The following information is contained in a letter from the secretary of the navy to a committee of congress:

The following table will show the expense of building, and annual expense in service, of each rate:

Rate.

Expense of Building.

Annual Expense.

74 60

50

44

36

32

20

The distribution of prize money is thus directed by act of tongress:

The proceeds of all ships and vessels, and the goods taken on board of them, which shall be adjudged good prize, shall, when of equal or superior force to the vessel or vessels making the capture, be the sole property of the captors; and when of inferior force, shall be divided equally between the United States and the officers and men making the capture.

The prize money, belonging to the officers and men, shall be distributed in the following manner:

I. To the commanding officers of fleets, squadrons, or single ships, three twentieths, of which the commanding officer of the fleet or squadron shall have one twentieth, if the prize be taken by a ship or vessel acting under his command, and the commander of single ships two twentieths; but where the prize is taken by a ship acting independently of such superior officer, the three twentieths shall belong to her commander.

II. To sea lieutenants, captains of marines, and sailing masters, two twentieths; but where there is a captain without a lieutenant of marines, these officers shall be entitled to two twentieths and one third of a twentieth, which third, in such case, shall be deducted from the share of the officers mentioned in article No. III of this section.

III. To chaplains, lieutenants of marines, surgeons, pursers, boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and masters mates, two twentieths.

IV. To midshipmen, surgeons mates, captains clerks, schoolmasters, boatswains mates, gunners mates, carpenters mates, ships stewards, sail makers, masters at arms, armourers, cockswains, and coopers, three twentieths and an half.

V. To gunners yeomen, boatswains yeomen, quarter masters, quarter gunners, sail inakers mates, serjeants and corporals of marines, drummers, fifers, and extra petty officers, two twentieths and an half.

VI. To seamen, ordinary seamen, marines, and all other persons doing duty on board, seven twentieths.

VII. Whenever one or more public ships or vessels are in sight at the time any one or more ships are taking a prize or prizes, they shall all share equally in the prize or prizes, according to the number of men and guns on board each ship in sight. No commander of a fleet or squadron shall be entitled to receive any share of prizes taken by vessels not under his immediate command; nor of such prizes as may have been taken by ships or vessels intended to be placed under his command, before they have acted under his immediate orders; nor shall a commander of a fleet or squadron, leaving the station where he had the command, have any share in the prizes taken by ships left on such station, after he has gone out of the limits of his said command.

A bounty shall be paid by the United States of twenty dollars, for each person on board any ship of an enemy at the commencement of an engagement, which shall be sunk or destroyed by any ship or vessel belonging to the United States, of equal or inferior force, the same to be divided among the officers and crew in the same manner as prize money.

Every officer, seaman, or marine, disabled in the line of his duty, shall be entitled to receive for life, or during his disability, a pension from the United States, according to the nature and degree of his disability, not exceeding one half his monthly pay.

The following calculation is interesting:

Much having been said on the disparity of force between the American 44 gun frigates and the British 38, the rates of the Constitution and Guerriere, it will, perhaps, not be out of place here, to give a comparative view of the force of each. Both the American 44 gun ships and the British 38 gun ships are constructed on the same principles, and their guns are placed in the same relative position, forming batteries of a similar nature. The guns in each ship are placed on the main or gun deck, the quarter deck and the forecastle. The gun deck, which may be considered as the line of defence, is about 176 feet long in the American 44 gun ships, and about 160 feet in the English

38 gun ships. The line of defence, therefore, in the American 44 gun ships, exceeds the English by about 16 feet. But it is to be observed, that the length of line of defence by no means implies strength. This essentially consists in the number of guns that can be placed in battery, with advantage, in a given line, and the strength of the ramparts and parapets, in which light the sides of the ship may be considered. A line of defence of 200 feet, mounting 30 guns in battery, would be about onefourth weaker, and produce an effect one-fourth less, than a line of defence 150 feet long, mounting the same number of guns. The American 44 gun ships mount 30 twenty-four pounders on the gun deck, 24 thirty-two pound carronades, and 2 eighteen pounders on the quarter deck and forecastle, or upper decks. The British 38 gun ships mount 28 eighteen pounders on their gun deck, 18 thirty-two pound carronades, and 2 eighteen pounders, on their quarter deck and forecastle, besides a 24 pounder shifting gun. In an engagement between ship and ship, the effect produced is by the broadside or the number of guns placed in battery on one side of the ship. So that only half the number of guns in a ship can be considered as placed in battery in its length or line of defence. The number of guns, therefore, of the American 44 gun ships, placed in battery in its line of defence of 176 feet, will be 28. The number of guns in the English 38 gun ships, placed in battery in its line of defence of 160 feet, will be 24: but as they carry a shifting gun, which may be placed in battery on either side, the number will actually be 25. So that the number of guns in battery in the American 44 gun ships, will exceed those in the English 38 gun ships, only one-tenth. But the American line of defence is one-tenth longer, and consequently would be one-tenth weaker than the English, if it had only the same number of guns in battery: consequently, the force of each, when the line of defence and number of guns placed in battery are considered, is about equal.

