leaving a space of eight months during which no proper tribunal for the trial of heavy causes is accessible to one of the greatest mercantile communities in the world. At Bristol only one assize is held in the year; at Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Halifax, Hull, and other equally important and populous towns, no assizes are held. Will it be seriously asserted, that of fifteen judges one cannot be spared to try causes at Liverpool more than twice a year, at Bristol more than once, or at Birmingham at all? But if great cities suffer from inanition, little insignificant towns are, by a strange rule of compensation, indulged in a biennial surfeit of legal nutriment. Twice a year are the judges and bar heralded with much pomp and circumstance into Rutland, Huntingdon, Bedford, Dorchester, Dolgelly, &c., to the infinite excitement of the children, and enhancement of the price of beds, in order to try, on the average, one cause during two circuits. An amount of law power sufficient to dispose of a Liverpool assize is let off, dispersed, and dissipated in a remote rural neighbourhood. The judge tours in search of the picturesque, and the bar play a match with the county cricket club. That the present arrangements are not the most convenient possible I venture to think scarcely admits of a dispute. Greater difference of opinion must be anticipated on the subject of any proposed change, and it is not without much diffidence that I throw out the following suggestions:-I suggest that more frequent sittings at Nisi Prius-say four, or at least three in the year-be held at some of the principal towns in the kingdom, in lieu of the present civil assizes; these places, of course, to be carefully selected with reference to railways, the distribution of population, and other considerations of public convenience. If it be objected that this would be to remove the assizes to a considerable distance from a great number of places, I answer, that a distance by railway of 100 miles may be no more than equivalent to 30 by coach or omnibus, and that places from which the assize town is removed to a greater distance may be thereby greatly accommodated. I answer further, that the county courts afford new facilities for the local trial of small causes, whereby the cause list has been reduced in many places to a tenth of its former dimensions; that the superior judges are now required to try only the more important causes; and that counties (of which there are many) which furnish but one or two such per annum are not entitled, on considerations of public convenience, to an assize; in short, that counties have ceased to be (if they ever were) the most convenient districts into which the country can be divided for the purpose of civil assizes, and that it is time that new districts were established. But where, when, and how are our criminals to be tried? There is no necessary connexion whatever between civil and criminal assizes; in truth, the productiveness of a given district in criminals has some tendency to vary inversely as its productiveness in causes, poverty being one main source of crime, wealth of litigation. Poor agricultural districts, such as Wiltshire, furnish the criminal judge with a week's employment, while his civil brother is hardly able to protract his business for half a day, with the assistance of counsel; but because a week is allotted to the trial of 100 criminals, it does not follow that a week should be allotted to the trial of one cause. Nay, further, because 100 criminals call for a criminal assize in a given place, it does not follow that a civil assize must necessarily be held there also for the trial of one cause, or possibly without one to try. There is no reason beyond immemorial custom for the judges hunting in couples. Again: in criminal assizes there is a lamentable waste of judicial power, the greater part of the time of the judge being occupied in trying petty larcenies, egg stealings, and the like, which are quite as well disposed of at quarter sessions. He is obliged to do this because the assizes are never coincident with the sessions, and because he is bound to deliver the gaol— that is, to try all the prisoners in it. Thus, whether an offence be tried before a superior or an inferior judge depends upon no principle whatever, but upon the accident of when it happens to have been committed. This waste of power (which will be lessened, but not prevented, by the increased jurisdiction of justices) takes place in all criminal assizes except those held in London, where it is arranged that the judge shall attend during a part of each session of the Central Criminal Court for the purpose only of trying the heavier class of offences. Why should not this arrangement be adopted throughout the country? It is unnecessary that the judges should try petty larcenies throughout the provinces twice a year; but it is highly necessary that they should try murders more than twice a year. By a slight alteration the times of holding the quarter sessions might be so arranged as to be compatible with criminal circuits to be taken by single judges. If the judge tried only the class of crimes which he tries at the Central Criminal Court, probably one day of a judge at each sessions would on the average suffice; doubling that time, and allowing for travelling days, on a rough calculation 500 days per annum would be more than enough for the transaction of all the criminal business throughout the country requiring the attention of the superior judges. Will it be said that 500 days cannot be spared for this purpose from the time of the fifteen judges? Were these arrangements, sir, of which I have endeavoured to sketch the outline, adopted, I am convinced that all the civil and criminal business of the country might be transacted with greatly increased benefit to the public, and with so much economy of the time of the judges as to enable them to hold continuous sittings at Nisi Prius in London during the whole year, with the exception of the vacations. Regard for your space deters me from discussing whether the arrangements for sittings in banc might not be improved; whether more than three judges need attend them; and other questions incident to the main subject of this letter. Nor will I say more at present on the probable effect of the plan which I have proposed upon the Bar, than that I believe it would be beneficial rather than injurious; but that, be this as it may, the public convenience must be the first consideration. I am, &c., A LAWYER. PUBLIC PROSECUTORS. (The Evidence of R. M. Straight, Esq., continued from p. 22). With regard to the magistrates' clerks being intrusted with these prosecutions, supposing there was a district officer paid by a salary, would there be any objection to its being the duty of the magistrates' clerks, they being paid by salary--that is to say, the clerks of petty sessions-to send the depositions to the district officer in cases of difficulty, and in cases of no difficulty, to conduct the prosecution?—No, I do not think there would be. I do not exactly understand what you mean by the words "district officer." I think we are using that expression in different senses. The person charged with the duty of collecting and methodising the evidence in all criminal cases where his assistance is required, over a certain area, as the person to whom the magistrates' clerks would refer; does that system appear to you objectionable?-No, I do not think it would be objectionable; it does not occur to me that it would be so. Mr. W. Ewart.-The magistrates' clerks would have discretion in certain cases to apply to the district officer? Yes; though I should have thought it more convenient to have an officer for each petty sessional division. ... Having sat with the grand jury in London for some time, I think I have the means of forming a pretty accurate opinion as to the number of unfounded prosecutions which are made. I am of opinion that the number of prosecutions which are instituted without probable cause are not very numerous. I think that a great number of prosecutions are commenced where there is a reasonable and a probable ground, and the party accused is really guilty; but they are not proceeded with, because the prosecution is founded in order to enforce some civil claim. That, I think, is a great scandal upon the administration of justice. In case a prosecution is commenced, it should be the duty of some proper officer to see that it is effectively carried on. . . . . I do not think there are many frivolous prosecutions carried on for want of a public prosecutor. . . I think that here and there prosecutions may fail for want of the evidence being properly got up after commitment. With regard to the grand jury, he said-The grand jury is a very great constitutional privilege. The Crown can put no one upon his trial for felony or trea son without the consent of the grand jury, who represent the people. On the other hand, the people, by means of the grand jury-that is to say, if they have the fiat of the grand jury, who represent them-can arraign |