FFLLOW CITIZENS, Should the present plan prevail, the Western Rail-road will be finished four years sooner and upon the one million of dollars of stock now held by the State, there will be avoided the viz: loss of the interest of said 4 years, Should the present plan prevail, the contracts which would be made, at the present low prices, will save, to the State, at least 30 per cent. on their said $1,000,000 of stock, say, Thus, there will be a saving to the State on their own $1,000,000 of stock, of, and a like saving, to the individual Stockholders, on their $2,000,000, of, Saving to the People of the Commonwealth, as a mass, While we only ask of the State the Loan of their Credit, for 80 per cent. on our $2,000,000, viz: for In furnishing which, the State have the guarantee, against loss, of the amount paid, by the Stockholders, viz: $240,000 00 300 000 00 540,000 00 1,080,000 00 1,620,000 00 1,600,000 00 400,000 00 a No one can reasonably doubt the success of the Western Rail-road, when once opened. There is not a bank, nor capitalist, in the habit of loaning on Rail-road Stock, but what considers a loan of 80 per cent. on the Stock of the great Railroads, now finished, viz: the Boston and Worcester Rail-road, the Boston and Lowell Rail-road, and the Boston and Providence Rail-road, as a loan of the safest character. We may, therefore, safely assume, that there is no risk of loss to the State; but, on the contrary, a clear demonstrable gain of $1,620,000. FELLOW CITIZENS, Should the present plan prevail, the Western Rail-road will be finished 4 years sooner. What is 4 years, to the probable existence of every business man in the State, and of every farm er, and of every active man in Massachusetts? What is four years? Is it not as much as 25 per cent.? Shall we then curtail, by 25 per cent., the business life of every actor, by rejecting the present plan? It is very desirable to reduce the term of military service, without reducing our military efficiency. Once the Western Rail-road finished, we can thus reduce this term of service. Instead of having every citizen a soldier, from 16 to 45 years of age, we can have it from 20 to 25 years. Thus reducing our citizen soldiers to a quarter part of their present number, we will save (even in the trainings in time of peace) at least $3 for 3 days on 75,000 men, or $225,000 per annum; and yet, by the facility and celerity of transportation, our force will remain as great, nay, even greater, in efficiency. At this particular time, there is, in the State, a great mass of persons, willing to work, but unable to find work. Shall we create this mass of capital, to employ, at once, usefully, this mass of labor? Or shall we leave it to seek shelter and to seek food, in the poor houses; or to mortgage future earning, and the future welfare of their families, by contracting burthensome debts, which (even when business revives) will hang, like a mill stone, about their necks? FELLOW CITIZENS, Should the State think proper thus to create, on the Stock held by individuals, a State Stock, for $1,600,000 00 it will naturally create a like Stock, to pay 80 per cent on its own Shares, viz: 800,000 00 $2,400,000 00 Thus, there will be, at hand, a mass of of exchange on England; because this stock will be payable in England, where it is saleable at an advantageous price. Allow us to present, to your earnest attention, the effect of this creation of such a mass of Exchange on England, ON THE RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS. The great problem to be solved is "how to resume Specie Payments without producing great distress." We all know that distress of the most aggravated character cannot be avoided, if curtailment is resorted to; and we also know that curtailment was tried, in vain, in England, from 1797 to 1822, at seven distinct periods, the history of which was, at each period, curtailment, distress insufferable, turning out of the ministry, and then, (in despair of attaining the object,) a fresh increase of Loan: and some of the most distinguished men were actually disposed to look upon the resumption of specie payments as an impossibility. At last, the resumption of specie payments, by a great mass of banks in the United States, demonstrated to the world, that this great result could be obtained, and stimulated the proud isle to fresh exertion. From the latter end of 1815, to the end of 1817, the Bank of England reduced the amount of "Bills and Notes under Discount" tremendously, say, from 16 million pounds sterling, to 2 1-2 million pounds sterling; and yet did not resume and could not resume. Frightened at the misery they had produced, they shrunk aghast, and again increased the Loan and gave up the pursuit. They had overlooked the great American invention, by which our banks were enabled to resume. Soon after the peace of 1815, the banks in New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore resolved to resume, and tried their hand at curtailment. They only produced mischief; and public sentiment compelled them to retrace their steps. Curtailment produced, as usual, its natural offspring, viz: general distress, and, of course, general distrust, and, of course, terror; all of which is the very reverse of the first and indispensable elements of resumption of specie payments, viz: quiet and ease and comfort, and their natural offspring, viz: general and generous confidence. These are the natural result of a gentle, general increase of Loan. The discovery (by American genius) of this undeniable truth led the way to the resumption of specie payments. It was not done by curtailment. It was done by the very reverse of it, viz : by the agreement of the then new bank of the United States, with the local banks, to discount 2 millions in New York, 2 millions in Philadelphia, and 1 million in Baltimore; and to take, by the hand, all the local institutions and sustain them, shoulder to shoulder. Thus it was that a force, foreign to the then common course of trade, was brought in, to give additional strength to the local banks, who, one and all, declared that, without it, they would not, and could not undertake to resume specie payments. And this is the true secret, viz: non-curtailment, a gentle increase of Loan, and ▲ FORCE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN EXISTENCE, to inspire a tone of general confidence, in each and every one of the public, and in each and every one of the banks; and it was by this, that, for the first time in the history of the world, success crowned the attempt to resume specie payments by a mass of Banks. Baffled in 1815, 16 and 17, in their efforts to resume specie payments, by curtailment, the Bank of England and the British Government afresh sought the causes of success on this continent. Americans, who happened at the time to be in London, were consulted by the ministry; and, in result, the true cause was discovered, viz: that success was due to the aid of a fresh force, a force foreign to the then existences in trade, and to a gentle increase of Loan. The new elements were accordingly brought into action in 1822, viz: by a reimbursement to the bank by government, (a force foreign to trade) and by a gentle increase of Loan. A general kind feeling and tone of confidence and prosperity being thus created, the bank was enabled (at last without an effort) to resume, even before the time appointed. If, then, we arm the mass of banks in Massachusetts, with this auxiliary force, viz: $2,400,000 of exchange on England, it will furnish, in the Spring, an amount more than sufficient to pay our cash-balance then due to Europe and to New York; and we can then resume specie payments without curtailment, and without producing incalculable mischief, and with a force in hand, sufficient to inspire general confidence. Whether, then, we consider the plan proposed, as an important element in the resumption of specie payments, or as a clear saving to the State, or to the Stockholders, or to the public at large, or in its moral effects, the measure recommends itself equally as a measure fitted to produce incalculable benefits. Read and adopted. Ordered, That the Treasurer of the Corporation, for the time being, under the order of the Board of Directors, be authorized to execute, in the name of the Corporation, such securities as may be necessary for any loan or loans which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts may grant to the Corporation of their credit, by proper instruments; and to pledge, as collateral security therefor, the franchise of the Corporation, together with the road and its appurtenances,—including all additions made to the same after such pledges shall be given. Ordered, That all the foregoing proceedings, including the address now adopted by the stockholders be certified by the President and Clerk, printed, and a copy thereof forwarded by the Clerk to the Governor, and to each Counsellor, Senator and member of the House of Representatives, and to each Stockholder. THOMAS B. WALES, President. |