The American 44 gun ships carry twenty-four pounders on their gun decks, the English eighteen pounders. But are not eighteen pounders of sufficient weight of metal for the service of large frigates, and fully calculated to produce every effect that may be required in an engagement between frigates? It has, moreover, been asserted by the officers of the Constitution, that the shot of the Java's eighteen pounders were only three pounds lighter than those of the American twenty-four pounders, after accurately weighing them both. So that, consequently, the difference in weight of metal was only one-eighth. It has been often asserted in the British newspapers, that the American frigates were 74's in disguise. It has also been asserted, by an English naval commander, in his official letter, that the American 44 gun ships were built with the scantling of a 74. If, by this assertion, he meant to insinuate that the American 44 gun ships were of the same nature with a 74 or

ships of the line, he has manifested an extreme want of candour or want of professional knowledge. 74 gun ships are all of the line, that is, they have guns mounted on two gun decks, extending the whole length of the ship, or its line of defence, besides those on the quarter deck and forecastle; and, in addition to these, there are guns on the poop. The length of the line of a 74 is about the same as that of the American 44 gun ships. A 74 gun ship mounts about 88 guns; consequently, the number of guns placed in battery in her line of defence, will be 44 guns; and in the American frigate of 44 guns, only 28 in the same line of defence. Consequently, the strength of the line of defence of a 74, is not very far from double that of an American 44 gun ship, considered in respect of the number of guns; without taking into consideration the difference in weight of metal, and the compactness and strength of sides.

This, we believe, sufficiently demonstrates the illiberality and absurdity of comparing the American 44 gun frigates to British 74's, with a view to disparage the rising glory of the American navy, and to depreciate the noble exploits of her gallant tars.

On the great question which should now engage the attention of our statesmen, the author adds some considerations, which we deem of sufficient interest to extract from them copiously, and conclude with recommending the volume as containing, in a small compass, much useful and agreeable matter.

On turning our attention to the subject of the United States' navy, these questions naturally arise in our minds-Is an efficient naval establishment necessary for the United States?Does it possess the means of forming and supporting one?What naval system would answer best for the United States?

It will first be necessary to fix a determinate idea to the words, efficient naval force. If this force be merely destined for the defence of the sea-coast of the United States, it should be equal to any force the enemy could permanently keep on the coast. Let us examine the strength of the force England can, under various circumstances, send to our coasts. The British navy consists of nearly 1000 vessels of every description. Previous to the present war with the United States, she had at sea 115 sail of the line; in port and fitting out, 32; 4 guard ships of the line; hospital ships, &c. 31; in ordinary and repairing, 70; building, 31;-making together, 283 of the line.

By this statement we perceive, that notwithstanding the English were at war with a nation that was making every exertion to form a naval establishment equal to her own, she had not one half of her sail of the line at sea.

Let us now examine the probable amount of force the English government could, while at war with France, keep on the

coasts of the United States. At the commencement of the year 1813, six months after the declaration of war, there were only 8 sail of the line on the whole American station, including Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Western Islands, and West Indies. It is said that about 20 additional sail of the line are to be sent to the American station. We may, therefore, reasonably conclude, that, while the English government is at war with France, she could not keep more than 30 sail of the line on the American station; nor could she, possibly, keep more than the two-thirds of these, or 20 sail of the line, on the coasts of the United States.

Now, as a sail of the line is in itself a force superior to any frigate, or perhaps any number of frigates that could attack it, we must conclude, that a nation with a naval establishment, however large, consisting only of frigates, would not be efficient against one having sail of the line; and that the latter, in proportion to the number of sail of the line she possessed, could blockade the ports of the former. The English government, therefore, with this force on our coast, could, while our naval force consists only of frigates, permanently blockade from ten to twenty ports, harbours, or bays. If the American government possessed four sail of the line, then all the English blockading squadrons would have to consist of at least four sail of the line, and not more than four or five places could be blockaded. If the United States possessed eight sail of the line, not more than two places could be blockaded; if they possessed twelve, not more than one; and if they possessed from twenty to thirty sail of the line, they could effectually protect the coast against any naval force the English government, while at war with France, could keep on it. Therefore, from twenty to thirty sail of the line would be a sufficient naval establishment under existing circumstances.

Supposing England were at peace with every other government but the United States, she could not well keep more than 100 sail of the line on the American station; and of these she could not permanently keep more than 60 on the coasts of the United States. So that then, if the United States possessed no vessel of the line, she could blockade from 30 to 60 places. If the United States were in possession of 4 sail of the line, she could not blockade more than 15 places, if they possessed be tween 20 and 30 sail of the line, she could not blockade more than 2 or 3 places; if they possessed from 60 to 100 sail of the line, they could effectually protect the coast against any naval force England could keep on it. Therefore, from 60 to 100 sail of the line might be considered as an efficient naval establishment, fully to protect the coasts of the United States against every exertion of the British navy, if England were at peace with every other nation but the United States.